
wsst 



m 



H 



Hi 



mm 
n 



■ 

■ 

— W 

HHHHj 



mm 

wbhBB 
■■H 

93&I 



BBfU... 




1° ^v> *SBm % 



v , o - • , ^ n .<y ,\ . . „ "V * t « ■ a ♦ "**o 






<•• 



<*> . - " . <s> c? , o " ° ♦ % 



Al- 






& 






A 



4 O 
•a? ^ 






Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/foundingofromaneOOmars 




UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS STUDIES 



THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 



BY 



FRANK BURR MARSH, Ph.D. 

Adjunct Professor of Ancient History in the University of Texas 




PUBLISHED BY 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 



University of Texas Press 
1922 






Copyright, 1922 

By 

The University of Texas 



DEC -1*22 

CU690457 



PREFACE 



The first chapter of this work was originally read as a 
paper before the American Historical Association and was 
published in their proceedings for 1913. It has, however, 
been extensively revised and in part rewritten. 

The general purpose of the work will, I hope, be suf- 
ficiently clear, but there are one or two matters to which it 
might be well to call attention. My quotations from Cicero's 
letters are all taken from Shuckburgh's translation. Not 
only is this version the work of an eminent scholar, but it 
seems to me especially excellent for the manner in which 
it has reproduced in English the style and flavor of Cicero's 
Latin. A few experiments convinced me that I could not 
improve on Shuckburgh's rendering, and I have therefore 
been content to adopt it. Needless to say, I have carefully 
compared the translation with the original text and In a 
few cases I have ventured to differ from Shuckburgh and 
to modify his rendering of the passage in question. Where 
such changes have been made, I have called attention to it 
in the notes, except in one or two cases where the alterations 
were very slight and trivial, or such as will necessarily arise 
in quotation. There are one or two other cases where I have 
quoted from modern translations for special reasons. For 
example, in the quotation from Hirtius on the siege of 
Uxellodunum I have taken the English version of Edwards 
because he holds the same view as to the date intended as 
Holmes, from which view I am inclined to dissent. 

There are a number of disputed points where I have ad- 
hered to the conventional view without comment. Thus, 
for example, Boak has recently argued (in the American 
Historical Review for 1918) that after the time of Sulla 
the senate assumed the right to confer the imperium. I find 
myself unable to accept this view, and I note that its author 
has himself abandoned one of his supposed instances in the 



History of Rome which ho has just published. If any such 
power was claimed by the senate no attempt was made to 
use it against Caesar. In connection with the proconsular 
impcrium o( Augustus I have taken account of the views 
advanced by IVlham (in his Assays o)i Roman History), 
but the criticism o( Hardy (in his Roman Studies) seems 
to me io leave the question very much .s-^/> jud%C9 t to say the 
least, and it has appeared safer to adhere to the commonly 
received interpretation. Should either the views of l>oak 
or Pelham be accepted it would require only slight verbal 
changes in the text. I am also aware that doubts have been 
raised as to the province assigned to Caesar by the senate 
before his election as consul, but they do not appear to me 
to be o( sufficient weight to justify an amendment to the 
text o( Suetonius. 

It remains only to acknowledge my indebtedness to several 
o\ my colleagues. I have to thank Professors Barker, Pun- 
calf, and Hat tie o( this University for their kindness in 
reading my manuscript and for valuable suggestions. I am 
especially under obligation to Dr. 1\ M. Ratchelder of the 
Mathematics Department for very valuable assistance in 
preparing the manuscript for the press and in reading the 
proof. 

Frank Burr marsh. 

Austin, Texas. May 1. liVj-j. 



VI 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Chapter I. The Adminiatrathre Ptohlem of the Republic... 3 

Chapter II. The Development of the Military System 23 

Chapter III. The Supremacy of Pompey 52 

Chapter IV. The First Triumvirate 84 

Chapter V. Caesar l20 

Chapter VI. The Destruction of the Republican* 164 

Chapter VII. The Triumph of Octavian 192 

Chapter VIII. The Restoration of the Republic 219 

Chapter IX. The Transformation of the Principate 237 

Appendix. 

The Lex Vatinia 271 

The l>x Pompeia-Licima * ,v 

Chronological List of Consuls 2<n 

List of Consulars Active in the Imperial Service 294 

Analysis of the Consular Fasti 297 

Alphabetical List of Consuls 305 

List of Books Referred to in the Notes 314 

T . 319 

Index 



VII 



CHAPTER I 

The Administrative Problem of the Republic 

No part of Ancient History has possessed greater fascin- 
ation for the imagination than the story of the rise of the 
Roman republic from an insignificant town of Latium to a 
position of world empire and the destruction of the civil lib- 
erty of the Romans in the moment of their triumph. That 
the two things were intimately connected is obvious upon 
the surface, and historians have agreed that it was Rome's 
conquest of the Mediterranean world that proved fatal to 
republican institutions. Two main explanations have been 
advanced of why this should have been the case. One of 
these is that, assailed by the new temptations which the em- 
pire brought with it, the Romans themselves deteriorated 
in character ; the other is that, having begun her career as a 
city-state, Rome found her machinery of government inad- 
equate to perform the work which world dominion imposed 
upon her. Both these explanations are quite obviously true 
and quite as obviously insufficient. The corruption and de- 
generacy of a people do not always lead to a change of 
government, and it should be shown why it did so in this 
instance. That a city-state could not govern an empire may 
be true, but it leaves open the question as to precisely why 
it could not. In what particular respects was the Roman 
republic unequal to its task? Just where and why did the 
machine break down? When the government did finally 
collapse why did not the entire fabric go to pieces? If the 
degeneracy of the Roman people will explain the fall of the 
republic, how shall we account for the fact that this same 
people continued to rule the world ? How did it happen that 
the Roman world emerged from the chaos of the civil wars, 
transformed indeed into an empire, but still Roman as dom- 
inantly as before? By what steps had the empire been de- 
veloped out of the republican machine? — for it is surely 
incredible that it had no more solid foundation than the 
astute hypocrisy of Augustus. A survey of the last century 



4 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

of the republic, even if only in brief outline, ought to pro- 
vide some definite answer to such questions, and such a sur- 
vey is the purpose of the present work. Its object will, 
therefore, be to show in some detail just how and why the 
republic failed and fell and in what way the empire was 
gradually evolved to meet the imperative needs which the 
old system could no longer satisfy. 

It was not entirely because the Roman state was munic- 
ipal in its origin that it proved unequal to the task of gov- 
erning a widely extended empire; the peculiar character 
of the Roman constitution had much to do with its failure. 
The Roman republic possessed a very intricate and deli- 
cately adjusted organization wherein each part was fitted 
to every other, and this complexity was one of the causes 
which led to the breakdown of the machine. With the very 
beginning of Rome's extra-Italian conquests the difficulty 
began. The problem which the administration of the prov- 
inces presented exercised a marked influence on the foreign 
policy of the republic — an influence generally ignored, but 
one which will repay a brief consideration. This is the more 
true because the problem, in one shape or another, lasted 
throughout the last century of the republic and exerted a 
transforming influence upon the institutions of the early 
empire. It will be well, therefore, at the start to see 
clearly the precise nature of this administrative problem 
for which the statesmen of the day were striving to find a 
satisfactory solution. 

A glance at the history of the growth of Rome's imperial 
power will at once reveal some curious features which would 
seem to call for explanation. The first of these is the inter- 
mittent character of Roman expansion. In a relatively 
short space of time Rome annexed several provinces, and 
then for a number of years no additions were made to her 
empire. A brief table will perhaps make this clearer. 
From 241 to 197 B.C., a period of forty-four years, Rome 
annexed four provinces. Then from 197 to 146 B.C., a 
period of fifty-one years, no new territories were acquired. 
From 146 to 121 B.C., a period of twenty-five years, four 
more provinces were annexed. Then from 121 to 63 B.C., 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 5 

a period of fifty-eight years, there was no further increase 
of the Roman dominions. Thus it will be seen that the 
Roman empire expanded rapidly for forty-four years, then 
stood still for fifty-one years, then advanced again for 
twenty-five years, then remained stationary for fifty-eight 
years. 

A second peculiarity is that in the periods of rest, if they 
may be so termed, the republic not only did not annex new 
provinces but strove earnestly to avoid doing so. It is not 
that opportunities were lacking but that Rome refused to 
take advantage of them. One or two illustrations will suf- 
fice to make this evident. As has been said above, in the 
fifty-one years between 197 and 146 Rome acquired no new 
territory. Yet, during this time, Rome carried on several 
important and successful wars. From 200 to 196 she was 
engaged in the Second Macedonian War, the result of which 
was to place Greece and Macedon completely at her mercy. 
On this occasion Rome contented herself with curtailing 
the power of Macedon and withdrew her forces. Hardly 
had the Roman legions departed than in 192 Antiochus of 
Syria invaded Greece, and Rome was forced into a, war 
with him. The result of that war was to leave Rome mis- 
tress of Greece and Asia Minor. Instead of using her op- 
portunity, she gave up her conquests and withdrew her 
forces without adding even a single district to her empire. 
In 171 Perseus, king of Macedon, began a war of revenge 
on Rome. He was crushed at the battle of Pydna in 168 
and his kingdom lay helpless at the feet of the conqueror. 
Instead of annexing Macedon, Rome contented herself with 
abolishing the Macedonian monarchy, divided the country 
into four republics, and retired across the seas. Nineteen 
years after Pydna, the Macedonians revolted under a pre- 
tender and this time Rome finally yielded to the inevitable, 
and there being no other way of keeping Macedon quiet, 
she annexed it as a province at the beginning of the second 
period of expansion. 

Another instance of this same aversion to conquest is 
furnished by the province of Narbonensis, or Transalpine 
Gaul. After Rome had acquired possessions in Spain it 



X 



6 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

was, as historians have often pointed out, inevitable that 
she should seek to gain a land connection between Italy 
and Spain. In ancient times the Mediterranean could only 
be navigated at certain seasons and it would thus be unsafe 
for Rome to rely wholly on the sea for her communications 
with the Spanish provinces. All modern historians have 
felt the force of these considerations. What has not been 
explained is why Rome remained blind to them for seventy- 
six years. This, however, seems clearly a part of the gen- 
eral anti-expansionist policy which prevailed from 197 to 
146. As soon as a forward policy was resumed Trans- 
alpine Gaul was promptly annexed and land communica- 
tion with Spain assured. 

As has been pointed out, this second period of expansion 
lasted for twenty-five years and came to art end in 121 B.C. 
Of Roman policy after this time Professor Tenny Frank 
has admirably said : "A careful examination of the behavior 
of the home government . . . reveals the significant 
fact that a complete indifference to expansion, at times 
verging upon a positive aversion, existed at Rome. The 
Asiatic province and Cyrene constitute the only consid- 
erable territorial additions, and these were gifts, accepted 
in both cases with certain restrictions. In Africa, Gaul, 
and Cilicia, Rome took charge of the least rather than the 
largest possible portion of territory at her disposal. The 
senate was, of course, the center of the anti-imperialistic 
sentiment, discouraged, it would seem, by its experiences 
in Spain, and wholly out of sympathy with the military de- 
velopments necessitated by foreign possessions." 1 The facts 
here stated are entirely correct, but the explanation of the 
senate's attitude seems hardly adequate. Another explan- 
ation that has been offered of this attitude is that the senate 
was jealous of the power of the governors of the provinces 



a Frank, Roman Imperialism, 274. Of the two provinces here mentioned the an- 
nexation of Asia really dates from the preceding period since it was then that the 
first steps were taken for making it a Roman dependency; the other, Cyrene, seems 
not to have been administered as a separate province for a considerable time. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 7 

and found them difficult to control. 2 This motive was doubt- 
less present, yet it can hardly be the whole explanation, 
since this motive would be likely to be felt as strongly at 
one time as at another, while the opposition of the senate 
to new annexations is clearly greater at certain periods 
than at others. Why should the senate have been more re- 
luctant to extend the territories of the republic before 146 
B.C. than after that year? 

If we turn, however, to the constitutional problem which 
the administration of provinces presented to the Romans, 
an explanation is readily forthcoming. Previous to 146 
this problem involved greater difficulty than it did after that 
date, owing to certain new developments in constitutional 
usage. This explanation, moreover, will apply equally at 
another point. The growth of the empire was again ar- 
rested in 121 B.C., but it so happens that the administrative 
problem had again become difficult of solution at about that 
time. 

The key to the senate's attitude may, perhaps, be found 
in its composition and its position in the Roman state. In 
early times the duty of making out the list of the 300 sena- 
tors had been intrusted to the censors. Very soon, how- 
ever, their freedom of choice began to be limited by custom, 
if not by law. Certain persons — namely the ex-magistrates 
— came to be regarded as having a moral, if not a legal, 
right to be placed upon the roll. This right seems to have 
been established by the Ovinian law, which probably di- 
rected the censors to fill the vacancies in the senate by des- 
ignating the most worthy of the ex-magistrates, including 
the tribunes and quaestors. 3 The number of these last two 



z For example Heitland (The Roman Republic, ii, 187-88) says: "That the senate 
was anything but eager to annex provinces is clear enough, and was no doubt 
mainly due to the known difficulty of controlling distant governors." He also points 
out some other considerations such as the influence of the "old Roman" party and 
the wealth or poverty of the province in question, but he seems to regard the reason 
quoted as the chief cause of the senate's attitude. Mommsen has also emphasized 
the fear of the vast power which must have been intrusted to the governor as the 
reason for the refusal of the senate to accept the gift of Egypt under the will of 
one of the last Ptolemies. History of Rome, iv, 319. 

3 The exact provisions of the Ovinian law have been disputed. The arguments in 
favor of the view taken in the text are very strong and are fully set forth in 
Willems, Le senat de la republique romaine, i, 153-73. 



8 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

classes must have been more than sufficient for the purpose, 
so that under ordinary circumstances the censors would 
have little, if any, opportunity to go outside their ranks. 
Whatever the provisions of the Ovinian law, the account 
which Livy gives of the filling up of the senate after the 
disastrous battle of Cannae strongly suggests that by 216 
B.C. the rule was clearly established in practice that the ex- 
tribunes and ex-quaestors should be preferred to citizens 
who had not held office. 

When the problem of administering dependencies first 
presented itself it was comparatively easy of solution. The 
earliest provinces acquired by the Roman people were Sar- 
dinia and Sicily, which were taken from Carthage at the 
end of the First Punic War primarily for the purpose of 
keeping her at a safe distance from southern Italy and se- 
curing the safety and control of the Italian seas. Having 
annexed them, Rome was obliged to provide in some fashion 
for their government. A brief experience sufficed to con- 
vince the Romans that the tranquility and safety of these 
islands required the presence in them of a Roman governor 
armed with the imperium, 41 that is one of the higher Roman 
magistrates. But all the magistrates were then fully oc- 
cupied in Italy, and Rome had none to spare for her extra- 
Italian possessions. Under these circumstances the obvious 
course to follow was to increase the number of magistrates 
with the imperium and send the newly created ones across 
the seas. As it was out of the question to increase the num- 
ber of the consuls, the praetors were selected for this pur- 
pose and their number was raised from two to four. At 
the same time, as it was customary for a magistrate holding 
an independent command to be accompanied by a quaestor, 
the number of the quaestors was increased to meet the new 
demands. This successfully solved the problem for the 



*The term imperium signified the power of command. It was applied to the sum 
total of the powers conferred upon the higher magistrates. The Roman made no 
clear distinction between civil and military, executive and judicial functions, but 
included them all in the one term. In a broad sense the imperium thus meant 
the power of governing and whoever had received it from the people could act as 
an executive magistrate, sit as a judge, or command an army The only regular 
magistrates possessing the imperium were the consuls and praetors. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 9 

time being, and when, at the close of the Second Punic War, 
Rome annexed two new provinces in Spain, the same method 
was again resorted to in order to secure governors. The 
number of the praetors was now raised to six and that of 
the quaestors to twelve. At this point, however, a halt was 
called and for the next 51 years a steadily anti-expansionist 
policy was followed by the senate. One reason for this 
must certainly be found in the fact that there existed defi- 
nite obstacles to any further increase in the number of the 
magistrates, and hence that it was difficult, or impossible, 
to administer more territory. The precise nature of these 
obstacles will repay a brief consideration. 

During the period of Roman history that closed in 197 
B.C. two important developments had been taking place. 
In the holding of the offices a definite sequence had been 
gradually established by which it was customary to hold the 
quaestorship before the praetorship and the praetorship be- 
fore the consulship. The quaestorship had thus been made 
the first step in a Roman's official career, even the tribunes 
being usually ex-quaestors. While this was happening there 
had been another development of great importance going 
on. Little by little a new aristocracy was taking shape and 
was becoming all the time more and more clearly defined 
and more and more powerful. From the earliest days of 
Rome there had been a close association between nobility 
and the holding of office. One of the outstanding marks of 
the old patrician aristocracy had been their monopoly of 
office. When the long conflict between the patricians and 
the plebeians had at last ended in the victory of the people 
and the magistracies had been thrown open to all the citi- 
zens, much of the old feeling still remained. Thus it speed- 
ily happened that those plebeian families whose members 
had been elected to office by their fellow citizens began to 
take their place side by side with the old patrician families 
to form a new nobility. As early as 217 B.C. one of the 
tribunes had denounced this tendency, saying that the new 
plebeian nobles had begun to despise the people the moment 
they had ceased to be despised by the patricians. The denun- 
ciation was without effect and the new nobility continued 



10 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

to develop without check. This new aristocracy was com- 
posed of all those families which had attained to any of 
the curule offices. 5 As the holding of these offices thus came 
to confer distinction, not only on the man who held them 
but on his descendants as well, it was entirely natural that 
the families so ennobled should feel themselves a class apart 
and should exert themselves to keep the offices in the hands 
of members of their class as far as possible. Such an at- 
tempt coincided far too well with the aristocratic and con- 
servative temper of the Roman people not to meet with a 
large measure of success, and the outstanding fact about the 
Roman republic, from the end of the Great Wars on, is the 
contrast between its theoretical and its actual government. 
In point of law, the republic was a democracy and its offices 
open to all citizens without distinction of birth, while in 
point of fact, they were almost entirely monopolized by a 
ring of noble families. After 197 B.C. it may reasonably 
be assumed that this nobility was so far developed and had 
become sufficiently class-conscious to begin to view the broad 
problems of Roman policy from the standpoint of aristo- 
cratic interests. 

It is evident that a nobility like that of Rome could not 
regard with indifference an indefinite increase in the num- 
ber of the offices. If this were permitted a point must ulti- 
mately be reached when the number would become too great 
for the existing aristocracy to fill, and since the holding of 
the higher offices conferred nobility, an undue increase in 
their number was equivalent to a creation of peers. An 
aristocracy tends naturally to exclusiveness ; the English 
House of Lords has twice stooped to profound humiliation 
to avoid the cheapening of their rank that must come with a 
large addition to their number. A similar attitude on the 
part of the Roman nobles might safely be inferred. It 
would mean, in point of fact, that they would seek to check 
the increase in the number of the offices as soon as this 



5 The curule offices were the consulship, praetorship, and two of the four aedile- 
ships. Of the aediles two were known as curule aediles and the other two as 
plebeian aediles. The curule offices were those which had once been exclusively 
patrician and were distinguished by certain special marks and privileges. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 11 

threatened to bring about any considerable augmentation 
of their class. By 197 this point had actually been reached, 
and it is consequently at that time that the increase in the 
number of the magistrates was checked. But if this were 
done it was evident that the state could not be permitted 
to assume new administrative responsibilities, and thus the 
Roman nobility was forced to adopt an anti-expansionist 
policy abroad as a necessary means of securing its exclusive- 
ness at home. 

So satisfactory was the existing system to the nobility 
that they prevented any alteration in the number of the 
magistrates for over a century and contented themselves 
with strengthening those features of it which worked most 
directly to their advantage. In regard to the magistrates 
a brief consideration will suffice to show that any change 
must have been to the disadvantage of the aristocracy. 
There were during this time 6 praetors and 12 quaestors. 
Custom, if not positive law, had imposed the rule that the 
quaestorship should be the necessary preliminary to all 
other offices — even in most cases, to the tribuneship. In 
the case of this last office the quaestorship seems never to 
have been required, but it was very generally held and it is 
probable that few of the tribunes who had not held it were 
admitted to the senate. More and more the quaestorship 
became the path that led, not only to all the higher offices, 
but to the senate as well. As the traditional number of the 
senate was fixed at 300 it would seem that the number of 12 
quaestors a year would somewhat more than suffice to fill 
its ranks. 6 It was quite clearly to the interest of the nobles 



6 Willems (i, 161-164 and 404-406) has attempted to fix the average duration of life 
of the ex-quaestors and has estimated it at 30 years or slightly less. The size of the 
senate as reorganized by Sulla was certainly between 500 and 600, which, based as it 
was on 20 quaestors a year would give the average life at from 25 to 30 years. 
On the basis of 25 years 12 quaestors a year would give 300, while with 30 years the 
number would be 360. Before the last increase in the number of the quaestors they 
probably numbered 10, which, on the basis of 30 years average life, would give 300. 
It may not be unreasonable to infer that very probably before this last increase the 
quaestors were not quite numerous enough to fill the vacancies in the senate and that 
after the increase the number was slightly larger than was required. The nobility, 
in that case, would seem to have stopped the increase as soon as the number became 
obviously too large to serve their purpose and this was, perhaps, as soon as the 
position of the nobility became sufficiently strong and well defined to enable them 
to act successfully. 



12 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

to maintain this office as an indispensable first step in an 
official career and not to permit an undue increase in its 
numbers. It must have served as an excellent means of 
preserving the supremacy of the aristocracy at once in the 
magistracies and in the senate. It was almost always held 
at an early age, at 30 or thereabouts, and under the condi- 
tions of Roman public life so young a man had rarely been 
given any opportunity to impress his personality on the 
voters, unless, perhaps, in the law courts. In general the 
candidates for the office would be comparatively unknown 
men and the nobles would have little difficulty in securing 
the return of the members of their families who might 
stand. Now and then a new man might be chosen, but the 
Roman voter called on to decide between two candidates who 
were both personally but little known to him would nearly 
always vote for the one who bore an historic name. The 
quaestorship could thus be made to serve the purpose of the 
aristocracy if the senate and the higher magistracies were 
made to depend upon it. The greater the number of the 
quaestors in proportion to the number of the noble families 
the less efficiently it could be employed in this way. The 
stationary number of the quaestors seems therefore readily 
intelligible. To increase the number would simply have 
meant admitting so many more inconvenient rivals for the 
higher offices from outside their ranks. 

The objections to any change in the number of the prae- 
tors are even more obvious. The holding of this office in 
itself conferred nobility and 6 was quite as large a number 
as the aristocracy desired to have. It was, indeed, upon this 
office that the size of the nobility ultimately depended. It is 
true that both the consulship and the curule aedileship en- 
nobled their holders, but the praetorship invariably preceded 
the one and almost invariably followed the other. In the 
earlier days of the repulic this had not been true. In former 
times there had been but two consuls, two praetors, and two 
curule aediles, so that at this period the offices must have 
been held more or less independently of each other. There 
were therefore at first six offices which conferred noble rank. 
It may be only a coincidence, but it is, at least, suggestive 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 13 

that the Roman aristocracy stopped the increase in the num- 
ber of the praetors at precisely this same number. It would 
seem that they had no great objection to the increase so long 
as it kept within the limits of the already existing noble fam- 
ilies. When that point had been reached and any further in- 
crease must have resulted in the creation of more noble fam- 
ilies, a halt was promptly called. Yet if new provinces were 
to be governed it was necessary to increase the number of 
the praetors. Experience had clearly shown that the govern- 
ors must possess the imperium which meant that they must 
be either praetors or consuls. Their class interests as an 
aristocracy therefore impelled the Roman nobles to set them- 
selves against imperialism and foreign conquest. 7 

The only solution of the difficulty that would permit of 
new annexations was to create a new office which should not 
confer nobility, or a seat in the senate, and use this new mag- 
istracy for the government of the provinces. This would 
have meant the direct election of the provincial governors 
in the assembly, since only the people could confer the 
imperium. This plan, which would seem so obvious and 
natural to a modern mind, was open to grave objections 
from the standpoint of the senate and of the nobility who 
used that body as an instrument of government. 

In the first place, a large part of the power and influence 
of the senate sprang directly from the fact that it concen- 
trated in itself the whole official experience of the Roman 
world. Consuls and praetors must inevitably treat with 
respect the deliberate judgment of a body in which sat every 
Roman who had led an army or governed a province. Once 
let official knowledge and experience accumulate outside the 
senate and much of its influence would be gone. This was 

7 In a recent volume by Ferrero this point is stated in general terms but with great 
clearness. On a aujourd'hui de la peine a comprendre pourquoi Rome, mime 
a I'apogee de sa puissance, hesita si souvent a itendre ses conquetes et a agrandir 
son Empire. Mais une aristocratie est un corps fermS, qui ne s'improvise ni ne se 
diveloppe a volonte comme peut s'improviser et se developper une bureaucratie 
recrutee dans toutes les classes et dans toutes les nations; c'est pourquoi Rome dut 
veiller toujours a ne pas Uendre I'Empire de telle sorte que le nombre d'administra- 
teurs et d' off icier s superieura que pouvait fournir son aristocratie devint insuffisant; 
et c'est egalement pourquoi elle s'efforga toujours d'administrer I'Empire avec le 
moins de fonctionnaires possible. Ferrero, La ruine de la civilisation antique, 120-21. 



14 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

a consideration absolutely vital to a body which, like the 
senate, ruled far more by influence than by legal right. 

Indirectly, too, such a proposal would have been injurious 
to the nobles. In the Roman mind there was a very close 
association between the magistrates, the senate, and the no- 
bility. Office-holding and a seat in the senate were among 
the badges of the noble. Once create important offices which 
did not confer nobility or a senatorship and there was bound 
to arise a new order to rival the existing nobles. Such a 
development could not but appear dangerous to those nobles 
and could not be expected to find favor at their hands. 

Still further, a considerable part of the senate's control 
over the provincial governors lay in the fact that they were 
ipso facto senators, and the opinion of their order, spoken 
through that body of which they were themselves a part, 
could not but weigh heavily with them. Break this connec- 
tion, let the people name governors who had no direct in- 
terest in the supremacy of the senate, and a blow would 
be struck at its power. If the senate already found its 
control over the provinces too weak, it would not be likely 
to consent to a change which would have weakened it still 
more. 

Hence, from whatever side the problem of providing more 
governors for new provinces might be approached, it was 
impossible of any solution agreeable to the nobles. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the senate, which was dom- 
inated by the aristocracy, took the stand that there should 
be no new provinces to require governors, and that it di- 
rected the foreign policy of Rome with that end in view. 
The senate permitted the extension of the empire as long as 
the existing system could be so expanded as to meet the ur- 
gent needs of government. When that point was reached 
and when any new annexations would require extensive re- 
adjustments, the senate called a halt. 

Yet, although the expansion of Rome could be, and was, 
stopped for some fifty years, the existing system could not 
be made permanent. On the one hand, new annexations 
could not be forever avoided, and on the other, the system 
broke down from within. 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 15 

The growth of judicial business at Rome ended by de- 
manding the retention there of more than two praetors, 
especially after the establishment of the standing court 
de repetundis in 148 B.C.; and the senate's Macedonian 
policy having ended in utter failure, that turbulent country 
was finally annexed at the same time that the destruction 
of Carthage placed Africa in Roman hands. Thus the num- 
ber of the provinces was increased to six, while but three 
praetors were available as governors. Faced by this situa- 
tion, the senate threw the system of governing by praetors 
overboard and worked out a new plan. This was rendered 
possible by a new and most significant development in the 
Roman constitution, namely, the rise of the promagistracy. 

The origin of this new institution was simple. In the 
early days of the republic, when the number of the magis- 
trates with the imperium was very restricted, the state oc- 
casionally needed a larger number than was regularly pro- 
vided. Under these circumstances the imperium of some 
one of the magistrates who were about to quit office was 
prolonged and he continued to exercise his powers after he 
had laid down his magistracy. As he was no longer consul 
or praetor, as the case might be, but was yet exercising the 
powers of that office, he was said to be acting pro praetore 
or pro consule, that is, in place of a praetor or a consul. 
The right to prolong the imperium in this fashion belonged 
at first to the people in their assembly, but during the period 
of the Great Wars the senate assumed it, as it assumed so 
many other powers of government. 

The convenience, and even the necessity, of this power 
for the conscript fathers in arranging for the administra- 
tion of the provinces was obvious from the start. Indeed, 
without it the government could not have been carried on. 
The Roman republic was equipped with only eight magis- 
trates with the imperium — the two consuls and the six prae- 
tors. Normally two praetors were kept in Rome and four 
sent to the four provinces then existing. But it often hap- 
pened that a magistrate with the imperium was impera- 
tively needed somewhere else. In this case the senate dis- 
patched one of the praetors and to replace him left one of 



16 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the provincial governors in office for a second year as a 
propraetor. This usage was the easier to establish as it 
was a regular rule of the constitution that a governor con- 
tinued in office till his successor arrived to take over the 
government. Now, as each year the senate settled what 
provinces should be distributed by lot among the praetors, 
if they failed to designate one of the four regular provinces 
for this purpose, the praetor there in charge could not be 
superseded for another year. 

Thus the power which the senate had assumed of contin- 
uing in office at its discretion a consul or a praetor beyond 
his regular term supplied the element of elasticity required 
to make the rigid system workable. Since it was clearly a 
necessity, no serious objection seems to have been made to 
this assumption of power on the senate's part. Once estab- 
lished as a legitimate part of the machinery of government 
to meet exceptional emergencies it came to be employed with 
increasing frequency. The more the steadily growing needs 
of the Roman state pressed upon the heavily burdened reg- 
ular magistrates, the greater the temptation to relieve the 
pressure by making use of the promagistracy. 

By the year 146 B.C. the promagistrate had come to 
be a frequent visitor in the Roman government. But up 
to that time he had always remained a visitor. That is, the 
use of a proconsul or propraetor had been looked upon as 
something exceptional — a temporary expedient to meet an 
unusual situation. About 146 the senate solved the problem 
of governing the increased number of provinces by turning 
the exception into the rule. Henceforth the promagistracy, 
instead of being a special device intended to meet an emer- 
gency, was a regular part of the ordinary constitution, and 
the provinces were governed not by magistrates but by pro- 
magistrates. The new system was not, of course, intro- 
duced abruptly, nor was the old system given up at once. 
What happened was that after 146 the magistrate became 
rarer in the provinces and the promagistrate more frequent. 
We now begin to meet with instances of a praetor who had 
served his year of office in Rome being sent out as a pro- 
vincial governor in the following year. Those praetors who 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 17 

had gone directly to a province were more and more often 
left there for a second year. It is, however, likely that the 
new system of using the promagistrate as a governor did 
not become a matter of ordinary administrative routine 
until the time of Sulla. 8 

This new method of administering the provinces had, from 
some standpoints, little to recommend it. It made directly 
for poor administration and this for a very simple reason. 
If a man is elected to fill a given office he can be chosen with 
some reference to his fitness for that office. But if he is 
elected to fill one position, and when his term is over, is then 
sent to fill some other and quite different one, this becomes 
impossible. Every year the Roman people elected praetors 
to serve as judges in Rome; when their year of judicial 
service there expired, the senate shipped them off to gov- 
ern provinces and command armies. They were necessarily 
chosen with but the very slightest reference to their qualifi- 
cations for these new duties. Of course some of them, like 
Julius Caesar, were men of so versatile a genius that they 
could do almost anything and do it well ; but such men were 
rare, and it inevitably happened that a very large number 
were ill-adapted to the posts which the fortunes of the lot 
assigned to them. As a result the provincial administration 
suffered and Rome suffered in consequence. 

Yet, whatever the demerits of the system from the stand- 
point of political science, from that of the nobles it had 
signal advantages. It solved all the problems of adminis- 
tration and solved them in a way entirely agreeable to the 
senate. Its advantages may be summed up as four in num- 
ber. It enabled the senate to relieve the congestion of busi- 
ness at Rome by keeping most of the six praetors there dur- 
ing their term of office. At the same time it furnished 
enough governors to meet the increased demands, as all six, 
together with the two outgoing consuls, were available for 
provincial governorships. It did both these things without 
increasing the number of the magistrates, and hence of the 
nobles, and in the fourth place, it did so without disturbing 
any of the existing rules and regulations. 

8 For a discussion of this point see Willems, ii, 566-67. 



18 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

The year 146 B.C. may be taken, then, as marking the be- 
ginning of a new form of provincial administration. Hence- 
forth the consuls and praetors were to serve their year of 
office in Italy, and when that was over, were to go out for a 
second year as proconsuls and propraetors to govern the 
provinces. But the year is significant for another reason. 
It marks the beginning of a second period of expansion, and 
this, in part at least, because of the new system. If we have 
been justified in concluding that from 197 to 146 B.C. the 
senate was seriously opposed to annexing new provinces be- 
cause it had no governors to put in charge, after 146 this 
reason ceased to apply. While, under the old system, the 
senate had at most only four praetors to send out as govern- 
ors, under the new there were at least eight promagistrates 
available for service. As after 146 there were only six 
provinces the senate had no longer the same motive for re- 
sisting expansion. Yet the expansion which was possible 
under the new arrangement was distinctly limited. The 
new system would provide for the government of eight prov- 
inces, and then a halt must be called or the system would 
break down. 

Yet the new limit of growth imposed by the number of 
available governors was not quite so rigid as in the case of 
the former system. The same power which extended the 
imperium of a magistrate for one year could as easily ex- 
tend it again. If some of the governors were allowed to 
serve for two years in their province instead of one, a num- 
ber of provinces somewhat in excess of eight could be pro- 
vided for. Yet such an extension of the governor's term 
must have appeared, from the senate's standpoint, to involve 
some danger. Two years' service in a province might give 
time for a bad or incompetent governor to do serious mis- 
chief and for an able one to become unduly strong. In a 
single year a governor could hardly inaugurate and carry 
far a policy contrary to the wishes of the senate, whereas 
in two he would be in a far more independent position and 
might irrevocably commit the state. Moreover, it tended 
directly to make the governor less responsible for his 
actions. It was an established principle of the republican 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 19 

constitution that a magistrate could not be called to answer 
for his conduct while he remained in office. It was, there- 
fore, a sound constitutional principle which insisted upon 
an interval between offices so that the magistrate should 
become again a private citizen, and as such liable to pros- 
ecution for any illegal acts. To secure this the rule had 
grown up that two years must elapse before a man who had 
held one office should be eligible for another. If he were 
allowed to spend both years as the governor of a province 
this rule would be practically annulled. A month or two 
spent in Rome in the canvass for the next office would not 
be sufficient, since his province was at a considerable dis- 
tance from the city and it would, therefore, require some 
time to collect the evidence and forward it to Rome. This 
work, moreover, could rarely be begun until the governor 
had left the province and consequently, unless he remained 
in private life for a considerable time, it would in most 
cases be impossible to bring him to trial for anything he 
might have done. If the governor remained only one year 
in his province ample time would be secured for any prose- 
cution, but, if he were allowed to stay for a second year, 
this became very doubtful. 

From these considerations it will appear that, while the 
senate might have no grave objection to an increase in the 
number of the provinces to eight, it would be unwilling to 
see the number increase much beyond that point. What- 
ever its motive may have been, this was actually its policy. 
Though not exactly imperialistic, the conscript fathers of- 
fered little opposition to expansion between 146 and 121 
B.C. During these years, besides the two provinces of Mace- 
don and Africa, annexed at the beginning of the period, 
two other provinces, Asia and Transalpine Gaul, were 
acquired. At this point the limits of the new system had 
been reached, and from this time on the senate was again 
strongly opposed to expansion. That body had offered 
little opposition when Asia was annexed under the will of 
Attalus of Pergamum, but it promptly rejected Egypt when 
it was offered them under the will of Ptolemy Alexander. 



x, 



20 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

For the fifty-eight years following the annexation of Trans- 
alpine Gaul the growth of the empire was practically ar- 
rested. Indeed, if the existing system was to be main- 
tained, the senate had little choice, since it had at its dis- 
posal only eight governors. Yet situations continually arose 
to call for one or more of these in places which did not 
normally require a resident governor. When this happened 
some of the governors had to be given a second year in their 
provinces, and if this practice were once allowed to spread 
and to become the regular usage of the constitution, serious 
consequences might follow. In fact, the number of the 
provinces already amounted to ten. Neither Cisalpine Gaul 
nor Cilicia seems to have been regarded at first as among 
the regular provinces, yet they ended by making themselves 
such. A word concerning them may not be out of place. 
The conquest of Cisalpine Gaul was a long and gradual 
process. It was begun as far back as 200 B.C., but the 
Gauls offered a prolonged though somewhat intermittent 
resistance. The surviving books of Livy furnish fairly 
complete information as to the regular annual assignments 
of provinces from 198 to 167 B.C. The regular method at 
that time of governing a province was by a praetor, yet 
during these thirty-one years praetors were sent to Gaul 
only five times, with three years for which Livy gives us no 
information. On seven occasions consuls were dispatched 
to Gaul, so that in all there were not more than twelve or 
fifteen years during which a regular magistrate was sta- 
tioned in the province. The inference from this would 
seem to be clear. When Gaul was quiet it was not thought 
to require a special governor, and when it was turbulent 
a praetor or consul was sent to deal with it. This was prob- 
ably rendered easier by the troubles in Liguria, which called 
for the presence in the north of Italy of one or both of the 
consuls with a good deal of regularity. If there was a 
consul in Liguria, he could doubtless keep an eye on the 
Po valley and see that all went well. This was the case in 
eight years at least when no magistrate was sent to Gaul it- 
self. Thus we may reasonably doubt whether the senate 
viewed the Cisalpine province as a regular charge on its 
supply of governors. This seems the more reasonable as the 



THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 21 

Romans planted numerous colonies in the Po valley, some- 
thing not done in any of the other provinces. 

The province of Cilicia presents a somewhat similar case. 
In 103 B.C. the Romans established a military post in this 
region. It may well be doubted if they had at that time 
any idea of acquiring a province, since the territory was 
very restricted in extent. Yet here, too, it gradually be- 
came evident that conditions were such as to make the 
presence of a governor necessary during the greater part of 
the time. 

If Cisalpine Gaul and Cilicia were made part of the reg- 
ular provincial empire, the limits of the promagistracy were 
already exceeded. This difficulty was removed by Sulla, 
who, during his dictatorship, increased the number of prae- 
tors to eight, thus making the number of promagistrates 
available each year balance the number of the provinces. 
This policy of increasing the number of the magistrates 
was possible to Sulla since, in the first place, he was clothed 
with irresistible power, and in the second, because, disre- 
garding the feelings of the nobility, he created peers whole- 
sale by increasing the size of the senate. 

In spite of Sulla's masterful recasting of the republican 
constitution the same problems continued to confront it. 
The whole policy of the senate, as he reorganized it, was 
anti-expansionist. No doubt the career of Sulla himself 
had made the senate more suspicious than ever of the mili- 
tary power, but the old motives had by no means disap- 
peared. The state had no more governors available to send 
out to new provinces, and hence the senate was resolved not - 
to assume new burdens. Yet in spite of the senate's re- 
sistance new responsibilities could not forever be evaded. 
A series of complications which the conscript fathers failed 
to deal with satisfactorily led to the intervention of the 
Roman people. Their method of solution was to confer 
sweeping powers on some popular general. For such action 
on the part of the assembly the incompetent administration 
which was the necessary result of the existing , system of 
provincial administration furnished an ample excuse and 
even a direct provocation. Thus with the death of Sulla 
we enter on the period of the great commands, extending 



22 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

over several provinces and assigned for a term of years to 
some prominent leader of the day. This system ended, and 
could end, only in the empire, which in its essential features 
was simply the adoption of the great command as a regular 
part of the republican machine. 

From what has preceded it will be seen that for the 
Koman republic the task of governing provinces outside of 
Italy presented serious constitutional difficulties. This was 
not chiefly because the institutions of Rome were municipal 
in their origin, but rather because of their peculiar char- 
acter and the way in which nobility, the magistracy, and the 
senate had become associated. It has been shown that the 
problem of administering extra-Italian territory had first 
been met by increasing the number of the magistrates with 
the imperium. As long as this method could be followed 
without disrupting the governing machine the Roman do- 
minions expanded somewhat rapidly, but when this limit 
had been reached there came a pause. Then the senate 
successfully opposed all further expansion, until finally 
such expansion could no longer be resisted. By that time, 
however, the promagistrate had become so far familiar 
to the Roman mind that his use as a regular part of the 
machinery of government was possible. This device of 
substituting the promagistrate for the magistrate opened 
up another period of expansion, and for a time the senate 
ceased to offer any very serious objection to it. But when 
the new system had in its turn been carried to the limit 
which the rigid rules of the constitution imposed, the senate 
sought to call a halt and to avoid all further annexations. 
When, at length, a new policy of imperialism was forced 
upon the state the problem of administration could only be 
met by means that proved speedily fatal to the republic. 
As long as the complex republican institutions could, in 
some fashion, be adjusted to meet the crying needs of the 
day they could continue to exist. When, however, such ad- 
justment had become impossible, or at any rate too difficult 
for the statesmen of the time, the republican government 
broke down and, in spite of the protests of idealists and 
patriots, a new system of government was inevitably evolved 
to take over the burden which the republic could no longer 
bear and yet from which it was unable to escape. 



CHAPTER II 

The Development op the Military System 

If the administrative needs of a world empire proved em- 
barrassing to the Roman government, the military demands 
which such an empire made inevitable presented a difficulty 
no less serious. The two problems were very closely bound 
together, since the Roman made no clear distinction between 
military and civil affairs and was accustomed to deal with 
both through the same agents. Nevertheless, although the 
two were thus united, it will make for clearness to consider 
them separately, bearing in mind that they presented them- 
selves to the Roman as different phases of a single intricate 
and complex problem. 

In early days Rome was essentially a city-state, and like 
the city-states of Greece, fought her battles with a citizen 
militia. The so-called Servian constitution reveals the army 
as practically identical with the whole body of Roman citi- 
zens. The muster of the people for war was, at the same 
time, the assembly of the people for political purposes. In 
these primitive times the whole matter of war was ex- 
tremely simple. The citizens assembled at the call of a 
magistrate to decide upon all questions of peace or war. 
If the decision was in favor of war, the people who had 
voted it marched forth at once under the command of the 
magistrate who had presided over their deliberations in 
the assembly, or of his colleague. The battle over, the sol- 
diers returned to their customary occupations, in the case 
of the majority to their farms. The campaigns on which 
they were engaged were neither carried on at any great dis- 
tance nor did they last for any great length of time. Ag- 
gressive wars, at any rate, were usually so timed as to fall 
within the slack season of agriculture when the farmer could 
very well leave his land to the care of his wife and children 
for a week or two, and the whole campaign was generally 
finished before serious harm had been done by the neglect 
of the daily work. Nor was the absence of the magistrate 



24 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

from the city a matter of much consequence in these rude 
and simple days. If the courts of justice were closed for a 
week or two, or if the ordinary work of the government was 
suspended for a short time, no great amount of damage 
could result. In case of need the number of magistrates 
with the imperium was sufficient so that one could usually 
be left in Rome to act, if action was imperatively called for 
by the circumstances. 

Thus, at first, the military and political machinery was 
entirely adequate to the needs of the small city-state. The 
army was simply the citizen body, leaving its routine work 
for a few days and campaigning in the near neighborhood 
under the command of the ordinary magistrates of the city. 
Such a system could not long continue in the face of the 
rapidly changing conditions. The very success of Rome in 
conquering her immediate enemies soon led to alterations 
in her methods of warfare. Once master of the immediate 
vicinity, her armies were compelled to march ever farther 
and farther afield and the burden which was imposed upon 
the soldier became greater with each added mile. Nor was 
it only the soldier who felt the increasing burden ; the longer 
the march to and from the fighting, the longer the magis- 
trate was obliged to be absent from his post in the city. 
Thus the success of Roman arms, coupled as it was with the 
steady growth in the size of the city and the extent of ter- 
ritory subject to its authority, imposed an ever increasing 
burden of civic business on the officials of the state; and 
while the armies were forced to make longer and more dis- 
tant campaigns with each advance of the eagles, the incon- 
venience caused by the absence from Rome of the magis- 
trates would be felt with a steadily increasing force. An- 
other factor should also be noted in this connection : as the 
boundaries of the state expanded, the length of the frontier 
to be guarded increased in due proportion. In the beginning 
of the republic Rome probably did not often find herself en- 
gaged in more than one war at a time. When all central 
Italy had come under Roman control the occurrence of sev- 
eral simultaneous wars must have become more and more 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 25 

common, and this fact imposed another and heavy burden 
upon the political machinery of the state. 

The increasing demands of the army were, no doubt, very 
gradually felt, and for a considerable time the primitive 
system of government and command could bear the added 
strain. Moreover, in those early days the republican ma- 
chine possessed considerable elasticity, and it was no very 
difficult matter to adjust it to meet the new needs whenever 
they had made themselves sufficiently felt. Such readjust- 
ments are found from a very early period, although, in the 
accounts we have of them, they are connected rather with 
the early political and social struggle between the patricians 
and plebeians than with the increasing demands of the 
growing state. Still it may well be suspected that these 
had their part in the early changes that were made. When 
the republic was first established its constitution provided 
for but two magistrates with the imperium, namely the two 
consuls. But in the course of the struggle between the 
orders, the dominant patricians had suspended the appoint- 
ment of the consuls and had replaced them by a board of 
six consular tribunes. The motives for this change were, 
doubtless, chiefly to be found in the political exigencies of 
the struggle with the plebeians who were demanding a full 
equality with the privileged class. Yet, whatever the mo- 
tive, it served to increase the staff of officials available to 
meet the needs of the state and of the army, and this fact 
may have been one reason for the rather protracted use of 
this somewhat clumsy political evasion. 

In the course of time the pressure on the dominant patri- 
cians became irresistible and they were finally forced to con- 
cede at once the restoration of the consulship and the ad- 
mission of the plebeians to that office. It was, however, 
clear that the old arrangement no longer provided an ad- 
equate staff for the management of affairs. When, there- 
fore, the consular tribunes were replaced by the two con- 
suls a new office, the praetorship, was invented which in- 
creased the number of the magistrates with the imperium 
to three. 1 No doubt the patricians were intending by this 

^eitland, i, 99. 



26 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

device to diminish to some extent the scope of the concession 
which they had been forced to make, but, it may be confi- 
dently surmised, it was the obvious and undeniable needs of 
the state that induced the plebeians to accept this lessening 
of the completeness of the victory which they had won by 
the passage of the Licinian laws. 

With the internal conflict settled, and as the event proved 
permanently settled, Rome found herself equipped with 
three magistrates with the imperium. It is probable that 
one reason for the new office of praetor was the frequent 
absence of both consuls from the city at the head of the le- 
gions. The new system was one which, as things stood, ad- 
mitted of considerable expansion. There was no serious 
objection, at first, to a further increase in the number of 
the praetors and it was not long in taking place; by the 
outbreak of the First Punic War, the number had been 
raised to two. Thus Rome entered on her mighty struggle 
with Carthage with four magistrates capable of carrying 
on the business of government and commanding her armies. 
This staff of officers had proved sufficient for her needs in 
the conflicts which had resulted in making her the head of 
an Italian confederacy embracing the whole of the penin- 
sula south of the Apennines. The conduct of the first great 
war outside of Italy did not call for any increase in the 
number of the magistrates, but its successful issue brought 
new responsibilities. With the close of the war Rome an- 
nexed the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. Annex- 
ation was soon found to imply government, and to meet the 
new requirements the Romans, as was shown in the preced- 
ing chapter, increased the number of the praetors from two 
to four. This proved sufficient for a time, but events soon 
compelled further changes. 

The Second Punic War led directly to two important de- 
velopments in the Roman governmental machinery. In the 
first place the acquisition of two new provinces in Spain 
forced a new increase in the size of the praetorian college, 
this time to six members, which number remained unal- 
tered until the reorganization of the constitution by Sulla. 
In the second place the terrible struggle with Hannibal, 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 27 

which taxed to the utmost the stern pride and unyielding 
patriotism of the Romans, gave rise to a new and most sig- 
nificant institution. When the great invader had been 
turned from central Italy into the south and stood there at 
bay, Rome found herself compelled to resort to warfare 
of a kind and on a scale which she had never yet attempted. 
It was no longer a question of one or two armies for a short 
campaign. A number of armies operating continuously 
were now necessary to wear out and overcome the revolted 
peoples of southern Italy and the mighty Carthaginian wno 
had induced them to rise against the Roman supremacy. 
Little by little Rome succeeded, but to do so called for more 
commanders than the state possessed ready to hand in its 
annual magistrates and this made necessary the expedient 
of the proconsulship. It is probable that the device was 
not a wholly new one, but the circumstances of the war 
against Hannibal led to a great development of it and made 
it a regular part of the machinery of the state. The Romans 
had no leisure in the midst of such a struggle to undertake 
elaborate constitutional adjustments, and the use of the pro- 
consul met the immediate needs of the hour with the least 
change possible in the formal requirements of the law. 

Originally a proconsul was simply a consul who remained 
in charge of his army after his year of office had expired. 
Such a practice was probably rendered easier of adoption 
by the obvious impossibility of insisting that a general 
should lay down his imperium at the precise moment that 
his term as magistrate terminated, since this would often 
happen before his successor had come to take over the com- 
mand. It was only natural to avoid such a lapse m re- 
sponsible leadership by allowing the man in charge to con- 
tinue to act until the new general arrived. But since the 
senate had the power to determine what functions, of a 
special sort, should be assigned to the annual magistrates, 
it might easily happen that, if the new consuls were em- 
ployed elsewhere, one of the retiring consuls would be left 
at the head of the army which he had been commanding and 
that no successor could arrive to supersede him. When he 
was expected to remain in charge for any length of time it 



X 



28 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

was, at first, felt necessary that the people should extend 
his imperium by a formal vote. Since, however, the senate 
created the situation and since the commander could con- 
tinue in his functions for some time without such formal 
action, the senate soon assumed the right to prolong the 
imperium for another year without consulting the assembly 
in the matter. What was done in the case of the consul 
was equally possible in the case of the praetor, and the 
senate thus acquired the right to prolong indefinitely the 
imperium once it had been conferred by the Roman people. 
This new power made it possible for the senate to increase 
its staff of officers with the imperium without making any 
addition to the number of the magistrates. 

While these changes were taking place in the command 
of the armies, their composition was also being modified. 
In early days, when the campaigns were short, the Roman 
citizen could leave his work and serve without any very 
serious loss or inconvenience. When circumstances re- 
quired a longer time of service this was no longer possible, 
and it became necessary to make up to the soldier in some 
way the losses he incurred by the service. Livy expressly 
tells us that it was at the siege of Veii that the army was left 
in active service for so long a time that the payment of the 
soldiers became necessary. It is quite probable that at first 
this was regarded as a very exceptional thing, but as the 
range of Rome's military operations grew constantly wider 
it was not long before it became a regular custom. 

With the introduction of pay into the army it became pos- 
sible to lengthen the time of service without serious diffi- 
culty, and this seems to have been done without particular 
protest. When, as a result of the victory over Hannibal, 
Rome found herself involved in the task of conquering and 
holding Spain and the legions were sent across the seas, the 
term of service was of necessity extended far beyond any- 
thing that had previously been known and those citizens 
who were conscripted for the Spanish war were expected 
to serve with the legions for six years. 

By the time of the Spanish wars, then, the military sys- 
tem of Rome had changed its character in almost every 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 29 

particular. Instead of citizens serving without pay, as a 
part of their civic duty, under the annual magistrates of the 
city, we have now citizens serving continuously for years at 
a time, and often under the command of a proconsul or pro- 
praetor rather than one of the regular magistrates. The 
use of the promagistrate as a commander was not as yet 
regarded as regular, nor was it the usual method until some 
time after the close of the Second Punic War. Neverthe- 
less, once introduced, it rapidly extended itself, becoming 
constantly more common as the needs of the administration 
grew relentlessly greater and the difficulty of providing 
more regular magistrates began to be felt. Why this diffi- 
culty should develop has been already shown and likewise 
why the difficulty, once it began to make itself apparent, 
was met by the rapid development of the promagistracy. 
At< first a special expedient to meet an exceptional case, the 
promagistracy became gradually, but somewhat rapidly, a 
normal and regular part of the constitution. 

From a purely military point of view the use of the pro- 
magistrate had certain real advantages in that it made pos- 
sible a greater continuity of command. A competent gen- 
eral could now be given the command of an army for two 
years — one as magistrate and the second as promagistrate — 
and in case of special need or difficulty, for an even longer 
time, since if the imperium could be held beyond the legal 
term for which it was originally conferred there was no 
essential reason why it could not be indefinitely prolonged. 
Moreover, as has been seen already, the new system relieved 
the pressure on the regular corps of magistrates and pro- 
vided the men needed to meet the increasing demands of 
provincial administration. 

There can be small wonder, therefore, that the Roman 
state resorted with increasing frequency to a device so 
simple, and at the same time so well adapted to meet the 
growing demands of the state with so little disturbance to 
the formal constitution. No sweeping changes were neces- 
sary, only a slight modification of existing and established 
practices which, having gradually grown up, were now a 



30 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

well understood and accepted part of the governmental 
machinery. 

Could the expansion of Rome's empire and its heavy re- 
sponsibilities have been restricted within the narrow limits 
which Rome originally set for herself, the new machinery 
might have worked with little difficulty or change, but this 
was quite impossible. Whatever the desire of the senate 
and the ruling statesmen, the fall of Carthage had made 
Rome, whether she would or no, a world power. Sooner 
or later she would be forced to meet the obligations of her 
new position. Her reluctance might avail to make her slow 
and half-hearted in assuming these responsibilities but could 
not enable her to escape them. That Rome lusted for con- 
quest and sought the empire of the Mediterranean, no one 
who views the actual circumstances of her history can for 
a moment believe. Rather her empire was a penalty im- 
posed upon her by the defeat of Hannibal, a penalty which 
she strove desperately to avoid paying, but which fate in- 
exorably enforced despite all her struggles. 

While Hannibal had stood at bay in the south of Italy, 
he had striven by every means in his power to find the re- 
sources which he needed to crush Rome by drawing into the 
conflict some outside power. To prevent this Rome had 
been obliged to interfere in both the East and the West. 
She had dispatched armies to Spain to prevent her foe from 
using the resources of that peninsula against her, and she 
had met his attempts to get help from Macedon by entering 
into close diplomatic alliances with the various states of 
Greece. 

When the war ended in the destruction of the power of 
Carthage, Rome found, to her dismay, that she had in effect 
signed a number of blank checks which others had the power 
of filling in, and which, whatever her reluctance, she was 
bound in honor and in prudence to redeem. The ambitious 
schemes of Philip of Macedon and his partner, Antiochus 
of Syria, forced her to reluctant intervention in the East, 
while, at the same time, her fears of a possible revival of the 
power of her vanquished rival, Carthage, involved her in 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 31 

the formidable task of conquering the warlike Spanish 
tribes. 

Instead of bringing peace, the end of the long contest 
with Hannibal served merely as a starting point for a 
whole series of wars. Yet few peoples have shown them- 
selves less anxious for conquest than the Romans. After 
the fierce struggle for their very existence as a state, the 
people of Rome were passionately longing for an end of 
battles and campaigns, a chance to cultivate their fields 
and pursue their ordinary avocations in quiet and tran- 
quility. So intense was this desire for peace among the 
common people that the senate was only able to induce the 
popular assembly to vote the declaration of war against 
Macedon by the false pretense that Philip intended an 
actual invasion of Italy. Deceived by this misrepresenta- 
tion, the citizens, weary as they were of war, allowed the 
constitutionally necessary vote to be wrung from them. 
The war thus brought about was, indeed, necessary, though 
not for the reasons that the senate alleged. It was impos- 
sible for Rome, without dishonor for the present and danger 
for the future, to abandon the Greek allies who had served 
her so well during her time of deadly peril. Doubtless 
when the senate first dispatched the legions to the East, 
it was both hoped and believed that it was only for a single 
brief campaign. But fate overruled the will of people and 
senate alike and the war with Philip proved to be but the 
first of several eastern wars. In the West, as well, the an- 
nexation of Spain was found to be the beginning of many 
long years of hard fighting. Thus the defeat of Hannibal 
was very far from bringing peace to Rome. Instead of 
peace the downfall of Carthage led directly to a new series 
of wars in both the East and the West which were fought 
under such new conditions as to affect profoundly the mili- 
tary system of the republic. Hitherto the wars of Rome 
had been waged in Italy or near at hand in Sicily. The 
legions had, indeed, crossed over into Africa and Spain, 
but these expeditions had been too brief to leave any per- 
manent effects. Now for the first time the Romans found 
themselves engaged in long wars at a great distance. Under 



32 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

these circumstances they began to develop the system of 
the great commands. This called for three distinct inno- 
vations in the military system of the republic. In the first 
place, armies of exceptional size were now sent out, and 
in the second place, they were intrusted to the command of 
a single general who remained in charge for the entire 
war, and in the third place, the theatre of operations was 
so far from Italy that any real control by the Roman gov- 
ernment was impossible. No one of the three was alto- 
gether new, but the frequent combination of all three is 
only met with after the Second Punic War. That such 
powers as the great command implied were a possible dan- 
ger to the republic was as obvious to the Romans as it can 
be today, yet they had little or no choice. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to see how Rome could have defeated 
Antiochus and conquered Macedon and Spain without in- 
trusting her generals with exceptional powers. Whatever 
the potential dangers which such powers might involve, 
men could devise no substitute that promised any hope of 
victory and success. 

While thus the Roman generals were growing stronger 
to the possible danger of the state, a social and political 
crisis was passing over Italy which contributed to make 
the peril all the greater. Like many other changes in his- 
tory, this one had its roots in economic causes. The ex- 
tension of Rome's sovereignty outside the boundaries of 
the Italian peninsula had serious consequences for the health 
and prosperity of the Roman people. As the empire grew, 
the character of the Roman citizens began to undergo a 
change which her statesmen viewed with grave misgiving 
and alarm. With the annexation of provinces beyond the 
seas Italian agriculture fell on evil days and rapidly de- 
clined. For this there were many reasons but among the 
most important must be ranked the introduction into the 
Italian markets of the cheap grain of Sicily. Hitherto the 
raising of grain had been the characteristic feature of 
Italian agriculture, and now the markets where this crop 
was sold began to be flooded by imported grain sold at a 
price with which the farmer of Italy, for all his sturdy 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 33 

frugality and rough simplicity of life, could not compete. 
That grain could be grown more cheaply in Sicily than in 
many parts of Italy was by no means the whole difficulty ; 
other factors contributed to make the matter much more 
disastrous than a simple economic competition need have 
been. 

When first the Romans took control of Sicily they found 
a revenue system in existence which collected the taxes 
levied on the inhabitants of the rural districts in kind — 
chiefly in grain, which formed the staple product of the 
island. This system the Romans, being little blessed with 
new or original ideas, retained and merely adapted to their 
own immediate needs. The farmers of Sicily were still 
to pay their tribute as they had been accustomed to do, 
only now to the Roman government instead of their former 
masters. Since Rome had no machinery at hand for col- 
lecting her revenues, she resorted to the simple expedient 
of selling the right to collect the taxes to the highest bidder. 
As a consequence of this the Roman capitalist found open 
to his enterprise a new field for investment. Thus, too, it 
came about that there were in Rome influential capitalists 
with quantities of grain to dispose of, which they had ac- 
quired, not by purchase from the producer, but by purchase 
from the Roman state. This grain they could afford to 
sell without reference to the cost of its production, but 
solely on the basis of the bargain they had made with a 
government in which the influence of wealth was such that 
they were likely to have made a very easy contract. Hence 
when, as usually happened, the Roman capitalist bought 
cheap, he could afford to sell at a price utterly ruinous to 
the Roman farmer. The state itself made matters worse. 
A considerable part of its revenues was paid in grain and 
such portion of this as was not needed for the army was 
thrown upon the market to be disposed of for whatever it 
would bring. Moreover, since it was considered a duty of 
the government to keep down the cost of living, the state 
usually met any serious rise in the price of food by selling 
its surplus stock of grain at a low figure. Thus the annex- 
ation of Sicily came to mean to the Roman farmer a per- 
manent lowering in the price of his principal crop. 



34 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

The time when the old type of agriculture was ceasing 
to be profitable was just the time when the farmer needed 
help for other reasons. The war with Hannibal had been 
fought on the soil of Italy and had desolated that fair land, 
turning some parts into a veritable wilderness. When the 
invader was finally driven out of the peninsula, the farmer, 
in but too many cases, found his little plot of land in a state 
of utter ruin. Buildings, domestic animals, tools were 
gone; to make a new beginning he was forced to borrow. 
Now at the very time when he was struggling to get upon 
his feet, the price of his chief crop began to decline rap- 
idly. Under such conditions the outcome could not be a 
matter of doubt. For a time the small farmer might battle 
against the adverse tide, but in the end he was usually 
driven to shipwreck. Sooner or later he lost his farm and 
drifted to the city to pick up a precarious livelihood as best 
he might ; most often, probably, as a client or dependent of 
some wealthy house, or, when this was impossible, as a 
member of the idle mob subsisting by odd jobs and the 
largess of the various candidates for office. 

The small farmer had still other troubles. The domin- 
ions of Rome were growing, and as they grew, called con- 
stantly for more soldiers. Nor could the soldiers any longer 
be sent home after a brief campaign. The wars now being 
waged by Rome were far across the seas and the men who 
went out in the service were obliged to stay for years. The 
drain of these new military needs can not have been other 
than a serious matter to the already overburdened agri- 
cultural class of Italy. 

In considerable degree the very causes which were push- 
ing the small farmer to the wall were, at the same time, 
preparing a substitute for him. Both the speculations of 
the capitalist in the grain of Sicily and the wars and con- 
quests of the republic abroad brought in a flood of wealth 
to those individuals or classes so placed as to take advan- 
tage of the oportunities. Thus while many landowners 
were ready in despair to sell their property, much surplus 
wealth was seeking investment. At first glance it might 
seem strange that capital should go into agriculture under 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 35 

the depressing conditions then prevalent, but there were 
some causes at work which served to make the situation of 
the large landowner very different from that of the small 
farmer. The wars had glutted the Roman market with 
slaves with the natural result that their price had fallen 
very low. A rich man therefore, who could acquire a large 
tract of land for a trifle, could also provide himself with the 
slave labor necessary to cultivate it cheaply. Large scale 
farming made possible various economies, and the slave 
labor available on the market was by no means crude or 
unskilled. The eastern wars of Rome had resulted in a 
flood of slaves drawn from the Orient, which was the home 
of scientific and improved agriculture, and the Carthaginian 
captives were of much the same character. Thus it hap- 
pened that large scale production could often be carried on 
by new and better methods than the small farmer knew, or 
could employ if he did know. 

In addition to this the capitalist found himself less ham- 
pered in the matter of his crops. He did not need to con- 
fine himself to raising grain, but could turn to olives or the 
vine, a thing less possible to the small farmer since they 
were not immediately productive. When no form of agri- 
culture could be made to pay, there was ranching to fall 
back upon. The ships of ancient times, though they could 
carry grain with ease, sometimes using it as ballast and so 
reducing the cost of transportation to practically nothing, 
were quite inadequate to handle either animals or meat on 
a commercial scale. Hence sheep and cattle raised in Italy 
had no competition from abroad to fear, and all through 
southern Italy ranching began to take the place of agri- 
culture. So rapid was this change that one man's life wit- 
nessed its beginning and completion. The elder Cato as a 
young man practiced farming for profit, but in his old age 
confessed that it was an amusement rather than a gainful 
occupation. Asked what was the best form of investment 
for capital, the old man promptly answered, "Good ranch- 
ing land." When the questioner inquired what came next 
he answered, "Fair ranching land," and, when pressed still 



36 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

farther, he gave as the third most profitable investment, 
"Poor ranching land." 2 

Rome's wars and conquests had, therefore, produced a 
striking change in the economic aspect of the peninsula. 
In the North, in Etruria especially, great plantations worked 
by slave labor had replaced the small farms of earlier times. 
In passing through this part of Italy, Tiberius Gracchus 
was horrified at the dearth of population and the absence 
of free laborers. 3 While this transformation was taking 
place in the North, the South was being given over in a 
similar manner to great livestock ranches whose herds of 
cattle and sheep were tended by slaves. In both quarters 
the small proprietors had largely disappeared, being driven 
from the land to swell the idle rabble in the towns, especially 
in Rome. 

These changes did not, of course, affect the whole pen- 
insula equally and in many places they were hardly felt at 
all. The ravages of Hannibal had fallen most heavily on 
the South. The cheap grain from across the seas, while 
easily transported by water, could not travel far by land, 
and was quite unable to disturb the market prices in the 
mountainous parts of central Italy. In Umbria and Sam- 
nium conditions remained much the same as in the past, 
and the rich and fertile valley of the Po was very slightly 
affected. 

Yet, making all allowance for the regions where the new 
conditions were felt but little, if at all, the change was far- 
reaching, and in the eyes of thoughtful Romans, sinister 
and ominous. This was inevitably so for many reasons. 
The Roman mind was hard and practical in its texture, and 
was stubbornly conservative in type. Not readily did the 
conqueror of the world take in a new idea, and all the old 
traditions which he cherished combined to teach him that 
the small farmer, tilling his own little plot of ground by his 
own labor and that of his family, was the very backbone of 
the Roman state. Hence the Roman could not view with- 
out the gravest misgivings the rapid and relentless decay of 



'Cicero, De Officiis, ii, 25. 
3 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 8. 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 37 

the very class which he had been taught to regard as so 
vitally important. Even had the Roman's mind been free 
from any preconception as to the value of the small farmer 
to the state, the military system would have brought the 
problem home to him in a manner at once plain and un- 
avoidable. Service in the legions had always been bound 
up intimately with the ownership of land. It was the land- 
owner alone who had hitherto furnished the recruits for the 
army. It was on the small farmer that Rome depended for 
her soldiers. The landless rabble in the city, the urban 
mob, played little part in the conscription which was used 
to fill the ranks. Now, at the very moment when the state 
was calling for soldiers to an extent unknown before, the 
class from which, by all established usages and customs, 
they were drawn was shrinking every day. With each new 
war the task of filling up the ranks grew more difficult and 
the class who gave no military service to the state grew 
visibly larger. Here was a problem which no Roman could 
entirely ignore. No candidate for office could shut his eyes 
to the rapid growth of the city rabble and no general could 
fail to perceive the increasing difficulty of recruiting. 
Neither could avoid the conviction that, while Rome was 
victorious abroad, things were alarmingly out of joint at 
home, and that, although the empire grew and flourished 
across the seas, the state was sick, and dangerously so, at 
its very heart. 

Yet it was much easier to see and feel the malady than to 
devise a remedy. The mind of the ancient world had given 
little thought to economic causes. In this sphere the Greek 
saw but dimly and the Roman, with his slower wits and 
duller imagination, was most unlikely to discover truths 
which the subtle Hellene had not been able to perceive. 
Even had the Roman been more clear sighted than he was, 
his vision could have been of little use. The character of 
the Roman government forbade the application of a really 
effective cure. The Roman assembly was so constituted 
as to give a disproportionate weight to that part of the 
citizen body which dwelt within the city. The disastrous 
effects of the cheap grain could have been met only by some 



38 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

form of protection and this was something which the mob 
of Rome could never be induced to accept, since it would 
have increased the cost of living and thereby threatened the 
daily bread of a large number of the voters. This being so, 
no Roman statesman ventured to suggest the measure which 
would seem to modern eyes the obvious solution of the prob- 
lem. Yet, though they could not reach the root of the evil, 
the Romans were not without remedies of their own, al- 
though it may be questioned whether, in this case, the cure 
proposed was not worse than the disease. 

It was Tiberius Gracchus who first tried to remedy these 
conditions. As has just been implied, it is no reflection 
upon his sagacity that he completely failed to grasp the 
economic factors in the case. What he saw was the. simple 
fact that Rome was suffering from a decrease in the num- 
ber of small farmers; and the remedy which he proposed 
was simply to increase the class whose threatened disap- 
pearance constituted a danger to the commonwealth. The 
problem which arose from too few farmers he would solve 
by making more. His plan for accomplishing this was to 
distribute land in small allotments to the poor. For this 
purpose it was obvious that he required a large amount of 
land, and as it happened, the Roman law furnished him with 
a good technical pretext for obtaining it. While the con- 
quest of Italy was in progress the state had declared great 
tracts of land in every part of the peninsula the property of 
the Roman people. From ft the people had not hitherto 
received much benefit. Owing to the policy of the wealthy 
nobles who controlled the government, this land had passed 
in practice into the hands of private individuals who held 
and used it, although the title remained vested in the state. 
The state, however, dominated by the class who had the land 
in their possession, had allowed many years to pass — some- 
times as long a time as two centuries — without making any 
effort to assert its ownership. As a result of this long lapse 
of time the possessors had come to regard the land they oc- 
cupied as theirs, but, as the Roman law in this matter had 
no statute of limitations, it was still within the legal rights 
of the government to revive its claims and act upon them 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 39 

in whatever way it chose. Whether such a course was con- 
sistent with moral right and equity might be open to ques- 
tion, but it was undoubtedly within the strict letter of the 
law. Tiberius now proposed that the state should reassert 
its rights and should eject the possessors from the bulk of 
the public land they held and that the land so acquired 
should be distributed in small allotments to the poorer citi- 
zens. This would break up many of the large estates and 
replace them with small peasant holdings. How the new 
farmers were to make a living where the old had failed 
Tiberius did not stop to ask himself, though some faint sus- 
picion that here might be a difficulty seems to have crossed 
his mind, since he proposed to make the new holdings in- 
alienable. This feature of his proposal may well have been 
intended to prevent his new peasants from giving up their 
farms and returning to the city. 

The success of such a scheme in solving the agrarian 
problem must be considered doubtful at the best, and the 
advantages of the measure can hardly be regarded as suffi- 
cient to compensate for all the trouble and confusion which 
it caused. Tiberius, however, saw but one great evil to be 
cured and was supremely confident of the necessity and 
value of the remedy he had devised. Yet his bill was scarcely 
drafted when he found himself confronted by difficulties 
and obstacles which he had not at all foreseen. Quite nat- 
urally the possessors raised an outcry at being called upon 
to give up property which long years of actual use had led 
them to regard as theirs. Strangely enough Tiberius seems 
not to have anticipated this, and he had likewise failed to 
notice that this very class possessed an enormous influence 
in the government. The accepted usage of the constitution 
gave them the power to block the reform at the very out- 
set. By the theory of the Roman law the magistrates ruled 
supreme. The senate, by the letter of the law, had no power 
to do more than advise the magistrate in case he called upon 
it for advice. Its decrees when passed had only an advisory 
force and the magistrate might disregard them if he chose. 
The magistrate possessed the constitutional right to lay any 
measure that he pleased before the people in their assembly, 



40 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

and if their approval was given, it became a law regardless 
of the wishes of the conscript fathers. However, the actual 
practice of the constitution had for many years required 
that every bill should be brought first before the senate and 
that, if it failed to gain the approval of that body, it should 
quietly be dropped. Yet this was a matter rather of usage 
than of law, and if the magistrate dared to disregard this 
custom, there was no legal obstacle to hinder him from 
bringing any bill he chose before the people. In Tiberius 
Rome found at last a magistrate so confident in his own 
righteousness and wisdom that he was ready to set tradi- 
tion at defiance and to use his legal prerogative to the utter- 
most. Ignoring the senate he brought his agrarian bill di- 
rectly before the people. But the conscript fathers, though 
they could not interfere directly, were by no means power- 
less. Few constitutions have ever been better provided 
with the means of obstruction and delay than that of Rome. 
If Tiberius, as tribune of the people, had a legal right to 
lay his bill before the assembly, any one of the nine other 
tribunes had a legal right to stop its progress by the inter- 
position of his veto. The occasions were few and far be- 
tween when the senate could not find one among the ten who 
was willing to take its side and put a check upon obnoxious 
legislation. On this occasion such a tribune was promptly 
found and Tiberius was at once confronted with the veto 
of his colleague Octavius. Opposition from this quarter 
seems to have been quite unexpected by the reformer, and 
in face of it he lost his head. Determined at all costs to 
pass his bill, and that immediately, he had the assembly 
remove Octavius from office and then proceeded to enact 
his agrarian law. He seemed for the moment to have suc- 
ceeded in his aim, but the deposition of Octavius was of 
very doubtful legality, and the passions he had roused by 
his legislation and by the methods he had resorted to in 
order to pass it were of the most violent. The natural, if 
not the inevitable, end was the outbreak of a riot in which 
the bold reformer perished by violence. 

But, though Tiberius Gracchus died, his work survived. 
His great agrarian law was not repealed, and under it a 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 41 

commission set to work to seize and redistribute the soil of 
Italy. In the next few years more than 70,000 of the poor 
received allotments of land. In so far as Tiberius Gracchus 
had aimed simply to create more farmers, his law had been 
a success. How far this result was permanent is, of course, 
another matter. The economic causes that lay at the root 
of the problem were untouched and must soon have brought 
about the ruin of the new farmers as they had that of the 
old. 4 No doubt there were many of the new allotments that 
accomplished the reformer's purpose, when they chanced 
to fall in some region of the peninsula into which the cheap 
grain did not penetrate, or where other forms of agricul- 
ture were possible besides the cultivation of grain. But 
such partial success as may have been achieved can hardly 
have been upon a scale great enough to relieve the situation 
for any length of time. 

But if the social and economic effects of the agrarian bill 
were temporary, it was otherwise with its political results. 
In carrying his law the reformer had broken once for all the 
usages and traditions of the Roman government. He had 
given a conspicuous demonstration of what a magistrate 
who dared to stand upon his legal rights and to defy the 
senate could accomplish, and this lesson was not lost upon 
his contemporaries. It was the less likely to be neglected 
because of the changes in the popular assembly which re- 
sulted from the economic crisis. The success of Gracchus 
was visible evidence that the people were no longer dom- 
inated as they had been in the past by the ring of noble 
families who controlled the senate. Each of these families 
gathered round it a group of voters, clients or freedmen, 
of whose votes it could dispose at pleasure, and collectively 
they seem to have been able for a long time to keep the as- 
sembly well in hand. Now, however, the growth of the urban 
rabble, due, in large part at least, to the decline in agri- 
cultural prosperity, had greatly weakened their influence. 



*The right to sell the allotments was soon given to the new farmers, about the 
time of the overthrow of Gaius Gracchus. Greenidge, A History of Rome, 285. 

For the number of new farmers see the census returns given in the Epitome of 
Livy. These figures have generally been interpreted in the sense in which they are 
here taken. See for example Greenidge, 150 and Mommsen, iii, 335. 



42 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

The crowds who came to the city were too great to be 
absorbed into the groups of dependents of the aristocratic 
houses, and as a consequence, the assembly was escaping 
from the control of the governing oligarchy. From this 
time on the people became more and more unmanageable 
until their power perished with the republic itself. 

The death of Tiberius Gracchus left the senate master of 
the state, but its supremacy did not remain undisputed for 
any length of time. In a few years the younger brother of 
the reformer took his place as the leader of the party of 
opposition and protest. The career of Gaius Gracchus as a 
reformer and popular leader need not be considered in de- 
tail, since the constructive part of his program was largely 
unfulfilled. Two things, however, he did that should be 
noted. He set the capitalist class, or knights, against the 
senate, and by the establishment of the corn dole, he still 
further freed the mob of Rome from the domination of the 
oligarchy. While he defied the senate and courted the 
knights he found enthusiastic support, but when, confident 
in his popularity, he attempted to carry through some real 
reforms, his supporters turned against him, and like his 
brother, he perished in a riot. After his death the senate 
resumed its control of the government, but its power was 
weakened and undermined. The antagonism which Gaius 
had striven hard to create between the senate and the 
knights deprived that body of the support of a large and in- 
creasing part of the propertied class, while the corn dole, 
by making the poorest voters depend directly on the state 
instead of on the great aristocratic families for their daily 
bread, weakened the influence of the senate over the as- 
sembly. 

The measures of the democratic party under the Gracchi 
had proved quite unavailing to solve the military problem. 
The agrarian bill may have augmented the number of the 
small land owners, but it did not do so on a scale that would 
relieve the pressure. The state still needed armies and still 
found it difficult to raise them; and since political reform 
was powerless to meet the difficulty, it only remained to try 
the effect of a direct reform of the military system itself, 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 43 

and especially of the methods of recruiting. This change 
the war against Jugurtha was destined to bring about. 
This war, in and of itself, was trivial enough, but circum- 
stances combined to give it an importance far beyond its 
military merits. The manner in which the senate had 
drifted into the war in the first place had created a uni- 
versal suspicion of corruption. Starting thus, the senate's 
generals had failed to fulfil the popular expectation of a 
speedy victory over the petty African king. No doubt the 
Roman populace ignored the difficulties of north African 
geography, but in any case the dragging out of the war 
year after year exasperated the mob. If the senate could 
not, or would not, end the war, the people resolved to take 
matters into their own hands; and if the generals of the 
senate were incompetent or corrupt, they were ready to try 
what a popular general could accomplish. It was under 
such conditions that a blunt soldier like Marius, uncon- 
nected with the ruling oligarchy except by marriage, came 
forward as a candidate for the consulship, and in spite of 
the fact that he was a new man, was triumphantly elected 
on a pledge to end the Numidian war with a speedy victory. 
In the election of Marius the senate had sustained a ser- 
ious defeat, since he had won on the plain platform of tak- 
ing out of the senate's hands the conduct of a war which 
they had shamefully mismanaged. The conscript fathers 
would not, however, accept the adverse verdict of the as- 
sembly. It was still the prerogative of the senate to deter- 
mine the provinces for which the magistrates drew lots and 
the senate sought, by the use of this power, to retain their 
general, Metellus, in command in Africa. But Marius and 
his supporters were not to be thus diverted from their ob- 
ject. The war against Jugurtha was what Marius wanted 
and what the people were determined he should have. When 
the senate would not yield to the people's will, the assembly, 
on the motion of a tribune, passed a law conferring the 
command in Africa upon their favorite, superseding Metel- 
lus. All that remained was for Marius to provide himself 
with an army and the senate gleefully hoped that in at- 
tempting this he would make a shipwreck of his sudden 



X 



44 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

popularity. As soon as he resorted to conscription to ob- 
tain his soldiers a revulsion of the popular feeling might be 
expected. 5 But Marius met the situation with a measure 
at once simple and daring, and accomplished a revolution 
in the military system of Rome of which he did not in the 
least foresee the consequences. Instead of forcing the re- 
luctant farmers into the ranks, he called for volunteers, 
and forthwith found himself with all the men he needed 
without trouble. Nothing could be more simple in appear- 
ance, yet few measures have been fraught with larger con- 
sequences. By thus making the Roman army a volunteer 
force, instead of one resting on conscription, Marius changed 
its character fundamentally. Hitherto the soldier had been 
a man possessed of some property, but the men who flocked 
to join the new consul were almost all to be found among 
the poverty-stricken rabble in the towns. Henceforth the 
legionary owned only his weapons, his plunder, and what- 
ever his general could obtain for him from the state. Be- 
fore this time the men were drafted to fight under whom- 
soever the republic might see fit to place in command of the 
army ; now they were men who had come forward to serve 
under a particular man, and who had chosen to serve be- 
cause of the confidence which they felt in the man and his 
ability to lead. Henceforth, too, their fortunes were inti- 
mately bound up with his. If, when the campaign ended, 
their leader failed to remain a power in the state, he could 
not procure for them the rewards to which they looked for- 
ward. From this time on, therefore, the army was bound 
to its commander by a tie that replaced the former loyalty 
to the state and to its constitution; and an army could no 
longer be transferred from one general to another at the 
pleasure or convenience of the government. If the power 
of the men who led the legions had already grown to a de- 
gree that was ominous for the future by the development 
of the proconsulship, this change in the composition of the 
army increased the peril many times and led straight to the 
predominance of the soldier in the state. 



"Heitland, ii, 355. 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 45 

To all of this it is quite probable that Marius was blind. 
He needed soldiers and he wished to get them without loss 
of popularity. By taking volunteers he accomplished both 
his objects and he could hardly do so in any other way. 
His success went far to justify his innovation, nor is it 
easy to see how the change could have been very long post- 
poned. If Marius had never lived, some other man would 
surely have met a pressing need by a measure of reform 
so obvious. It could not have been very long before a state 
which needed soldiers would have been forced to abandon 
an unpopular conscription when volunteers were to be had 
for the asking by any man who had the reputation of a 
competent commander. 

The volunteer army of Marius achieved a rapid victory 
in Africa, and he returned to save the state from a much 
more serious danger. While he was occupied with finishing 
the war against Jugurtha, two mighty hordes of barbarians 
had begun to menace Italy from the north. The incapable 
generals whom the normal working of the constitution had 
put in charge, instead of averting the peril, had contrived 
to make it worse by leading the Roman armies to over- 
whelming disaster. The people turned naturally to their 
favorite and reelected Marius consul on his return and sent 
him out to save the state. Again he justified their confi- 
dence and the Cimbri and the Teutons were completely 
crushed. After this victory it might have been expected 
that the rough soldier would retire; but his own vanity and 
the character of his army alike forbade this course. To at- 
tract the necessary recruits to his standard he had given a 
promise that the soldiers should be rewarded with lands at 
the close of their service. 6 The time had now come when 
he must fulfil his pledges to his men. As he could hope for 
no assistance from the senate, which had been steadily hos- 
tile to him from the start, he turned of necessity to the mob 
who had been throughout the basis of his power. He formed 
a close alliance with the ruling demagogues of the moment 
and tried his hand at politics. Unluckily for him his part- 
ners, Saturninus and Glaucia, were violent and reckless, and 

"Frank, 270. 



46 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

he himself, efficient as a general, was quite incapable in the 
struggles of the forum. 7 The almost inevitable result of 
such a combination was a swift and utter failure. Marius 
supported his allies till their proceedings had goaded the 
conservatives to fury, then, frightened by their wild career, 
he abandoned them, to the unbounded rage of the democrats. 
Thus in a short space of time he fell from the summit of 
glory to complete political insignificance. Yet he had done 
great things for Rome in the field and he had taught his con- 
temporaries two lessons which were not destined to be for- 
gotten. He had shown that a popular soldier could obtain 
the men he needed for an army simply by asking for them, 
and also that a leader with the assembly at his back could, 
by a law of the people, take command of any war or any 
province that he pleased, regardless of the wishes of the 
senate. 

Marius and his party had fallen from power and the sen- 
ate was again in control in Rome. It was not he but an- 
other who was the first to grasp the meaning of the military 
changes he had made. The twelve years that followed the 
retirement of Marius were filled with agitations ending in 
a furious civil war. This war, due to the demand of the 
Italian allies for full Roman citizenship, involved all Italy 
and brought back Marius once more to the command of a 
Roman army, but brought also to the front his formidable 
rival, Sulla. The Italian uprising, suppressed more by con- 
cessions than by arms, served as a prelude to a crisis which 
revealed for the first time, but once for all, the essential 
character of the new army. While Rome was paralyzed by 
the Italian revolt, war had broken out in the East. The 
King of Pontus, Mithridates, taking advantage of the situa- 
tion, had overrun all Rome's possessions in that quarter, 
and as soon as the crisis in Italy had passed, she found 
herself forced to dispatch a large army under a competent 



7 In several respects there is an obvious likeness between the career of Marius 
and that of Pompey. Both were good soldiers but neither was a capable politician. 
Both were forced by the character of their armies to take a hand in politics and 
neither was successful. Pompey, however, had better fortune and his partners, 
Caesar and Crassus, were men of a very different stamp from Saturninus and 
Glaucia. This was Pompey's luck rather than his merit, however. 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 47 

commander to recover the lost ground and punish the bold 
oriental who had made use of her difficulties. For this new 
task there were two rival candidates, Marlus and Sulla. 
By the normal working of the constitution the task was as- 
signed to Sulla, one of the consuls for the year. But 
Marius was not disposed to acquiesce in his defeat. As 
once before he had deposed a general of the senate from 
his command by virtue of a law passed in the assembly, 
so now he determined to repeat his performance. With 
the help of the leading demagogue of the moment, a certain 
Siilpicius Rufus, he accordingly procured an enactment of 
the people transferring the command of the war with Mith- 
ridates to himself. But he had overlooked the change he 
had himself made in the army. Sulla had no thought of 
submitting to the law, and Sulla's soldiers belonged no 
longer to the state, but to their general. Realizing this the 
consul gathered up his forces and marched rapidly on 
Rome. The mob were powerless to back up their decree 
by force, and Sulla occupied the city and undid at pleasure 
the acts of his opponents. For the first time a Roman gen- 
eral had turned the swords of his soldiers against his coun- 
try and his government, and for the first time the army 
had overruled the decision of the forum. Horror and con- 
sternation must have reigned in Rome at such a sacrilege, 
but power was with the aspiring general, and for the mo- 
ment, at any rate, his will was law. For the time being 
he was content to impose on Rome the supremacy of the 
senate, to which he owed his command, and this done, he 
departed to fulfil his eastern task. He must have known 
when he set sail from Italy that what had been accom- 
plished by violence could be undone by the same means. 
He may have thought that he had left the senate with suffi- 
cient force to meet its enemies, but if so he miscalculated. 
Perhaps he did the best he could and trusted to his luck. 
In any case, he was scarcely gone when the reaction came; 
the democrats seized possession of power as violently and 
lawlessly as he had done, and after a short struggle gained 
control. As Sulla had outlawed Marius and Sulpicius Rufus, 
so now he was in turn declared a public enemy. His friends 



>< 



48 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

were murdered, or sought refuge in his camp in Greece, 
and Marius and Cinna reigned in Rome. But the demo- 
crats had learned the lesson which Sulla had so plainly 
taught. Possession of the forum and the magistracies was 
nothing if not sustained by force. In Italy there was no 
power to challenge their supremacy, but in the East were 
Sulla and his army, engaged for the moment in a struggle 
with Rome's enemies, but, once released from the clutches 
of the war with Mithridates, quite capable of turning their 
attention to their enemies in Rome. That Sulla's soldiers 
would follow him even against the government of his coun- 
try none could doubt, and the entire time of his absence was 
a long nightmare to his foes in Italy, haunted forever with 
the question of what he might and would some day do when 
the time came for his return. The largest army in the 
Roman world belonged to him, and their sole hope of safety 
lay in getting in their hands a stronger army to protect them 
from the reckoning he would, late or soon, be in a position 
to exact. They therefore spent the years which his cam- 
paigns against the King of Pontus gave them in desperate 
attempts to form an army to support their government. 
But unfortunately for them they were woefully weak in 
generals who could make a strong appeal to the common 
soldier. They were unable to provide themselves with any 
force which could hold its own with Sulla's veterans, and 
when he did at last return to Italy, he rapidly beat down 
their forces, and once again, at the head of his legions, oc- 
cupied the city. 

For the second time Sulla was the armed master of Rome, 
but now his position was quite different from what it had 
been on the first occasion. Then his soldiers had probably 
followed him chiefly in order that the eastern war might re- 
main in his hands. Of this they were as desirous as he 
could be himself. The war against Mithridates promised 
rich spoil and plunder, and Sulla was a general in whom 
they trusted and under whom they were confident of vic- 
tory. If the command had been transferred to Marius, 
other soldiers would have reaped the rich rewards which 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 49 

were the certain fruits of success. Now that they had re- 
turned victorious, they backed their general because, if he 
were proscribed, they could not hope to get the land allot- 
ments he had promised them. They were well pleased to 
see him master of the state, since the greater his power the 
more easily he could fulfil his pledges. Nor was a tem- 
porary control enough to safeguard them. They could only 
hope to keep what he might give them if his enemies, and 
theirs, were rendered powerless, for if the defeated demo- 
crats should get the upper hand again they might reason- 
ably be expected to undo all Sulla's acts. His army was, 
therefore, willing to see him made dictator, and to have 
him protect them by a thorough reorganization of the con- 
stitution. And Sulla, on his part, dared not stop short of 
this. 

So in 82 B.C. Sulla was named dictator with full power 
to amend and change the laws. Whether public opinion 
would have acquiesced in a permanent autocracy may be 
questioned, but Sulla had no desire for such a role. He 
meant to reorganize the republic so as to secure his own 
safety, and to accomplish that, the steps to take were clear 
and unmistakable. Sulla was himself, no doubt, a sincere 
aristocrat ; even if he had not been, he had no choice. The 
irresistible pressure of circumstances had bound him to the 
senate by ties he had no power to break. Between him and 
the popular assembly no accommodation was possible, even 
if he had desired it. The only course left open was to re- 
organize the state under the sole control of the senate, and 
to destroy every power that might threaten that control. 
No doubt such convictions as he had pointed this way and 
made the path of interest coincide with that of duty. The 
constitutional reform of Sulla, therefore, took the shape of 
a senatorial restoration. His purpose, through all his leg- 
islation, stood out clear and plain — to reorganize the senate 
so as to secure the control of that body to his friends, and 
to make it absolute master of the Roman government. 

If Sulla had but little choice in the work, at any rate he 
did it as well as circumstances rendered possible. He en- 
larged and increased the senate, and chained down every 



7 



50 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

power that could interfere with its supremacy. The trib- 
unes and the assembly he completely gagged. No more 
should the turbulent mob-leaders be permitted to use the 
legislative power of the people to modify or to upset the 
arrangements of the conscript fathers. No law could be 
submitted to a vote of the Roman citizens until it had re- 
ceived the sanction of the senate. That body was thus left 
in unchallengeable control of laws, provinces, wars, and 
armies. Never again should a Marius intrude himself 
where the conscript fathers did not desire his presence ; no 
more should tribunes of the people dispose, as Sulpicius 
had tried to do, of armies and of provinces. Whatever 
arrangements the senate might see fit to make should stand. 

But if the senate was to govern, it must have at its com- 
mand the means of government. So Sulla provided it with 
a staff of magistrates adequate to deal with the affairs of 
the empire. He increased the number of the praetors, so 
as to give the senate a supply of promagistrates sufficient 
to administer the provinces and to dispatch the business of 
the state at home. To give the senate yet another means 
of controlling the governors, he entrusted to that body the 
exclusive right to try those who were accused of maladmin- 
istration. That Sulla, in transferring this function from 
the knights to the senate, aimed principally to weaken the 
influence of the capitalist class upon the administration 
is no doubt true, but the change would, nevertheless, 
strengthen the hold of the senate on the provincial govern- 
ment both directly by making the governor effectively re- 
sponsible to the senate, and indirectly by shutting out all 
possibility of outside interference. 

The senate was thus placed in a position of supreme au- 
thority and fortified on every side. From a purely legal 
point of view there was only one weak point in the sena- 
torial fortress. That was that the magistrates, who were 
still the executives of the state, were chosen by the vote of 
the people. Thus the senate might find itself compelled to 
carry on the government through officers who were polit- 
ically hostile to it. This Sulla could not prevent without 
an almost unthinkable breach with Roman customs and 
ideas. Nor is it likely that he regarded the danger on this 



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 51 

side as serious. The interference in the past had come 
mainly from the tribunes, who were now effectually silenced. 
Consuls and praetors had not usually given the senate much 
trouble. Nor were they likely, under Sulla's constitution, 
to be strong enough to do much harm. Even if a demo- 
cratic consul should be elected, Sulla had tied his hands ef- 
fectively and he would find himself so restricted and con- 
fined that nothing of importance could be accomplished. 

When Sulla, having finished his reforms, retired to 
enjoy the fruits of his successful eastern war, he left 
the senate in a position that was legally impregnable. No 
move could be made against it without a violation of the 
law. But could the law be trusted as an adequate protec- 
tion? If the military system by which Sulla had risen to 
the dictatorship remained unchanged, what guarantee was 
there that others might not follow in his footsteps and that 
the constitution he had set up with the sword might not be 
overthrown by it? Yet Sulla left the military system as 
it was, either because he did not fully appreciate the danger, 
or because he had no substitute to put in its place. He 
seemed uneasily aware that here was the weak link in the 
chain by which he sought to bind the Roman people, but 
he was unable to strengthen it. 8 The armies must still be 
commanded and the provinces governed by the promagis- 
trates, and the state must find its soldiers where it could. 
If in the future ambitious proconsuls should find themselves 
in conflict with the senate and with powerful armies at 
their backs, the conscript fathers must meet the situation 
as they could. While Sulla lived the danger was not likely 
to arise, and by his temperament he may have been disposed 
to anticipate Louis XV, and say, "After me the deluge!" 
At any rate, when Sulla died in 78 B.C., the new military 
and the new political systems stood side by side in harmony. 
Hardly, however, had he departed from the scene than the in- 
compatibility between the two was obvious in all men's eyes, 
and his elaborate constitution fell crashing to the ground. 



s He enacted strict laws against a governor who defied the senate, but with his 
own career in mind it is hard to believe that he can have had much faith in their 
value. 



CHAPTER III 
The Supremacy of Pompey 

At this point it may be desirable, even at the risk of some 
repetition, to sum up the outstanding features of the ad- 
ministrative and military system of the Roman republic. 
The government of Italy itself need not detain us now. Here, 
in the environment which had created them and conditioned 
and shaped their early growth, the institutions of the city- 
state could work after a fashion, and had the growth of 
Rome been limited to the peninsula, she might, perhaps, 
have gone on indefinitely under her ancient and traditional 
forms. The problems which proved fatal to the liberty of 
Rome came from without. It was in attempting to govern 
provinces across the seas and under the burden of the wars 
that came inevitably with the empire of the Mediterranean 
world that the republic actually broke down. 

In Italy the government remained still vested in the peo- 
ple, magistrates, and senate as before. The older theory 
of the constitution had placed these powers in the order 
named above. Sulla in his great reforms had changed the 
order of importance to senate, magistrates, and people. The 
citizens in their assembly still chose the magistrates each 
year and they, under the direction and by the advice of the 
senate, administered affairs at home. Long since they had 
ceased normally to go abroad during their term of office. 
When the year was up the senate dispatched those possessed 
of the imperium abroad as governors in the provinces. It 
was here that serious difficulties arose. 

When Sulla reorganized the state he estimated the num- 
ber of the provinces requiring governors as ten. These 
were as follows : Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, the two prov- 
inces of Spain, the two Gauls, Africa, Macedon, Asia, and 
Cilicia. To meet the needs of these ten provinces he gave 
the state two consuls and eight praetors every year, making 
the ten promagistrates required. Each year the senate fixed 
the provinces for the ensuing year, specifying which should 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 53 

be consular and which praetorian, and the out-going consuls 
and praetors then distributed the provinces among them- 
selves by lot. To each would normally be assigned a term 
of one year as governor in some part of the empire across 
the mountains or the seas> beyond the sacred soil of Italy in 
any case. If circumstances were not normal, however, the 
senate could meet the case in either of two ways. As it 
had the sole right to determine what the provinces should 
be, and as it had long since assumed the right to prolong the 
imperium after it had been conferred by the vote of the as- 
sembly, it could, by simply omitting one of the ordinary 
provinces from the list for which the lots were to be drawn, 
leave in control for another year the governor whose prov- 
ince was omitted, since, as the province could not be drawn 
by any magistrate, no successor could appear to supersede 
the incumbent then in office. The magistrate who was not 
assigned one of the ordinary provincial commands remained, 
under these circumstances, available for service elsewhere, 
and could be given an extraordinary command put down for 
that particular occasion in the list of provinces submitted 
to the chances of the lot. The same result could be attained 
if at any time the senate should see fit to unite under one 
governor two provinces which were usually kept separate 
and distinct, should send for example but one governor to 
have charge of both Spains or of both Gauls. Sulla might 
reasonably have thought that he had thus provided the sen- 
ate with an administrative staff equal to its needs and that 
it had ready at hand the means for such readjustment as 
might be rendered necessary by temporary circumstances. 
This supposition was indeed the truth, but it was so only 
on the assumption that the extension of the Roman empire 
was to cease and that Rome was henceforth to pursue a 
purely defensive policy. Such a policy the senate was not 
only willing, but even eager to adopt, but fate willed other- 
wise and the machine which Sulla had made broke down in 
consequence. 

The military system likewise was built upon the theory 
of peace as the normal state of things, and it likewise broke 
down under the strain of constant and serious warfare. It 



54 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

may seem strange that a people so continuously engaged in 
war as the Romans should have constructed their whole 
army for the day of peace that never came. Such is, never- 
theless, the fact. The Roman republic had no standing 
army. It persistently refused to regard war as a normal 
condition. Unlike the modern Germans it consistently re- 
fused to think in terms of militarism and regarded every 
campaign as an exceptional necessity to be met by measures 
of a temporary character. Perhaps it is too much to say 
that the Romans expected perfect peace and complete tran- 
quility. Small wars with turbulent and barbarous peoples 
on the frontiers were, no doubt, a thing which they antici- 
pated and with which the state could deal with ease, but pro- 
longed and serious wars requiring large armies the Roman 
world did not contemplate as a thing likely to occur at fre- 
quent intervals. Hence the standing army, the force that 
stood in constant readiness for action, was extremely small. 
Adequate for the ordinary needs of frontier warfare, it was 
quite unequal to a campaign upon other than a petty and 
restricted scale. This standing army consisted only of the 
small forces stationed in the provinces and under the com- 
mand of the provincial governors, a force not larger than 
was absolutely needed to maintain order and protect the 
frontier from the restless border tribes. If the republic 
found itself at war with any foe of greater power than these 
tribes it set to work and raised an army for the campaign 
in question. Once the campaign had been brought to a 
conclusion by the triumph of the Roman arms the victorious 
army was disbanded, since the state had now no further use 
for it. Thus the real military power of Rome rested wholly 
upon armies raised for each occasion and disappearing as 
soon as the need had passed away. The idea of keeping a 
great force under arms in time of peace was wholly alien 
to the Roman mind. Why keep an army when there was no 
need for it? Why burden the state with legions for which 
there was no immediate use? If circumstances required, 
a new force could always be raised, though this took time 
and the republic was like to have paid dear more than once 
for its persistent unreadiness to act. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 55 

When all was tranquil, therefore, the Roman world had 
no soldiers under arms in Italy, and in the provinces only 
small forces under the governors. In such of the overseas 
possessions as had no dangerous neighbor, as for example 
Sicily, these forces amounted to little more than a handful. 
Where a turbulent frontier, or restless tribes within the 
border, made a more dangerous situation, as in Spain or 
Gaul, a larger force was stationed, yet in no case did the 
governor have at his disposal a powerful army capable of 
taking the field against a really formidable enemy. 1 

Dangerous insubordination from the ordinary governor 
was not, therefore, a danger which was greatly to be feared. 
He had no force sufficient to enable him to march on Italy, 
or overawe the government, without a risk far greater to 
him than to the state. Nor were his troops likely to be 
willing to follow him in any perilous adventure. Appointed 
as he was by lot, he had no close or vital connection with!V~ 
either his province or his troops and his term of office was/ 
normally too short to permit him to acquire a dangerous 
popularity with either. When his successor should arrive 
he could do nothing but surrender his command and return 
to Rome as a private citizen liable to be called to account 
before the courts for any act of his that might have over- 
stepped the law. The court before which, in such a case, he 
had to appear for trial was, after Sulla's dictatorship, com- 
posed exclusively of senators, and while they might be care- 
less, or corrupt, if the charge related only to the plunder or 
oppression of the provincials for whom the conscript fath- 
ers cared but little, yet it can scarcely be supposed that if 
he had been guilty of insubordination to the senate, his 
judges would have been too much disposed to leniency. Thus 
it would seem quite clear that the independence from control 
on the part of the ordinary provincial governor was not a 
serious danger to the state, nor one that needed to concern 
the senate overmuch. If dangerous men were chosen by 



a When Caesar went to Spain as propraetor, he found there a force of two legiona 
(Dodge, Caesar, 44). When he assumed command of the two Gauls, he found at his 
disposal four legions or about 20,000 men (Rice Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 
42). In both cases his first measure was to increase his forces. With a force of 
four legions only he could hardly have ventured on the civil war. 



56 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the people to be consuls or praetors, they could do little 
during their year of office and the senate could often by a 
little manipulation of the provinces for the following year 
contrive to eliminate them as factors to be feared or 
dreaded. 2 

The danger to the state arose from those extraordinary 
conditions, as the Roman viewed them, which yet contrived 
to keep recurring with such frequency. It was when a war 
arose calling for one of those large armies which the state 
only raised in time of need and for a specific campaign that 
the military system involved an element of real and serious 
peril. When the necessity arose for a force greater than 
was normally under arms in the provinces, the Roman 
policy of never going in advance to meet a danger made the 
peril all the more intense. An army, when the circum- 
stances called for it, must be improvised, and since the state 
quite usually delayed as long as possible its preparations, 
it must be improvised at once and in hot haste to meet the 
need which statesmen had refused to see afar. When this 
was the case the state, depending as it did after the reform 
of Marius on volunteer enlistment, found itself obliged to 
have recourse to the men of established military reputation 
who could attract recruits. Thus arose a small group of 
indispensable generals, the men who could raise an army, 
whenever it might be required, by the might of their repu- 
tation and personal popularity. 

With armies thus brought together by the personal pres- 
tige of a successful general a change in the commander was 
no easy or simple matter. The character of the wars which 
called such generals to the front would have made frequent 
changes dangerous even if the character of the army had 



2 An illustration may be found in the case of Caesar. The senate regarded him as 
dangerous and foresaw the probability of his election as consul. The conscript 
fathers, therefore, named as the consular provinces for the year of his proconsul- 
ship the charge of the roads and forests in Italy. Caesar was not to be thus put 
aside however, and, as the assembly had by that time been freed from the restrictions 
which Sulla had put upon it, he succeeded by its help in setting aside the arrange- 
ments of the senate. In addition to its power of fixing the provinces, the senate had 
also the right to determine the number of the troops and the amount of the funds 
at the disposal of a governor. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 57 

not rendered them impossible except under exceptional con- 
ditions. Not only did the state find itself compelled to call 
upon the general of popularity and repute in order to obtain 
an army for its wars but, once selected, it had no real choice 
except to leave him in command until the war was finished 
and his army could be dispensed with. Thus practical per- 
manence of command was grafted on the Roman system, 
and that command was more and more disconnected from 
the annual magistracies. It would rarely happen that a 
crisis would arrive at the precise moment when one of the 
few who, under the new conditions, was capable of taking 
up the task chanced to be among the men just ready to de- 
part for their provincial duties, and even if he were, the 
lot by which these duties were assigned gave no assurance 
that he could be employed where he was wanted. It neces- 
sarily follows, that the normal machinery could not be used 
in case of any serious war and that, whenever the state was 
confronted by any work of large importance, it was driven 
to create an extraordinary command in order to meet it. 
That is to say, the constitution of Rome, while adequate 
to meet what Roman statesmen regarded as a normal situ- 
ation, was helpless in a case of greater difficulty. The an- 
nual magistrates were average Roman leaders and poli- 
ticians and the annual governors of the provinces were nec- 
essarily the same. But such men could not handle any sit- 
uation that involved a serious responsibility. That the great 
commands might be fraught with danger to the state was 
clear enough to men of very moderate foresight, but to 
realize this was useless unless a remedy could be provided, 
and this was just what the Romans were unable to supply. 
Whenever the senate attempted to carry on a serious cam- 
paign by means of the ordinary machinery, disaster fol- 
lowed promptly as a result and a great command had to be 
resorted to in order to retrieve a situation which delay had 
only made more critical. Whatever the reluctance of the 
senate, the state could wage successful war on a large scale 
only by this means and such wars it found itself unable to 
avoid. 

It was this fact that caused the failure of Sulla's work 



/ 



58 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

of reorganization. All that he found it in his power to do 
was so to entrench the senate in control of things that it 
could govern the Roman world in relatively tranquil times. 
His really vital failure lay in this, that he was unable to 
create a world in which the military and administrative ma- 
chine, such as he found or made it, could work successfully. 
For this failure he was not responsible. He was dictator 
of Rome but his autocracy stopped at her frontiers. He 
could not rule at once his country and the rest of the world. 
He had been forced to leave his eastern enemy, beaten but 
still unconquered, while he fought for mastery at home. 
Once master in his own house, he reorganized the state as 
best he could, but he could not so reshape that state that it 
could stand in face of the difficulties which it had to meet 
once he was gone. Hardly was the reformer in his grave 
when his constitution broke down under the strain of de- 
mands which it could not meet and which he had not been 
able to avert. The mechanism was unequal to the work the 
world required. 

When Sulla died, the senate was, perhaps, adequate for 
peaceful days but dangerously weak for troubled times. 
This weakness has sometimes been laid to the charge of the 
successive massacres which had decimated the governing 
nobility. While these contributed their part, the essential 
weakness was not that the average senator lacked courage 
or conviction for the task of holding the fortress which 
Sulla had ingeniously contrived to fashion. That many of 
the senate did lack these qualities is true and had probably 
been true long before his time. Yet if this had been its only 
weakness, it is difficult to see how the position of the senate 
could have been successfully assailed. What really mattered 
was that it lacked men of established military reputation 
who were at the same time thoroughly loyal to the constitu- 
tion which Sulla had devised. Some there were, indeed, but 
not enough for the troubled times the state had to confront, 
and this could only mean that sooner or later the senate 
would find itself driven by necessity to place strong armies 
in the hands of men it could not trust and take the chance 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 59 

that they would show an unexpected loyalty to those who 
had reluctantly intrusted them with power. 

Sulla had left behind him when he died but four really 
competent generals, namely Lucullus, Metellus, Pompey, and 
Crassus. The first two were devoted partisans upon whose 
loyalty the senate could rely ; the others had been regarded 
by Sulla himself with something of suspicion. If he had 
not wholly trusted them, the senate could have even less of 
confidence, for the awe which the dictator inspired and the 
thought of his veterans would probably have kept them 
loyal to him, while the senate was much less likely to in- 
spire a salutary fear. Upon the military side, therefore, 
the senate was dangerously weak if stormy weather should 
confront the state. Even in Sulla's lifetime the clouds had 
been gathering upon the horizon. In the East a renewal 
of the war with Mithridates was an obvious possibility, 
while the civil war in Italy had led directly to a new and 
serious war in Spain. In this last region Sertorius, the 
governor appointed by the democratic regime which Sulla 
had overthrown, had rallied around him the remnants of his 
party that had escaped the vengeance of Sulla and was wag- 
ing open war against the government that Sulla had set up 
at Rome. So grave had the situation become in Spain that 
the dictator had dispatched Metellus to take charge and 
crush the rebels. This task soon proved to be no easy one 
and the war there dragged on with varying fortunes. Thus, 
at the moment of Sulla's death, the senate, which he had 
restored to power, had ready at hand in Italy only one gen- 
eral, Lucullus, in whom it had entire confidence. Unfort- 
unately for the conscript fathers his reputation as a com- 
mander was yet to make, for, though he had done good serv- 
ice in the East, he had borne no part in the civil war in Italy 
and his eastern service had been chiefly with the fleet. He 
was probably but little known at home, and in spite of his 
capacity as a general, he never possessed the gift of making 
himself popular with his men. In an emergency which 
called for instant action he was likely to be of little use, and 
the senate might be forced to fall back upon the services of 
Pompey and of Crassus, however little it might trust them. 



60 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Scarcely had Sulla's death occurred in 78 B.C. than the 
senate found itself facing a crisis. Lepidus, one of the 
consuls for the year, began an agitation which threatened 
to undo all Sulla's recent work. Taking advantage of the 
discontent then seething throughout Italy, he made a bar- 
gain with the democrats and sought to repeat the revolu- 
tion that had placed Cinna in power when Sulla had set 
out for Greece to fight against Mithridates. After some 
preliminary skirmishes in Rome he put himself at the head 
of an open rebellion in Etruria. We need only to recall 
what Sulla had done to realize that Italy was full of com- 
bustible material. He had confiscated immense quantities 
of land and penalized numerous Italian municipalities that 
had taken the other side in the civil war. Add to this the 
children of the proscribed and the discontented democrats 
and all the other classes who were injured by his reforms 
and it is evident that a revolt had excellent chances of get- 
ting strong support. The advantage of the senate lay in 
the fact that Sulla's victory had been so recent and so 
crushing that many who sympathized with the movement 
were inclined to wait till it should be well started before 
they joined it openly. The best hope, if not the only one, 
of averting a dangerous civil war lay in prompt and vig- 
orous action. Of these things the senate was well aware 
and it was clear enough to the conscript fathers that the 
safety of the state required that Lepidus should be sup- 
pressed before his insurrection had a chance to spread. If 
time were given him to arouse and organize the elements 
of unrest, all Italy would soon be in flames. To save itself 
the senate had to act at once, and that it might do so, it 
required a man whose name would be enough to call in vol- 
unteers. One such man there was ready to hand and what- 
ever their opinion of his soundness in the faith, the con- 
script fathers had no choice but to place Pompey at the 
head of their forces. This they did, and the rebellion of 
Lepidus was swiftly crushed : but the victory left the state 
facing a new peril less menacing, indeed, but not less real 
than that which had just passed harmlessly away. 

The youth to whom the conscript fathers had been forced 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 61 

to turn for safety, although not yet thirty years of age, 
was already a well-known and popular soldier. His father 
had been a general distinguished for his very dubious loy- 
alty rather than for any striking military achievements. 
At the time of the elder Pompey's death the son had been 
too young to attract the attention of the then dominant 
democrats and so had lived to witness the return of Sulla 
from the East. Then, boy as he still was, he had hastened 
to join Sulla at the head of a considerable body of volun- 
teers. In the civil war he rendered services of importance 
to the future dictator and displayed a military capacity 
which led to his being intrusted with the task of destroy- 
ing the remnants of the Marian party in Africa and Sicily 
and so securing the food supply of Rome. For his victo- 
ries, which, though of vital significance to the dictator, 
were scarcely wonderful in themselves, he demanded the 
unprecedented honor of a triumph, something never before 
conferred on anyone not a regular magistrate of the re- 
public, and the right to use the title of Magnus, or the 
Great, as a family name. Sulla, although astonished at his 
presumption, granted his demands, but, having done so and 
thus disarmed his vainglorious lieutenant, retired him forth- 
with from public life. It seems reasonably clear that this 
retirement was due to the dictator's understanding of the 
man and to a perception of the fact that he could not be 
relied upon to put the interests of the senate before the 
promptings of his own vanity and ambition. Still Pompey 
had contrived to impress his contemporaries with a sense 
of efficiency and to acquire the reputation of a general who 
could win the hearts of his men. When Lepidus menaced 
the state with a counter-revolution the senate in its terror 
called upon him to use his popularity to crush the rebel. 
His success in this task was rapid and complete. His name 
brought men to fill the ranks and his real gifts as a com- 
mander, joined to the incompetence of his opponents, did 
the rest. 

The danger from Lepidus once averted, the senate found 
itself confronted with the problem of dealing with its own 
general. The victorious Pompey was at the head of a 



62 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

strong force in Italy which he refused to disband and the 
senate had at hand no soldiers to resist any demands he 
might be pleased to make. As it happened, what he de- 
sired at the moment was not very distasteful to the senate. 
The war in Spain was still dragging on and Metellus, the 
general in charge there, was calling loudly for reinforce- 
ments. Pompey requested that he and his army might be 
employed on this mission and the senate yielded its consent. 
He and his troops departed for the Sertorian war and for 
the next few years he was too far away and much too busy 
to cause further trouble to the government he served. Still 
the first downward step had been taken, and the armies of 
the state were no longer in the hands of men thoroughly 
loyal to the new constitution. 

Pompey had hardly departed for Spain when war blazed 
up again in the East. For this the senate itself seems to have 
been largely responsible. Nicomedes, the king of Bithynia, 
died, and by his will bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. The 
conscript fathers, probably under the pressure of the 
knights, accepted the legacy, although they must have known 
that this would mean a war with Mithridates, who could 
not accept the annexation of Bithynia by Rome without ab- 
dicating his place as an independent sovereign. Lucullus, 
at the moment, was one of the two consuls and after consid- 
erable maneuvering and intrigue he succeeded in having 
himself dispatched to take charge of the war. 3 With his 
departure for the East the senate was left without a single 
loyal general of established reputation in Italy. The danger 
of such a situation was not long in making itself felt, and 
that in the peculiarly sinister form of a great servile insur- 
rection in the peninsula. A band of gladiators under the 
leadership of Spartacus, breaking from their barracks, 
raised the standard of revolt and speedily aroused the coun- 
try districts of Italy which were crowded with slaves whom 
the hard conditions of their life had rendered desperate. 



s Reinach, Mithridate Eupator, 318-20. Lucullus obtained the command by resign- 
ing the province that had already been assigned to him by lot under the Sempronian 
law of C. Gracchus. Having done this the senate had the legal power to appoint him, 
without the use of the lot, to a new command. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 63 

In a short space of time the original band of gladiators had 
grown into a formidable force and seemed to the Romans to 
be a menace, not to this party or that, but to organized so- 
ciety itself. The danger was made worse by the incom- 
petence of the ordinary annual magistrates to deal with it. 
Consuls and praetors were driven from the field in head- 
long disgraceful flight by the revolted slaves till the lesson 
was at length fully learned that the average Roman politi- 
cian could not handle one of the new armies with the small- 
est chance of success. When, at length, the senate dared 
no longer trifle with the situation, it reluctantly called in the 
help of yet another general of tried capacity but doubtful 
loyalty to anybody except himself. With the support of the 
oligrachy Crassus was named as praetor for 71 B.C., and 
given the command against Spartacus and his servile rebels. 
Like Pompey he had been one of Sulla's able lieutenants, and 
like him had been retired from command. Now, once more 
at the head of an army, he speedily restored discipline which 
had gone to pieces in the inefficient hands of his predeces- 
sors and soon was pressing his foes with energy. For a time 
he seemed unable to crush the uprising completely, and in 
spite of his successful campaign the gladiators still kept the 
field. As Pompey had now brought the war in Spain to a 
triumphant close, the senate called him home with his vic- 
torious army to help their praetor finish the rebellion once 
for all. Before he could arrive, however, Crassus, furious 
at the thought of dividing the glory with one whom he re- 
garded with an envious jealousy, had made an end. Never- 
theless, obeying with alacrity the summons of the senate, 
Pompey arrived in Italy with his devoted soldiers at his 
back. 

Thus by the inexorable pressure of necessity the senate 
had been forced to place in doubtful hands two armies, both 
of which were now in Italy itself. The loyal generals were 
powerless to help. Lucullus was absent in the East and 
Metellus was unable or unwilling to offer any serious as- 
sistance. Ready to hand there was no force that could op- 
pose Crassus and Pompey, and the senate was quite helpless 
to resist them if they should unite. If they should fight each 



64 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

other there might be a chance of safety for the conscript 
fathers, yet this they did not do, although for a time men 
seem to have anticipated some such event. The two quite 
cordially and sincerely disliked each other, yet neither was 
prepared to pay too high a price to gratify his jealousy and 
envy of the other. Pompey had the stronger army, and if 
it came to open war would probably have won. This Crassus 
knew and consequently he was desirous to come to terms 
with his rival rather than to fight him. Pompey, even though 
victory was probable, had no wish for a civil war, if he could 
get what he sought without it. Neither wanted anything 
which the other could not grant and so, setting their private 
feelings on one side, they came to terms. The senate, which 
Sulla had thought to make the supreme power in the state, 
could only look on helplessly and humbly ratify a bargain 
in the making of which they were in no respect consulted 
and of every stipulation of which they strongly disapproved. 
The elaborate safeguards with which Sulla had surrounded 
the conscript fathers were useless and all because the Italy 
he left behind could not be managed by the average politi- 
cian, even though he came of an old family. He might be 
an able speaker in the forum and a skilful vote getter, but 
he could not in a time of stress command the services of 
volunteers of the kind on whom Rome now relied to fight 
her battles and thus the power inevitably passed to the ex- 
ceptional men who, under the new conditions, could raise 
and lead the armies that the state required. 

The terms on which Pompey and Crassus formed their 
combination were dictated in the main by vanity and per- 
sonal ambition. Pompey desired the consulship and Crassus 
wished to stand as high as he. Pompey preferred Crassus 
as a colleague to a civil war with him. They therefore 
speedily agreed that they should be the consuls for the en- 
suing year although by Sulla's laws neither was eligible for 
this dignity. Pompey had never held the minor offices re- 
quired of a candidate for what was still the highest post in 
the republic, while Crassus was actually praetor and a three 
year interval between offices was demanded by the law. But 
legal technicalities were nothing to men with armies at their 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 65 

backs; they had but to ask and no one would dare to 
say them nay. Nor was such a demand a thing unknown 
to Roman constitutional tradition. From time to time the 
Eoman people had exempted some favored candidate from 
the requirements of the law and made him magistrate 
though legally disqualified. This Pompey and Crassus now 
combined to demand for themselves, and the senate, men- 
aced by the swords of their armies and having no swords 
at hand to answer force with force, saw itself compelled to 
yield a sullen consent to their joint candidacy. 

That consent given, with whatever of reluctance, the path 
of the two ambitious generals seemed to be quite clear. 
They deemed it wise, however, to take ample precautions 
against possible obstacles. With the senate and its parti- 
sans overawed, there was but one chance of their plans mis- 
carrying. Perhaps the people in their assembly might re- 
fuse to do their part. To obviate the danger of any such 
mishap they struck a bargain with the democrats and thus 
made all secure. The demand of the democrats was that, 
once in office, they should undo Sulla's work and put the 
constitution back where it had been previous to his dicta- 
torship. To this they readily agreed, Pompey desirous of 
popularity and Crassus perhaps approving, but in any case 
unable to resist and probably quite content with the satis- 
faction of his personal ambition. For the senate, whose 
exclusive control they pledged themselves to destroy, neither 
cared at all. They must have known that it distrusted them 
and that it had called on them for help only because a dire 
necessity had left it no real choice. For the future they 
could hope for very little from the conscript fathers, except 
under such pressure, but the mob stood ready to applaud 
and trust. There seems no reason to suppose that any 
qualms of conscience troubled them at tearing down what 
both of them had recently fought valiantly to raise. Cer- 
tain elements in the character of each of the two men will 
go far to explain the apparent contradiction. 

Pompey was not by any means destitute of scruple, but 
throughout his life he was quite unable to perceive the 
larger aspects of a political problem. He was capable of 



66 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

sacrificing his personal ambition to the interests of the 
state, only he was too short-sighted and purblind a states- 
man to discern a conflict between the two unless it was 
particularly glaring. Thus it came about that, well inten- 
tioned as he was, he struck deadly blows at the republic 
without realizing it, and set invaluable precedents for an 
empire of which he did not dream. In this particular case 
it is not necessary to charge him with any great incon- 
sistency. It was true that he had fought for Sulla, but, 
when he joined his standard, the policy of the future dicta- 
tor was still involved in much uncertainty. That Sulla, if 
victorious, would favor the senate and the aristocracy was 
obvious to all; but it was by no means clear what precise 
measures he would take for this purpose, or to what lengths 
he would go in this direction. At the beginning of the civil 
war he used language of studied moderation without giving 
the slightest hint of many of the things he later did. Pom- 
pey may very well have joined him as the only hope of de- 
livering Rome from the tyranny of the discredited demo- 
cratic regime then in power; but such an alliance did not 
bind him to approve of the violent and drastic fashion in 
which Sulla used his victory. It is not impossible that 
Pompey, like many other men of moderate views, supported 
Sulla in the civil war only to be disgusted by many of the 
laws which, as dictator, he enacted in his endeavor to en- 
trench the senate securely in power. If this were so, he 
might, without conscious inconsistency, now use his oppor- 
tunity to repeal some of the measures to whose too narrow 
partisanship he had always been opposed. The oligarchy 
which the dictator had set up might seem too weak and 
founded on too sudden a break with the traditions of the 
Roman constitution to hope for permanence. An attempt 
at some sort of compromise by which, while it retained 
all its ancient rights and its former position in the state, 
the senate should be forced to give up its recently ac- 
quired monopoly of power, might seem to Pompey a wise 
precaution against future violence and in no way to demand 
a surrender of the principles for which he had fought in 
the past. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 67 

Crassus, on his side, was less endowed with scruple, and 
in the enforced leisure from politics which Sulla's disfavor 
had procured for him he had been busily engaged in amass- 
ing wealth. In this pursuit he would naturally be drawn 
into close and active relations with the equestrian class 
who were the financiers and capitalists of Rome. Sulla in 
his reorganization of the state had striven systematically 
to weaken the knights and consequently the destruction of 
some parts of his work would be pleasing to a class with 
whom Crassus must, by this time, have been on intimate 
and even cordial terms. The chief role in the task to which 
the two had pledged themselves fell outwardly to Pompey, 
but Crassus may reasonably be assumed to have had no 
wish, except the promptings of his personal jealousy and 
dislike, to thwart the work. 

In this wise was formed a triple combination of Pompey, 
Crassus, and the democrats which in 70 B.C. proceeded to 
undo the constitutional reforms of Sulla. The new consuls 
could not legally bring any bill before the people without 
the approval of the senate, but, while their armies remained 
camped without the city, that body, venerable and august as 
it might be, dared not refuse its consent to the proceedings 
of the two. Their first important act was to restore to the v, 
tribunes of the people the powers of which Sulla had de- /^ 
prived them. The requirement of the senate's preliminary 
consent to bills was thus annulled and any tribune, with the 
support of the assembly, could once more legislate at will, 
regardless of the opinions or the wishes of the conscript 
fathers. This was the one really vital point because the 
cancelling of the control of the senate over legislation made 
possible all manner of changes in the future. The other 
rights and privileges of the tribunes were also restored, 
but in removing the restrictions which Sulla had put upon 
the popular assembly the really decisive blow was struck. 
The courts, too, were remodeled and the knights recovered, 
if not the complete monopoly which Gaius Gracchus had 
conferred upon them, at least a powerful influence which 
fell little short of absolute control. Thus the hold of the 
senate over the provincial governors was weakened and the 



*. 



>> 



68 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

capitalist class was given a weapon with which to push 
their interests in the empire at large. 

Beyond these two great measures, great if tested by their 
influence upon the future, Pompey and Crassus accom- 
plished little in their consulship. But what they did, al- 
though it fell short of a complete repeal of Sulla's laws, de- 
stroyed their essential meaning and their purpose and thus 
pulled down the edifice their author had constructed. The 
senate's exclusive power and control over the state, as es- 
tablished by the dictator, had fallen under the stress of 
military necessities which he had been unable to foresee or 
to avert. But though the supremacy of the senate was de- 
stroyed, for the moment its overthrow seemed to make little 
difference with the working of the government. The people 
were too ill organized to exert continuously their newly re- 
covered power of interference, and at this moment, per- 
haps because of the grim thoroughness of Sulla's bloody 
proscription, they were lacking in strong and purposeful 
leaders, capable of heading an attack upon the clique of 
noble families who still continued to monopolize the offices. 
It was also true that just then there seemed no adequate 
reason for any interference. Few, even among Roman 
democrats, had ever gone so far as to imagine that the ma- 
chinery of the state could run without the nobles as the 
usual holders of the offices or had dreamed of the democracy 
as capable of more than an occasional intervention when 
things went seriously amiss. Gaius Gracchus seems, in- 
deed, to have cherished the design of substituting the as- 
sembly for the senate as the constantly directing and con- 
trolling power of the state, but no other leader can be found 
to whom such large and far-reaching designs can reason- 
ably be ascribed. The others had put forward individual 
reforms or attacked this or that detail of the administra- 
tion of the senate but without giving any indication of a 
broadly conceived plan of replacing it. When things were 
running quietly, when no grievance was acutely felt, it 
seemed to most Romans that there was no occasion for pop- 
ular action, and in the year 70 B.C. there were no leaders 
on the democratic side possessed of such wide influence as 



THE SUPREMACY OP POMPEY 69 

to be capable of making their ambition a sufficient excuse 
for legislation. Thus it came about that when the popular 
party had demolished the essential work of Sulla, a pause 
ensued as if with that accomplished there remained no more 
to do. 

The two consuls who had done so much, once they had 
fulfilled their pledges to their supporters, allowed their per- 
sonal dislike for each other to dominate their conduct. What- 
ever thing one wished the other could be trusted to oppose. 
Crassus, as the weaker of the two, could hardly venture on 
any initiative himself, but was content to thwart his ambi- 
tious colleague whenever possible. Pompey, on his side, cast 
longing eyes toward the East, where he desired to super- 
sede Lucullus in the expectation of winning new laurels 
for himself. Such a design met with but little favor from 
Crassus, who was bitterly opposed to anything that prom- 
ised additional glory for his rival. In alliance with the 
senate he succeeded in checking Pompey, and the latter, dis- 
daining an ordinary proconsulship, announced that at the 
close of his year of office he would retire into private life. 
Crassus promptly followed the example thus set and like- 
wise declined a governorship, partly, no doubt, for financial 
reasons, but partly also because he wished to remain in 
Rome where he could more easily continue to thwart Pom- 
pey. 

The next two years passed by without conspicuous events, 
but then new troubles arose. While Rome's attention had 
been turned in other directions a new enemy had grown to 
menacing proportions. The Romans had never loved the 
sea and had become a naval power only under the compul- 
sion of the war with Carthage. Her African rival once de- 
stroyed, Rome had given little attention to her fleet. The 
policing of the seas, which was the duty of the dominant 
Mediterranean power, had been neglected during many years, 
and piracy had again become a formidable scourge. At 
last the senate could no longer shut its eyes to the necessity 
of action, but the commanders placed in charge failed mis- 
erably to accomplish anything. The seas remained unsafe 
and the pirates plundered far and near along the coasts. 



> 



70 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

How long the Roman government might have tolerated this 
condition and the manifest incapacity of the ordinary au- 
thorities under the direction of the senate to do anything 
worth while to meet it, is matter for speculation merely. 
The pirates by a stroke of folly stirred the people to action. 
Grown too bold from long impunity, they ventured finally 
to intercept the grain ships on which the Roman mob de- 
pended for its dole of food. The misery of their subjects 
had not moved the populace of Rome particularly, but the 
prospect of famine for themselves was a very different 
thing. Indifference immediately gave place to anger. The 
mob was united in demanding swift and effective action, and 
since the lack of bread was in itself a clear demonstration 
of the incapacity of the senate's commanders, the people de- 
termined to appoint one of their own. Nor was the choice 
a matter of the slightest difficulty. Pompey was popular 
and bore the reputation of a general who had never failed. 
Whatever task had been assigned him he had successfully 
performed and his record was in no wise injured in the eyes 
of the rabble by the fact that so far fortune had always 
favored him; for example, the ending of the war against 
Sertorius had been due more to that leader's murder by 
some of his own followers than to any skill of Pompey. 
The feeling of the people was too strong and too unanimous 
not to find prompt expression, and one of the tribunes, 
Gabinius by name, availed himself of the newly restored 
powers of his office to bring a bill dealing with the situation 
before the assembly. 

The Gabinian Law was sufficiently sweeping in its pro- 
visions. Pompey was not mentioned by name, but every 
one knew well enough that he was meant. The purpose of 
the bill was to create, by popular action, a new great com- 
mand. In general terms it provided that some man of con- 
sular rank should be selected by the assembly and intrusted 
with the sole charge of the war against the pirates. It 
clothed the man so chosen with wide and even extravagant 
powers for the intended campaign. He was authorized to 
raise a fleet and an army for the war, and was given power 
to call upon the treasury for ample funds. Ships, men, and 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 71 

money were all placed at his disposal on a scale which far 
surpassed the actual requirements of the occasion. This 
may have been due to a desire to flatter the man on whom 
the choice of the assembly was certain to fall, or it may have 
been that the excited feeling of the streets had vastly over- 
estimated the difficulty of the task. The most startling fea- 
ture of the bill was not the resources it assigned to the 
commander but the jurisdiction which it gave him. His 
authority was to extend over the whole Mediterranean and 
over its coasts for fifty miles inland. This would give prac- 
tical control of all the provinces of Rome since but little of 
her empire lay farther from the sea than fifty miles. To 
exercise his far-reaching imperium the commander was au- 
thorized to select a number of legati, or lieutenants, from 
the higher ranks of the senate. The term for which he 
was to hold his powers was fixed at three years. 

The bill amounted to a practical dictatorship for Pompey ; 
yet the situation could be made to justify its main provi- 
sions. To crush the pirates a fleet was obviously neces- 
sary, and its exact size could hardly be determined in ad- 
vance. An army was equally necessary, for if the pirates 
were permitted to retire into their strongholds, they could 
there await in safety the first favorable opportunity to re- 
new their depredations. To destroy them effectively they 
must be tracked down at once by land and sea, and for this 
purpose an army of uncertain size and the control of the 
coasts to an indefinite extent were required. The neces- 
sary operations might well last for a considerable time and 
three years were allowed by the bill. The Roman people 
meant to make an end, once for all, of the enemy who threat- 
ened their supply of food and to accomplish this they did 
not hesitate to set up a possible master for themselves. The 
senate and the nobles could not be expected to submit quite 
tamely to a bill which thus handed over all the power and 
resources of the state to a man whom they neither liked nor 
trusted. They resisted bitterly but in vain; the clamor 
of the streets bore down all opposition. When a fellow 
tribune tried to stop Gabinius by interposing his veto, the 
precedent of Tiberius Gracchus was at once revived and the 



72 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

obstructive tribune removed from office. The legality of 
such a step was no clearer now than in the past, but in the 
face of the popular anger and enthusiasm the senate did 
not dare resort to legal technicalities. 4 The hostile tribune 
having been deposed, the bill was voted in the assembly and 
solemnly declared a law of Rome. Thus Pompey entered 
on a new command, and the wisdom, for himself, of his 
policy of emancipating the people from senatorial control 
was completely justified. What the senate would have re- 
fused the people had given eagerly, and he, for his part, 
must have rejoiced in private that by virtue of his acts as 
consul the people had recovered the power to give. The 
hostile senate was forced to look on helplessly while Pom- 
pey gathered in the due reward of popularity. 

From the day the bill was passed in 67 B.C. till Pompey 
disbanded his army in 61, he was the Emperor of Rome in 
all but name. The task the people had assigned him was 
soon discharged and the popular choice was justified by his 
extraordinary success. In a campaign far shorter than 
any one had dreamed of, he swept the pirates from the sea, 
and by a judicious combination of severity and mercy, he 
brought about the surrender of their strongholds on the 
coast. By assembling overwhelming force, by showing his 
foes that if they fought to the bitter end they could expect 
no mercy, and then tendering reasonable terms as a reward 
for prompt surrender, the task was soon achieved, and 
Pompey found himself at the head of an army in Cilicia, 
the great pirate center, with his task fulfilled. But a force 
that was overwhelming against the freebooters was equally 
so against the state that had commissioned him. Even in 
Cilicia, with his fleet and army at his beck and call, he had 
but to ask what he would and the government in Rome was 
powerless to refuse. It thus followed that Pompey had 
scarcely finished the work intrusted to him when his com- 
mand was extended and enlarged. For this the situation 
in the East furnished the pretext. 

In Asia Rome had been engaged for some years in a new 
struggle with her old foe, Mithridates. This war had been, 

*Frank, 314. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 73 

and at the moment still, was, in the charge of Lucullus. At 
first that general had been brilliantly successful, and hith- 
erto Pompey had seen his efforts to supersede him foiled. 
Now, however, the situation had changed; the war, which 
had opened so successfully for Lucullus, had ended in a 
dismal failure and disgrace. His generalship had been com- 
pletely adequate; he was, perhaps, as good a soldier as 
Rome had, but one vital quality he lacked : he could not gain 
or hold the devotion of his men. In spite of the victories 
to which he led them, his soldiers hated him and at last 
refused to follow him any longer. His last campaigns had 
failed by reason of the mutiny and insubordination of his 
own army. In face of this complete breakdown on his part 
the senate had decided on his recall 5 and had voted to 
intrust the final settlement of the East to new commanders 
of the ordinary stamp. But their very action in removing 
him had been a signal for a fresh crisis. The war, which 
had seemed practically ended, flamed out again and the men 
designated by the senate were quite obviously unequal to 
the new situation. It was necessary to make a change in 
the arrangements and but one change was possible. A new 
and serious war required a commander superior to the ord- 
inary promagistrate and such a one was already actually 
upon the scene. Pompey, the ever victorious, was there at 
hand in the very region where the war would be fought out. 
His name and popularity would quiet the mutinous soldiers 
of Lucullus and the forces he had raised to fight the pirates 
would serve to reinforce their ranks. He had previously 
been known to desire the command, and if it should be now 
refused to him, what might he not do? If he embarked 
his legions on his fleet and sailed for Italy, who could be 



5 Another factor in procuring the recall of Lucullus was the attitude of the Roman 
capitalists or knights. Lucullus had not originally been named as governor of the 
province of Asia, but he was later given full authority there for war purposes. In 
the exercise of his power he contrived to quarrel with the knights. The province was 
overwhelmed with debt and Lucullus undertook a drastic reduction of it. This in- 
furiated the Roman capitalists who saw their extortionate profits thus curtailed and 
they neither forgot the measure nor forgave the author (Heitland, iii, 35-36). 
Ferrero has pictured Lucullus as an imperialist, but it appears to the present writer 
that Frank has conclusively disproved this. It was partly because he adhered to the 
older traditions of Roman policy that the knights desired his recall and Pompey's 
appointment. See Frank, Roman Imperialism, 307-14. 



74 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

found to offer any resistance ? Rome had at hand no army 
to oppose him and quite naturally preferred to give with 
outward spontaneity what it was dangerous to refuse. 

The Gabinian Law thus found a successor in the Manilian 
Law. This, we are told, was unexpectedly proposed by an 
obscure tribune of the people. The unexpectedness can 
only have lain in the man who gave his name to the meas- 
ure, for Roman politicians can scarcely have failed to an- 
ticipate some such proposal. At any rate, the bill when 
laid before the people for their vote encountered little op- 
position. Whatever eloquence could do to make its passage 
easy was well done by two young men just rising into prom- 
inence. Caesar and Cicero both spoke in favor of it. 
Though oratory might be right and seemly in the enactment 
of a Roman law, in this case it was hardly necessary. No 
one dared to offer open opposition except those who knew 
themselves so definitely set down as enemies of Pompey that 
they had nothing much to lose. If the great general should 
be provoked into invading Italy, none cared to offer them- 
selves as marks for a proscription except such as felt that 
they were certain of inclusion. So men's tongues were tied 
by fear, and whatever they might say in private, in public 
they kept silent or approved. The powerful speech of 
Cicero may have done something to make compliance easier 
for some and may have rallied a few waverers, but can 
scarcely have influenced the inevitable result. That was 
determined not by flowing periods or balanced sentences 
but by the military situation of the state which left it help- 
less. The bill was easily passed and added to the powers 
Pompey already held under the Gabinian Law the sole 
charge of the war against Mithridates and the other eastern 
foes of Rome. It vested in him the proconsular command of 
Cilicia, Bithynia, and Asia and it authorized him to make 
war and conclude peace in the name of the republic as he 
might deem expedient. This bill added to the already irre- 
sistible power which he held the last fragments of military 
force which the state possessed. From this time on till he 
might be ready to dismiss his troops, he was the master of 
the Roman world. Yet the law procured a breathing space 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 75 

for the Roman politicians none the less. Just now, and for 
an uncertain time to come, the new war would so tie his 
hands that his mastery must remain potential merely. For 
a year or two he could not interfere in Italy, and in that 
space of time something might yet be done to arm the state 
against the day when new victories would leave him free to 
turn his attention to affairs in Rome. 

Such a conception of the situation is fully borne out by 
the course of events in Rome following the passage of the 
Manilian Law. Of those who remained in the capital there 
were many who both feared and hated the absent proconsul 
and who fully meant to take advantage of the respite which 
their eastern enemy was giving them. In the front rank of 
such men was to be found the rich and active Crassus, a 
prey for long to bitter jealousy of his former colleague. 
He was one of the few who had openly opposed the Manilian 
Law and he now set himself to work to save the state, and 
incidently himself, from Pompey. This was a task which 
obviously involved considerable difficulties, yet one which 
did not seem impossible of achievement. At any rate, if 
Crassus failed, it can not be attributed to any lack of effort. 

The political affiliations of Crassus were of the most 
doubtful kind. A lieutenant of Sulla, he had fought for 
the aristocracy only to become a partner in Pompey's bar- 
gain with the democrats in 70 B.C. To thwart his colleague's 
eastern ambitions he had joined the senate once again, leav- 
ing the democrats to rally around Pompey. The passage 
of the two great laws in favor of the latter convinced him 
that this was a mistake and he now sought to use the pop- 
ular party for his own ends. Yet he could hardly flatter 
himself that he could eclipse his rival in a frank contest for 
the favor of the mob. Accordingly he set to work by indi- 
rect means and by the use of other men. His vast wealth 
made this course the easier and the more promising. So 
rich a man as Crassus could manage to pull many wires 
without appearing in the open. His millions made him a 
strong power in the financial world and among the Roman 
politicians there were many whom he could control. For 



76 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

many years Crassus had been spending money freely to se- 
cure influence and had not spent in vain. It was his com- 
mon practice, we are told, to loan money freely to any one 
who had, or seemed likely to acquire, the least importance. 
Nor was the generous lender in a hurry for repayment. 
He was content to bide his time until the moment came when 
he could use his debtor. In this way, among many others 
doubtless, it gradually came about that many of the senators 
could scarcely venture to displease him greatly and that 
many of the demagogues of the forum could be likewise 
brought into line when he might choose. If to all these 
we add the numbers of the rabble whose votes were so much 
property for sale, the influence which the millionaire could 
exert was truly formidable. True, it was not by any means 
omnipotent, but by clever management and profuse expend- 
iture he might accomplish much. 

Accordingly in 65 B.C., the year after the passage of the 
Manilian Law, with Pompey fully occupied in Asia, he suc- 
ceeded in having himself elected censor for the year and in 
securing the services of the ablest of the rising men of 
^Rome, no less a person than Gaius Julius Caesar. The later 
greatness of this man has served to cast a glamour over his 
earlier career which it can hardly be held to have merited. 
By birth and marriage allied to the popular party, although 
sprung from an old patrician family, Caesar had narrowly 
escaped from Sulla's proscription by the intercession of his 
aristocratic relatives and friends. He had escaped, how- 
ever, and as soon as quieter times permitted he had entered 
politics upon the democratic side. His private fortune was 
soon spent and he found himself a bankrupt demagogue. 
His splendid genius was his only asset, but it was enough, 
for Crassus had the necessary means and needed someone 
to carry out his schemes. A bargain was thus easily con- 
cluded between the two, and for the next few years the fu- 
ture conqueror of Gaul acted as the henchman and political 
manager of the great financier. For the year of Crassus' 
censorship his partner was one of the aediles and the two 
set busily to work. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 77 

Both men were gifted with too clear an insight not to dis- 
cern wherein lay Pompey's power and to perceive the only 
means by which it could be met. Even if Crassus had been 
far more stupid than he was his own career would have en- 
lightened him. He must have been perfectly aware that in 
70 B.C. Pompey would never have selected him as his col- 
league in the consulship but for the army with which he 
had been ready to enforce his claims. It was that army 
and that alone which had induced the conqueror of Serto- 
rius to agree to a compromise. If when Pompey should re- 
turn from Asia as the conqueror of Mithridates, Crassus 
was to hope for favorable terms he must be able to appeal 
to a similar argument. His primary purpose, therefore, 
during the next few years was to obtain, by any means that 
offered, a military power to balance that which the final 
crushing of the king of Pontus would set free. But where 
and how and by what pretext could he obtain it? 

This question seemed comparatively easy to answer be- 
cause of the circumstances of the moment. The recent 
shortage of grain in Rome had fastened the attention of the 
people upon the sources of supply. Some years before a 
worthless Alexandrian king had been murdered by the mob 
of his capital. 6 It was reported that he had left a will be- 
queathing Egypt to the Roman people. Whether the will 
was genuine or not no one had troubled to inquire, nor had 
the senate hitherto accepted or rejected the legacy in any 
formal manner. It now appeared to Crassus that this cir- 
cumstance might furnish the opportunity he sought. The 
annexation of Egypt might be made popular by being repre- 
sented as a means of securing to the mob an ample supply 
of grain and would furnish a pretext for raising an army. 
Crassus and Caesar, therefore, promptly brought the matter 
forward with some hopes of success. To help in the forma- 
tion of their army by securing for themselves popularity in 
that part of the peninsula where the recruiting was the best, 
Crassus, as censor, proposed to extend citizenship to the in- 
habitants of the province of Cisalpine Gaul. This project 

"The king was Ptolemy XII Alexander II. BouchS-Leclercq, Histoire des Lagids, 
ii. 118-21. 



78 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

was blocked by his colleague in the censorship, but this can 
hardly have displeased the millionaire. Gratitude in poli- 
tics is apt to be of short duration and a favor gained is 
speedily forgotten. As matters were people of the Po val- 
ley had not yet obtained the privilege they coveted and they 
would continue to look to Crassus as their champion for the 
future. 

Admirably conceived as was the Egyptian plan, it was 
none the less a failure. The prompt victory of Pompey over 
the pirates had removed the immediate scarcity, and now 
that food was plenty the mob no longer felt any interest in 
the source of the supplies. Moreover, Pompey was still the 
idol of the populace and an expedition to Egypt was too ob- 
vious a blow at him. An army in that country would hold 
a powerful position on his flank, a strategic fact which had 
doubtless commended the scheme all the more strongly to 
its authors. Pompey could by this means be menaced with- 
out being named, and under cover of anxiety about the peo- 
ple's food, an army could be placed precisely where it could 
threaten him if he attempted to return. Unfortunately for 
Crassus the threat was just a little too obvious and the 
Roman mob, with abundant food assured for the present, 
were not disposed to affront a man who was still their fa- 
vorite. The senatorial party, likewise, though with little 
confidence in Pompey, had yet no greater faith in his would- 
be rival. If they needed a savior they were not disposed 
to welcome Crassus in that role, however eager he might 
be to play it. The dread, too, of increased responsibilities 
was strong, since the state already had as many provinces 
as it could govern with the existing machinery. Caesar 
and Crassus therefore encountered opposition on all sides 
and despite all their efforts could not get their enterprise 
so much as fairly launched. Finding themselves unable to 
carry out their plan, they dropped it and turned their at- 
tention to new schemes. 

Their design on Egypt having failed, they hoped to ac- 
complish some part of their purpose by gaining control of 
the government. If they could secure the election of friendly 
magistrates for the next year, they might with them hope 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 79 

either to revive the Egyptian scheme or devise and carry- 
out some other plan, it mattered little what, so that it in- 
volved the raising of an army under their control. Accord- 
ingly, in 64 B.C. they made a desperate effort to carry the 
elections. Of the candidates for the consulship for the en- 
suing year they strenuously supported two, Catiline and 
Antonius by name. So energetic was their campaign in 
favor of these two that the aristocrats were frightened to 
the point of swallowing their pride. Catiline was a des- 
perate and reckless adventurer ready for anything, while 
Antonius was a pliant tool of those behind him. If these 
two became consuls the nobles knew not what they might 
do, but could be reasonably certain that it would be highly 
objectionable. Of the candidates to whom in normal times 
they would have given their support none had much hope 
of winning. They were thus forced to throw their whole 
support to the least objectionable man who seemed to have 
a chance and this man happened to be Cicero. The strong 
dread of Crassus and his schemes and those who were, or 
seemed likely to be, his agents thus combined to force the 
aristocrats of Rome to make a new man their champion 
and to support him for the highest office in the state, high- 
est in dignity if no longer in real power. The result of 
the election with the issues thus confused was, on the face 
of it, ambiguous; Catiline was defeated and Antonius and 
Cicero elected. The nobles had thus won half the battle. 
But in such a contest half a loaf was the equivalent of the 
whole. The plans of Crassus and of Caesar required action 
and one consul could prevent his colleague from doing any- 
thing at all. The program he had been elected to put 
through having thus become impossible, Antonius went 
over to the winners and allowed himself to be bought off 
by Cicero, who ceded him the lucrative province of Mace- 
donia on his pledge to remain quiet during his year of 
office. It happened, therefore, that for 63 B.C. Cicero was 
the sole consul, in fact if not in name, and the control of 
the chief magistracy thus rested entirely in the hands of 
the conservatives. 

Caesar and Crassus had again been defeated in their 



80 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

plans. But before they finally admitted the checkmate 
they fell back on one last design and made a farewell effort. 
Rullus, a tribune known to be their tool, brought forward 
an agrarian bill. The very name of such a measure might 
be popular with the mob and the bill was framed with con- 
siderable ingenuity. Its purpose, not of course avowed, 
was to place an army at the disposal of its real authors, 
who were keeping in the background. On the surface it 
proposed a mighty benefaction to the poor by directing that 
the state should purchase and assign them lands in Italy. 
To get the money which this transaction would require, the 
bill directed that the state should sell its properties lying 
outside the peninsula. To direct the sale and purchase and 
assignment, an agrarian commission was to be elected and 
to enable its members to perform the duties delegated to 
them they were invested with the imperium. This would 
enable them to sit as judges to determine what property 
was public and what private and to raise troops to carry 
out the sentences which they might render. The signifi- 
cance of these provisions would seem clear. Crassus, and 
perhaps Caesar, were to be members of the commission. 
Acting in their judicial capacity they could declare the will 
of the late Ptolemy valid and Egypt the property of the 
Koman people. To obtain possession an army would be 
needed, and this the bill empowered them to raise and to 
command. Under cover of an innocent-looking agrarian 
bill the Egyptian enterprise could be resumed and finally 
carried out. 

In spite of its apparent plausibility the scheme possessed 
one capital defect. To make it possible to carry it out, the 
clauses of the bill had to be framed in such general terms 
as to cause perturbation and alarm. No art could quite 
conceal the singular disproportion between the machinery 
which it was proposed to set up and the avowed ends it 
was to serve. Suspicion was inevitable that the intention 
of the bill was other than alleged. Besides, the Roman mob 
was no longer so land-hungry as in the past. The longer 
they lived in Rome upon the public bounty in the shape of 
the corn-dole, the less they cared for hard work on a farm. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 81/ 

The largess of the state by relieving them of anxiety for 
their daily bread had taken away all serious desire for al- 
lotments of land. If they had sought for land at all, it 
would in most cases have been simply in the hope of selling 
it, and even if the bill should pass, and if it should be car- 
ried out in its professed spirit, it would be some years be- 
fore they could hope to get anything. As a bribe to the 
mob, therefore, it was not particularly attractive. Yet the 
old tradition, which made the very name of agrarian bill 
suggest a measure for the people and against the rich, might 
have sufficed to carry it along, backed as it was by powerful 
friends and patrons, had it not met with resolute and vig- 
orous opposition. This, however, was exactly what it did. 
Cicero, bent on discharging his obligations to the party that 
had raised him to power, employed all his eloquence to tear 
the bill to rags. He brought home to the people in con- 
vincing fashion the discrepancy between the purpose of 
the measure and the machinery provided to attain it. He 
showed the people that it could be of no real benefit to them 
and last, but by no means least, he stripped away the spe- 
cious disguise and showed it to the people for what it was 
■ — a direct blow at Pompey. The effect of Cicero's crushing 
exposure was decisive and the bill was allowed to drop. 

Crassus and Caesar had scored another failure and in dis- 
couragement they retired from the game. There was noth- 
ing further for them to do but to wait on Pompey and see 
what his course would be. But there were some in the 
democratic ranks who could not afford to wait. Of these 
Catiline was the chief. Seeing his last hopes foiled he now 
turned to conspiracy and violence. It is most unlikely that 
either Crassus or Caesar had a hand in this ; to suppose that 
they were partners in the plot requires us to suppose that 
they were fools. In its essence the conspiracy of Catiline 
seems to have aimed simply at the seizure of the govern- 
ment by force. The more atrocious parts of the project 
may reasonably be regarded as simply the oratorical em- 
bellishments of Cicero, It was plainly thus that his con- 
temporaries viewed them; this is clearly shown by the 
simple fact that Crassus was suspected of complicity. 



82 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Surely no man who really believed that Catiline intended to 
burn down the city could imagine that he had as partner, 
even in the background, the greatest owner of tenements in 
Rome. Nor could any one believe that the greatest capital- 
ist and creditor of his day was risking treason to abolish all 
debt. In short, no man who suspected Crassus can pos- 
sibly have taken Cicero's speeches without a large amount 
of salt. If we assume that the aim of the conspirators was 
rather to seize possession of power by force than merely 
massacre and conflagration, the case presents itself in a 
new light. Such an attempt was not without fair chances 
of success. A year or two before Crassus and Caesar might 
well have been objects of suspicion, but now? The war in 
the East was ended and the hands of Pompey were now 
free. A tumult in Italy could do nothing, even if it suc- 
ceeded, but furnish him a pretext to return at the head of 
his legions to restore order. Pompey, with his army be- 
hind him, the armed master of Italy, this was exactly what 
Crassus with the help of Caesar had been striving desper- 
ately to prevent. Can it be imagined that now in sudden 
blindness he played with treason just to bring about the 
very thing he dreaded ? His former relations with Catiline, 
his desperate plots and intrigues, more or less known ana 
suspected, would suffice to account for the suspicion of con- 
temporaries without the need of our believing them well 
founded. 7 

In any case the energy of Cicero effectually crushed the 
conspiracy and Rome could wait in peace till Pompey chose 
to come. That the latter was not well pleased with this 
turn of affairs there is ample evidence to show. To Cicero 
it seems never to have occurred that in suppressing the 
conspiracy without Pompey's help he was deeply disoblig- 
ing the great general. Nor was this merely a matter of 



'The conspiracy of Catiline has enjoyed a fame beyond its just deserts by reason 
of the speeches of Cicero. Those who suspected Crassus must have taken some such 
view as that suggested in the text. The actual intentions of the conspirators are not 
of much importance. Probably they did intend to cet some fires in Rome, very 
likely for the purpose of creating confusion. Probably they did intend to murder 
some high officials, such as Cicero, in order to disorganize the government. With so 
much for foundation, Cicero's eloquent tongue or pen could readily do the rest. 



THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 83 

vanity on the part of one who thought of himself as indis- 
pensable. If only Catiline had developed a little more 
strength, as he might easily have done had Cicero been a 
little less vigilant and energetic, the senate must have called 
him home with his army as they had done in the days of 
Spartacus. His experience in 70 B.C. can not have failed 
to teach him how much the presence of an army simplified 
Roman politics. Now, thanks to Cicero's unwelcome suc- 
cess, ambition and patriotism, which had seemed about to 
coincide, were thrust asunder and he found himself obliged 
to choose between them. He could not take his army into 
Italy without a clear violation of the law, and for this viola- 
tion he had neither pretext nor excuse. True, one of the 
tribunes, known to be Pompey's man, made frantic efforts 
to provide him with a semblance of justification, but the de- 
vice was too transparent to serve the turn. He could not 
ask his army to follow him to avenge the insults which the 
senate had not yet offered him. And even if his men would 
have supported him, he shrank from open illegality. Hith- 
erto, however much he had trampled on the spirit of the 
law, he had been able to keep within its letter. Now that 
he had to choose between his own ambition and the consti- 
tution of his country, he had sufficient conscience to take 
the better part. 

For a year he lingered on in the East, hoping against hope 
that circumstances might yet play into his hands, and mean- 
while answering the self -laudations of Cicero with a cold- 
ness which filled that brilliant consular with amazement and 
alarm. Yet nothing came of the delay, and finally, aband- 
oning his faint hopes, he dismissed his army, as the law re- 
quired, and returned to Rome a private citizen. If, in such 
a cause as he could have provided, his army would have fol- 
lowed him, a question the answer to which must be con- 
jectural, he might have said that the empire of the world 
had been within his grasp and that he had "made the great 
refusal." 



CHAPTER IV 
The First Triumvirate 

From the position of dominance which he occupied in 
62 B.C. Pompey fell swiftly. Cicero's words as to his 
headlong descent from the stars, 1 though used in another 
connection, would have been appropriate at this time. The 
change in his position is so significant that it deserves a 
somewhat careful consideration. It revealed the complete 
helplessness of Pompey as soon as he had laid aside the 
sword and thus contained a lesson which the future could 
hardly fail to read. Remembering what had befallen him 
at this time, the proconsuls of the future would be far less 
willing to disarm. As his predominance in 62 pointed 
out clearly the path to power, so his humiliation in 60 in- 
dicated just as clearly the essential condition of that power's 
stability. 

Returning to Rome in 61 B.C., Pompey dismissed his 
army in obedience to the law. Henceforth as a private 
citizen, eminent indeed, but only one among many, he must 
seek to carry out his policy. The nature of the position he 
had held and the character of the army he had led alike con- 
tributed to force a policy upon him. He could not retire 
entirely from politics and let things take their course, but 
was compelled to try to direct and control that course in 
some particulars. It was because of this that he en- 
countered his intolerable humiliation and saw himself driven 
to employ means from which he shrank and to combine with 
men whom he loathed to gain the ends which circumstances 
imposed upon him. Under the sweeping provisions of the 
two great laws, especially the Lex Manilla, he had carried 
out a general settlement of eastern affairs ; to keep his army 
loyal he had made promises of future rewards to his sol- 
diers. His men were no longer of the same class that had 
once filled the legions. In the past they had, in the main, 



^Letters, i, 117. Att., ii, 21. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 85 

been farmers taken from the plow but having still their 
little plots of ground sufficient to support them after the 
campaign as they had done before. While this was true 
the disbanding of an army was a comparatively simple 
matter. The men could be mustered out and sent back to 
their homes since they had homes to which they could re- 
turn. After the reforms of Marius, however, the legions 
had been filled with volunteers possessed of no property. 
To disband such an army meant to turn loose on society a 
horde of men without home or occupation and with nothing 
but their pay and what had fallen to their share from the 
spoils of victory. Such men quite naturally demanded some 
provision from the state whose battles they had fought, and 
looked to their general to see that it was duly made. The 
habits of the Roman mind, and perhaps the financial neces- 
sities of the state as well, combined to point to land allot- 
ments as the form which this provision should take rather 
than pensions, as modern usage would suggest. With 
armies of this type, each and every general was forced to 
hold out to his men the promise that, when their task was 
achieved and the victory was won, they should be rewarded 
by a grant of land, and if the general saw himself compelled 
to promise this, the soldiers quite naturally looked to him 
to see that it was done. Retirement was no longer possible 
to one who had held a great command since, when he laid 
down the imperium, he must still persuade the state to 
redeem his pledges to his men. Thus after his army was dis- 
banded Pompey found himself obliged to take an active part 
in politics. All through the East were princes and com- 
munities that had concluded peace with Rome trusting in 
Pompey's word, and that word he felt himself in honor 
bound to make good by inducing the senate to give its 
formal sanction to his arrangements and so pledge the state 
to respect them in the future. On the other hand he must 
secure for his soldiers the land allotments which he had 
promised them. Both these demands, which Pompey found 
himself obliged to make, seemed to him quite reasonable and 
such as Rome could grant without the slightest hesitation. 



86 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

To his angry disgust he soon discovered that this was not 
the case but that, on the contrary, both his aims were wholly 
unattainable. To reach his ends he was obliged to resort 
to political rather than military methods and his ability as 
a politician was unequal to the task. This may have been 
no great reflection upon him, since in the existing state of 
Koman politics success was almost impossible. Even 
Caesar, the most astute statesman and shrewdest manager 
of men the age could show, failed equally when he under- 
took the same task. 2 However that may be, the lesson of 
Pompey's failure was quite unmistakable; a Roman gen- 
eral imperatively needed a control of politics, and nothing 
but the secure possession of military force could give him 
that control. The whole history of Rome from 62 to 54 
B.C. served to make this fact obvious to all. 

Pompey began his political campaign in the natural and 
obvious way: he came before the senate with the request 
that that venerable body should ratify his eastern settle- 
ment, and he procured the help of a tribune to introduce a 
bill making provision for his veterans. Instead of ready 
acquiescence in his wishes, he found himself face to face 
with a settled opposition and a persistent obstruction which 
he was unable to overcome. The conscript fathers viewed 
the matter in a very different light and they had no difficulty 
in finding plausible pretexts for refusing, or at any rate 
not granting, his demands. 

The opposition of the senate may have turned out to be 
unwise, but it is quite intelligible, as a brief consideration 
of the implications of Pompey's policy will show. In the 
senate two sets of motives influenced the action of the mem- 
bers, neither of which alone might have been strong enough 
to defeat him but which combined were sufficiently power- 
ful for the purpose. The first of these was the jealousy 
and dislike of Pompey, long kept in check by fear, but now 
released from all restraint. Pompey had many private 
enemies, foremost among whom were Crassus and Lucullus. 3 



2 When consul Caesar was unable to carry Pompey's bills by legal means. 
3 Dio, xxxvii, 49. Appian, ii, 9. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 87 

His former colleague in the consulship had never made the 
least concealment of his bitter animosity and naturally 
seized this opportunity to annoy and humiliate his rival. 
Lucullus had returned to Rome embittered by his failure 
in the East, furious that another should have reaped the 
glory of his victories, and especially angry at Pompey for 
the arrogant manner in which that general had replaced 
him in command. Never an adept in the art of courtesy 
and consideration for others, Pompey had made no effort to 
spare the feelings of the unfortunate man whom he was 
sent to supersede, but, on the contrary, had seemed to seek 
for opportunities of affronting him. Lucullus now saw a 
chance of which he eagerly availed himself to pay the score. 
With such men as these were others who had no personal 
grudge, but who regarded the predominance of Pompey with 
genuine apprehension. He had risen to a height which the 
constitution did not contemplate, and to check him seemed 
to them a public duty. Hitherto he had ignored the senate 
all too much in his career, and, as a lesson to others, it was 
time to teach him his mistake. Now was a good occasion 
to show proconsuls in the field that they must finally answer 
to the senate and that they should conduct themselves 
accordingly. If Pompey were permitted to settle the affairs 
of half the world as if that body were a negligible factor 
in the government, the lesson for the future would run in 
a very different fashion from what they thought desirable. 
On public grounds they were anxious to teach the general 
his place and now he offered them the opportunity they 
sought. Nor was it necessary that such motives should be 
avowed too openly : there were abundant grounds for oppo- 
sition that could be put forward. 

Quite aside from any jealousy of Pompey's past great- 
ness, or any desire to humiliate him in the present, there 
were many plausible pretexts of which his opponents could 
make use. It was true that he had received wide powers 
from the people, but these were not in any sense unlimited. 
Had he the right because of his exceptional command to 
lay before the senate a large number of treaties and demand 



88 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

their immediate sanction by a single vote? His enemies 
might urge with much show of reason that the senate was 
morally bound to examine his acts one by one, if only to 
make sure that he had not exceeded his powers. In so far 
as he had only done what the Roman people had authorized 
him to do well and good, but it was the obvious duty of the 
senate to ascertain the fact before it pledged the Roman 
state to observe his engagements for all future time. This 
it could do only by a careful examination of his various 
arrangements, and for this purpose it was indispensable 
that they should be taken up separately and not acted upon 
in one indiscriminate mass. To Pompey this seemed to 
foreshadow very clearly that some of his agreements would 
be rejected, but the conscript fathers refused to yield to 
his objections. 

Perhaps the opposition was the stronger because some of 
Pompey's arrangements affected seriously another depart- 
ment of public affairs, and one that had hitherto been almost 
a monopoly of the senate, namely the provincial administra- 
tion. Pompey had added two new provinces to the empire, 
Bithynia-Pontus and Syria. To the annexation of Bithy- 
nia the senate had given its approval, but Syria was a 
new and perhaps unwelcome addition. It seemed not un- 
reasonable, since it lay with the senate to provide governors 
for these new possessions, that it should be consulted in the 
matter and given an opportunity to discuss the question of 
whether it could meet the added burden. This was the more 
plausible because the increase in the number of provinces 
had far-reaching consequences. Sulla had left the senate 
a staff of magistrates just large enough to administer the 
territories which Rome then held. If any additions were 
made the senate would inevitably find itself short-handed. 
The situation could be met by only two expedients, to either 
of which there existed obvious objections. The term of two 
of the governors might be prolonged for a second year ; but 
this diminished their effective responsibility, since the pros- 
ecution of a governor who remained beyond the usual term 
in his province was no easy task, and there was therefore 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 89 

a real danger that, by leaving him in office for a second year, 
the senate would destroy all serious accountability for his 
acts. Nor could the other method, that of uniting two 
provinces under a single governor, be resorted to without 
grave risks, since this would really amount to tne creation 
of a great command. The new annexations would thus en- 
tail formidable administrative problems throughout the Ro- 
man world, and hence many of the senators viewed the ex- 
tension of the empire with genuine alarm. Some, no doubt, 
were swayed by blind prejudice and loyalty to inherited 
tradition, but such considerations as the above must have 
reinforced them powerfully. Whatever the motives of the 
conscript fathers, Pompey soon found that the majority 
were not disposed to accept without question the burdens 
he had placed upon their shoulders. When his eastern set- 
tlement was brought before the senate and he demanded its 
ratification by one sweeping vote, Cato, a man of unbending 
principle and conviction if there were any such in Rome, 
took the lead in insisting that his measures should be con- 
sidered one by one. If his arrangements were discussed 
separately, it was clear that the conscript fathers might 
accept some and reject or modify others, and Pompey felt 
that his honor was affected by the smallest alteration in his 
settlement. 

While Pompey thus found himself unable to secure the 
prompt ratification of his eastern acta, he had no better 
success in his efforts to reward his veterans with land. In 
consultation with a tribune he had a bill prepared and 
brought forward for discussion. This measure, intended 
to provide for his disbanded soldiers, encountered bitter op- 
position which could justify itself on broad and general 
grounds without proclaiming enmity to Pompey as its 
source. Of all the public lands once held by Rome but one 
important tract had survived the various agrarian bills. 
This was situated in Campania and had hitherto been leased 
by the state to syndicates of capitalists. This was the last 
considerable source of revenue still left in Italy itself ; aside 
from this Rome lived upon the income of her provinces 
across the seas. To redeem his promises to his men Pompey 



90 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

proposed to allot this Campanian domain, along with other 
lands, to his veterans. To this it was objected that it would 
be unsafe to leave the government entirely dependent on 
revenues which might be cut off by war or rebellion at any 
moment. The dislike of Pompey, covering itself with such 
excuses, flared up in a moment and proved to be so strong 
that even Cicero, good friend of Pompey as he thought him- 
self, joined with the opposition. The great orator himself 
describes his action in the matter and the general situation 
in these words: "The agrarian law is being vehemently 
pushed by the tribune Flavius, with the support of Pom- 
pey, but it has nothing popular about it except its sup- 
porter. From this law I, with the full assent of a public 
meeting, proposed to omit all clauses which adversely af- 
fected private rights. I proposed to except from its opera- 
tion such public land as had been so in the consulship of 
P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius (the Campanian land). I 
proposed to confirm the titles of those to whom Sulla had 
actually assigned lands. I proposed to retain the men of 
Volaterrae and Arretium — whose lands Sulla had declared 
forfeited but had not allotted — in their holdings. There 
was only one section in the bill that I did not propose to 
omit, namely, that land should be purchased with this money 
from abroad, the proceeds of the new revenues for the next 
five years. But to this whole agrarian scheme the senate 
was opposed, suspecting that some novel power for Pompey 
was aimed at. Pompey, indeed, had set his heart on get- 
ting the law passed." 4 Yet Cicero imagined that Pompey 
would be satisfied with his proposals. 5 That the general 
showed no immediate displeasure may be accounted for by 

^Letters, i, 54-55. Att,, i, 19. 

5 Strachan-Davidson thinks Cicero was simply trying to make Pompey's plan work- 
able. (See his Cicero 182.) This seems hardly reasonable in view of Cicero's own 
language. The bill must have been badly drawn indeed if it could only be made work- 
able by the omission of all except one clause. That the bill as drafted included the 
Campanian domain seems clear, and Caesar's later legislation seems to show that thia 
was necessary for the purpose. The essential difference between Pompey and Cicero 
may have lain in this, that while Cicero was ready to support a scheme for the pur- 
chase of land, Pompey desired an immediate distribution of some of the public land, 
accompanied by a plan for purchase to be carried out later. He would thus be able 
to do something for his men at once, instead of confining himself wholly to promises 
for the indefinite future. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 91 

the attitude of the senate. If that body was opposed to 
any sort of agrarian bill, Pompey might not think it wise 
to quarrel with an influential member who was willing to 
agree to something. But Cicero's half-hearted and lim- 
ited support soon proved to be of little use, and even as 
amended by him the agrarian bill was seen to have no 
chance of gaining the approval of the senate. 

Since Pompey's consulship the sanction of the conscript 
fathers was no longer indispensable for the enactment of a 
law. The great general, unable to accomplish anything in 
the senate, turned to his old friends the people. He had 
vainly offered the optimates his alliance, but in the past he 
had several times obtained his wishes, over the head of the 
senate, by the action of the popular assembly. He now de- 
termined to attempt it once again. Unfortunately for him 
his influence over the people had been materially weakened 
during his absence. While he was in the East Crassus had 
been actively engaged in seeking to acquire the leadership 
of the democrats, and whatever crude party machinery ex- 
isted was largely in his hands. All that his gold could buy, 
or Caesar's genius win, had been effectually gained by the 
great financier, and Pompey could no longer count on the 
united support of the popular party. Crassus had not been 
active in thwarting his rival in the senate merely to oblige 
him in the forum, and when Pompey tried to override the 
senatorial obstruction through the action of the assembly, 
he found that the supporters of the senate joined to the 
followers of Crassus were too strong. The result of these 
conditions was that the general, victorious abroad, was 
powerless at home. Well might Dio say that he repented 
of having let his legions go too soon and having put himself 
at the mercy of his enemies. 6 He still controlled his vet- 
erans, and if he had been prepared to resort to force, he 
might have called on them to rally round him. But this 
would have been open treason and his conscience held him 
back. Thus he could do nothing but accept defeat and stand 
helplessly aside, humiliated and, as he felt, dishonored. But 

6 Dio, xxxvii, 50. 



92 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

it was not to be for long. It soon appeared that there was 
still a way out of his difficulties. 

Ancient writers point to Caesar as the author of the 
startling combination that now took place, and this is wholly 
in line with all the probabilities. The enemies of Pompey 
seem never to have thought of the possibility of a com- 
bination between him and Crassus, since the two were 
open foes. Their feud had grown more bitter since 70 B.C. 
when they had held the consulship together. Yet the situa- 
tion had some points of analogy with that which had ex- 
isted when they had previously joined hands. Each was 
now at odds with the senate and each was helpless by him- 
self. Pompey was furious at his humiliation and Crassus 
likewise found his plans thwarted by the conscript fathers. 
With singular shortsightedness the senate had chosen the 
moment of the breach with Pompey to open up a quarrel 
with the equestrian class. The friction in this case arose 
from two separate matters. A bill had been brought for- 
ward making the knights. serving on juries in the courts 
liable to prosecution for accepting bribes. This measure 
the senate favored in spite of Cicero. The other question 
was one concerning the farming of the taxes. The syndi- 
cate which had contracted for the taxes of Asia demanded 
that the terms of their bargain should be reduced by the 
senate. Cicero, though he was disgusted at the impudence 
of the demand, urged strongly that it was advisable to 
yield since he feared that otherwise the senate might alien- 
ate the powerful capitalist class. He himself tells us that 
it was Crassus who induced the knights to bring forward 
their demand. 7 The senate, however, led by Cato, rejected 
his counsels and Crassus thus added another to his already 
long list of failures and stood still further discredited in 
men's minds. 

Thus neither Crassus nor Pompey had at the moment any 
reason to love the senate and neither could use that body to 
advance his aims. Each controlled a fragment of the pop- 
ular party, but neither fragment by itself was large enough 



''Letters, i, 47-48, 52, 65. Att., i, 17, 18; ii, 1. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 93 

to enable its owner to accomplish anything. Yet if they 
should unite their forces the situation woulo^ be very differ- 
ent. Their followers combined could reasonably be ex- 
pected to dominate the assembly and they could then enact 
whatever measures they might choose, if only they could 
get one of the magistrates to bring forward their proposals. 
The motives for an agreement between them were therefore 
strong, and against such a combination there was nothing 
but their mutual jealousy and dislike. Caesar was not the 
man to let such feelings stand in his way and set himself 
to bring about a coalition. 

At the time of Pompey's return to Rome, Caesar had de- 
parted to Spain to serve his term there as propraetor. He 
had now returned and was a candidate for the consulship. 
In his canvass for this office he could count on the bitter 
opposition of the optimates, and he not unnaturally desired 
the united backing of the democrats. This he could only 
get by bringing Pompey and Crassus together as his sup- 
porters. To Crassus he was heavily in debt, while a com- 
bination of the followers of Pompey with the senate against 
him might be fatal. His task as a peacemaker was thus 
marked out for him and even, in a sense, imposed upon him. 
Accordingly he set about his work, and with the ground 
prepared by the senate's failure to make a friend of Pompey 
and its simultaneous quarrel with Crassus and the knights, 
he speedily attained his object, although it was one which 
previously had not occurred to anyone as within the sphere 
of practical politics. Neither of the two turned a deaf 
ear to his persuasions and he was able to obtain the open 
support of both in his canvass for the consulship. In this 
way was brought about the first triumvirate, which was des- 
tined to dominate the politics of Rome for several years to 
come. In the eyes of contemporaries Caesar was a minor 
figure in the combination and was regarded as little more 
than the agent who carried out the orders of his great part- 
ners. The former campaign manager of Crassus was not 
yet the conqueror of Gaul and his military genius was as 
yet unsuspected by his fellow countrymen. 

At first the triumvirate was less successful than its 



94 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

organizer may have hoped. The threat which such a com- 
bination involved frightened the senate into something 
closely akin to desperation. They probably did not yet know 
the full scope of the alliance, but they feared Caesar, espe- 
cially when backed by such men as the two who were openly 
supporting him as a candidate for the consulship. 8 His 
election they had little prospect of preventing, but they were 
determined that he should have a colleague from their own 
party. To gain this end they raised a large corruption fund 
and exerted all their efforts. 9 Under these circumstances 
the election resulted in the return of Caesar and a strong 
conservative by the name of M. Bibulus. This failure of 
the three to win more than a half victory was the equivalent 
of a defeat, since one consul had the legal power to stop 
every act of his colleague. Thus from the very start Cae- 
sar's consulship was predestined either to fail completely 
or to snatch success in plain defiance of the law. 

Although he can not have been blind to the difficulties in 
his path, Caesar began his consulship in a conciliatory fash- 
ion. Before taking office he had made some overtures to 
Cicero with a view to securing his support. 10 These had 
failed of their purpose and the optimates, whom he may 
have hoped to divide, were not only certain to be united 
against him, but they would have as their leader his fellow 
consul. He tried at first to meet this situation by a con- 
ciliatory attitude. He treated Bibulus with studied court- 
esy and sought to appease the hostility of the senate by a 
moderate policy. He soon discovered that his efforts were 
without result. His promises to his partners included the 
securing of land for Pompey's veterans and this was the 
first task to which he set his hand. An agrarian bill was 
framed in very moderate terms and laid before the senate 
for consideration. In proposing the bill Caesar invited the 
conscript fathers to cooperate with him in the matter and 



8 Dio says expressly that the combination of the three was not known till later. 
(Dio, xxxviii, 5.) Yet in the preceding book (xxxvii, 54) he makes both Pompey 
and Crassus support Caesar as a candidate. The two statements are easily reeon-- 
cilable, I think, as above. 

•Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 19. 

^Letters, i, 69. Att., ii, 3. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 95 

declared his willingness to make such alterations in his 
project as they might desire. 11 There was little to object 
to in the provisions of the bill but the senators, perhaps be- 
cause of a blind confidence in Bibulus and an equilly blind 
detestation of Caesar, refused to yield an inch. Lacking 
reasonable criticisms they resorted to obstruction, and under 
Cato's leadership they showed themselves resolved to talk 
the bill to death. Caesar tried in vain to force the matter 
to a vote. To put a stop to endless discussion he went the 
length of ordering the arrest of Cato in the hope that, if the 
chief obstructionist were once removed, some action would 
be possible. But the attempt to reach a decision in this way 
broke down before the attitude of the conscript fathers. 
When Cato was being led out under arrest so many of the 
senators rose to follow him that Caesar was obliged to aban- 
don his purpose and release his prisoner. 12 It was now 
abundantly clear that nothing whatever could be done with 
the senate and Caesar turned to the assembly. 

When the agrarian bill was brought before the people 
Bibulus promptly interposed his veto. Caesar tried in vain 
to argue the question and asked his colleague to point out 
the objectionable features of the measure. The only an- 
swer of the optimate consul was the declaration that there 
should be no innovations during that year. Caesar besought 
him to yield to the manifest wishes of the people and called 
upon the crowd to back his plea, declaring that Bibulus alone 
stood in the way of the bill. But Bibulus was not to be in- 
fluenced by such appeals and merely replied that the bill 
should not be passed that year even if everybody favored it. 13 

Caesar thus found himself brought to a full stop. He 
was unable to act through either the senate or the assembly 
unless he were prepared to ignore or override the law. 
This, if his two partners would give him their support, he 
was in fact quite ready to attempt. To defy his opponents 
and to declare the bill carried in spite of legal technicalities 
would have been easy enough, but such a line of action could 



^Dio, xxxviii, 2. 
"Dio, xxxviii, 3. 
U8 Dio, xxxviii, 4. 



96 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

only be successful if it were backed by force. A coup d'etat 
of this nature would be highly dangerous unless its authors 
were well assured that the defenders of the constitution 
would be powerless to act with any sort of energy. It had 
been attempted in the past, but the results had hardly been 
encouraging. 14 If Caesar broke the law the senate could 
direct Bibulus to restore order, and if his colleague could 
find the means to act, the results might be disastrous to 
Caesar. Even if the senate did not go so far as this it had 
the power to cancel as illegal any measure passed in viola- 
tion of the technical and constitutional requirements. To 
ignore the law and to declare his bills carried in defiance of 
the constitution was neither safe nor worth while unless 
Caesar was backed by such armed force that his opponents 
could not resist with anything but words and that the senate 
would not dare to annul his enactments. The force essential 
to their purpose the triumvirs determined to provide under 
the guise of a law concerning the province to be assigned 
to Caesar for his proconsulship. 

By the Sempronian law of Gaius Gracchus the senate was 
obliged to name the provinces to be assigned to the consuls 
at the close of their term of office before their actual election 
by the people. The conscript fathers, foreseeing that 
Caesar would probably be chosen, had sought to provide a 
safeguard for the future by naming as the provinces for 
the consuls for 59 the charge of the roads and forests of 
Italy. 15 If this arrangement were allowed to stand, Caesar 
would be completely shelved as soon as his year of office had 
expired. Not only would he have no army under his com- 
mand but his province would be one where it would be im- 
possible for him to free himself from the load of debt that 
still hung over his head. He could hardly be expected to 
submit to this without a struggle, and it may safely be as- 
sumed that he had stipulated with his partners for their 
backing in an attempt to upset the senate's arrangements. 
The three now determined to carry out their understanding 



"Saturninus and Glaucia had attempted much the same thing. They lost their lives 
and failed to accomplish anything besides. Lepidus was a more recent case in point. 
15 Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 19. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 97 

and to do it in such a way that success would furnish 
them the means of putting through the remainder of their 
program. 

As soon therefore as the agrarian bill had been completely 
blocked by Bibulus, a new measure was brought forward. 
The nominal proposer was a tribune by the name of Va- 
tinius who was a tool of the triumvirs. He laid before the 
assembly a bill which conferred on Caesar the province of 
Cisalpine Gaul for a term of five years dating from March 
1, 59. This would make Caesar's consulship and proconsul- 
ship run concurrently for nearly a year. The motive of 
this arrangement is easy to guess in the light of what had 
gone before and what was soon to follow. 16 Under cover 
of his governorship of Gaul, Caesar would have the right 
to enlist troops and to keep them in the vicinity of Rome 
until such time as he might choose to set out for his prov- 
ince. While he remained in Rome as consul his army at 
the gates of the city would serve to overawe all opposition 
and would thus enable him to put through whatever 
measures he and his partners might have agreed upon, re- 
gardless of constitutional obstacles. Moreover his province 
had been so selected that, even after his consulship should 
have expired, he could continue to threaten Rome and so 
prevent the senate from attempting to annul his legislation. 
Of all the provinces of the republic, Cisalpine Gaul was 
nearest to the capital, and Caesar at the head of a strong 
army in the valley of the Po would have Rome at his mercy. 

That such a law as this would meet with opposition was, 
of course, to be expected. Even if the conscript fathers 
had not seen the danger to themselves which it involved, 
there were still ample reasons for bitter hostility. The 
measure violated several of their cherished principles at 
once. They were averse to a long term for a provincial 
governor and the bill gave Caesar a term of unprecedented V 
length. In addition to this it constituted an encroachment 
of the popular assembly on a field of administration which 



**For a discussion of the Vatinian law the reader is referred to the Appendix. 



98 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the senate regarded as their own in a peculiar and especial 
sense. But the Roman assembly cared little or nothing for 
considerations of this kind. It had already been shown by 
the Gabinian law that the people were quite ready to confer 
V sweeping powers for a term of years upon a general who 
x possessed their confidence and favor. At the moment 
Caesar was popular with the rabble and the mob was rein- 
forced by Pompey's veterans who were with him to a man. 
Under these circumstances argument was clearly useless 
and the only hope of the conservatives lay in obstruction. 
This they attempted but they had a less favorable oppor- 
tunity than in the case of the agrarian bill. Then they had 
been able to act under the leadership of Caesar's colleague 
in office, but as Vatinius was a tribune, Bibulus could no 
longer interfere. Some of the tribunes were, indeed, op- 
posed to the bill, but they did not venture to employ their 
veto to stop its progress. The reason for this it is not dif- 
ficult to guess. The veto had to be interposed in person 
and the attitude of the mob was hardly reassuring. They 
found, however, another way in which they hoped to defeat 
the hated measure. This was by a resort to religious forms 
and omens which under the existing law made any action 
by the assembly impossible, or, if it should be attempted, 
illegal. This had the advantage that it did not require 
their presence in the assembly and three of the tribunes 
now "resorted to this means of stopping Vatinius. But 
neither Vatinius nor his employers intended to be checked 
by omens and the bill was promptly voted by the people. 
That it was constitutionally null and void cannot be doubted 
but that proved to be a matter of very minor consequence. 
It had been put upon the statute book, and until the senate 
cancelled it, Caesar had the right to recruit troops. With 
Pompey's veterans thronging the streets he was not likely to 
have any difficulty in finding men and it cannot have been 
long after March 1, when the bill was finally passed, before 
he had a considerable force camped near the city. 

As soon as he was thus effectually armed, Caesar took 
up the agrarian bill again. The triumvirs had now 



> 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 99 

definitely embarked upon the enterprise of setting up in 
Rome a military dictatorship and they had thoroughly made 
up their minds to put their measures through regardless 
of either law or constitution. To destroy any lingering 
hopes of a successful resistance on the part of the con- 
servatives, and to make clear the impossibility of any seri- 
ous attempt to defend the republic by deeds, Caesar called 
both Pompey and Crassus before a meeting of the people. 
The triumvirate was now for the first time openly avowed 
and Caesar's two partners proclaimed their firm support of 
the agrarian bill. This was not quite enough and Caesar 
put to Pompey the blunt question of what course he would 
take if force were resorted to against the bill. To this 
Pompey replied with the explicit declaration that if any 
one dared to draw the sword he would snatch up his shield." 
The wrath of the conservatives at this speech was un- 
bounded since it destroyed their only hope of successful 
resistance to any violation of the constitution which Caesar 
might intend. Pompey was the one man in Italy who could 
raise an army on the spur of the moment. In spite of his 
support of Caesar's candidacy for the consulship they may 
have felt some hope that in the last resort they could obtain 
his help if Caesar went too far. Once before he had given 
his backing at the elections to a consul who had attempted 
to carry through a revolution; but when the crisis came 
and Lepidus resorted to violence, Pompey abandoned his 
protege, and rallying to the side of the senate, suppressed 
the rebellion. The conservatives may have thought that 
what had happened once might happen again and this is the 
more likely if the real scope of the coalition of the three was 
yet unknown. The formal declaration of Pompey put an 
end to all such calculations since by that act the one man 
who might have held Caesar in check despite his troops out- 
side the city openly declared himself on Caesar's side. 



"Di©, xxxviii, 5. Plutarch, Caesar, 14 and Pompey, 47. The public avowal of the 
triumvirate may very well have taken place before the passage of the Vatinian law. 
It has been placed at this point in the narrative quite arbitrarily. The significance 
would be the same whenever the incident occurred. 



100 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

In view of this new situation Bibulus, unable for tech- 
nical reasons to convene a regular session of the senate, 
called a meeting of the senators at his own house. After 
due discussion it was resolved to make no attempt to meet 
a violation of the law by force but to resist by every legal 
means that could be found. 18 In pursuance of this decision 
Bibulus appeared upon the scene when Caesar tried to put 
his bill to a vote in the assembly. He was supported in his 
veto upon this occasion by no less than three tribunes, but 
Caesar was no longer to be stopped or hindered by the con- 
stitution. The would-be obstructors of his legislation were 
driven from the forum and so roughly handled that they 
were glad to escape with their lives. After this the 
agrarian bill was solemnly declared duly passed and en- 
acted into law. 

The violence and illegality of these proceedings are self- 
evident. Bibulus and the tribunes had at least succeeded 
in stripping off every pretense of constitutional action and 
making Caesar's contempt of law both obvious and flagrant. 
No doubt the optimates — and many men who were not ad- 
herents of the senate — shuddered and were filled with rage 
and consternation. But what were they to do? The ques- 
tion of whether a bill purporting to be a law had really been 
enacted in a valid way was for the senate to determine. 
Accordingly Bibulus convened the conscript fathers the next 
day and laid the matter before them. This was logical 
enough, but in the existing circumstances it was futile in 
the extreme. If the senate desired to annul the law, it must 
obviously be prepared to deal with Caesar and his soldiers. 
Theoretically this was easy. The senate should declare mar- 
tial law and Bibulus should then proceed to restore order. 
Unfortunately he had no troops to cope with those of his 
colleague, and while that was so, the senate had too much 
discretion to attempt to act. No doubt the conscript fathers 
sympathized deeply with Bibulus and raged at heart over 
his wrongs, but when he called for action not a voice was 
raised and not a motion offered. 19 Whether the agrarian 

18 Appian, ii, 11. 

19 Dio, xxxviii, 6. Suetonius, 20. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 101 

bill was really a law or not — and it was clearly not — both 
it and the Vatinian law were on the Roman statute book 
and the senate dared not make a move to take them off. 

After this defeat Bibulus in despair shut himself up in 
his house for the remainder of the year and refused to ap- 
pear in public or to discharge any of the duties of his office. 
One thing, however, he could do even in retirement. He 
could find a way to invalidate whatever his lawless col- 
league might undertake to do in the way of legislation. By 
the Roman law, when one of the consuls was engaged in 
observing the heavens for omens no legal meeting of the 
assembly could be held. Of this device Bibulus availed 
himself, since it did not require his personal presence in 
the forum. From the seclusion of his house he issued 
edicts declaring that he was occupied with this theological 
astronomy. Caesar, of course, paid no attention to the 
edicts, but the stubborn optimate had none the less gained 
his essential object. He had provided the senate with a 
pretext for declaring all Caesar's laws null and void if ever 
in the future that step should become possible. 

With his colleague and the hostile tribunes driven from 
public life, Caesar's course was quieter and smoother, 
though not more legal, than before. Since moderation and 
conciliation were now obviously useless, he at once proposed 
a second agrarian bill which provided for the allotment of 
the Campanian and other land still held by the state which 
the first bill had not touched. The conservatives might 
rage but they were too completely cowed to offer any oppo- 
sition except the edicts of Bibulus. Cicero put the situation 
in a sentence when on hearing of the new proposal he rep- 
resented Pompey as meeting all opposition and criticism 
with the brief retort "I shall coerce you by means of Caesar's 
army." 20 This, as Cicero was well aware, closed all dis- 
cussion. For the moment Caesar was a dictator and he 
proceeded to put through the entire program of the three. 
Not only was the second agrarian bill passed rapidly, but 
all Pompey's eastern acta were ratified, while Crassus and 



Vn 



^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 



102 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

his equestrian friends were gratified by a generous reduction 
of the terms of their bargain for the taxes of Asia. 

Caesar had thus attained his objects and those of his part- 
ners, but only by means of violence and sedition. The re- 
public had been overturned and in its place a military des- 
potism had been set up in Rome. This triumph of the three 
rested on force and on that alone — the force of Caesar's 
soldiers and his mobs. A revolution such as that which had 
just been accomplished could not but inspire the bitterest 
anger and dismay in all who felt a real attachment to the 
supremacy of law. To the intensity of these feelings the 
letters of Cicero to Atticus throughout this year bear elo- 
quent testimony. Nothing but terror held tne opposition 
quiet. So far the three had been content with driving their 
opponents from the forum, but would they stop with that? 
Already in April, before the law dealing with the Campan- 
ian land had been announced, Cicero avowed his fears that 
Pompey "finding himself belaboured by the tongues of all, 
and seeing these proceedings easy to upset, should begin 
striking out." 21 For himself he declares that he has so com- 
pletely lost all energy that he prefers to submit to the exist- 
ing tyranny rather than fight. In May he is apprehensive 
that trouble is brewing worse than has yet happened. lie 
writes that Pompey "is getting up a disturbance. We (the 
conservatives) have everything to fear. He is preparing a 
despotism and no mistake." 22 In June or July he says bit- 
terly "We are bound hard and fast on every side, and are no 
longer making any difficulty as to being slaves, but fearing 
death and exile as though greater evils, though they are in 
fact much smaller ones . . . you see the citizens allowed to 
express their sentiments, but debarred from carrying them 
out with any vigour. And to omit details, the upshot is there 
is now no hope, I don't say of private persons, but even of 
the magistrates being ever free again. Nevertheless, in 
spite of this policy of repression, conversation, at least in 



^Letters, i, 102. Att., ii, 14 The words which Shuckt*urgh translates "begin strik- 
ing out" are mere incipiat. Winstedf s version "may run amuck" seems to me bet- 
ter. The proceedings must be the Vatinian and agrarian laws. 

22 Letters, i, 108. Att., ii, 17. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 103 

society and at dinner tables, is freer than it was. Indigna- 
tion is beginning to get the better of fear, though that does 
not prevent a universal feeling of despair." 23 In July he 
wrote to his friend "About politics I will write briefly : for 
I am now afraid lest the very paper should betray me. Ac- 
cordingly, in future, if I have anything more to write to you, 
I shall clothe it in covert language. For the present the state 
is dying of a novel disorder; for although everybody dis- 
approves of what has been done, complains, and is indignant 
about it, and though there is absolutely no diff erence of opin- 
ion on the subject, and people now speak openly and groan 
aloud, yet no remedy is applied : for we do not think resist- 
ance possible without a general slaughter, nor see what the 
end of concession is to be except ruin." 24 

Although the triumvirs had accomplished their immediate 
purpose and all opposition had to confine itself to dinner 
tables and letters, one of the all-powerful three was de- 
cidedly unhappy. Pompey was glad, no doubt, to gain the 
things on which he had set his heart, but he shrank from 
paying the price. Perhaps he found the cost much greater 
than he had expected. When he agreed to the program of 
Caesar he may not have foreseen the lengths to which it 
would be necessary to go, and may quite well have thought 
that the threat contained in the Vatinian Law would be 
enough to frighten the conscript fathers into a more rea- 
sonable mood. Perhaps the rage and fury of the upper 
class was greater than he had anticipated. At any rate 
he found the resentment of his opponents hard to face and 
all the more so, probably, because his conscience was ill at 
ease. At first he sought to evade the responsibility and to 
throw the blame on others, and Cicero has given a vivid 
picture of him while attempting this. Hitherto, the orator 
wrote, Pompey has fenced with these questions. " 'He ap- 
proved Caesar's laws, but Caesar must be responsible for 
his proceedings in carrying them' ; 'he himself was satisfied 
with the agrarian law'; 'whether it could be vetoed by a 
tribune or no was nothing to do with him' ; 'he thought the 



^Letters, i, 109-10. Att., ii, 18. 
^Letters, i, 115. Att., ii, 20. 



104 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

time had come for the business of the Alexandrine king to 
be settled'; 'it was no business of his to inquire whether 
Bibulus had been watching the sky on that occasion or no' ; 
'what was going to happen if Bibulus came down to the 
forum at that time he could not have guessed.' " 25 

If Pompey was troubled in conscience, Caesar must have 
felt the need of binding him all the more closely to himself. 
It must be kept in mind that Caesar, at this time, would 
certainly have been ruined had Pompey turned against him. 
Had this occurred and the great general joined hands with 
the conservatives, Caesar would have shared the fate of 
Lepidus. He was not likely, therefore, to leave any means 
untried to keep the waverer firm. With this object in view 
Caesar arranged a marriage between his daughter Julia 
and Pompey. The news of this marriage, coming to Cicero 
in May, filled the orator with dire misgivings, since it fore- 
shadowed the continuance of that unholy alliance which 
had subverted the republic. 26 

By this arrangement Caesar strengthened his hold upon 
the all-important Pompey, but it did not make the three 
partners any the more popular. As the summer advanced 
the opposition grew — not stronger — but more general. A 
reason for this is easy to conjecture. Rome had more than 
once before seen laws rushed through the assembly with 
more or less illegality and violence. Many Romans had at 
the start regarded Caesar merely as another Gracchus or 
Saturninus. As the year wore on it became more and more 
apparent that while these leaders had passed some partic- 
ular law, or laws, in disregard of technicalities, Caesar had 
done something much beyond this. What he had done was 
nothing less than to destroy the constitution of the republic. 
As this became clearer and clearer it would be only natural 
that many who had supported him at first should begin 
to fall away. By July even the knights so far forgot the 
favor Caesar had done them in the matter of the eastern 
taxes as to join in demonstrations against the masters of 
the city. The three at once dropped ominous hints that both 



^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 
^Letters, i, 108. Att., ii, 17. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 105 

the knights and the populace had better mend their man- 
ners. 27 Even the mob was turning against Caesar. In 
July Cicero had declared to Atticus that nothing was now 
"so popular as the dislike of the popular party." 28 In an- 
other letter he says that the three "feel that they do not 
possess the cordial goodwill of any section." 29 In a third 
he repeats that "all on that side, whether promoters or mere 
hangers-on, are falling out of fashion, though no one op- 
poses them : there never was a greater unanimity of feeling 
or talk everywhere." 30 Still no one dared to move and 
Cicero is forced to conclude that although "everybody en- 
tertains the greatest detestation for those who are the mas- 
ters of everything" yet "there is no hope of a change." 31 
As the feeling against the triumvirate grew, the edicts of 
Bibulus, drawn up in bitter and scathing language, were 
immensely popular. Pompey, at least, was roused to fury 
by them. 32 Cicero viewed this state of things with genuine 
alarm. "I fear," he wrote to his friend, "they have been 
exasperated by the hisses of the crowd, the talk of the re- 
spectable classes, and the murmurs of Italy." At first the 
orator admits that the despotism had been popular with the 
multitude, but now he declared that "they have become so 
universally hated, that I tremble to think what will be the 
end of it." 33 For the information of his friend Cicero de- 
scribes at some length the unhappy position in which Pom- 
pey found himself. "Accordingly," he wrote, "that friend 
of ours, unaccustomed to being unpopular, always used to 
an atmosphere of praise and revelling in glory, now dis- 
figured in body and broken in spirit, does not know which 
way to turn; sees that to go on is dangerous, to return a 
betrayal of vacillation; has the loyalists his enemies, the 
disloyal themselves not his friends. Yet see how soft- 
hearted I am. I could not refrain from tears when, on the 



^Letters, i, 112-13. Att., ii, 19. The knights were threatened with the loss of their 
special seats at the theatre and the populace with some restriction of the corn dole. 
^Letters, i, 115. Att., ii, 20. 
^Letters, i, 117. Att., ii., 21. 
^Letters, i, 120. Att., ii, 23. 
^Letters, i, 119-20. Att., ii, 22. 
^Letters, i, 114. Att., ii, 19. 
^Letters, i, 116. Att., ii, 21. 



106 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

25th of July, I saw him making a speech on the edicts of 
Bibulus. The man who in old times had been used to bear 
himself in that place with the utmost confidence and dignity, 
surrounded by the warmest affection of the people, amidst 
universal favour — how humble, how cast down he was 
then ! How ill-content with himself, to say nothing of how 
unpleasing to his audience ! Oh, what a spectacle ! No one 
could have liked it but Crassus — no one else in the world! 
Not I, for considering his headlong descent from the stars, 
he seemed to me to have lost his footing rather than to have 
been deliberately following a path." 34 But the plight of 
Pompey inspired Cicero with fear as well as sorrow. "I 
fear," he wrote frankly, "lest one so impulsive and so quick 
to strike, and so unaccustomed to personal abuse, may, in 
his passionate resentment, obey the dictates of indignation 
and anger." 35 

Caesar must have felt that Pompey was wavering. Cicero 
wrote to Atticus to tell him that the general "is exceedingly 
dissatisfied with his position, and desires to be restored to 
the place from which he has fallen ; that he confides his an- 
noyance to me, and is without disguise seeking for a rem- 
edy." 36 The orator did not think one could be found, and 
he was right, but Caesar can hardly have been blind to such 
feelings on the part of his indispensable ally or have viewed 
them without alarm. If the rule of the triumvirate was 
losing what popular support it had once had, and if the 
most important member of the combination desired, even 
vaguely, to break away, it was essential to take precautions. 
Pompey's leanings toward a reconciliation with the conser- 
vatives must be checked at once and Caesar must place him- 
self in a position where he could dispense entirely with the 
favor of the mob. It seems likely that this double motive 
lay behind the dubious incident which followed. Suddenly 
an informer by the name of Vettius was produced to testify 
that he had been employed by the conservatives to murder 
Pompey. On examination his story broke down hopelessly, 



^Letters, i, 116-17. Att., ii, 21. 
^Letters, i, 117. Att. t ii, 21. 
^Letters, i, 120. Att., ii, 23. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 107 

however, and he was shortly afterwards murdered in prison. 
With his death the charge was allowed to drop. Whether 
Pompey was frightened or not it is impossible to say, but 
the incident furnished a pretext to have the assembly vote 
Caesar the protection of a guard. 37 With troops within the 
city itself the last step had been taken in the consolidation 
of the despotism. 

It still remained for the masters of Rome to take precau- 
tions lest the end of Caesar's term as consul should mark their 
overthrow. To guard against this they must secure friendly 
magistrates for the next year who, backed in case of need 
by Caesar's army in Gaul, could hold the senate and its par- 
tisans in check. Bibulus succeeded in postponing the elec- 
tions, but they were finally held in October and two con- 
suls were declared returned on whom the three could count. 
As an added safeguard it was resolved to remove the men 
most capable of leading the opposition. These men were 
Cato and Cicero. The first was sent off to Cyprus on a 
special mission the acceptance of which would debar him 
in the future from questioning the validity of Caesar's laws. 
Cicero proved more difficult to deal with. Caesar tried to 
induce him to accept some position which would close his 
mouth in a similar fashion, but was met by a refusal. The 
three at length made up their minds that, if the orator 
would not go quietly, he — and others — should be taught a 
lesson. They decided to banish him from Rome, and for 
this purpose they had conveniently at hand both a pretext 
and an instrument. The pretext was the execution of the 
Catilinarian conspirators, which the popular party had al- 
ways contended was illegal, and the instrument was a trib- 
une who was a bitter personal enemy of Cicero. No sooner 
were the new tribunes installed in office in December than 
Clodius, acting as he boasted at the suggestion and with the 
approval of the three, 38 brought in a bill of which the pur- 
port was to banish Cicero because as consul he had put 
Roman citizens to death without a trial. Before the bill 
was carried Caesar had laid down the consulship, but his 



37 Appian, ii, 12. 

^Cicero, Respecting the Answers of the Soothsayers, 22. 



108 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

army was still camped outside the city, and Clodius called 
a meeting of the people without the walls of Rome in order 
that Caesar might attend. As might have been expected, 
he spoke out in condemnation of the execution of the con- 
spirators, though he professed sympathy for Cicero per- 
sonally. The legal scruple on Caesar's part is certainly a 
touch of irony, but with the army there at hand and Caesar 
openly approving, resistance was quite clearly hopeless and 
Cicero bowed before the storm, and broken-hearted, left 
his native country for the East. 

With matters in Rome secured against an immediate re- 
action, Caesar was free to depart for his province, where 
his presence was urgently required. That province had, 
however, undergone a considerable extension, and one of 
vast importance, since the Vatinian law was passed. The 
measure of Vatinius had given Caesar Cisalpine Gaul and 
Illyricum for the period of five years, but after its passage 
the sudden death of Metellus Celer, the proconsul of Trans- 
alpine Gaul, had left that province vacant and Caesar had 
induced, or compelled, the senate to assign it to him. This 
measure, urged by Pompey, had been accepted by the con- 
script fathers because they feared that if they should re- 
fuse, Caesar would seize the province by a second Vatinian 
law. 39 If this were done he would receive the added dis- 
trict for a term of years, but if it came to him by the action 
of the senate it would be held for one year only, though 
the appointment might be renewed from time to time. It 
was therefore obviously to the interest of the senate, if 
Caesar could not be prevented from getting the province, 
to forestall popular action by conferring it themselves. 

Though the motives of the senate are easy enough to un- 
derstand, those of Pompey are somewhat less obvious. In 
later years Cicero reproached him for having armed Caesar 
against himself. It seems quite evident that the governor- 
ship of Transalpine Gaul had been no part of the original 
bargain between the three. Had it been so it is difficult 
to see why both Gauls had not been assigned at once by the 



39 Suetonius, 22. The part played by Pompey is clear from Cicero's later reproaches. 
Bee Letters, ii, 281. Att., viii, 3. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 109 

law of Vatinius. There can have been no thought of pla- 
cating the optimates by a show of moderation, and the most 
probable explanation is that the Vatinian law gave Caesar 
all that had been agreed upon at that time. Had the orig- 
inal intention been allowed to stand unaltered, Caesar could 
never have begun the conquest of Gaul at all. It was his 
possession of the Transalpine province that made his mili- 
tary achievements possible. It seems quite evident that the 
conquest of Gaul was not a thing that Pompey intended in 
the least. Perhaps, if he had foreseen its possibility, he 
would not have consented to the addition of the new province 
to his father-in-law's command. If conquests were to be 
made, Pompey was very much of the opinion that he and 
not another was the one to make them. In agreeing to the 
extension of Caesar's power he may have had no further 
motive than to prevent the sending of an adherent of the 
senate to that province. A war in Gaul was possible, if not 
imminent, which might call for a large army, and the three 
would naturally wish to keep that army in safe hands. If 
the situation should grow serious it is quite possible that 
Pompey expected to take over the command. It may be 
confidently affirmed that if he fostered Caesar's greatness 
to the point where it was a danger to himself, he did so quite 
unintentionally. 

If the conquest of Gaul was in no wise a part of the pro- 
gram of the triumvirate, it is by no means certain that it 
was a part of that of Caesar. It is quite possible that it 
was not until he was actually in his province that he fully 
realized the opportunity. It is very likely that he meant 
to go to war with some of the independent tribes, since, even 
if he were not anxious for martial glory, a war offered the 
best chance of paying off his debts. There is no evidence, 
however, that he went to Gaul with any settled plans of 
conquest. 

Whatever the original purpose of Caesar may have been, 
he was no sooner in his province than war broke out, and 
that without any act of his. The migration of the Helve- 
tians was obviously a movement which a Roman governor 
would be bound to stop, and from this as a beginning the 



110 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

rest followed easily. Within the next few years the pro- 
consul of the Gauls found himself launched upon a career 
of conquest which his partners had never intended. They 
had, however, little choice but to accept his policy whatever 
it might be. Crassus was probably well pleased to see 
Pompey's prestige as the only great general of Rome dimin- 
ished by the rising reputation of Caesar. On his side Pom- 
pey, whether he liked it or not, could not venture to act 
without the support of either Crassus or the senate. Against 
Caesar the millionaire would give him no assistance, and the 
events of Caesar's consulship had left Pompey at open war 
with the senate. He could, therefore, do nothing to stop 
Caesar even if he wished, and it is not likely that for some 
time he felt any great apprehension or jealousy of the man 
who was to overthrow him. He may well have feared that 
he might yet have to depend on Caesar's army to protect him 
from his foes, and in such an event a certain amount of 
glory and success would give Caesar a stronger hold upon 
his soldiers. 

The real danger to Caesar lay not in the possibility that 
his two partners would try to call a halt but in their in- 
ability to work together after he had left Rome. It is a 
mistake of modern historians to view the triumvirate as a 
sort of coalition government. The facts seem clearly to re- 
veal it as a temporary combination for limited and definite 
ends. After those ends had been achieved the combination 
ceased to have a program except in a purely negative sense. 
The means by which Caesar had put through their measures 
made it essential to his partners to prevent the return of 
the conservatives to power lest all the Julian laws by which 
they profited should be annulled. Beyond that they seem 
to have had no common program whatever, and both Pom- 
pey and Crassus resumed their freedom of action and 
straightway began to quarrel again. Under these circum- 
stances Rome began to drift rapidly toward veritable an- 
archy since the forces of disorder were no longer under any 
strong control. Crassus and Pompey would not permit the 
senate to resort to any energetic measures, and while they 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 111 

were at odds with one another they were unable to replace 
that body in any effective way. 

The immediate question which precipitated the troubles 
was the recall of Cicero. Pompey seems to have consented 
to the orator's exile with reluctance and he now demanded 
that the banished consular should be permitted to return. 
Perhaps Pompey hoped to pave the way to some reconcilia- 
tion with the senate, perhaps his conscience reproached him 
for his desertion of his friend and he wished to make 
amends. Crassus had no desire to humor his colleague, 
whom he had never ceased to hate, and he had not the slight- 
est love for Cicero. Though he did not care to take a place 
in the front ranks of the opposition to his partner he was 
quite prepared to use his influence in secret. The leader- 
ship of the resistance to Cicero's recall thus fell to Clodius, 
who entered on this task as a labor of love. The reckless 
tribune had already quarreled with Pompey on other mat- 
ters, but the proposal in regard to Cicero roused him to 
actual fury. He had the mob of Rome well organized and 
he turned his rabble loose on Pompey. In doing this he ran 
but little risk as long as the great general and the senate 
should remain apart. Caesar's army was no longer at the 
gates of Rome and there was no force at hand to keep the 
peace. It is true that troops could readily be raised, but this 
required a commission from the state. As a mere private 
citizen Pompey could not recruit soldiersi, nor could the con- 
suls without the sanction of the senate. As the consuls for 
the year were tools of the triumvirs the conscript fathers 
were unlikely to decree a revival of the military despotism 
of the year before solely in order to accommodate a man 
whom they detested as much as they did Pompey at this 
moment. While they were in this frame of mind Pompey 
did not dare permit them to arm anybody else for fear that 
they might use the forces so obtained against him. If, 
therefore, Clodius abstained from a direct attack upon the 
senators he would have little to fear. 40 He saw this clearly 



40 Heitland (The Roman Republic, iii, 172.) thinks that Pompey could easily have 
put an end to the anarchy if he had wished. He blames him for not acting and calls 
him solemn and irresolute. It is not easy to see just what Pompey could do. He 



112 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

and acted upon it boldly regardless of consistency. To keep 
the senate quiet he repudiated Caesar and declared his laws 
invalid, while with his rioters he drove Pompey to the 
shelter of his house. 41 The turbulent tribune can hardly 
have intended to go so far as actually to annul Caesar's leg- 
islation, for this would have entailed the cancelling of all 
his own acts including the law that banished Cicero. By 
raising the question, however, he could effect a sort of truce 
with the conservatives, 42 and under cover of this he could 
harry Pompey at his pleasure. 

Pompey could find no way to meet this situation except 
to call in the help of a counter-rioter. One of the tribunes 
for the next year, Milo by name, was selected for this task, 
and quickly raised a gang of gladiators and cut-throats to 
fight the mobs of Clodius. He succeeded in getting the upper 
hand so far that in August of 57 B.C. Cicero's recall was 
finally voted by the assembly, and the orator returned in 
triumph to his country. The rioting did not end with this, 
however. Clodius out of office proved quite as turbulent 
as in, and he and Milo between them made the streets of 
Rome a veritable pandemonium. The senate had cooper- 
ated with Pompey to bring back Cicero, but the nobles had 
by no means forgiven him his share in recent events. Cicero 
might hate Clodius, but the conservatives had probably little 
wish to see him crushed and none at all to accomplish this 
by making Pompey virtually dictator. In vain Cicero, who 
felt himself bound by ties of gratitude to the general who 
had procured his return, tried to bring about an under- 
standing between his patron and the senate. The time had 
not yet come for such a project to succeed, and the failure 
of the attempt could only prolong the day of anarchy and 
riot. 



could not raise troops without the sanction of the senate unless he were prepared to 
violate the law. But his attitude during Caesar's consulship had clearly shown that 
he had his scruples about breaking the law in person. Moreover i£ he had dared a 
breach of the law would he have been successful? According to Cicero all Italy was 
against him at the time. Certainly the mob and the conservatives were. Action 
might well, therefore, seem both dangerous and illegal. 

41 Cicero, For his House, 15. 

^Dio attributes to some such motive the laws proposed by Clodius. xxxviii, 12. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 113 

A shortage in the grain supply occurred at this time to 
add fuel to the flames. Pompey hoped to make use of this 
to obtain a new army, or at least new glory. The senate, 
urged by Cicero, and probably fearing that the mob would 
turn upon themselves, passed a decree giving the charge 
of the grain supply to Pompey. This, however, fell short 
of what the general desired. Cicero plainly intimates as 
much in a letter to Atticus. "A second law," he wrote, 
"is drawn up by Messius (one of the tribunes), granting 
his power over all money, and adding a fleet and army, and 
an imperium in the provinces superior to that of their gov- 
ernors. After that our consular law seems moderate in- 
deed: that of Messius is quite intolerable. Pompey pro- 
fesses to prefer the former ; his friends say that he prefers 
the latter." 43 The vital difference in the two bills probably 
lay in the fact that one provided for an army and the other 
did not. On this occasion Pompey's wishes were not grati- 
fied and he was able to obtain only what he said he wanted, 
namely the consular bill which gave him authority and 
honor, indeed, but left him still without an army and there- 
fore still at the mercy of the mob of Clodius, except for such 
protection as Milo could afford him. Nominally pleased but 
really disappointed, he turned at once to a new scheme for 
accomplishing his purpose. The king of Egypt had been de- 
throned and the question of his restoration was now before 
the senate. Pompey was anxious that the conscript fathers 
should commission him to replace the fallen monarch in 
power, and hoped in this way to find an excuse to get an 
army. But the senate had no wish to give him one, and 
found in religion a convenient pretext to avoid it. A pass- 
age in the Sibylline books was found and was interpreted 
to fit the case. Cicero put it plainly when he wrote : "The 
senate supports the trumped-up religious scruple, not from 



43 I have here altered Shuckburgh's translation slightly. Cicero wrote Pompeius Mam 
velle se dicit, familiares hanc. Shuckburgh renders it "Pompey professes to prefer 
the former; his friends the latter." This version is ambiguous, like the Latin, but 
the passage seems to me to mean rather that Pompey's friends said that he favored 
the bill of Messius rather than that they did, as Shuckburgh's version might imply. 
The implication is much the same whatever reading is adopted. Letters, i, 188. 
Att., iv, 1. 



114 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

any respect to religion, but from ill-feeling towards him, 
and disgust at the king's outrageous bribery." 44 

While the Alexandrian business was still under discussion 
the meetings of the people grew steadily more turbulent and 
disgraceful. Crassus had no desire to see his old rival gain 
any new success and Clodius was eager to humiliate him. 
The shortage of grain furnished the mob leader with a good 
ground of attack, as Pompey had not yet been able to re- 
lieve the situation. He availed himself of this to the utmost 
while taking further advantage of the great general's half- 
concealed ambitions in the Egyptian matter. One meeting 
of the people as described by Cicero will be sufficient for the 
present purpose. "Pompey spoke, or rather wished to speak. 
For as soon as he got up Clodius's ruffians raised a shout, 
and throughout his whole speech he was interrupted, not 
only by hostile cries, but by personal abuse and insulting 
remarks. However, when he had finished his speech — for 
he showed great courage in these circumstances, he was 
not cowed, he said all he had to say, and at times had by his 
commanding presence even secured silence for his words — 
well, when he had finished, up got Clodius. Our party re- 
ceived him with such a shout — for they had determined to 
pay him out — that he lost all presence of mind, power of 
speech, or control over his countenance. This went on up 
to two o'clock — Pompey having finished his speech at noon 
— and every kind of abuse, and finally epigrams of the most 
outspoken indecency were uttered against Clodius and 
Clodia. Mad and livid with rage Clodius, in the very midst 
of the shouting, kept putting questions to his claque : 'Who 
was it that was starving the commons to death?' His ruf- 
fians answered, Tompey.' 'Who wanted to be sent to Alex- 
andria?' They answered, 'Pompey.' 'Whom did they wish 
to go?' They answered, 'Crassus.' . . . About three 
o'clock, as though at a given signal, the Clodians began spit- 
ting at our men. There was an outburst of rage. They 
began a movement for forcing us from our ground. Our 
men charged : his ruffians turned tail. Clodius was pushed 



"Letters, i, 203. Fam., i, 1. 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 115 

off the rostra : and then we too made our escape for fear of 
mischief in the riot." 45 

Amid such scenes as this Pompey might well feel that he 
had fallen into the depths once more. He told Cicero that 
Clodius and his other enemies were being backed by Crassus 
and that plots were being formed against his life. To pro- 
tect himself he called in his friends from the country as an 
offset to the Roman mob. 46 But in spite of them he was 
unable to obtain the commission to Egypt which he sought. 
The triumvirate seemed to have gone completely to pieces. 
Caesar was away in Gaul while at home Pompey and 
Crassus had abandoned all pretence of friendship or co- 
operation and Clodius, the irresponsible mob leader, held the 
streets, checked only by the rival gangs of Milo. Under 
these circumstances a revival of the senate's power seemed 
not only possible but probable. Already the conservatives 
had secured the control of the chief magistracy of the 
republic since the two consuls for 56 B.C. were both of their 
party 47 and largely under the influence of Cato. 4s The con- 
script fathers could thus dominate the executive branch of 
the government and they had looked on well content while 
the consul Marcellinus signalized his year of office by sup- 
porting Cicero against Clodius and by thwarting Pompey's 
unavowed ambition to be dispatched to Alexandria. As the 
year went by their hopes rose higher and they dreamed that 
the senate's supremacy might be entirely restored. They 
began to talk of putting an end to Caesar's career of con- 
quest in Gaul and of undoing his laws. Domitius Aheno- 
barbus, who was now a candidate for the consulship, de- 
clared openly that he would deprive Caesar of his com- 
mand, 49 and Cicero announced that he would raise the ques- 
tion of the Campanian lands in the senate. The optimates 



>^ 



^Letters, i, 213-14. Q. Fr., ii, 3. 

^Letters, i, 215. Q. Fr., ii, 3. 

*'The determination of the triumvirs that neither of the consuls should preside at 
the election for the next year when Crassus and Pompey were to be candidates is 
evidence of the party standing of the two consuls. It confirms the references in the 
next note. 

^Plutarch Cato Minor, 39. That the consuls acted in harmony is shown by Cicero. 
Letters, i, 220. Q. Fr., ii, 6. 

49 Suetonius, 24. 



116 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

were soon to find that they had made a tactical mistake. 
Their threats served only to drive the three together again. 
The prospect of a conservative revival led straight to a re- 
newal of the triumvirate. 

However great their personal hostility, neither Pompey 
nor Crassus had any wish to see the senate again in con- 
trol. The millionaire had had his imagination fired by 
Caesar's victories and was ardently desirous of military 
glory for himself. Great as was his influence among the 
needy nobles in the senate, he must have realized that this 
body would never give him an army of its own free will. 
Pompey on his side saw the provision for hiy veterans, that 
had caused him so much trouble, threatened by the nobles. 
The senate had indeed given him the charge of the grain 
supply, but they had given less than he wished, though all 
for which he dared openly to ask, and they had refused him 
the Egyptian command he had wanted. It was plain that 
they neither liked nor trusted him and that, if he were 
again to command an army, he must look elsewhere. Both 
men were prepared to realize that they had allowed their 
personal dislike to carry them too far, and both were ready, 
if their personal ambitions were gratified, to patch up their 
coalition once more. Caesar, on his side, was no less anx- 
ious to renew the combination that had gone to pieces. The 
senate's animosity he must have realized very fully. If it 
could get control of the government in Rome, he could 
cherish few illusions as to what he might expect. Already 
they had shown their hands quite openly as a result of their 
overconfidence. The question of the consular provinces for 
54 B.C. was then before the house. The senate could not, 
indeed, revoke the Vatinian law or interfere with its pro- 
visions. But it will be remembered that under this law 
Caesar was given the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and 
Illyricum only. His most important province, Transalpine 
Gaul, from which as a base he was actually carrying on his 
great campaign, he held only from year to year by the vote 
of the senate. The conscript fathers could legally dispose 
of this province with entire freedom, and if they chose, 
could supersede Caesar there at the close of 55 B.C. and 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE H7 

could thus bring his military career to an abrupt close. 
Unless he were prepared to begin a civil war there and 
then, which was not by any means the case, it was vitally 
important to him that his command in Transalpine Gaul 
should not be interfered with. This he could hope for only 
if his former partners would come to his assistance, and if 
they were to do so, he must be prepared to pay them what- 
ever they demanded for their help. Thus for the second 
time the necessities of his position forced him to play the 
part of peacemaker and to employ all his talents to reconcile 
Pompey and Crassus with each other. In this he was en- 
tirely successful. It was arranged that his two partners 
should visit him at Luca, a small town near the frontier 
of his province, and here the triumvirate was renewed and 
its program for the immediate future settled. 

The terms of the agreement were not at once made public, 
and when they were, the triumvirate was found to be a very 
different thing from what it had been at the start. In the 
first combination Caesar had reaped the greater part of the 
profits. Now his partners claimed their share. It was too 
much to expect that they would consent to leave all the 
armed strength of the coalition to one of its members, even 
if they had not each had military ambitions of their own. 
If their power was to be based upon an army, they de- 
termined that the military forces of the coalition should be 
increased and that each of the three partners should have 
his share. Accordingly it was resolved that Pompey and 
Crassus should both hold the consulship again, and that at 
the expiration of their year of office both should receive 
important proconsular commands. What these should be 
was likewise decided in advance. Pompey was assigned the 
two provinces of Spain with an army to command, and 
Crassus was to receive Syria with another army. These 
commands were to be held for the term of five years, and 
to balance these concessions Caesar's term in Gaul was to 
be extended for the same length of time. For giving his 
consent to these arrangements, which armed his partners 
for a possible future struggle with himself, Caesar has been 
blamed by some modern critics. Yet that the conditions 



118 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

which he granted to his colleagues turned out to be danger- 
ous to himself was something which he could not well have 
foreseen. He could be certain that the two would never join 
their forces against him. As long as they both lived he might 
feel himself secure. Just how secure, one can appreciate 
by trying to imagine what would have been the course of 
events when he and Pompey came to the final struggle for 
supremacy if the East had been occupied by Crassus with a 
strong army under his command. It is obvious that in such 
circumstances, if Pompey had dared to draw the sword at 
all, he must have surrendered almost at once to one or the 
other of the two. With Caesar rushing at him from the 
north, he could not, as he did, elude his adversary by re- 
treating to Greece. If he had ventured on the attempt, the 
forces of Crassus would have come upon him before his 
hastily raised army had been hammered into shape. As 
long as both his partners lived, therefore, Caesar was 
reasonably safe, and even the death of one of them might 
not prove disastrous if his army remained powerful and 
could be kept in friendly hands. What Caesar did not an- 
ticipate was just what actually occurred. The one event 
which could make the terms agreed upon at Luca involve a 
serious element of risk was the very thing that speedily be- 
fell. This was not merely the death of Crassus in the East, 
but his death in the midst of such an overwhelming disaster 
that his army was destroyed as a striking force. 

We may conclude, therefore, that Caesar made no great 
mistake as things stood, or as their future development could 
be reasonably forecast. The immediate effect of the re- 
newal of the combination left little to be desired by the 
three. As soon as it was known at Rome that they had 
come to terms, the opposition which had lately seemed so 
confident collapsed. The men who had been attacking them 
made haste to sue for peace. Cicero, who had declared his 
intention of bringing before the senate the question of the 
Campanian lands, made haste to eat his words and set to 
work composing what he himself described as his recanta- 
tion. All men in silence waited to see what the three would 
do, for no one knew exactly on what terms they had renewed 



THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 119 

their league. The uncertainty was not of long duration, 
for Pompey and Crassus soon announced themselves as 
candidates for the consulship. The only man who tried to 
stand against them was prevented by mob violence from 
entering his candidacy, and the two were chosen without 
the slightest open contest. All that remained was to pro- 
pose and enact the laws that gave effect to their arrange- 
ments for the provinces, and the compact of Luca had been 
carried out in all essential particulars. The attempt at a 
senatorial reaction had failed and the command of the army 
and the Roman world had been divided among the tri- 
umvirs. 



CHAPTER V 

Caesar 

The renewed triumvirate which seemed all-powerful in 
55 B.C. was not destined to endure for any length of time. 
The close personal ties which bound two of its members 
together were loosened when in 54 Julia, the daughter of 
Caesar and the wife of Pompey, died suddenly. In the 
next year a still more serious blow of fate destroyed it 
entirely. 

As a part of the bargain concluded at Luca the province 
of Syria had been assigned to Crassus for the term of five 
years. The millionaire had been a capable soldier in his 
youth and had long been seeking an opportunity for mil- 
itary glory. His chance had now come and he seized it with 
eagerness. As governor of Syria he would have sole charge 
of Rome's relations with the rising power of Parthia. In 
the East he dreamed that he might rival the achievements 
of Caesar in Gaul and return to Rome with all the glory 
of a splendid conquest. A war with Parthia he found it 
easy to contrive, but the campaign, on which he embarked 
light-heartedly enough, proved far more difficult than he 
had anticipated. The Parthians were a new people with 
whom the Romans had but recently come in contact, and 
Crassus knew them no better than his fellow countrymen. 
He failed to realize in advance of actual experience the true 
nature of Parthian warfare, and he paid for his misunder- 
standing with his life. The strength of his adversaries lay 
in their light cavalry, and pitched battles formed no part 
of their strategy; their plan was to retreat before the foe 
and draw him ever farther from his base of supplies until 
a favorable opportunity should offer to cut off his com- 
munications and surround his army in a hostile country. 
Crassus fell into this trap, and as a consequence his army 
was destroyed and he himself treacherously slain, while 
attempting to negotiate with his foes. 

The defeat and death of Crassus put an immediate end 



CAESAR 121 

to the triumvirate and left Caesar and Pompey face to face. 
The question of supremacy was one which could no longer 
be evaded or disguised. While the masters of the world 
were three in number one of the three could yield to the 
wishes of his two partners without too great humiliation. 
This was no longer possible; whoever yielded now must 
definitely take the second place himself and openly concede 
the leadership to the other. With the death of Crassus 
either Pompey or Caesar must be admittedly supreme. Not 
only so, but the practical destruction of the army of Crassus 
removed a potent check on Pompey which might have pre- 
vented him from resorting to arms. It is unlikely that 
Pompey would have challenged both Caesar and Crassus, 
but against Caesar alone he dared to make a stand. 

Besides the dissolution of the triumvirate, other forces 
were also tending in the direction of a struggle for 
supremacy. Pompey would hardly have ventured to oppose 
even Caesar alone without the support of the senate and its 
party. Such a combination, which at one time would have 
seemed almost impossible, was now fast becoming more or 
less inevitable. The chief cause for this was the growing 
fear of Caesar. The Roman nobles may not yet have 
known the exact nature of Caesar's plans for the future, 
but they knew, or suspected, quite enough to fill them with 
apprehension and alarm. His wonderful conquest of Gaul 
had not only given him a splendid military reputation but 
a powerful and devoted army as well. During his term as 
consul he had shown clearly his contempt for the constitu- 
tion of the republic, and to many the most vital problem of 
the day seemed to be the devising of some way to save the 
state from his dictatorship. If Caesar were to be resisted, 
it was clear that Pompey must lead the opposing party. 
Indeed without Pompey resistance was so hopeless that it 
might well be called impossible. There seemed but two 
alternatives open: either to submit to Caesar and permit 
him to become supreme without a struggle, or to seek an 
alliance with Pompey and to make him the leader of the 
party which was seeking to defend the republic against the 



122 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

unscrupulous ambition of the great proconsul of the Gauls. 
Neither alternative was pleasant to the Roman aristocracy, 
but there was little hesitation as to which was the less bad. 
The nobles neither loved nor trusted Pompey and they 
cherished many deep resentments against him, but these 
feelings were much weaker than the fear and hatred with 
which they regarded Caesar. As the menace from Caesar 
seemed to them to grow more and more ominous, the sen- 
atorial party grew more and more ready for an alliance 
with his rival. 

It was the mob of Rome that gave the final impulse to the 
reconciliation. From the close of 55 B.C., when Pompey and 
Crassus laid down the consulship, the city had been left to 
all intents and purposes without a government. The tri- 
umvirs, having gotten what they wanted for themselves, 
were satisfied to let matters drift, but so long as their com- 
bination existed it was strong enough to prevent the senate 
from taking any vigorous or efficient action. Meanwhile 
the three were occupied with their own interests: Caesar 
was absent in Gaul, Crassus departed for Syria even before 
his year as consul had expired, Pompey remained in Italy, 
it is true, but made no move to interfere in politics. As 
proconsul of the Spains he should have gone at once to his 
province, but he did not choose to do so. Instead he stayed 
in Italy recruiting troops for Spain and governing his 
provinces by legates. This was no doubt within the letter 
of the law, but it was clearly a violation of its spirit. There 
was no fixed rule as to when a governor should set out for 
his province, but it had certainly never been intended that 
a proconsul of Spain should remain in Italy for any length 
of time, or indeed for longer than was necessary to make 
the needful preparations for taking over his command. 
Pompey, however, chose to linger near Rome and also chose 
to keep near him ready for action a considerable body of his 
newly recruited troops. Perhaps he foresaw that the grow- 
ing disorder would finally force the senate to call on him 
for help and wished to be ready when the time came. He 
was coming to fear the greatness of his partner, and he 



CAESAR 123 

had always shown some inclination toward an alliance with 
the conservatives. 1 Hitherto his advances had been repulsed, 
but if the nobles had at length learned their mistake and 
were now ready to accept him as their chief, he was not 
likely to reject their overtures. In the meantime he fell 
back upon a policy of "watchful waiting." 

With the government paralyzed Rome was soon plunged 
in utter anarchy. The two triumvirs had hardly laid down 
the consulship when the turbulence broke out. The whole 
of 54 B.C. was a time of disorder and disturbance, and it 
was found impossible to hold the regular consular elections. 
The next year opened without consuls, and when at last 
they could be chosen in a moment of temporary quiet, they 
were unable to relieve the situation. Clodius and Milo 
were both candidates for office and each was backed by 
a riotous mob. Their personal hatred of each other en- 
venomed their political hostility and their perpetual clashes 
turned the Roman streets into a pandemonium. Pompey 
was the one man in Italy who had physical force behind 
him and he could— or at least would— do nothing without 
some show of legal right. This the senate alone could give 
him, but that body was not yet ready for such a step. In 
such a state of things elections were again impossible and 
the year 52 B.C. opened without magistrates in office. At the 
beginning of the year a climax was suddenly reached in the 
disorders. Clodius and Milo met by accident outside the 
city and Milo seized the unexpected opportunity to murder 
his opponent. The news of this event precipitated a final 
riot in Rome, where the followers of Clodius rose in fury on 
learning of the death of their favorite and burned his body 
and the senate house together. The situation was now felt 
to be quite unendurable. Fear of the mob, combined with 
the dread of Caesar, swept away the scruples of the con- 
script fathers and they decreed that Pompey should be 



a Pompey had shown himself very ill at ease during Caesar's consulship, and his 
conduct afterwards in bringing Cicero back from exile and in other matters at that 
time seems to show an attempt on his part to come to terms with the senate. 
The conscript fathers, however, could not be induced to give him what he wanted 
and he turned again to Caesar and renewed the triumvirate at Luca. 



124 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

named as sole consul to restore order. Even the rigid Cato 
yielded to the obvious necessity of the case and frankly 
owned that the constitution must bend if it were not to 
break entirely. Pompey's policy of watchful waiting had 
thus been justified by the result and he entered the city, 
dictator in all but name, and this at the invitation of his 
former foes. 

With the troops' at his disposal Pompey had little trouble 
in restoring order and quieting the mob. it was clear, 
however, that the unexampled honor that had come to him 
went far beyond the terms of the compact agreed upon at 
Luca. Though from the moment of his election as sole 
consul Pompey began to draw near to the conservatives, he 
was far from ready for a definite break with Caesar. To 
placate his partner and probably to fulfil his pledges, 2 
Pompey used all his influence to pass a law proposed by the 
ten tribunes granting to Caesar the privilege of becoming 
a candidate for the consulship without coming to Rome in 
person. With this concession Caesar was satisfied, and 
Pompey was left free to deal as he might choose with other 
matters. As soon as he had restored order he proceeded to 
hold the elections in due form and set to work with vigor to 
punish the most flagrant of the recent offenders. The juries 
were remodelled and the courts now met under the pro- 
tection of Pompey's soldiers. Milo, in spite of his former 
services to Pompey, was promptly brought to trial and 
banished for the murder of Clodius. Many others shared 
his fate and stringent laws were passed against violence and 
corruption at elections. These laws applied not only to the 
future but were made retroactive as well, and every public 
man in Rome was thus brought potentially within their 
scope. Means were thus found to expel from Italy the 
most turbulent of the Roman politicians and incidentally 
those most obnoxious to the senate, with which body Pom- 
pey's alliance grew constantly more close. As if to make 
his change of policy more evident, Pompey contracted a new 
marriage and this time chose his wife from one of the old 



2 It is not improbable that such a measure had been definitely agreed upon at Luca. 



CAESAR 125 

aristocratic families identified with the conservative party. 
Soon after this he made his new father-in-law, Caecilius 
Metellus, his colleague in the consulship. This took from 
his position its unprecedented character but at the same 
time ranged him definitely upon the side of the senate. 

The fears which the conservatives had long felt of 
Caesar's future action had been increased by recent events. 
The law of the ten tribunes, which conferred on him the 
right to be elected consul in his absence, had revealed his 
plans with an unmistakable clearness. Before this law 
was passed his intentions may have been suspected, but 
doubt was now impossible. Caesar planned to become 
consul without leaving his province and hence without giv- 
ing up his army. But though they now knew his design, 
was it possible for the conservatives to prevent him from 
carrying it out? This very law of the ten tribunes served 
to create a legal tangle of such a sort that there seemed no 
way in which he could be stopped. In order to under- 
stand what followed it will be necessary to examine this 
curious legal situation at some length. 

As the law stood, Caesar's command in Gaul would 
terminate in 50 B.C. 3 and yet, in spite of this, it would be 
impossible to supersede him before January 1, 48. The 
legal complications which brought about this singular result 
were not accidental but were rather the result of a delib- 
erately contrived plan for Caesar's advantage. Caesar 
meant to be elected consul for the second time in the course 
of 49, and he was fully determined not to give up his 
provinces and army till he was ready to assume the consul- 
ship in Rome at the beginning of 48. He had carefully 
worked out his arrangements for this purpose and seemed 



s The date usually given by English historians is March 1, 49. The question as 
to the time when Caesar's proconsular command expired has given rise to much 
discussion. A number of different dates have been suggested and at present most 
German scholars seem inclined to favor 50. The matter is discussed in the article 
on the Lex Pompeia-Licinia in the Appendix, where references are given to the 
various views on the subject. For the purpose of this chapter the difference between 
the two years is not very important. Whether Caesar's term ended in 50 or extended 
to March 1, 49, it is certain that he meant to stay beyond it and that Pompey was 
determined to prevent this. The events that followed must be interpreted in much 
the same fashion whichever date may be selected. 



126 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

certain of success. As proconsul of Gaul he had a perfect 
right to remain in his province till his successor arrived to 
take over the government, and under the existing legal 
system, it would be impossible for the senate to send a 
successor before the beginning of 48, when Caesar would 
be quite ready to leave, if he had not already left, for Rome. 
The reasons for this may be rather briefly stated. Under 
the Vatinian Law Caesar's command would have expired 
March 1, 54 B.C., but in 55 his term had been prolonged by a 
law proposed by Pompey and Crassus, the two consuls for 
that year. This second term was for five years, like the first, 
and the new quinquennium was to be counted from the date 
of the passage of the law, that is from some time early in 
55. The law, however, contained a peculiar clause which 
forbade any discussion of a successor to Caesar before 
March 1, 50. 4 Now since the Sempronian law required that 
the senate should select the consular provinces before the 
election of the consuls who were to receive them, this clause 
would make it impossible for the senate to assign the Gauls 
to the consuls for 50. The first consuls to wnom Caesar's 
provinces could be assigned would be those for 49, but they 
would not be able to take over their commands till the end of 
the year, owing to their duties in Rome. The only way to 
supersede Caesar before 48 was, therefore, to make the Gauls 
praetorian rather than consular provinces. Against this 
Caesar had another weapon ready to his hand. The Sem- 
pronian law had deprived the tribunes of the power to veto 
the assignment of the consular provinces, but that right 
still held good in the case of the praetorian. If the senate 
should attempt to send out a propraetor to supersede 
Caesar, any one of the ten tribunes could interpose a veto, 
and Caesar fully intended to have at least one tribune always 
ready in Rome to protect his interests. With this legal 
tangle to protect him, Caesar could feel reasonably certain 
that if his candidacy in absentia were admitted, he could 
retain his provinces till the time arrived for him to go to 



4 This may be considered as practically certain from the following passages: Cicero, 
Letters ii, 78. Fam., viii, 8; and Caesar (or better Hirtius), Gallic War, viii, 53. 



CAESAR 127 

Rome as consul, and that he would not be obliged to lay- 
down one office before he was ready to take up the other. 

In this situation what Caesar could do, and meant to do, 
was clear enough. Quitting Gaul at the last moment to 
assume the consulship in Rome, he would be able, during his 
year of office, to provide himself with a new proconsular 
command for any term he chose, and for this purpose he 
could take his pick among the provinces. No one could 
imagine for a moment that he would allow any legal or 
constitutional forms to stand in his way. The experience 
which Rome had had of his methods was amply sufficient to 
dispel any such illusions. In all probability Cicero simply 
reflected the general opinion when he wrote to Atticus: 
"Imagine him consul a second time after our experience of 
his former consulship! 'Why, comparatively weak as he 
was then,' you say, 'he was more powerful than the whole 
state.' What, then, do you think will be the case now?" 5 
If Caesar once became a candidate, it seemed impossible to 
prevent his election, 6 and once in office there was no hope 
of restraining him. That such a prospect should have made 
the blood of many senators run cold may easily be under- 
stood. Pompey alone could help them, and this he was 
ready to do since he had begun to share their apprehensions. 
It is quite unlikely that at this time he had any thought of 
war, but he had made up his mind that Caesar's plan of 
passing directly from one office to the other must be 
thwarted. He was firmly determined that Caesar should 
give up his army before he became consul, and on this point 
at least he was ready to join hands with the conservatives. 
In the correspondence of Cicero there are various indications 
of Pompey's attitude during the next two years that serve 
to make it fairly clear. While Cicero was absent in Cilicia 
his friend, Caelius Rufus, wrote to him the news in Rome. 
From these letters it is clear that in the course of 51 Pompey 
had resolved that Caesar must give up his army before he 



B Letters, ii, 232. Att., vii, 9. The words were written in December, 50, but the 
sentiment expressed must have been felt much earlier. 

6 The whole conduct of the conservatives makes this clear. Cicero never seems to 
have doubted Caesar's election if he stood for the office. 



128 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

became consul. 7 Later, by the end of 50, the letters of 
Cicero himself to Atticus show that Pompey had come to 
fear the second consulship of Caesar, regardless of his 
army, declaring openly that it would mean the overthrow 
of the constitution. 8 It is possible that the change was due 
to the increasing influence of the conservatives, with whom 
Pompey's alliance grew constantly more close. 

It is probable that the events of Caesar's first consulship 
in 59 B.C. had left a deep impression on the mind of Pompey. 
Caesar had then governed Rome as a dictator in defiance of 
law and constitution alike. True, he had owed his power 
largely to Pompey and had used it largely for Pompey's 
benefit; that did not modify in the least Pompey's determi- 
nation that Caesar should not be dictator of Rome again. 
In 59 Caesar had overawed all opposition, because he had an 
army to support by force his lawless acts as consul, and 
Pompey was resolved that he should not be a consul with 
an army a second time. If Caesar became consul while he 
still kept his province he might bring his troops to Rome 
under the pretense of a triumph — as Pompey had done in 70 
B.C. — and restore the essential conditions of his dictatorship 
in 59. The only safeguard was to force him to surrender 
the command of his army before he became consul. This did 
not remove all danger, but it was the least that Pompey 
would consider. All this did not mean that Pompey clearly 
foresaw a war with Caesar. It was by no means certain 
that some compromise could not be agreed upon by which 
Caesar would give up his army while Pompey would concede 
him his second consulship. Perhaps in 52 Pompey would 
have consented to even more favorable terms to Caesar. 
At any rate neither Pompey nor the Roman world in gen- 
eral recognized as a fact that Caesar would fight rather 
than accept any terms that Pompey would grant. The civil 
war was yet hidden in the future. 9 



''Letters, ii, 51, 177, 196. Fam., viii, 9, 11, 14. 

^Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. See also to the same effect Letters, ii, 232. Att,, 
vii, 9. 

9 As late as December, 50, Pompey thought, or pretended to think, that Caesar 
would submit rather than fight. Cicero Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. 



CAESAR 129 

While Pompey was effecting his reconciliation with the 
conservatives Caesar's hands were tied by the last desperate 
revolt of the Gauls under Vercingetorix. This gave Pompey 
ample leisure to make his arrangements without serious in- 
terference. The first necessity was to break down effec- 
tively the legal safeguards by which Caesar had defended 
his position. To accomplish this Pompey, during his con- 
sulship in 52, proposed a new law regulating the whole 
matter of the administration of the provinces. By this it 
was provided that there should henceforth be an interval 
of five years between the holding of a magistracy in Rome 
and the governorship of a province. Thus a consul or a 
praetor at the end of his year of qffice would become a pri- 
vate citizen for five years and would then be assigned a prov- 
ince to govern as a proconsul or propraetor. For the first 
few years after the passing of this law there would be a 
shortage of governors, and this Pompey proposed to meet by 
the assignment of governorships to such of the ex-magis- 
trates as had not hitherto held a province. This law of Pom- 
pey's repealed the Sempronian law which had hitherto been 
in force and which protected Caesar so effectually. By the 
new system it would be possible for the senate to name a 
successor to Caesar as soon as his legal term should expire. 

Under the existing conditions in Rome, with Pompey 
master of the city, the new law concerning the provinces 
was passed without the least difficulty. The purpose was 
not openly avowed, of course, but the law was justified as 
a means of checking the furious competition for the offices 
which had been recently convulsing Rome. 10 In spite of 
such disguise the real object could hardly be doubted, espe- 
cially when Pompey introduced and carried another law, 
one clause of which required that a personal canvass should 
be made by all candidates for office. This directly repealed 
the special privilege just given Caesar and he naturally pro- 
tested. Pompey, perhaps not yet sure of the conservatives, 
gave way and added a provision exempting Caesar, but as 



10 Dio says that the law had been proposed by the senate in the preceding year 
with this object. Dio, xl, 46. 



130 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

he made this change in his bill after it had been voted by the 
people its legal force was somewhat doubtful. 11 

By these two laws Caesar's position was completely 
changed. He could no longer count with certainty on going 
directly from the proconsulship to the consulship. He might 
be superseded and find himself during some months a pri- 
vate citizen. The danger of this was clear enough. Under 
the Roman law a man could not be prosecuted in the courts 
while he retained the imperium, but the moment that he 
laid it down he could be called on to answer for his acts. 
Now some of Caesar's enemies were firmly resolved to bring 
him to trial as soon as he became a private citizen. For 
this his career, whether in Rome or Gaul, would furnish 
ample grounds. His trial would take place before courts 
controlled by Pompey, or the senate, and even if he should 
win an acquittal, the mere fact of prosecution would debar 
him from becoming a candidate for office until the trial was 
finished. That Caesar feared this we have contemporary 
evidence. During the year that Cicero was absent in Cilicia 
Caelius Rufus wrote to him that "Caesar is fully persuaded 
that he can not be safe if he quits his army." 12 Asinius 
Pollio, one of Caesar's officers, has left on record the story 
that after the battle of Pharsalia, as Caesar gazed upon the 
field of his great victory, he exclaimed, "They would have 
it so. After so many great deeds, I, Gaius Caesar, would 
have been condemned if I had not sought the help of my 
army." 13 It may be considered certain that Caesar was fully 
convinced that for him to become a private citizen would not 
only mean the end of his career, but that he would be in great 
danger unless protected from his enemies by an official po- 
sition. Moreover, it was much more than his personal 



"Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 28. Marcellus in 51 argued that Caesar's privilege 
had been cancelled, but Cicero seems to regard it as still in force. See Letters, 
ii, 228. Att., vii, 7 and also Letters, iii, 121. Fam., vi, 6. 

^Letters, ii, 196-97. Fam., viii, 14. 

13 The exclamation of Caesar is quoted from Pollio by both Plutarch and Suetonius. 
(Plutarch, Caesar, 46. Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 30.) There is also evidence 
that threats of prosecution were openly made against Caesar. It should be noted 
that the law of Pompey against corruption at elections was made retroactive and all 
persons who had been candidates for office in Rome since 70 B.C. were liable under it. 
This looks very much as if the conservatives feared that they could not get evidence 
from Gaul in time to use against Caesar and devised the provisions of this law so 



CAESAR 131 

fortunes that was involved. Even if Caesar had been ready 
to sacrifice his own career and run the risk of being made 
a victim of the fierce resentment of the Roman nobles, it 
would still have been almost impossible for him to sub- 
mit. He had the interests of his army to consider. His 
veterans would certainly expect such an allotment of lands 
as Pompey's soldiers had received. Pompey's experience 
had made it clear enough that if Caesar should lay down 
the sword and retire to private life, his men would remain 
unrewarded for their years of service. The senate hated 
Caesar far more intensely than they had Pompey when he 
returned from the war against Mithridates, and if Pompey 
had been unable to get anything from the conscript fathers, 
Caesar could hardly expect more generous treatment. In 
addition to his personal ambition and apprehensions, the 
pressure of his army and his obligations to his soldiers 
would compel Caesar to fight for his position if necessary. 
Hence, in all the negotiations that followed, Caesar clung 
desperately to this one point : he must succeed to the consul- 
ship without becoming, even for a short time, a private citi- 
zen. But this was just the one thing that his opponents 
would not yield. Because of this, the later attempts at com- 
promise were futile and amounted to little more than play- 
ing for position, each party trying to cast upon the other 

that they could prosecute him on a charge for which the evidence was available in 
Rome. Did Pompey intend to make such a use of the law? Some have held that 
he had no clear understanding of the law but had merely passed what his conserva- 
tive friends asked for without seeing the real significance of the clauses in Question. 
Meyer (Caesars Monarchic 243 note 1) thinks that this theory credits Pompey with 
a degree of naivite that is incredible. This seems reasonable, but there is one ob- 
jection. Cicero in his letters ignores this danger to Caesar. From this we can 
hardly help inferring that the orator did not take it very seriously. If Pompey had 
any intention of using the law against Caesar, it is highly probable that Cicero would 
have known it. The great general was no adept at concealment, and the description 
of Caelius Rufus had much truth when he wrote that Pompey "is accustomed to think 
one thing and say another, and yet is not clever enough to conceal his real aims." 
(Letters, ii, 16. Fam., viii, 1). Perhaps the explanation is that Pompey had no 
intention of using the law against Caesar himself, but did mean to employ it to get 
rid of a number of politicians, some of them Caesar's partisans. It would obviously 
be much easier to persuade Cicero of the sincerity of such an attitude than it would 
Caesar. Whatever the solution of the difficulty, it seems clear that Cicero was very 
little concerned about any risk that Caesar might run from a prosecution. Even 
if Caesar could have been convinced as to Pompey's intentions, he might reasonably 
doubt whether Pompey could control the conservatives once the menace of the Gallic 
legions was removed by Caesar's laying down the command of his army. 



132 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the odium of striking the first blow and appearing in the 
light of the aggressor. 

While providing himself with a legal weapon against 
Caesar, Pompey was not likely to leave his own position 
weakened by any doubts or questions which a little legisla- 
tion could remove. By entering the city he had, according 
to the Roman law, forfeited his proconsular imperium. 
He had no intention of giving up his provinces and he was 
shrewd enough to wish to avoid any legal difficulties in the 
future. He, therefore, took the precaution of having his 
Spanish command extended for some years, which would 
prolong his powers for some time beyond those of Caesar. 
Thus his rival might be driven into private life while he 
would still retain a powerful army. The future thus se- 
cured, Pompey was ready to lay down the consulship and to 
resume his former practice of governing Spain from the 
country towns around Rome and in other parts of Italy. 
He doubtless felt confident that, when the time came, he 
could force Caesar either to renounce the second consul- 
ship altogether, or to take it on conditions which would de- 
prive his tenure of the office of its dangers. If Pompey 
kept an army ready at hand in Italy while Caesar was ob- 
liged to surrender the legions of Gaul, it might be possible 
to hold him within such limits as Pompey should see fit 
to impose. 14 

By the beginning of 51 B.C. Pompey had completed his 
arrangements, and Caesar, on his side, was free to act. The 
latter, like his rival, had no desire to force an immediate 
crisis. Whatever feelings might actuate reckless and vio- 
lent partisans, the Roman world at large shrank back from 
civil war. Whoever struck the first blow would have to 
bear a heavy responsibility, and if he seemed to act on 
slight or frivolous pretexts, he would find public opinion 



14 On the eve of the civil war Pompey threatened to go to Spain if Caesar became 
consul. However, by that time Pompey had committed himself much further than at 
the beginning of 51 and he was trying to frighten the conservatives into supporting 
him more vigorously than some of them wished to do. The letters of Cicero show 
that he had then come to object to the second consulship of Caesar on any terms. 
The earlier plan of Pompey may have been, as suggested above, to let Caesar have 
the second consulship and to remain in Italy at the head of an army. See Cicero, 
Letters, ii, 232. Att., vii, 9. 



CAESAR 133 

strongly in favor of his adversary. It was true enough 
that public opinion had lost much of its former weight, 
but it was still a force that neither of the rivals cared to 
disregard. As a consequence they temporized and sought 
to put each other in the wrong. Caesar could not have 
marched on Rome as he did if Italian opinion had been 
decidedly against him, as might have been the case if he 
had struck in 51. Pompey, on his side, not only needed to 
gain public sympathy as completely as possible, but he was 
still too ill at ease among his new allies to be in haste. He 
had no desire to attack Caesar by attempting to recall him 
before his term expired, and that would not occur for some 
time to come. 

The difficulties of Pompey in dealing with the conserva- 
tives are made sufficiently clear in Cicero's letters. It is 
probable that while the revolt of Vercingetorix rendered 
Caesar powerless to strike, the whole conservative party 
had supported Pompey in breaking down the legal defenses 
of the common enemy. That did not mean that they were 
ready to go the length of civil war. When an armed strug- 
gle seemed imminent many hesitated and would gladly have 
drawn back. At the last moment there was a considerable 
section of the party which wished to come to terms rather 
than fight. Some, no doubt, feared the strength of Caesar's 
army, others distrusted Pompey and felt that his success 
in a war would not save the republic but would merely 
make him its master in place of Caesar. This was Cicero's 
conviction and it was plainly shared by many in the senate. 
This division among his supporters must have occasioned 
Pompey much anxiety, and there were probably times when 
he doubted how far he could trust to the wavering support 
of the conservatives. But in fact the senate had very 
little choice in the matter and the decision lay with Pom- 
pey; if he had sufficient confidence in his own strength to 
force a crisis the conscript fathers could do nothing except 
follow him, however reluctant they might be, or however 
much they might condemn his policy. Cicero expressed 
these sentiments more than once to Atticus. The orator 



134 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

dreaded a civil war beyond all things and would have pre- 
ferred any other solution. He distrusted Pompey and feared 
his victory almost as much as his defeat. In the critical 
December of 50 B.C. when the negotiations reached the 
breaking point he wrote frankly, "The political situation 
gives me greater terror every day. For the loyalists are not, 
as people think, united. . . . What we want is peace. From 
a victory, among many evil results, one, at any rate, will 
be the rise of a tyrant." 15 " 'Fight,' say you, 'rather than 
be a slave.' To what end ? To be proscribed, if beaten : to 
be a slave after all, if victorious? 'What do you mean to 
do, then ?' say you. Just what animals do, who when scat- 
tered follow the flocks of their own kind. As an ox follows 
a herd, so shall I follow the loyalists or whoever are said 
to be loyalists, even if they take a disastrous course." 16 
After the war had begun he declared bitterly, "There is now 
no question of the constitution. It is a contest of rival 
kings." 17 

Yet whatever he might feel, however great his fear that 
war could only prove the ruin of the republic, however 
much he might prefer to do "anything rather than fight" 
as he himself declared, he knew that he was powerless. 
No eloquence of his could any longer alter, or even in- 
fluence, the course of events. He was reduced to advising 
peace at any price in private while acquiescing publicly in 
any policy which Pompey might adopt. He saw this clearly 
and expressed it candidly when he told his friend : "What 
is to happen when the consul says : Your vote, Marcus Tul- 
lius ? I shall answer in a word : T vote with Gnaeus Pom- 
peius.' Nevertheless, in private, I shall exhort Pompey to 
keep the peace." 18 

Under such conditions Pompey would hardly have dared, 
even if he had wished, to launch a direct attack on Caesar. 
His obvious policy was to thwart Caesar's plans by strictly 
legal means, and if Caesar refused to accept the check, to 



^Letters, ii, 224-25. Att., vii, 5. 
^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 

^Letters, ii, 374 and also to the same effect 219 and 293. Att., x, 7 and vii, 3 
and viii, 11. 

^Letters, ii, 219-20 and also 226 and 229. Att., vii, 3, 6 and 7. 



CAESAR 135 

throw on him the odium of a resort to arms. On his side 
Caesar was equally determined not to be outmaneuvered in 
this easy fashion. In spite of Pompey's new legislation, 
intended chiefly, if not entirely, to accomplish his defeat, 
he meant to defend himself with every legal weapon at his 
disposal, seeking to thrust the responsibility of violating 
the constitution and so provoking war upon his adversary. 

As soon as he had disposed of Vercingetorix, Caesar be- 
gan the diplomatic game. At the beginning of 51 B.C. he 
made his first demands upon the senate. Probably in this 
first move he had little hope of a complete success, but he 
may have aimed at forcing Pompey to come out in the open 
and abandon his ambiguous attitude. Hitherto Pompey had 
disclaimed any hostility to Caesar, and the latter may have 
thought it possible by a bold play to break up the alliance 
between Pompey and the conservatives before it became 
firmly cemented. Whatever his expectations were, Caesar 
put forward the demand that the potential menace to his 
position in the recent laws of Pompey should be removed 
by an extension of his imperium in Gaul until the end of 
49. If this were granted, then Pompey's recent legislation 
would lose all force against Caesar, but would still accom- 
plish what Pompey had claimed was its sole object. Caesar 
justified his demand by arguing that the law of the ten 
tribunes had extended his imperium by implication. 19 On 
the face of it this law had merely given Caesar the right to 
become a candidate for the consulship in his absence. But 
he could urge with some show of reason that this concession 
was clearly meaningless if he were to become a private citi- 
zen and therefore able to make a personal canvass for the 
office. Reasonable or unreasonable, this request brought 
no result. 

While Caesar may have wished to draw Pompey into the 
open, the conservatives on their part were no less eager to 
accomplish the same result. One of the consuls, Marcellus, 



19 Cicero recognized the justice of Caesar's claim when he wrote to Atticus, "Do I 
approve of votes being taken for a man who is retaining an army beyond the legal 
day? For my part, I say no; nor in his absence either. But when the former was 
granted him, so was the latter." Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 



136 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

who was an ardent partisan of the senate, brought the ques- 
tion forward. He proposed to supersede Caesar in his 
provinces at once before his term of office had expired. But 
this was going much too fast for Pompey, and the matter 
was allowed to drop. The conservatives were still uncer- 
tain of their leader's attitude, and Cicero was asked to try- 
to discover his intentions. The orator was then on his way 
to take up the governorship of Cilicia under Pompey's new 
law. He had an interview with Pompey in the south of 
Italy and wrote back the cheering information that Pompey 
was an admirable citizen, prepared to meet any emergency. 
Doubtless his correspondent, Caelius Rufus, well knew the 
meaning of the phrase and could read between the lines 
when he added, "For he takes the same view, as we ever 
do, as to who are good and bad citizens." 20 

Encouraged by this and other similar reports, the nobles 
were ready to renew the proposal to supersede Caesar. 
They put it this time in a much more moderate form. In 
September the senate voted that the question of appointing 
a successor to Caesar should be brought before that body 
on the first of March of the following year. Caesar's trib- 
unes offered no objection to this, but when his opponents 
sought to go further than a mere discussion and to prevent 
the use of the tribunes' veto in the future, they promptly 
interposed. The chief result of the debate was the declara- 
tion which was drawn from Pompey. He spoke in favor 
of the discussion of the question of a successor to Caesar 
and when asked what he would do if the resolutions of the 
senate were vetoed by the tribunes, he replied that it made 
no difference whether Caesar refused to obey the senate, or 
secured someone to prevent the senate from passing a de- 
cree. This certainly amounted to a threat, though he still 
refused to treat the suggestion of war seriously, and when 
asked what he would do if Caesar should determine to keep 
his army and to be consul both, he answered only with the 



^Letters, ii, 33. Fam., ii, 8. 



CAESAR 137 

query, "What if my son should choose to strike me with 
his stick?" 21 

By his declaration as to his attitude in case one of Caesar's 
tribunes tried to use his veto, Pompey had joined hands 
with the conservatives in an unmistakable manner, but 
still with a half-hearted effort to leave open a retreat. 
Enough had now been said to render such a retreat im- 
probable, and though Pompey perhaps did not yet wish to 
face the fact, Caesar must henceforth have reckoned him 
an open enemy. His union with the conservatives had, 
moreover, been very skilfully executed; he had allied him- 
self with them, yet without giving Caesar a decent pre- 
text to draw the sword. Though the proconsul of Gaul 
was well enough aware of the real meaning of his rival's 
course, all that the public saw was that the senate was re- 
solved to do its duty by taking under its consideration a 
grave public question and that Pompey, like a patriotic 
citizen, would protect its freedom of discussion. The con- 
clusion to which the debate would lead was not yet known, 
and Caesar could not venture to begin a civil war on the 
ground that he might in the future be adversely affected 
by decrees which the senate had not yet passed, and so far 
as the public probably could see, might never pass. The 
temper of the senate had not yet been openly shown and 
was in fact uncertain. Caesar might very well distrust 
it, and though he could not fight on the issue of its probable 
future action, he would very naturally seek to arm himself 
against it. 

In the elections for 50 B.C. two opponents of Caesar had 
been returned as consuls, but in the elections for the tribunes 
he had been successful. This difference in the results in the 
two cases may readily be understood if it is borne in mind 
in what manner the voting was conducted. The votes in 
the Roman assembly were not counted by individuals but 
by groups. In the choice of the consuls the group by which 
the vote was taken was the century; this was based on 



"These details are from a letter of Caelius Eufus to Cicero, then absent in Cilicia. 
Letters, il, 76-78. Fam., viii, 8. 



138 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

property in such a way that the wealthy class enjoyed an 
influence out of proportion to their number. Tn the 
tribunician elections on the other hand the voting was by 
tribes, and in the division of the people into tribes property 
was not considered. 22 On this occasion the result was 
modified when the conservatives contrived to set aside the 
election of one of the tribunes and to replace him by one of 
their supporters in the person of C. Scribonius Curio. They 
doubtless thought that they had gained a point, but in 
reality they had played directly into Caesar's hands. Prob- 
ably they expected Curio to block any action of the other 
tribunes in favor of Caesar, and they had not considered 
what might happen if he should turn against them. Pom- 
pey in the senate had recently uttered a warning against 
any action by a tribune known as Caesar's partisan. That 
astute leader, therefore, determined to avail himself of the 
services of an enemy. Such action would leave Pompey 
helpless to follow up his threat, for it would be absurd to 
hold Caesar responsible for what his adversaries did. Thus 
Curio was in a position to be of much greater use to Caesar 
than an avowed supporter could have been. The reckless 
life of the new tribune had left him overwhelmed with debt, 
while Caesar had the plunder of Gaul at his disposal. A 
bargain was soon struck and Curio for an enormous bribe 
agreed to play Caesar's game, but to refrain as long as 
possible from coming out openly upon his side. By this 
unexpected move Caesar was able to block Pompey's plans, 
and all the better because of Pompey's own law concerning 
the provinces. By that measure Pompey had repealed the 
Sempronian law so that the senate might be able to send out 
a successor to Caesar as soon as his term should have ex- 
pired. In doing this, he overlooked the fact that he had 
also repealed the limitation which the Sempronian law had 
placed upon the tribunes' veto. That limitation had de- 
barred the tribunes from all interference with the assign- 
ment of the consular provinces by the senate. This clause 
had been repealed along with the rest of the law, and Curio 



2J Cicero plainly regards the lower classes as favorable to Caesar. 



CAESAR 139 

was thus armed with the power to stop any provincial ap- 
pointments, whether consular or praetorian, a point which 
Pompey was soon destined to discover and regret. 

Curio began his tribuneship by making various bids for 
popularity. He still posed as an enemy of Caesar but began 
more and more to assume the tone of an independent patriot 
and to harass Pompey with specious proposals which the 
latter could not very well refuse and yet was wholly un- 
willing to accept. The discussion of the provinces which 
had been set for March failed to reach any conclusion. 
Curio and one of the consuls whose neutrality Caesar had 
secured with gold were probably in part responsible for this. 
When other means seemed likely to fail, Curio came forward 
to propose, as a solution of all difficulties, the simultaneous 
retirement of both Caesar and Pompey. When this sugges- 
tion was brought forward Pompey was ill in southern Italy. 
He wrote at once to the senate saying that he was ready to 
lay down his command in Spain whenever those who had 
bestowed it on him might request. This sounded well but 
Curio found it much too vague. On his side Pompey made 
an offer of compromise, and intimated that he would consent 
that Caesar should remain in Gaul until November 13. 
This, from Caesar's point of view, was of course valueless, 
and Curio resolutely opposed this solution while pressing 
his own demand of a joint resignation. Cicero's corres- 
pondent in Rome, Caelius Rufus, summed up the situation 
in these words : "Pompey as yet seems to have thrown all 
his weight on the side of the senate's wish that Caesar 
should leave his province on the 13th of November. Curio 
is resolved to submit to anything rather than allow this: 
he has given up all his other proposals. 23 Our people, whom 
you know so well, do not venture to push matters to ex- 
tremes. The situation turns entirely on this: Pompey, 
professing not to be attacking Caesar, but to be making an 
arrangement which he considers fair to him, says that Curio 
is deliberately seeking pretexts for strife. However, he is 
strongly against, and evidently alarmed at, the idea of 



23 Perhaps the various bills he had brought in as bids for popularity. 



140 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Caesar becoming consul-designate before handing over his 
army and province. . . Mark my words — if they push their 
suppression of Curio to extremes, Caesar will interpose in 
favor of the vetoing tribune; if, as it seems they will do, 
they shrink from this, Caesar will stay in his province as 
long as he chooses." 24 

On the main question the senate came to no conclusion, 
since it would not put pressure on Curio to compel him to 
withdraw his veto of any decrees concerning the provinces. 
They did, however, pass one decree that Pompey and Caesar 
should each contribute one legion for a campaign against 
Parthia. To meet this demand Pompey withdrew a legion 
which he had loaned to Caesar and Caesar had to furnish one 
of his own. Both thus came from Caesar's army and the 
proposal had the effect of weakening his forces. 

In August the elections for the ensuing year were held; 
Caesar's candidate for the consulship was defeated, while 
two of his opponents were chosen. Among the tribunes he 
was more successful and secured the return of two of his 
supporters, namely Cassius and Mark Antony. The exist- 
ing deadlock seemed likely, therefore, to be indefinitely 
prolonged. This very fact rendered the extreme con- 
servatives more desperate, and, at the same time, some base- 
less rumors gave them greater boldness. When the legions 
for the Parthian war arrived, a report began to circulate 
that all was not well with Caesar's army ; it was said that 
the men were weary of his never-ending wars and that they 
would fight for him no more. These rumors, credited by 
many, led the conservatives to force the issue. Accordingly 
in December the question of his successor was again brought 
up. The consul, Marcellus, demanded that Caesar be de- 
clared an outlaw if he failed to surrender his army and 
province on a fixed day. The senate voted the decree while 
Curio sat silent in his place. Proceeding further, the consul 
made the proposal that Pompey should give up his command 
in Spain. As thus put, it seemed a direct affront to Pompey 
and the senate promptly rejected it. Then, and not till then, 



2i Letters, ii, 176-77. Fam., viii, 11. 



CAESAR 141 

did Curio arise. He did not attempt to use his veto, but 
demanded a vote upon the motion that both men should lay- 
down their extraordinary powers. Perhaps the senators 
were frightened when they realized that the decree, as it 
had just been voted, was an open declaration of war; prob- 
ably most of them were eager to grasp at what appeared 
a chance of compromise. Whatever the motive, in spite of 
seeming inconsistency, the senate now by a vote of 370 to 
22 accepted Curio's resolution. Thus by the venal tribune's 
clever move Pompey was practically defeated and placed in 
an embarrassing position. If he refused to comply, he, 
and not Caesar, was in revolt against the senate. If he 
agreed, he would disarm himself before his enemy. Nor 
could he see an exit from the trap into which his new allies 
had led him. There seemed no legal means left him of 
checking Caesar's plans. The play for position had ended 
in a victory for his rival, and if the latter could make use 
of his advantage, public opinion might be ranged upon his 
side. From the dilemma in which Pompey found himself 
only the sword could extricate him, and so at last he nerved 
himself for the resort to war. The magistrates in office 
were his friends, as against Caesar at least, and they pre- 
pared to try to find some fragment of legal justification for 
their chief. Marcellus a few days later made a strong effort 
to induce the senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, and 
failing in this, he left Rome and went to join Pompey, then 
in Naples, calling on him to take up arms and save the state. 
Pompey promptly accepted the invitation and proceeded 
to Luceria to assume command of the two legions destined 
for the war with Parthia and temporarily stationed at that 
point. As proconsul of Spain he had no legal authority 
over them, and the senate had passed no formal decree as- 
signing them to him. His rights in the case rested wholly 
on the consuls' declaration of martial law and summons to 
himself to act. He thus cast in his lot with the extremist 
element in the senate which was bent on war, and this at the 
very moment when his violence and haste would stand out in 
the most striking contrast to the moderate and conciliatory 



142 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

bearing of his opponent. For Caesar had been quick to 
take advantage of the skilful move of Curio. The latter 
had left Rome as soon as his term of office had expired on 
the 10th of December and had hastened to Caesar's head- 
quarters in Cisalpine Gaul. From here he hurried back 
bearing a letter from Caesar to the senate. In this Caesar 
recounted his services and professed himself quite willing 
to lay down his command if Pompey would but do the same. 
In brief he announced himself as prepared to render due 
obedience to the vote of the senate. What would have hap- 
pened had his offer been accepted we can only guess. Prob- 
ably Pompey was too deeply committed to draw back and 
Caesar was quite well aware of it before he wrote his letter. 
Certainly nothing less than such an attitude on his part 
could have enabled him to reap the full advantage of Curio's 
victory in the senate. 

There are clear indications that Pompey's hasty violence 
had produced a reaction in the public mind. In that critical 
December after Pompey had taken arms, Cicero wrote to 
Atticus: "The political situation gives me greater terror 
every day. For the loyalists are not, as people think, united. 
How many Roman knights, how many senators, have I seen 
prepared to inveigh against the whole policy, and especially 
the progress through Italy now being made by Pompey." 25 
In another letter he declares that he knows of no class that 
can be called loyalists and expresses doubts as to the 
knights. 26 . In yet another he affirms that he has met 
scarcely anyone who does not think it better to yield to 
Caesar's demands than to fight. 27 After Caesar's last offers 
were rejected, Cicero speaks of his party's most insane deci- 
sion, 28 and after the war had begun, when he notes the re- 
vulsion of feeling in Caesar's favor, he exclaims, "What 
grave mistakes and vices on our side are accountable for this 
I cannot think of without sorrow." 29 The feeling to which 



^Letters, ii, 224. Att., vii, 5. 
^Letters, ii, 227-28. Att., vii, 1. 
^Letters, ii, 225. Att., vii, 6. 
^Letters, ii, 241. Att., vii, 10. 
^Letters, ii, 304. Att., viii, 13. 



CAESAR 143 

the orator thus bears witness cannot have been wholly lost 
upon even the most reckless of the partisans of war, but 
they were all the more determined to drag the senate after 
them and so to gain some better legal standing for their 
leader. 

Pompey was now fully committed to the side of war. In 
that same December Cicero reported a long conversation 
with him to Atticus, declaring that Pompey had no wish for 
peace, having become convinced that if Caesar became consul 
even after giving up his army, it would mean the overthrow 
of the constitution. 30 All that remained, therefore, was for 
Pompey to force the senate to declare itself upon his side. 

The last stormy sessions of the conscript fathers need not 
be recounted at length. Timid senators still shrank back, 
Caesar's tribunes interposed and forced the reading of his 
letter mentioned above against the wishes of the consuls. 
On the senate it seems to have produced little effect. Al- 
though conciliatory in tone it ended with a threat which 
may have angered the hesitating members. In any case, in 
view of Pompey's attitude, the proposal of a joint resigna- 
tion could lead to no result, since the senate had no means of 
forcing Pompey to accept. In addition to his letter Caesar 
seems to have instructed his friends to make still other 
offers to the senate in case those in his letter were rejected. 
Of his provinces he consented to give up all except Cisalpine 
Gaul and Illyricum and of his army all except two legions. 
In return he demanded only that he be permitted to retain 
these until he should have been elected consul. Pompey 
seems to have been more or less inclined to accept these 
offers, but the consuls rejected them. 31 All efforts at com- 
promise having thus failed, nothing was left the senate but 
to take a final decision. Pompey threatened, urged, and 
encouraged, the wavering were intimidated, and so, at last, 
the final vote was passed ; Caesar's proposals were rejected 
and war was declared against him. Caesar's tribunes vetoed 
the decree, and the senate having declared martial law, they 

^Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. 

^Appiari, ii, 32. Cicero, Letters, iii, 121. Fam., vi, 6, may refer to these offers. 



144 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

left the house and fled to join their master in the disguise 
of slaves. 32 

So finally, after long drawn out negotiations and pro- 
tracted political intrigues, the inevitable war had come, but 
the manner of its coming was a blow to Pompey and his 
cause. His attempts to drive Caesar into open illegality 
had failed, and as a result the champions of the constitution 
were compelled to begin the struggle against its enemy by 
breaking it themselves. 33 Their disregard of the veto of 
Caesar's tribunes was, perhaps, justified by the passage of 
the "last decree," but even so it gave a popular pretext to 
their opponent of which he made prompt use. More sig- 
nificant was the paradoxical position in which, as a result 
of Caesar's tactics, they found themselves. The conscript 
fathers had by a very large majority passed a vote directed 
against both rival generals. After this they had, almost at 
once, declared war on the one who offered to obey and had 
intrusted the command of all their forces to the one who 
had refused to comply with their decision. The defenders 
of the senate had themselves defied it and were now attack- 
ing Caesar as a traitor for having ventured to submit to its 
authority. Such must have been the way in which the 
events in Rome would strike many Italians who were not 
closely in touch with the inside realities of things, and that 
they should be given such an appearance was a victory for 
Caesar at the very beginning of the war, not yet a victory 
in the field but soon to be translated into one. 

In January of 49 B.C., when the sword was actually 
drawn, neither party to the struggle was well prepared for 
war. While the negotiations were still in progress it was 
impossible for either side to take any step which would have 
been too obvious a menace to the other. When hostilities 



32 They appeared thus before his army, but it was probably only a theatrical device. 
Cicero does not suggest that they had been in danger (Letters, ii, 234. Fam., xvi, 11), 
nor does Caesar in his own account allege real violence. 

33 Meyer contends that the action of the consuls in appointing Pompey to command 
was legal. This may have been the case but it was nevertheless unconstitutional, 
just as a sudden wholesale creation of peers would be in England. To take the steps 
they did without the authority of the senate for their action was directly counter to 
the professed principles of the optimate party. See Meyer, Caesars Monarchic, 274- 
275. 



CAESAR 145 

began the bulk of Caesar's forces were upon the farther 
side of the Alps, 34 and Pompey's army in Italy had yet to 
be recruited. Though both the rival leaders were unready, 
there were shrewd observers in Rome, Cicero's friend 
Caelius Rufus among them, 35 who reckoned Caesar's army 
as the stronger of the two. Pompey, however, seems to 
have entered on the contest full of hope and confidence. 
A short time before the outbreak of the war Cicero had a 
long conversation with him and was much encouraged by 
Pompey's calm assurance of success and contempt for 
Caesar's power. 36 Later, when the course of events had 
disillusioned him, the orator spoke bitterly of his leader's 
blindness and folly. That Pompey misjudged the whole 
situation is obvious enough, but it is possible to understand 
his blunder. In the first place he had reason to believe that 
Caesar's army was not entirely loyal to its chief. Such 
rumors had been spread in Rome by the officer who brought 
the two legions into Italy for the Parthian war, and in ad- 
dition to such reports, the ablest of all Caesar's lieutenants, 
Labienus, was now in communication with the senate and 
was soon to desert to Pompey's side. Even if Caesar's 
army did support him, it was far away in the Transalpine 
province and the newly conquered parts of Gaul. A revolt 
of the recently subdued territories might be expected if 
Caesar withdrew his troops, and such a rising might im- 
peril his whole army and must terribly handicap him. If 
he dared to run the risk at all and if his soldiers should 
consent to follow him, it would require time to bring them 
across the Alps and this would give Pompey an opportunity 
to make the necessary preparations. It seems probable that 
Pompey took it for granted that Caesar would be unable to 



34 Ferrero thinks that the presence of only one legion in Cisalpine Gaul shows that 
Caesar did not look upon war as possible. Yet to have brought his army across the 
Alps without a reasonable excuse would have been a direct provocation to Pompey 
and would have thrown the responsibility for the war on himself. If it was worth 
while to carry on negotiations at all it would have been folly to throw away all 
possible advantage from them. See Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, ii, 181. 

35 See his letter to Cicero, illuminated by his conduct during the war. Letters, ii, 
197. Fam., viii, 14. 

^Letters, ii, 230-31. Att., vii, 8. 



146 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

assume the offensive, but would be obliged to wait in Gaul 
for the attack of his enemies. If he did this, Pompey could 
hope to crush him between the Spanish army and the army 
to be raised in Italy. 37 If the possibility of a sudden dash 
on Rome by Caesar occurred to Pompey at all, he doubtless 
dismissed it as absurd. If Caesar should try such a move, 
he would be stopped before the walls of the first Italian 
town. Pompey was supremely sure that the Italians were 
with him heart and soul ; for this the demonstrations which 
took place when he was ill in Naples were in part to blame. 38 
In his confidence he lost sight of the disastrous effect of his 
diplomatic defeat and the illegal violence of his party's 
recent acts. But his antagonist was fully alive to the turn 
in public opinion which these things had provoked. He had 
succeeded in putting his opponent in the wrong, and Caesar 
was not the man to lose the fruits of a hard earned success 
for lack of daring or initiative. Without waiting for the 
bulk of his army he gathered up such forces as he had at 
hand and boldly crossed the Rubicon, a little river which 
formed the southern boundary of Cisalpine Gaul. 

Had Italy been strongly upon Pompey's side the crossing 
of the Rubicon would have been followed by an immediate 
check. The first important town could have held up Cae- 
sar's insufficient force by an energetic resistance till Pom- 
pey could have come to its relief. But the senate had al- 
lowed itself to seem in the wrong and public sentiment had 
veered toward Caesar. Town after town threw open its 
gates to him without the least resistance, nowhere did any 
one attempt to make a stand, and Pompey's recruiting of- 
ficers fled from his advancing cohorts. As he came swiftly 
on, Caesar caught the bewildered recruits gathered for 
Pompey's army and enrolled them in his own. Without 
serious opposition he pushed on into the heart of Italy. 

The prompt offensive of Caesar fell like a thunderbolt 



37 0n the strategic situation see Meyer, Caesars Monarchic, 289-90, and Kromayer 
in Hartmann and Kromayer, Romische Geschichte, 141-42. Kromayer thinks that 
Caesar was beaten in the diplomatic negotiations, but this seems to the present writer 
clearly an error. His discussion of the general military situation is admirable though 
brief. 

^Plutarch, Pompey, 57. 



CAESAR 147 

upon the senate and the nobles. Their forces were neither 
organized nor ready and the recruits did not pour in as 
they had expected. Cicero had been dispatched to Capua 
to assist the levy and there, in the very district where Caesar 
had settled the veterans of Pompey, he confides to Atticus 
that "the settlers do not make a very eager response." 39 On 
the side of the conservatives there was only disorganization 
and confusion and a bitter disillusionment with Pompey. 
Cicero wrote to his friend: "How utterly incapable our 
general is you yourself observe, in having had no intelli- 
gence of the state of affairs even in Picenum : and how de- 
void of any plan of campaign, the facts are witness. . . . 
Everyone agrees that he is in a state of abject alarm and 
agitation." 40 But in the midst of the chaos among his ene- 
mies Caesar relentlessly advanced and their complaints and 
bitter words were impotent to arrest his progress. 

Pompey seems early to have seen that it was useless to try 
to save the capital, and accordingly he gave the order to 
abandon it. This order, unexpected, by his supporters, 
moved them to fury at what they thought his cowardice, but 
he knew his own weakness far too well to risk a battle. 
Besides his raw recruits he had at hand only the two legions 
so recently obtained from Caesar that he did not dare to 
trust their loyalty too far. He hurriedly retreated to the 
south and the nobles had no choice but to follow their leader 
in what some, if not most, of them regarded as a disgraceful 
flight. The senate and the magistrates left the city, for- 
getting in their frantic haste a large amount of money in 
the public treasury, and sought refuge in the camp of Pom- 
pey. Caesar was thus left free to occupy Rome whenever 
he might choose. The retreat of Pompey filled Cicero with 
the utmost indignation. "As to our leader Gnaeus," he ex- 
claimed, "what an inconceivably miserable spectacle ! What 
a complete breakdown ! No courage, no plan, no forces, no 
energy ! I will pass over his most discreditable flight from 
the city, his abject speeches in the towns, his ignorance not 



3t Letters, ii, 251. Att., vii, 14. 
^Letters, ii, 247. Att., vii, 13a. 



148 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

only of his opponent's, but even of his own resources — but 
what do you think of this?" 41 and he proceeds to tell Atticus 
of the forgotten money left in Rome. A little later he writes 
more calmly but with almost as much bitterness : "As to my 
remark . . . that I preferred defeat with Pompey to vic- 
tory with those others, it is quite true : I do prefer it — but 
it is with Pompey as he was then, or as I thought him. But 
with a Pompey who flies before he knows from whom he is 
flying, or whither, who has betrayed our party, who has 
abandoned his country, and is about to abandon Italy — if I 
did prefer it, I have got my wish : I am defeated." 42 

But though to Cicero, and doubtless to many others like 
him, the occupation of Rome by Caesar seemed the end of 
all things, the contest was by no means really settled by it. 
Pompey was still in arms in Italy, though with but the one 
desire of escaping across the sea as soon as possible. He 
had the raw recruits from whom in time an army might be 
made, but he was too experienced a soldier to dream that 
they were capable of meeting Caesar's veterans at once. 
His plan was to seek safety in the East till he could put his 
levies into shape. Accordingly he turned his flight to 
Brundisium, the chief port of southern Italy, from which 
he could transport his forces into Greece. Caesar, on his 
part, was bent on cutting off his flight and ending the whole 
war in one short campaign. It thus became a race between 
the two with Brundisium as its goal, but rapid as were 
Caesar's movements, when he reached the port he found 
his rival there ahead of him and safe behind the walls. 

Caesar's first campaign had been at once a brilliant suc- 
cess and a failure. He had driven Pompey out of Italy, but 
he had not been able to end the war. Now he could hope 
for nothing but a long and doubtful struggle. His position, 
far from being secure, was really critical. Public opinion, 
won over to his side by his success in the negotiations, had 
begun to turn against him. The flight of Pompey, carrying 
with him the magistrates and many, if not most, of the 



■"■Letters, ii, 263. Att., vii, 21. 
^Letters, ii, 288. Att., viii, 7. 



CAESAR 149 

senators, seemed to place the whole machinery of legal gov- 
ernment in his hands. Whoever might have been the ag- 
gressor at the start, Pompey could now pose as the cham- 
pion of the law. Appian expressly states that after Pom- 
pey sailed from Brundisium public opinion turned in his 
favor. 43 Cicero had noted the change in feeling even ear- 
lier, as soon indeed as Pompey fled from Rome. On Jan- 
uary 19 he had written to Atticus : "There is an extraord- 
inary outcry — I don't know what people are saying with 
you, but pray let me know — at the city being without mag- 
istrates or senate. In fact, there is a wonderfully strong 
feeling at Pompey's being in flight. Indeed, the point of 
view is quite changed : people are now for making no con- 
cessions to Caesar." 44 

The change in sentiment was, no doubt, fostered by the 
expectations men had entertained as to what Caesar would 
do if he should gain control. Most seem to have anticipated 
that he would imitate Sulla and proscribe his opponents. 
In December of 50 Cicero had said of him that he would not 
be "more merciful than Cinna in the massacre of the no- 
bility, nor less rapacious than Sulla in confiscating the prop- 
erty of the rich." 45 After the war broke out Atticus ex- 
pressed his fears of Caesar's probable cruelty and Cicero 
agreed with him that Caesar would "spare no form of 
brutality." 46 Later, when Caesar's course seemed to belie 
these apprehensions, Cicero grew sufficiently hopeful to 
doubt what kind of a tyrant Caesar would prove to be: 
"whether he will copy Phalaris or Pisistratus." 47 Never- 
theless, he found it very difficult to feel much confidence in 
Caesar's clemency, and when Atticus expressed hopes of 
Caesar's moderation, he retorted : "How can he help behav- 
ing ruthlessly? Character, previous career, the very nature 
of his present undertaking, his associates, the strength of 
the loyalists, or even their firmness, all forbid it." 48 A 



4S Appian, ii, 40. 

^Letters, ii, 242-43. Att., vii, 11. 
^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 
^Letters, ii, 243. Att., vii, 12. 
^Letters, ii, 262. Att., vii, 20. 
^Letters, ii, 316. Att., ix, 2a. 



150 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

personal interview with Caesar did little to increase his 
confidence, since the charm and courtesy of the leader was 
balanced by the sight of his partisans and followers. Of 
them Cicero wrote to Atticus in deep disgust : 'Tor the rest, 
good heavens! What a crew! what an inferno! to use your 
word. . . . What a gang of bankrupts and desperadoes !" 49 

Yet Cicero had already discerned clearly that a policy of 
moderation and mercy might be to Caesar's advantage. He 
had confessed this to his friend when he wrote : "By heaven, 
if he puts no one to death, nor despoils anyone of anything, 
he will be most adored by those who had feared him most. 
The burgesses of the country towns, and the country people 
also, talk a great deal to me. They don't care a farthing 
for anything but their lands, their poor villas, their paltry 
pence. And now observe the reaction: the man in whom 
they once trusted they now dread: the man they dreaded 
they worship." 50 A part of this feeling may have been due 
to the threats which Pompey's party were breathing forth 
against all who did not join them. Apart from any consid- 
erations of personal temperament, Caesar might think it 
well worth while to calm the frightened public and to make 
the contrast between himself and his opponents stand out 
as sharply as possible. In March Cicero had written that 
"Pompey has set his heart to a surprising degree on imi- 
tating Sulla's reign. I am not speaking without book, I 
assure you. He never made less of a secret of anything." 
From such a policy Cicero shrinks in horror, but fears the 
same thing from Caesar. 51 

Though Caesar displayed great magnanimity from the 
start, it was but slowly that even his supporters came to put 
faith in his continuing this policy. In April Curio told Cicero 
that "Caesar was not by taste or nature averse from blood- 
shed, but thought clemency would win him popularity: if, 
however, he once lost the affection of the people, he would be 
cruel." 52 Only two days after this conversation with Curio, 



^Letters, ii, 353-54. Att., ix, 18. 
^Letters, ii, 304. Att., viii. 13. 
^Letters, ii, 325-26. Att., ix, 7. 
B2 Letters, ii, 365. Att., x, 4. 



CAESAR 151 

Cicero received a letter from Caelius Rufus, who had joined 
Caesar at the outbreak of the civil war, in which the deserter 
told the hesitating consular frankly, "If you think that 
Caesar will maintain the same policy in letting his adversa- 
ries go and offering terms, you are mistaken. His thoughts, 
and even his words, forebode nothing but severity and 
cruelty." 53 Such expressions might be intended to frighten 
Cicero so as to prevent his joining Pompey in the East, but 
they may very well have meant that Caesar perceived the 
drift of public sentiment toward his rival and was irritated 
by it. Certainly he did not change his policy of clemency 
and moderation, although he may have uttered threats. 

The task that faced Caesar in Italy was one of serious 
difficulty. He was compelled to improvise a government 
of some sort and to do this with such materials as Pompey 
had left behind. With most of the senate and the magis- 
trates gone this problem was very far from simple, since to 
serve the ends for which it was designed it was essential for 
Caesar to give his government as much as possible the ap- 
pearance of legality. A senate, or some body which could pass 
as such, was necessary for his purpose. He set to work at 
once to gather at Rome as many of the senators as possible. 
There were some few of the conscript fathers who were his 
partisans, and there were more who, either disgusted with 
Pompey or convinced that his cause was lost, now came over 
to his side. Yet among them all there was a woeful lack 
of names that could command the popular respect. It 
would have been a real gain to his cause if he could have 
persuaded Cicero to join him. The orator, sent by Pompey 
to Capua, had remained there a prey to indecision and bit- 
ter misgivings until Caesar's advance had cut him off from 
Brundisium. On his way to Rome, after Pompey's flight 
to Greece, Caesar endeavored to gain his support, or at 
least his presence at the meeting of the senate which he in- 
tended to call. But though at a personal interview Caesar 
pressed the orator with the greatest urgency, Cicero re- 
fused to lend the sanction of his name to what he regarded 



ss Letters, ii, 367. Fam., viii, 16. 



152 THE FOUNDING OP THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

as a mockery of the senate. 54 So Caesar had to do the best 
he could without him. That best was only to establish a 
sort of provisional government at Rome under one of the 
praetors, while he himself prepared to fight the contest to a 
finish in the field. 

As matters stood, Caesar was still between the armies 
of his foe. Pompey had a large, though untrained, force in 
Greece, while he retained the legions under his command in 
Spain. Caesar thus faced the danger that he would find 
himself attacked upon both sides at once. Unable to follow 
Pompey because of the lack of ships, he resolved to deal 
with Spain, confident that the lack of training on the part 
of Pompey's men would render him powerless to take the 
offensive for some time to come. 

In Spain Caesar was successful in one swift campaign. 
Indeed no success, unless it were rapid, would have been 
of much avail, since his aim was simply to crush Pompey's 
forces there before his army in the East was ready for 
action. As it was, the generals of Pompey played into his 
hands and were defeated, and their forces were reenlisted 
under Caesar or disbanded. The western army of his rival 
ceased to exist and the ground was cleared for the final duel 
between the two. 

The military events of the campaign that ended at Phar- 
salia it is not necessary to study in detail. Several times 
Caesar seemed in imminent danger of complete defeat and 
ruin but each time fortune, or Pompey, intervened to save 
him. His crowning mercy came when Pompey, unable to 
withstand the clamors of his officers and of the senate that 
encumbered him, yielded his better judgment to their over- 
confidence and leaving an impregnable position in his camp, 
offered battle in the open plain of Pharsalia. There the 
superiority of Caesar's men could make itself felt and the 
splendid veterans of the Gallic war crushed the newly im- 
provised army of his foes. For the first time in his life 
Pompey fled from the field of battle defeated, and the Roman 



64 For an account of the interview see Letters, ii; 353. Att., ix, 18 and also 
Letters, ii, 358. Att., x, 1. 



CAESAR 



153 



world lay now at Caesar's feet. It is true there still re- 
mained much fighting to be done. Pompey, seeking refuge 
in Egypt, was murdered there, but his followers, rallying in 
Africa, prolonged the struggle. Defeated here, they made 
a last stand in Spain, and after a moment when they seemed 
to have some prospect of success, their military power was 
finally crushed at Munda. That they were able to rally at 
all after Pompey's overthrow was due in large part to the 
fact that Caesar found himself involved in a petty war in 
Egypt at the critical moment and could not follow up his 
victory with sufficient energy. 55 Though the Egyptian epi- 
sode thus served to prolong the war, it could not affect its 
final outcome. Still the very fact that the struggle had been 
so protracted enhanced its bitterness and greatly increased 
Caesar's difficulties when he undertook the task of recon- 
struction. 

The work of reorganizing the Roman state which fell to 
Caesar after the victory over Pompey he was forced to un- 
dertake in the midst of his further campaigns in Africa and 
Spain. This may, in part, serve as an. explanation of its 
imperfect character, for Caesar's government bore to the 
end very much the appearance of a temporary expedient. 
This the wars in which he found himself involved would 
serve at once to explain and justify. It was only after his 
last victory at Munda that he began to indicate his perma- 
nent intentions, and then the time allowed him by his ene- 
mies was too short and the steps that he had as yet taken 
at the time of his death too few to make it possible to deter- 
mine what he would ultimately have done. Yet the main 
lines of his policy are unmistakable, and the questions in 
dispute have to do largely with matters of name, of title, 
and of outward forms. 

When, after Pharsalia, a very large section of the Pom- 
peian party laid down its arms and submitted to the con- 
queror, he could at last proceed to organize a government 
upon a better basis than had been possible so far. Yet the 
difficulties were still great, and circumstances served but 

65 This seems clear from the course of the events. It was also Cicero's opinion. 
See Letters, iii, 55. Fam., xv, 15. 



154 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

to accentuate them. Had the war ended with Pompey's 
defeat, public opinion would probably have run strongly in 
Caesar's favor, but when it dragged on and flared up again 
in Africa, the tide turned against him. Those of the van- 
quished party who had yielded to the victor now drew back, 
fearing that they had made their peace too soon and alarmed 
lest the party they had deserted in its adversity might even 
yet prevail. When Caesar ended the African war by the 
battle of Thapsus, he stained his triumph, in the eyes of 
the old nobility, by the execution of some of his most bitter 
foes. When he returned to Rome in 46 B.C., he found the 
state of public feeling far less favorable than it had been 
immediately after Pharsalia, and this, as will appear quite 
shortly, materially complicated the task of establishing a 
stable government. 

Some of the difficulties which confronted Caesar in the 
task of reconstruction may readily be seen. The history 
of Rome, since the military reforms of Marius, had made 
visible to all men the supremacy of the military power. 
Only a government which held the sword could hope to 
stand. But if the career of Sulla demonstrated the power 
of the soldier, the career of Pompey had served to demon- 
strate as clearly the dependence of a victorious general upon 
the civil power. When the conqueror of Mithridates had 
disbanded his troops without assuring himself of some 
means of controlling the republican machine, he had stepped 
at once from the height of glory into the valley of humilia- 
tion. His descent had been too sudden and dramatic and 
its underlying causes too plainly visible for Caesar not to 
read the lesson of his fall. Thwarted and powerless, Pom- 
pey had seen himself obliged to enter the first triumvirate. 
Both he and his two partners in that combination had seen 
the need of grasping again the sword which he had laid 
aside, and thus the proconsulship of Caesar had been 
brought about. Events had led the three to divide the com- 
mand of the army among themselves, and this division had 
resulted in the civil war just ended. The outcome of that 
final struggle had left Caesar as a military autocrat in Rome. 
The whole course of events combined to show that he could 



CAESAR 



155 



not safely lay aside, or share with others, even if that had 
been possible, the command of the army. But it was no 
less obvious that he must have some kind of civil govern- 
ment to assist him in his work. No great community has 
ever yet been permanently ruled by martial law, and Caesar 
could not have imagined that such a government was ade- 
quate for the whole civilized world. But the traditions of 
the past had made the republic the only form of civil gov- 
ernment of which men had any clear " conception. Cicero 
had written to his friend that "when laws, jurors, law 
courts, and senate are abolished" there could be no se- 
curity. 56 Though the orator wrote thus in a moment of 
excitement, there can be little doubt that such feelings were 
general. Caesar's task was to restore enough of the old 
constitutional forms to pacify public opinion while retain- 
ing adequate authority in his own hands. It was thus es- 
sentially the same problem that Augustus had later to meet, 
but circumstances made it far more difficult for Caesar 
than it was for his adopted son. 

The very policy which Caesar had pursued contributed 
to increase the complication of the situation. When he 
first advanced on Rome many looked for a reign of terror 
after the model of Sulla. Caesar, however, had chosen other- 
wise and had surprised the world by his moderation and 
clemency. That this was partly due to the natural dis- 
position of the man need not be doubted, but it was also 
in some degree a matter of policy. One motive for the adop- 
tion of that policy may have been his clear perception of 
his future needs. If Pompey were vanquished, Caesar 
would be forced to govern, and he can have had but little 
confidence in the greater part of his own party. It is un- 
necessary to take literally all Cicero's bitter words respect- 
ing Caesar's followers, yet the suspicion can hardly be 
avoided that they were as a class hardly the sort of men to 
administer an empire. Many of them were reckless bank- 
rupts or men with dubious pasts. It would seem that Cicero 
had some basis in fact for his words when he wrote to 



^Letters, ii, 326. Att., ix, 7. 



156 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Atticus : "Of what sort, again, will he find his confederates 
or subordinates, whichever you please to call them, if those 
are to rule provinces, of whom not one could manage his 
own estate two months? I need not enumerate all the 
points, which no one sees more clearly than yourself. 
Still, put them before your eyes: you will at once under- 
stand that this despotism can scarcely last six months." 57 
In the bitterness of his feelings, Cicero may have painted 
his picture in unduly somber colors, but there was some 
foundation for his words. Several of Caesar's partisans 
did turn out badly when he sought to use them in his gov- 
ernment. Curio had been eminently serviceable as a trib- 
une, but when he was entrusted with a military command 
he lost his life and his army by his rashness. Q. Cassius, 
another useful tribune, when sent as governor to Hither 
Spain, succeeded by his misconduct in stirring up trouble 
and finally lost his life after laying the foundation for a 
formidable rebellion against his master. Whenever Caesar's 
back was turned, there was disorder in Rome fomented by 
his own partisans. From all of which it seems sufficiently 
clear that there was much rotten material in his party and 
a decided lack of men of the right sort, since, although he 
is accounted a shrewd judge of men, Caesar promoted so 
many of the unworthy to positions where they were able to 
do harm. In spite of all their faults and vices, the repub- 
lican nobility still had almost a monopoly of official exper- 
ience and training for public affairs and still possessed a 
very powerful hold upon the imagination of mankind. 
Without them it was a difficult, if not an impossible, task 
to govern the Roman world. A perception of this fact may 
have had something to do with Caesar's adoption of a policy 
of clemency. He spared no pains to win over the aristoc- 
racy which had supported Pompey in the civil war, and he 
conferred important offices upon his pardoned foes. It is 
significant to note that at the time of his death so many of 
those who had fought against him were holding high office 
in his government, or had been selected by him to hold such 



^Letters, ii, 382. Att., x, 8. 



CAESAR 157 

office in the near future. The number of such men is over- 
whelming evidence that the dictator was, for some reason, 
deeply anxious to use his former enemies to rule his em- 
pire. 58 

But Caesar's policy of clemency was not without its draw- 
backs. One of these his murder revealed with startling 
clearness. Another, and one that has been less frequently 
perceived, was that as a result of it the senate contained 
a majority belonging to the opposition. Caesar might trust 
the individual nobles to the extent of giving them high 
offices ; it was another matter to trust the conscript fathers 
as a body. They were, to a large extent, his vanquished 
and pardoned enemies who continued to nurse their bitter- 
ness in secret. 

But this body, which was sullenly hostile to the dictator 
at heart, was a necessary wheel in the republican machine. 
No restoration of the old constitution was in the least pos- 
sible without the cooperation of the senate, and this was 
just what Caesar, despite his clemency, was unable to se- 
cure. Thus when he undertook to construct a civil gov- 
ernment he found a senate which he dared not trust, yet 
with which he could not entirely dispense. It was impos- 
sible to give the conscript fathers a serious share in the 
control of affairs without the danger that they would use 
the power thus conceded to make his position untenable, in 
other words without the risk of finding himself in the situa- 
tion of Pompey when he consented to disarm; and yet, if 
Caesar did not take the senate into partnership, he could 
not gain the support of public sentiment. 

An obvious way to meet this difficulty would have been to 
reorganize the senate in such a fashion as to make it a safe 



58 Heitland suggests some of these considerations. In connection with Caesar's cor- 
dial treatment of Cicero after Pharsalia he says : "To win the adhesion of a man so 
distinguished and of so high a character in civil life was just what Caesar wanted. 
None knew better than he that most of his chief associates were men of dubious 
character and damaged reputation. They might serve his purpose in the war, but 
men of a more respectable type would be needed in the work of peace." (The Roman 
Republic, iii, 323.) Perhaps the Anticato was due to a desire on Caesar's part to 
check the spread of a cult for the stern republican which might make it more difficult 
to use the nobles in his government. 



158 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

partner in the state. But this was in no wise an easy thing 
to do. If the Pompeian party was spared, its members 
could not very well be excluded from the senate, since with- 
out them that body would have lost all moral weight in 
Roman eyes. If they remained, they formed a majority 
secretly hostile to Caesar. If he sought to overcome this 
majority by a wholesale creation of new peers — to borrow 
English terminology — he would enrage the old nobility and 
at the same time bring the senate into popular contempt, 
which would go far to render it useless for his purpose. 
He tried the experiment of appointing new senators till 
these dangers became manifest. 59 Only one way remained 
and that was to bring about a gradual transformation of 
the senate through the magistracies. Under the pretext 
of the increased needs of the imperial administration the 
number of the magistrates could be decidedly augmented 
and new men thereby introduced among the conscript fath- 
ers. The provinces, whose number Sulla had fixed at ten, 
had been increased by Pompey to twelve, and Caesar's con- 
quest of Gaul would now add several more. Taking ad- 
vantage of this the dictator raised the number of the prae- 
tors to sixteen and of the quaestors to forty. This would 
create a considerable number of new senators each year, 
and if the selections were made with care these new addi- 
tions would in time decidedly alter the political complexion 
of the senate. The transformation would take place some- 
what slowly, since there were many noble families to whose 
younger members Caesar could not very well refuse the 
honor of the quaestorship. In spite of this, the increase in 
the number of the quaestors was so great that it would not 
require many years to make a marked change in the com- 
position of the senate. Until this had been accomplished 
Caesar's position must remain substantially what it then 
was and he must perforce continue his dictatorship. If 
he did so, it was natural that he should seek some sort of 



59 The new senators whom Caesar appointed were the jest of Rome. 



CAESAR 159 

justification in men's minds for the retention of his extra- 
ordinary powers. 

Such a justification Caesar sought in new wars and con- 
quests. Perhaps, like Napoleon, his head was turned by 
military glory and astonishing success so that he came to 
love war for itself. But, like Napoleon, he may also have 
seen in war a plausible excuse for his autocracy and in vic- 
tory the means to blind his subjects to the loss of their 
freedom. Whatever may have been his motive, he had 
scarcely ended the war at home before he began to plan 
a new campaign for the conquest of Parthia. No doubt 
the wish to rival Alexander the Great had something to do 
with this design, but another motive must surely have been 
the hope that such a war would serve to solve, or at least 
to help in solving, the difficulties at home. While Rome 
was at war, his military dictatorship would not be nearly 
so open to attack, and if he could return from the East with 
the added laurels of a conqueror of Parthia, all opposition 
might be overcome and the way smoothed for a permanent 
settlement such as was for the present beyond his powers. 

While Rome was thus kept in a turmoil of war and rumors 
of war, Caesar's position as a temporary autocrat admitted 
of excuse. He had taken this position at the start as a 
matter of obvious necessity. Later it was consolidated and 
extended. When he first occupied the city with his forces, 
he had been named dictator for the purpose of holding the 
elections. He held the office for only eleven days, just long 
enough to fulfil the purpose for which it was conferred, but 
it was voted to him again after Pharsalia. The second 
grant of the dictatorship was for ten years, and after Munda 
it was given to him for life. Along with the dictatorship 
other powers were conferred upon him which made him 
absolute master of the Roman state, and reduced all other 
factors of the government to utter insignificance. Not only 
was Caesar dictator for life with all the vast authority 
which that title implied, but he possessed as well the powers 
of the tribune and the censor. The first were given him, 
like the dictatorship, for life, the second for three years 
with the title of Praefectus morum. As pontifex maximus 




160 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

he was the head of the Roman religion, and lastly he was 
one of the two consuls for each year. Yet even this it 
seemed was not enough, and the power was voted to him to 
name most of the annual magistrates without the need of 
a popular election. Still further, since he was intending to 
set out upon a Parthian campaign, he was allowed to 
designate the consuls and half the praetors for five years in 
advance. Thus the entire government was centered in his 
hands. The assembly was powerless to intervene, whether 
by means of its legislative or electoral functions. The 
senate was quite helpless, since by his censorial power he 
could control its membership, as consul could determine 
what matters should come before it for discussion, and by 
his tribunician power could prevent it from passing any 
decree of which he disapproved. The magistrates were his 
nominees and that same tribunician power in his hands 
made any attempt at independent action on their part im- 
possible. With such a concentration of powers in his hands 
he could have used the famous phrase "Petat c'est moi" in 
sober seriousness. 

Did Caesar intend the position thus briefly summarized 
to be a permanent one ? In substance yes, but whether pre- 
cisely in this form it is impossible to say. If his life had 
been spared, he might on his return from the Orient have 
exchanged his title of dictator for some other name. But 
that he meant to keep the substance of his power in some 
form, his contemporaries were convinced, and it can scarcely 
be doubted that in this they were entirely correct. It was 
in this sense that they interpreted his oft-repeated saying 
that he would never imitate Sulla. At first they seem to 
have taken this to signify that he would not resort to a 
proscription. Gradually, however, they came to construe 
it to mean that he would never abdicate. As this convic- 
tion grew and deepened, it paved the way for the tragedy 
that followed. Romans might submit to be governed by 
the sword in an emergency, but they were not yet ready to 
accept it as a permanent regime. They had regarded 
Caesar as a second Sulla without the stain of blood. They 



CAESAR 161 

had assumed that as soon as peace was restored he would 
use his power to establish a settled government. They did 
not see that they themselves had rendered this impossible, 
and when Caesar gave no sign of fulfilling their anticipa- 
tions, they angrily attributed it to his insatiable and crim- 
inal ambition. Such a hope and such a disappointment we 
see clearly enough in Cicero, and events soon showed that 
his feelings were shared by many others. When the victory 
of Munda had put the seal on Caesar's mastery, the orator 
had striven to approach him with advice. He had addressed 
the autocrat a long treatise on the subject of his future 
policy, but on learning from those who composed Caesar's 
court that it was quite unacceptable he had laid his still- 
born work away and in his public attitude revealed his 
growing bitterness and disillusionment. Even Caesar, 
though surrounded by flatterers, could not fail to see the 
growth of hostile sentiment. On learning that Cicero had 
been kept waiting in his antechamber for an audience, he 
had exclaimed: "Can I doubt that I am exceedingly dis- 
liked, when Marcus Cicero has to sit waiting and cannot 
see me at his own convenience? And yet if there is a good- 
natured man in the world it is he ; still I feel no doubt that 
he heartily dislikes me." 60 

Yet though these words would show that he was by no 
means blind to his danger, he took no precautions. Per- 
haps he overestimated the intelligence and insight of his 
enemies. He had so long been face to face with the realities 
and problems of empire that he may have failed to appreciate 
that much that was clear enough to him was hidden by a 
haze of custom and tradition from the eyes of others. He 
must have known that his death could not really serve his 
foes, and very probably he did not fully grasp the fact that 
this was not by any means so clear to them. Disdaining to 
protect his person, he spent the last months of his life busy 
with work and plans for future conquest and heedless of 
the conspiracy which was taking shape around him. 

The personal motives that influenced the murderers of 



^Letters, iv, 6. Att., xiv, 1. 



162 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Caesar matter little, but the public considerations by which 
they justified their act to themselves and others are of sig- 
nificance. They hoped that by killing Caesar they would 
restore the republic, and there were certain appearances 
which gave a color of plausibility to such a hope. The 
republic had not been in any sense abolished. Magistrates, 
people, senate all existed, but while the dictator stood above 
them clothed with such powers as he then held, they were 
powerless to move except at his command. Yet they were 
there and Caesar seemed the only obstacle to their working. 
If he were gone, the magistrates, senate, and people would 
once more be free to act independently. All that was neces- 
sary to set Rome free was to strike down the tyrant who 
alone stood in the way of liberty. Such a view did, indeed, 
fail utterly to take account of some of the most serious fac- 
tors in the case. It took the outside show of constitutional 
forms for the realities. It assumed that the dictator, who 
was an obvious obstacle to the senate's independence and 
control was the only obstacle, forgetting that for many 
years past the conscript fathers had been quite unable to 
dominate the state. All this the conspirators overlooked, 
and thus it was that, when their purpose was accomplished, 
the blow was struck at Caesar alone and no plans whatever 
were made as to what was to follow. The murderers seem 
to have been quite confident that with Caesar removed the 
constitution would automatically resume its normal opera- 
tion. "When this result failed to follow Caesar's death, 
their surprise and bewilderment were at once ludicrous and 
tragic. 

Of the moral aspect of the deed no Roman could feel any 
doubt, if once he were convinced that Caesar was a tyrant. 
Rome had taken over the ethical thinking of the Greeks 
without serious question or criticism. In that morality they 
found it laid down as an axiom that the slaying of a tyrant 
was not only the right but the positive duty of the citizen. 
By tyrant the Greeks had designated any ruler, no matter 
what his character, who had seized power illegally and who 
ruled against the constitution of the state. In the eyes of 



CAESAR 163 

his opponents, Caesar could not fail to be regarded as a 
tyrant under this definition, and in so far as they regarded 
him as such, they felt no question that his murder was a 
righteous act. Its expediency they might and did see sub- 
sequent reason to doubt bitterly, but its morality never. 
The fact that Caesar was dealing boldly, and yet wisely 
and successfully, with many of the pressing problems of 
the moment could not avail to excuse in their eyes his failure 
to find a constitutional settlement which they could accept. 
His projects for the conquest of Parthia only filled them 
with keener alarm and made them feel the need of haste. 
If Caesar hoped by eastern victories to win acceptance of 
his rule at home, this prospect only inspired his defeated 
foes with added fear. If he were allowed to depart for the 
East, all chance of striking such a blow was lost till his 
campaign was finished. When he returned, the lapse of 
time and his new glory might have made all hope of regain- 
ing liberty or shaking off his despotism an idle dream. 
They resolved therefore to act before the opportunity was 
gone and while they still could delude themselves with the 
hope that their action would be fruitful of results. 

Moved by such considerations, in addition to their per- 
sonal motives, the plot against the dictator was formed, 
and for these same reasons, many in the senate welcomed 
the deed, although they had no part in the actual conspiracy. 
Caesar's neglect of all precautions and his refusal to pro- 
tect himself by a strong military guard made the design 
comparatively easy. On the Ides of March the conqueror 
of Pompey was murdered in the senate and a new chapter 
of Roman history was opened. 



CHAPTER VI 
The Destruction of the Republicans 

The murder of Caesar fell like a thunderbolt upon the 
Roman world. The suddenness of the event stunned men, 
leaving them dazed and bewildered. The conspirators seem 
to have expected that the death of the tyrant would be 
hailed with acclamations and rejoicings by the liberated 
people, but instead of this the only greeting was an ominous 
silence. The senators, dismayed and terrified by the 
tragedy, had fled from the senate-house and the populace 
outside had scattered to their homes, so that the triumphant 
murderers found themselves in the midst of a sudden 
solitude. 

The panic and the silence filled the conspirators with 
surprise and consternation. They had no plan of action, 
never having dreamed that action would be necessary. Now 
they saw nothing better to do than to withdraw to the 
Capitol and send out hasty messages to their friends and 
those upon whose sympathy they felt that they could count. 
If the constitution was to resume its regular working, now 
that the tyrant was dead, the first step was to assemble the 
senate, and the proper person to do this was the surviving 
consul, Mark Antony. It was therefore necessary to com- 
municate with him at once. He had been one of Caesar's 
trusted lieutenants and was not likely to command the con- 
fidence of the conspirators. In fact they had deliberated 
long and earnestly whether they should not murder him at 
the same time as Caesar. Ultimately it had been decided 
to spare him, apparently on moral grounds. Caesar's life 
was forfeit because he was a tyrant, but it did not appear 
clearly that Antony was one. So one of the conspirators 
had detained Antony at the door of the senate-house while 
the murder was committed. From that tragic scene he 
had fled precipitately to his own house for safety. Once 
there and reassured for the moment, he, like the assassins 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 165 

in the Capitol, spent the night in hurried consultation and 
uncertainty. Before he dared to act in any way he wished 
to know precisely who the men were who had done the deed 
and what forces were behind them. When envoys of the 
conspirators approached him the next day they found him 
willing to convoke the senate, but unwilling to trust himself 
in the power of the assassins. The usual meeting place of 
the conscript fathers was near the Capitol, much too near 
to suit the taste of Antony, and he accordingly convened 
them in the Temple of Tellus, which was near his own house. 
Here the conspirators did not venture to attend, but their 
friends turned out in force, Cicero among them. 

The attitude of the great orator is so instructive that it 
may be well to interrupt the narrative for a moment to con- 
sider it. He had no part in the conspiracy, but he heartily 
welcomed and cordially approved the deed. This was only 
what might have been expected from his past. When the 
civil war broke out his sympathies were with Pompey and 
the senate, but circumstances, or his own cowardice and 
hesitation, prevented him from joining his leader very 
promptly. However, he had finally followed him to the 
East where the battle of Pharsalia seemed to him the end 
of the war. 1 Returning to Italy, he was readily pardoned 
by Caesar, but from this time on he took no active part in 
public affairs, occupying himself instead with literary work. 
As the hope of any sort of republican restoration at the 
hands of Caesar grew fainter and the dictatorship seemed 
more and more a permanent fact of Roman life, Cicero 
grew steadily more bitter and despondent. After the Ides 
of March his only feeling was a savage exultation at the 
tyrant's death, and he made eager haste to range himself 
among the friends and supporters of the murderers. Hence- 
forth all his efforts were concentrated on the one aim of 
restoring the republic. That republic he identified com- 
pletely with the senate, and this fact furnishes a clue to 



1 See his letter to Cassius, Letters, iii, 55. Fam., xv, 15. 



166 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

much that followed. Now that Caesar was dead, the ques- 
tion that confronted the Roman world was just the ques- 
tion of who should govern in his place. Not many years 
before, a proud aristocracy had ruled Rome and had used 
the senate as their instrument of government. The first 
triumvirate had thrust them out of power for a time. When 
Caesar and Pompey had begun to drift apart the nobles had 
seen a chance to take advantage of the rivalry between the 
two and had made Pompey their leader, but only to be de- 
cisively defeated in the war. Caesar's dictatorship had 
effectually barred the way against any recovery of power 
by the aristocracy, whom he had beaten and pardoned but 
whom he could not be persuaded to restore. His refusal 
led to the tragedy of the Ides of March, and now the van- 
quished nobility prepared to make a desperate effort to 
regain their lost control. The senate was now — as always 
— their instrument, and the republic was the name by which 
they designated and sought to consecrate their supremacy. 
Those who opposed them in the struggle were not con- 
sciously aiming at some other form of government, but 
were simply fighting to prevent the authority of the state 
from passing into the hands of their recently defeated 
enemies. Caesar's reforms had not yet had time to change 
the political complexion of the senate, where the old Pom- 
peian party was still dominant. In this struggle Cicero 
was heart and soul with the aristocracy, and in this he was 
simply following the convictions of his whole life. In mod- 
ern times some critics have seen in this attitude only the 
servility of a parvenu seeking at any cost to gain admit- 
tance to the ranks of an old and proud nobility. There is, 
however, another and more creditable explanation. The 
senate must have seemed the only practical alternative to a 
military despotism. In the days of C. Gracchus men might 
dream that a democracy was possible in Rome, but the 
course of events since then had been sufficient to dispel the 
illusion. One after another of the popular leaders had 
failed ignominiously in the attempt to govern. How was it 
possible for Cicero, or any of his contemporaries who had 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 167 

any vision of reality, to imagine that the rabble of the 
Roman streets could rule the world ? It was not a question 
of ruling well : how could anyone believe that the rival mobs 
of Clodius and Milo were capable of governing at all? The 
army and the senate might govern, but the Roman people 
had demonstrated their utter incapacity. If Cicero could 
not bring himself to accept a military despotism, he had no 
choice but to support the senate. That the conscript fathers 
were by no means perfect he was well aware from personal 
experience. He saw clearly that their rule left much to be 
desired, but in spite of all he clung to them as the only pos- 
sible instrument of government under which the things he 
prized most highly could exist. Freedom, government by 
discussion and by law — in his view these were only to be 
secured under the senate's rule. Caesar had represented 
nothing but violence and arbitrary force, and these he 
deeply hated. Now that the tyrant was dead, the only hope 
of freedom lay with the senate, and the cause of the senate 
was bound up with that of the conspirators. It was as 
their ardent friend and champion that he attended the ses- 
sion of the senate on that memorable 17th of March. 

The conscript fathers, when they assembled in the Temple 
of Tellus, found themselves confronted with formidable dif- 
ficulties. The obvious and logical thing to do was to de- 
clare Caesar a tyrant if they approved the murder, as the 
majority actually did. Such a step would have freed the 
conspirators from all blame, but it would also have an- 
nulled all Caesar's acts by declaring that his government 
had been illegal. It could readily be seen that the conse- 
quences of such a declaration were likely to be serious in 
the extreme. Caesar had been so long in power that vast 
numbers of people were affected by his acts. Within the 
Temple of Tellus itself were many senators who held their 
seats by virtue of his appointment, or through some office 
that he had conferred, and many others had received pro- 
motion in rank from him. If he were declared a tyrant, 
many senators would have to quit the house and many 
more would have to step down a grade or two in rank. To 
this they were quite naturally averse, and this was only a 



168 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

beginning of the consequences. If Caesar had been a tyrant, 
the elections held under him had not been valid and neither 
Rome nor the provinces possessed legal magistrates or gov- 
ernors. 2 In fact the whole machinery of the state would 
be utterly disorganized. Of this the assassins never seem 
to have thought at all. The senate might, of course, pass 
a decree authorizing the existing provincial governors to 
continue to exercise their functions for the time being, but 
in Rome itself new elections must be held at once. The 
attitude of the people had not yet been clearly shown, and 
no party could feel sure of how elections under present cir- 
cumstances would result. The men then holding office 
might easily fail to be returned and all those to whom 
Caesar had promised the various magistracies during his 
absence in the East would run a risk of losing them. There 
was thus a powerful group of senators who were unwilling 
to see Caesar declared a tyrant, and even the friends of the 
conspirators might well be doubtful of the wisdom of such 
a course. If there were reasons for hesitation in the sen- 
ate-house itself, the situation out-of-doors in Rome and 
Italy was even more ominous. How the murder would be 
received by Caesar's soldiers was sufficiently doubtful in 
any case, but if the news came coupled with a declaration 
which annulled their title to the lands they held from him 
an explosion was a certainty. The dead dictator had dis- 
banded many thousands of his veterans and had assigned 
them lands in various parts of the peninsula, and many 
others were even then in Rome awaiting their rewards. 



2 Appian attributes to Antony a speech setting forth these considerations. Antony 
is represented as saying : "Those who are asking for a vote on the character of 
Caesar must first know that if he was a magistrate and if he was an elected ruler 
of the State all his acts and decrees will remain in full force ; but if it is decided 
that he usurped the government by violence, his body should be cast out unburied 
and his acts annulled. These acts, to speak briefly, embrace the whole earth and 
sea, and most of them will stand whether we like them or not, as I shall presently 
show. Those things which alone belong to us to consider, because they concern us 
alone, I will suggest to you first . . . Almost all of us have held office under Caesar ; 
or do so still, having been chosen thereto by him ; or will do so soon, having been 
designated in advance by him ; for, as you know, he had disposed of the city offices, 
the yearly magistracies, and the command of provinces and armies for five years. 
If you are willing to resign these offices (for this is entirely in your power), I will 
put that question to you first and then I will take up the remaining ones." Appian, 
ii, 128. The translation is that of Horace White in the Loeb Library. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 169 

The only troops in the city were his, and while the senate 
deliberated, many of these soldiers and of his disbanded 
veterans thronged around the place of meeting with press- 
ing demands that Caesar's promises should be redeemed. 
Under these conditions the conscript fathers could not shut 
their eyes to the danger of ill considered action, however 
logical. 

Since the senate did not dare to repudiate Caesar's acts, 
it was impossible to brand him as a tyrant. Yet if this 
were not done, then obviously his death was murder and 
logically the conscript fathers were bound to punish the 
assassins. In this dilemma Cicero came forward to pro- 
pose a compromise. He advised that Caesar should not be 
declared a tyrant and that his acts and promises should be 
alike confirmed. This would reassure the veterans and would 
provide the state with a legal government. To protect the 
conspirators he urged the senate to pass an act of amnesty 
and in this way silence all question in regard to the dic- 
tator's death. That tragic event was to be treated as some 
great natural calamity, in face of which the long-divided 
parties of Rome might join hands in a reconciliation. All 
animosities were to be laid aside and all the past was to be 
covered by a general oblivion. The senate would accept 
all Caesar's laws without inquiring how they had been 
passed, the partisans of Caesar would accept the fact of his 
death without question of how, or through whom, it had 
come about. 3 The conscript fathers welcomed the advice 
of the great orator, which seemed to open up the only pos- 
sible way out of their difficulty. 

After much discussion, therefore, Cicero's suggestion was 
adopted. The amnesty was voted and the acts of Caesar 
ratified. As to the disposition of his body, the senate voted 
for a public funeral. This last was no part of Cicero's 
policy, though he may not at the time have seen its full 
danger. Atticus warned him that all was over if the public 
funeral was allowed, 4 but the warning was probably too late 



3 Dio, xliv, 32. 

*Letters, iv, 29. Att., xiv, 14. 



170 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

to alter the result. In all likelihood the motive of the senate 
was simply trying to carry out consistently the view they 
wished to have taken of the murder. If Caesar died a consul 
of Rome, it seemed only natural that he should be buried as 
such. If no inquiry was to be made into the past, on what 
grounds could the customary honors be refused ? And would 
such a refusal strike his soldiers as consistent with the 
ratification of his acts? Whether for these or other rea- 
sons, the senate sanctioned the customary honors and gave 
permission to the surviving consul to speak at the funeral 
of his colleague. 

Thus Antony obtained a chance to test the feeling of the 
populace. The speech which he delivered has not been pre- 
served and even its exact nature is a matter of some doubt. 
Probably it consisted chiefly of the reading of the various 
decrees of the senate and the people in the dead man's 
honor, with comments on them by Antony himself. Cae- 
sar's will was also read and produced a deep impression, 
partly because of several legacies to the Roman people, but 
perhaps as much because of a clause in which one of the 
leading conspirators, Decimus Brutus, was named among 
the heirs. It seems evident that Antony avoided saying 
anything which would amount to a final break with the 
senate, 5 but nevertheless he managed to provoke an outburst 
of popular fury. The people were stirred to a frenzy of 
rage and grief, and having burned Caesar's body in the 
forum, the mob swept through the city seeking to wreak 
vengeance on the murderers. To save themselves the 
"demi-gods," as Cicero called the conspirators, were forced 
to flee from Rome, while the senate, terrified by the dis- 
order, looked on helplessly. With the republicans thus scat- 
tered and intimidated, Antony was left free to shape his 
course as he might choose. 

What Antony's ultimate choice would be could hardly be 
a matter of much doubt. His private interests pointed out 



5 This seems clear from the uncertainty of the senate as to Antony's attitude for 
some time after the funeral oration. Varying accounts have come down to us as to 
the character of the oration itself. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 171 

as an obvious necessity that he should seek to rally the part- 
isans of the dead dictator, if that were possible, and put him- 
self at the head of a strong Caesarian party. He was a lieu- 
tenant of Caesar and had risen solely by the favor of his 
master. To the old nobility he had long been odious, and 
if the aristocracy, vanquished on the battlefield, should re- 
gain their power by the dagger, he could hope for nothing 
better than to be permitted to retire into private life. That 
the men against whom he had fought would forgive him 
their defeat, or suffer him to continue in high office, was 
more than he could reasonably expect. Whatever he ob- 
tained from the conscript fathers he must gain by working 
on their fears, or by taking advantage of their difficulties. 
This he could do far more easily at the head of a strong 
party than in any other way. Nor was Antony's position 
in this respect unique. Caesar had gathered about him a 
large number of officers and politicians who could hope for 
no advancement — some, perhaps, hardly even for safety — 
in a Rome dominated by the senate. Antony, by virtue of 
his consulship, was the natural leader of such men, and if 
he made a move, he might confidently hope that they would 
rally around him. 

If there were leaders in abundance for a Caesarian party 
in opposition to the senate and its claims to rule the state, 
the rank and file of such a party was equally ready to the 
hand. ., The decree of the senate ratifying Caesar's acts had 
not by any means quieted the apprehensions of his veterans. 
Setting aside all considerations of passion and of sentiment, 
though these were very powerful forces, there were very 
obvious reasons for distrust. The senate had promised 
much, but how far would it be safe to trust such promises? 
Could it be expected that the Roman nobles would really re- 
ward their enemies for having beaten them? If they did 
so, they would be condemning themselves, for if Caesar's 
soldiers were meritorious servants of the state for having 
vanquished Pompey, what must the latter's partisans have 
been ? No matter what were the real intentions of the sen- 
ate, it would have been little short of a psychological miracle 



172 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

if Caesar's men had put much faith in their promises. 
Cicero saw this clearly enough when he wrote to Atticus, 
"I return to the case of the veterans ... Do you suppose these 
men feel any confidence in retaining their grants so long as 
our party have any footing in the state?" 6 In a later letter 
he declared that the Caesarians kept repeating that the acts 
of Caesar would be set aside the moment that the senate 
ceased to be afraid. 7 

The materials for a Caesarian party were thus obviously 
in existence, and its power was likely to be out of all pro- 
portion to its numbers. At the moment of the dictator's 
tragic death the military forces throughout the Roman 
world were entirely Caesarian. The legions under arms 
had all been recruited by him, and his disbanded veterans, 
all seasoned soldiers, were the best available material from 
which to form new legions in a short space of time. No- 
where could the senate look for the support of regular 
troops, and though the republicans had many partisans, 
they would be mostly raw recruits who could not face his 
veterans immediately. The power of the army had not 
been broken by Caesar's death, and that army was not in 
the least prepared to acquiesce in the restoration of the 
aristocracy to full control. The real issue in the events 
that followed the Ides of March was not whether the senate 
should take over the government, but whether the Caesarian 
soldiery would find a single leader around whom they could 
unite. Would Antony succeed to Caesar's place, or would 
the army of the dictator divide its allegiance among several 
rival chiefs ? If this last should happen, would these chiefs 
join hands against the senate as a common foe, or would 
they fight among themselves ? If they fought among them- 
selves, would the struggle be sufficiently prolonged to give 
the senate time to organize new armies upon whose devotion 
it could really count? These questions were the true ones 
that confronted the Roman world, and the constitutional 
issues that were raised only served to mask and to disguise 



^Letters, iv, 18. Att., xiv, 10. 
''Letters, iv, 47. Att., xiv, 22. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 173 

them. In its essence the new struggle was simply the old 
battle between Caesar and Pompey fought over again under 
new leaders. 

Antony had very quickly seen the situation as it was. 
Although the vision of others might be as keen, he alone 
was in a position to act. His aims were dictated by the cir- 
cumstances in which he found himself, but at the start he 
followed the path marked out for him with an appearance 
of hesitation and uncertainty. This may, at first, have been 
real enough, since even after his own purposes were clearly 
formed, prudence might well have counseled a certain mod- 
eration and reserve. It was wise to make sure of the army 
before he declared irreconcilable war upon the senate and 
its supporters. It was possible that Caesar's veterans, even 
though they feared the restoration of the senate, might not 
be willing to accept Antony as their leader. If he could 
not obtain an adequate support from them, it might be ad- 
vantageous to come to terms with the conspirators. An- 
tony's vacillating conduct at the beginning seems to indi- 
cate that he had no desire to burn the bridges behind him 
until he had made certain that the road in front was open. 
As a consequence he mingled bids for the leadership of the 
Caesarians with concessions to the other side. It was not 
long, however, before he threw aside the mask, since his 
success was all that he could wish and the game seemed 
wholly in his hands if he possessed the necessary courage 
to play it boldly. 

The decree of the senate had ratified all Caesar's acts and 
even his intentions, and this proved of immense assistance 
to Antony. All Caesar's papers had fallen into his hands 
after the Ides of March, and he proceeded without scruple 
to avail himself of the opportunity which was thus pre- 
sented. Under the authority of the senatorial decree he 
was in a position to do whatever he might choose, alleging 
as his warrant that such had been the intention of the dead 
dictator as was shown by some note or memorandum that 
he had left behind. The resulting situation was paradox- 
ical and filled the republicans with anger and dismay. In 
name Caesar remained the master of the state and the 



174 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

conscript fathers were so far removed from any effective 
power that the conspirators, whom they honored and wished 
earnestly to protect, dared not show themselves in Rome. 
"Good God," Cicero exclaimed in his exasperation and dis- 
illusionment, "the tyranny survives though the tyrant is 
dead ! We rejoice at his assassination, yet support his acts !" 8 
"Can it be true?" he wrote bitterly in another letter to 
Atticus, "Is this all that our noble Brutus has accomplished 
— that he should have to live at Lanuvium, and Trebonius 
should have to slink to his province by by-roads ? That all 
the acts, memoranda, words, promises, and projects of 
Caesar should have more validity than if he were still 
alive?" 9 "Yes in truth," he summed the matter up deject- 
edly, "we have been freed by heroic champions with the re- 
sult that we are not free after all!" 10 

Instead of improving, the situation grew rapidly worse as 
Antony became bolder. Before long he began to find the 
genuine memoranda of Caesar ill adapted to his purposes, 
and when this was the case, he remedied the difficulty by 
more or less extensive forgeries. If Cicero had bitterly re- 
sented his subjection to Caesar's notebooks, he felt it still 
more keenly when he found himself the slave of Antony's 
fabrications. In view of this new posture of affairs he 
wrote to one of the conspirators : "We seem not to have been 
freed from a tyranny — only from a tyrant : for though the 
tyrant has been killed, we obey his every nod. And not only 
so, but measures which he himself, had he been alive, would 
not have taken, we allow to pass on the plea that they were 
meditated by him. And to this indeed I see no limit: de- 
crees are fastened up; immunities are granted; immense 
sums of money are squandered; exiles are being recalled; 
forged decrees of the senate are being entered in the aera- 
rium (treasury). Surely then nothing has been accom- 
plished except to dispel the indignation at our slavery and 
the resentment against an unprincipled man : the Republic 
still lies involved in the confusions into which he brought it. 



^Letters, iv, 15. Att., xiv, 9. 
^Letters, iv, 16. Att., xiv, 10. 
^Letters, iv, 29. Att., xiv, 14. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 175 

. . . Up to the present it has avenged its injuries by the 
death of the tyrant through your hands: nothing more. 
Which of its dignities has it recovered? Is it that it now 
obeys the man in his grave whom it could not endure in his 
life-time ? Do we support the rough drafts of a man, whose 
laws we ought to have torn down from the walls?" 11 From 
all of which Cicero drew the obvious moral that much still 
remained to be done. 

Such laments, though well founded, were of very little use. 
Antony had taken advantage of the disorders in the city fol- 
lowing the funeral to obtain a body-guard, and with his sol- 
diers around him was in secure control. The conspirators 
were destitute of any means of action, and could only nurse 
their rage and wait impatiently for Antony's consulship to 
end. With the new year other men must come to the front, 
and the consuls whom Caesar had designated for 43 B.C. 
were by no means friendly to Antony. As soon as they took 
office the republicans might hope to find some chance for 
action. But this possibility was quite as clear to Antony as 
to his enemies, and he naturally undertook to guard himself 
against the danger. The best available protection would be 
a province and an army held for a term of years, a great 
command, in short, such as had saved Caesar from being 
called to answer for his acts when consul. By the arrange- 
ments of the dead dictator Antony was to receive Macedonia 
as his proconsular command, but this appeared unsatisfac- 
tory under the changed conditions. If Antony were to go 
across the seas, the senate would have an opportunity to 
raise an army in Italy with which to attack him. The ex- 
ample of his master had not been entirely wasted on Antony 
who determined to establish himself in the valley of the Po 
at the head of a strong army. To do this he proposed to 
transfer the legions assembled in Macedonia for the Par- 
thian war to Cisalpine Gaul and to take immediate posses- 
sion of that province for himself. Not only would this 
strengthen him, but it would weaken his opponents. The 
province which he meant to seize had been assigned by 
Caesar to Decimus Brutus, in whose hands it might be very 

^Letters, iv, 36-37. Fam., xii, 1. 



176 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

dangerous to leave it. Cisalpine Gaul was one of the best 
recruiting grounds in Italy, and even if he had not wished 
it for himself, Antony would hardly have dared to let his 
enemies obtain control there. Established in the Po valley 
within an easy march of Rome and with a strong army 
under his command, he might be able to dominate the situa- 
tion. The only difficulty in the way of these arrangements 
was that they were directly contrary to those of Caesar. In 
this matter, however, Antony could not afford to be con- 
sistent, and he resolved to overrule Caesar's acts where this 
was necessary. The constitutional sovereignty of the 
Roman people had not been in any way abridged, and in the 
eyes of the law, the acts of the assembly were still the final 
authority. Accordingly Antony brought before the as- 
sembly a bill transferring the Macedonian army to Cis- 
alpine Gaul and giving him the government of that prov- 
ince for six years. With his body-guard about him he 
had little difficulty in passing any bill which he might choose 
to propose, and this one was enacted with great prompt- 
ness. The republicans looked on helplessly and in despair, 
for this arrangement meant quite obviously the indefinite 
prolongation of Antony's dictatorship. While his suprem- 
acy had seemed only a temporary accident they had found 
it almost unendurable, and now it seemed likely to con- 
tinue for years to come. Rather than submit to that they 
were ready to do anything, but at first there did not appear 
to be anything that they could do. Just when the situation 
seemed the blackest hope suddenly came to them from a 
wholly unexpected quarter; the Caesarian party, hitherto 
a unit, began suddenly to split to pieces. 

The attempt of Antony to rally the whole body of vete- 
rans under his leadership had for a time seemed likely to be 
entirely successful, but now a rival appeared upon the 
scene in the person of Caesar's adopted son. With the 
death of the dictator the male line of his family became ex- 
tinct, and his nearest relative was his sister's grandson, 
Gaius Octavius by name. In the last days of his life 
Caesar had shown marked favor to this youth, and by his 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 177 

will adopted him and made him heir to his personal for- 
tune. His political position Caesar could not of course be- 
queath, though had he lived it is quite possible that he 
would have found a way to designate his grandnephew as 
the successor to the throne. The Ides of March destroyed 
any such prospect, and Octavius could only claim to inherit 
Caesar's name and private property. Even this legacy was 
beset with serious danger, and the family of Octavius were 
strongly opposed to his acceptance, but the young man, who 
was then about nineteen years of age, rejected their advice 
without the slightest hesitation. The news of the assassin- 
ation reached him at Apollonia, where he had been sent to 
complete his education. This town was near the spot where 
the legions intended for the Parthian war were encamped, 
and this proximity had enabled Octavius to make friends 
with many of the officers, who were destined to be of emi- 
nent service to him in the future. They now came forward 
with offers of protection, but Octavius, rightly divining that 
he had little need of it at the moment, hastened to Rome to 
claim his perilous inheritance. 

The appearance on the scene of an adopted son of Caesar 
was not a pleasing development to Antony, although at first 
he attached small importance to it, not dreaming that 
Octavius, whom he regarded as a mere boy, was a person 
whom he need consider seriously. It was not long, however, 
before he was forced to modify this estimate, since the in- 
sistence of Octavius upon his rights was something that 
could not be entirely ignored. When Caesar died there ex- 
isted a great deal of confusion between his private fortune 
and the money of the state which happened to be in his 
hands at the time. The problem of distinguishing between 
the two might have been difficult at best, but, as matters 
stood, neither party to the case was in a mood to be im- 
partial. Antony, now as always, found himself in want of 
funds, and was disposed to stretch the claims of the state 
to the utmost, while Octavius, already angered by many 
public slights, was in no humor to submit quietly to being 
cheated of what he could with any show of reason regard as 



178 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

his just rights. It was not long before Octavius was claim- 
ing large sums which Antony could not, or would not, pay, 
and the two became open enemies. Causes of quarrel rap- 
idly multiplied when once hostilities had been begun. Al- 
though Octavius had been adopted by the will of Caesar, 
certain legal formalities remained to be completed before 
the adoption was valid in point of law. These Antony 
found the means to thwart, and though Octavius assumed 
the name of the dictator and began to style himself C. Julius 
Caesar Octavianus, his right to this designation was open 
to dispute. The matter proved to be of little practical im- 
portance, since the name was popularly used, and the name 
of Caesar, if borne with any shadow of right, was a power 
with the veterans. 

In open conflict with Antony, Octavian, as he should now 
be called, watched the consul's juggling with the provinces 
in undisguised alarm. If Antony succeeded in carrying out 
his plans, the youthful Caesar could not hope to play a part 
in Roman affairs. As it had become quite clear that the 
senate could not check his rival, Octavian resolved to ap- 
peal to the veterans for support. For such a step he had 
already received much encouragement ; on his way to Rome 
the veterans had flocked around him eagerly, and he doubt- 
less knew that many among them, disliking Antony, would 
welcome the appearance of some other leader. The consul 
was a dashing soldier, not without political insight and 
ability, but he was reckless, self-indulgent, and dissolute. 
Hence there was an under-current of opposition, even 
among Caesar's veterans, to his assumption of control. 
While Antony was still in Rome his enemies did not dare 
to make a move, but when, after the passage of his pro- 
vincial law, he left the city to take command of the Macedo- 
nian legions, an opportunity presented itself. No sooner 
had his rival gone than Octavian hastened to Campania and 
called on Caesar's veterans, many of whom had been as- 
signed lands in that region, to join him. Liberal financial 
inducements were added to the magic of his name, and the 
appeal met with an enthusiastic response. Although he 
had no legal right whatever to recruit soldiers, he soon 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 179 

found himself at the head of a considerable force. While 
gathering troops in Campania he also made effective use of 
his friends in the Macedonian army. By his provincial law 
Antony was authorized to bring over four legions from 
Greece to Italy, and to his great dismay half this force 
on their arrival refused to obey his orders and went over 
to Octavian. This desertion was a very unexpected blow 
to Antony. The boy whom he had despised was splitting 
up the army on which he had confidently counted, but he 
could not stop to deal with this unforeseen development. 
Decimus Brutus had established himself in the Cisalpine 
province, and so far from having any intention of sur- 
rendering it, he was now busily engaged in strengthening 
himself there. Antony was determined to dispossess him 
at once, and for this purpose he resolved to neglect the 
young Caesar for the moment. He therefore gathered up 
his sadly diminished forces and hastened to the valley of 
the Po. 

With Antony's departure for the north Octavian was left 
to pursue his course unchecked, but he was well aware that 
he had received a respite, not a pardon. When Antony had 
disposed of Decimus, Octavian could not doubt that his own 
turn would come. In truth his position was extremely 
precarious. He was at the head of an army without a com- 
mission from the state and was, therefore, in the eyes of the 
law a rebel and a traitor. If he must fight Antony, he was 
anxious to gain some legal standing, and the senate and its 
party alone could give it to him. Besides this, his forces 
were hardly strong enough to enable him to face his rival 
single-handed. It was obviously to his advantage to come to 
terms with the conservatives, for the time being at any 
rate, and he eagerly offered the senate the protection of his 
sword. On their side the conscript fathers, led by Cicero, 
were anxious to avail themselves of his services. The policy 
of Cicero in forming a combination with Octavian has been 
subject to much censure, then and since. Nevertheless it 
seems to admit of a very simple justification. In times of 
crisis one can not choose his friends with too great nicety; 
had Cicero rejected the aid of the young Caesar, he would 



180 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

only have ruined the senate's cause a few months earlier. It 
is unnecessary to assume that he was duped or deceived in 
the matter. When he first met Octavian it was with quite 
enough suspicion, and if he finally cast his distrust aside, it 
was not until it would have been madness to have nursed it 
further. Once convinced that it was necessary to trust 
Octavian, it was only common sense to try to persuade him- 
self and others to trust fully ; to accept Octavian's services 
and then to alienate him by perpetual suspicion would have 
been a stupid blunder. The one chance of retaining his 
loyalty was to treat him with apparent confidence, and if 
no precautions could be taken against his possible treachery 
nothing was to be gained by brooding on it. As to an al- 
liance with Octavian the senate had practically no choice. 
It was necessary to check Antony and save Decimus Brutus, 
and the only way open of accomplishing this was to make 
use of the young Caesar for the purpose. Decimus was mak- 
ing desperate efforts to raise an army in Gaul, but his forces 
were not yet in a condition to face the troops of Antony 
unaided. In the East, Marcus Junius Brutus and Cassius 
were likewise hard at work recruiting armies, but they were 
much too far away to give any effective help immediately. 
If Decimus was to be rescued the means must be found in 
Italy, and without Octavian they were not to be had. Both 
the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, designated by Caesar 
to hold the office during 43 B.C., were hostile to Antony, but 
they had no armies before their entry on their office and 
they could not at once thereafter gather an adequate force. 
The only material from which an army could be formed 
immediately was to be found in Caesar's veterans, and 
among the partisans of the senate there was no one who 
could appeal to them. Under these circumstances when 
Octavian, having gathered a considerable force, offered his 
sword to the senate, Cicero could see no alternative but to 
accept his services. He could and did write earnestly to 
the East to urge upon the senate's champions there the 
need of coming with all possible haste to Italy with all the 
troops that they could bring, but till they arrived he must 
use such soldiers as were at hand. Thus a coalition was 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 181 

brought about between Octavian and the murderers of 
Caesar. Whatever differences the future might bring to 
light, for the immediate present they had a common enemy 
in Antony. Suppressing his misgivings, Cicero declared 
himself Octavian's friend and persuaded the senate to ac- 
cept him as its general and to vote him the necessary 
powers. This done, Octavian joined his forces to those 
which the two consuls had succeeded in raising and set out 
to meet the common foe. 

While the forces of the senate were being strengthened 
by the swords of Caesar's veterans, Antony pushed his oper- 
ations against Decimus with vigor and succeeded in shutting 
him up in the town of Mutina. The first task of the senate's 
army was to raise the siege of this place and deliver Decimus 
from the hands of his enemy. The brief campaign there- 
fore centered around Mutina and Antony sustained a sharp 
reverse. Finding himself unable to hold his lines longer, 
he hastened to release his prey and sought to make his es- 
cape across the Alps into Transalpine Gaul, where he hoped 
to find support from the armies which were stationed in that 
region. The news of his retreat elated the senate beyond 
measure. Cicero tells us that the first reports were that 
"Antony had fled with a small body of men, who were with- 
out arms, panic-stricken, and utterly demoralized." 12 Had 
this been true, he would have been doomed to speedy de- 
struction, and even though the first reports exaggerated 
his plight, he might, perhaps, have been completely crushed 
had the pursuit been pushed with energy. This was not 
done, however. The forces of Decimus, just released from 
a long siege, were, as he himself says, "most woefully re- 
duced and in the very worst condition from want of every 
kind of necessary." 13 They were quite incapable of acting 
with vigor against their retreating foe, and Octavian could 
not be persuaded to follow up his victory. Why he refused 
to move cannot be said with certainty. Perhaps he had no 
wish to free the senate too completely from all danger. He 



12 Letters, iv, 242. Fam., xi, 12. 
13 Letters, iv, 236. Fam., xi, 13. 



182 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

must have realized that the republicans did not give him 
their entire confidence and that nothing but necessity had 
forced them to accept his services. If all such pressure 
were removed, they might be but too ready to discard him, 
and he may therefore have felt that a decisive victory would 
be his own undoing. Another explanation is suggested in 
a letter from Decimus to Cicero in which he wrote : "But if 
Caesar had listened to me and crossed the Apennines, I 
should have reduced Antony to such straits, that he would 
have been ruined by failure of provisions rather than 
by the sword. But neither can anyone control Caesar, nor 
can Caesar control his own army — both most disastrous 
facts." 14 

This last suggestion may well have been near the truth, 
for after all, the soldiers of Octavian were veterans of Julius 
and it would hardly seem likely that they would have been 
eager to defend the murderers. They had their own plain 
reasons for a profound distrust of the senate which they 
were serving, and if Octavian had presumed too far on their 
obedience, he might well have found himself deserted by his 
men. It is improbable that they felt any enthusiasm for a 
war against their former comrades and it seems quite pos- 
sible that they would have refused to hunt down one of the 
ablest of Caesar's lieutenants even at the bidding of Oc- 
tavian. If such was, in any degree, the sentiment of his 
army, it can only have strengthened the doubts and hesita- 
tions of the leader. 

The senate in its folly gave Octavian little chance to 
hesitate. Misled by the first and much exaggerated re- 
ports of a great victory, the conscript fathers showed them- 
selves quite blind to the realities. Octavian had saved them, 
as Cicero freely confessed, but they had no real confidence in 
him and little or no gratitude. Now that they thought him 
no longer necessary, they made haste to cast him aside. 
The war had cost both consuls their lives and new ones 
must be chosen. A suggestion was made that Cicero and 
Octavian should be elected, but it found little favor with 



u Letters, iv, 230. Fam., xi, 10. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 183 

the nobles and was dropped. The senate transferred the 
forces of the late consuls to the command of Decimus, thus 
pointedly ignoring Octavian. Freed from the fear of An- 
tony, the senate hastened to appoint a commission of ten 
members to review the acts of his consulship. This was 
certain to affect the interests of the veterans, but neither 
Octavian nor any other in whom the soldiers had confidence 
was named among the ten. By these ill advised measures 
the senate contrived both to slight Octavian and to enrage 
his men. The youthful Caesar could no longer hope for 
anything from the senate, and his army was ready to back 
him up in whatever action he might choose to take. 

For a brief moment Octavian still pretended to negotiate. 
He was already feeling his way toward a compromise with 
Antony and he also wished to save appearances. Accord- 
ingly he let the senate blunder on until, when action came, 
it should seem that of the army rather than of himself. The 
soldiers, as might have been foreseen, refused to serve un- 
der the command of Decimus Brutus, stained as he was with 
Caesar's blood, and sent an angry deputation to Rome to 
demand the rewards that had been promised them and the 
consulship for Octavian as well. The conscript fathers at- 
tempted to evade their demands and by doing so they threw 
away their last chance, if any still remained. Octavian had 
assured himself that terms were possible with Antony and 
he was now ready to let the army act. Without further 
delay the soldiers broke up their camp in the north and 
marched swiftly upon Rome. 

While in Italy the senate and its general were thus drift- 
ing into open war, Antony was recovering his power and in 
truth becoming more formidable than ever. In the Trans^ 
alpine province and the newly conquered parts of Gaul were 
stationed important armies under the command of Lepidus 
and Plancus. When Antony, escaping from his defeat be- 
fore Mutina, crossed the Alps, his fate depended upon the 
action of these two. Cicero had long seen their potential 
importance and all that his pen could do to insure their 
loyalty to the republic had been done. But letters, however 



184 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

eloquent, could not determine their decision. In truth they 
were not the masters of their own course but were dragged 
along by their armies. Perhaps they were quite willing 
to follow the lead of their men, but in any case they could 
hardly have resisted. Neither Lepidus nor Plancus had 
any strong hold on their soldiers, and it was quite safe for 
Antony to appeal to the latter over their heads. Lepidus 
made no attempt to prevent the appeal, probably because 
he wished it to succeed. As he had doubtless expected, his 
troops declared for Antony and Lepidus promptly combined 
his forces with those of the fugitive. Such a combination 
was far too strong for Plancus to resist, even if he wished, 
and he made a virtue of necessity and threw in his lot with 
the other two. As a consequence all the troops on the further 
side of the Alps were united under the actual control of 
Antony, who thus found himself at the head of a large 
army and in a position to invade Italy whenever he might 
choose. 

While Antony was thus regaining his power in the North, 
Octavian had ended his alliance with the senate by his rapid 
march on Rome. In vain the conscript fathers sought to 
renew negotiations and offered to concede all his demands. 
If he still felt any lingering inclination to accept their offers 
a final act of folly on the part of the nobles must have swept 
it away. The frantic appeals for help which Cicero had 
long been sending to the provincial governors brought a 
response which completed the ruin of the senate. Neither 
of the republican leaders in the East made the slightest 
move, but the propraetor of Africa dispached some troops 
to Italy. Two legions arrived at Rome just after the 
sweeping concessions had been offered to Octavian. With 
this unexpected support at hand, the senate's hopes suddenly 
revived and hurried preparations were begun for a defense. 
But the new confidence of the conscript fathers only lasted 
for a moment. Octavian merely hastened his advance, and 
when he reached the city the African legions came over to 
his side without striking a blow. The senate's power was 
broken utterly and Rome was at his feet. 

Taking possession of the city, Octavian caused himself 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 185 

to be at once elected consul. This done he gratified military 
sentiment, and doubtless his own, by passing a law to 
punish the murderers of the great dictator. Few of the 
conspirators were within his reach at the moment, but 
they were all solemnly condemned to death in their absence. 
No voice could be raised in their favor while the troops of 
Octavian dominated the city, and the people and the juries 
registered his will without the slightest opposition. Hav- 
ing in this manner thrown down the gauntlet to the re- 
publicans, Octavian left the capital and marched north to 
encounter Antony. This time the meeting was to be a 
friendly one, however. The previous negotiations had pre- 
pared the way for an agreement and all that remained was 
to arrange the final terms. The motives of Octavian in 
forming a coalition with Antony seem fairly clear. Perhaps 
he had never meant to fight for the senate longer than would 
suffice to bring the overbearing and arrogant Antony to 
terms. If he had been sincere in his alliance with Cicero, 
recent events had taught him that any real friendship with 
the republicans was impossible. By continuing on their 
side he could achieve nothing but his own ruin. In the 
event of victory they would certainly cast him aside, and 
by fighting their battles for them he might easily forfeit 
the loyalty of his army. Besides all this, Antony was much 
the stronger of the two since he had gained the legions of 
Gaul, and in a war had every chance to win. Octavian had, 
therefore, little choice but to accept terms if decent ones 
were offered. 

On his side Antony had equally strong motives for com- 
promise. Although he had the stronger army, he could 
not afford to overlook the fact that in the East large forces 
were gathering under the command of Marcus Junius 
Brutus and Cassius. If Caesar's veterans should fight 
among themselves, Antony might crush Octavian, but it was 
very probable that he would find his army so much weakened 
by the victory that he in turn would fall an easy victim to 
the republicans. Even had he been entirely sure of his 
men, he might well think a contest under such conditions 
too dangerous. But would his men have been ready to 



186 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

follow him? Now that Octavian had broken with the sen- 
ate and had proscribed the conspirators, would Caesar's 
veterans have been willing to fight against his adopted son, 
the bearer of his name, supported as he was by followers 
who were their former comrades? We may well suspect 
that the pressure of the army was added to the other con- 
siderations and that all combined to point in the direction of 
some compromise which should unite the Caesarians against 
their common foes. 

Both Antony and Octavian were, therefore, in a mood for 
compromise, and Lepidus served as a convenient mediator. 
The three met upon an island in the Po and there agreed to 
the formation of the second triumvirate. Unlike the first 
this was to be a legal institution. They resolved to pass a 
law creating a triple dictatorship for themselves and to 
combine their armies for a war with the republicans. The 
East they had yet to conquer, but the West they could and 
did divide among themselves. Lepidus was to keep his 
provinces of Spain and Narbonensis, 15 Antony took the 
newly conquered parts of Gaul together with the Cisalpine 
province, and Octavian got only Africa and the islands of 
Sardinia and Sicily. Italy itself was to be kept under the 
joint rule of the three, but while the other two should be 
absent in the East Lepidus was to act as their representative 
there. 

One other measure was decided on at the conference 
which has left a lasting stain on the triumvirs. They de- 
termined to revert to Sulla's methods and to open their ad- 
ministration by a sweeping proscription of their enemies. 
The motives which they avowed in public have been pre- 
served in Appian. In their proclamation they dwelt much 
upon their wrongs and pointed out that while they marched 
against their open foes they could not safely leave their ene- 
mies at home to strike them from behind. They called at- 
tention to the disastrous results of Caesar's clemency and 
sought to cover their own deeds with a specious appearance 



15 Narbonensis was the old province of Transalpine Gaul. After the conquests of 
Caesar it had lost its old importance, since it was no longer a frontier province. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 187 

of indignation at his murder. 16 Beneath the surface there 
were other motives which could not be avowed with decency. 
All three had been making lavish promises to their soldiers 
and now the time had come to pay. From the treasury of 
the state they could not hope to meet their obligations, and 
the confiscations which accompanied the proscription were 
necessary to enable them to satisfy the most pressing of 
their men's demands. Cupidity and vengeance thus joined 
hands, and while they struck down their personal and po- 
litical foes, they took into account the rich as well. Each 
of the three gave up those of his friends who had incurred 
the resentment of his partners, and thus Octavian was ob- 
liged to sacrifice Cicero to Antony. But the death of the 
great orator was only one of many; some 300 senators and 
2000 knights perished in the massacre. The republicans 
in Italy were thus wiped out in blood. Their refusal to 
accept the dictatorship of Caesar was paid for by their 
complete destruction at the hands of men, not one of whom 
had rendered to the state even a small fraction of his ser- 
vices. If Caesar had ignored their prejudices and scruples, 
those who followed him did infinitely worse. Of those who 
had slain Caesar and of those who had approved and con- 
doned the act, only such survived as found their way as 
fugitives to the camp of their last remaining champions in 
the East or with Sextus Pompey in the West. 

In later years, when Octavian had become the emperor 
Augustus and had reverted to a policy of clemency, it was 
his natural course to try to shift the blame for the proscrip- 
tion to the shoulders of the vanquished Antony. This ver- 
sion of events, although official, is in no way impossible. 
The blame, indeed, must rest in greatest measure on the 
older and stronger of the partners. Without the consent 
of Antony there could have been no such massacre. But 
there is also a tradition that Octavian, though reluctant 
at the start, was far more ruthless than his colleagues after 

16 Appian, iv, 8-11. 



188 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the decision had been made. This would be highly character- 
istic, at any rate ; from boyhood he displayed a cool astute- 
ness and a calm, deliberate policy which contrasted strongly 
with the recklessness of Antony. He was less likely to sac- 
rifice expediency to passion or to pity than was the im- 
pulsive and not ungenerous soldier, and he was far too able 
not to see clearly that a proscription which failed to destroy 
the party at which it was aimed would be not only a crime, 
but what was worse, a blunder. 

The thorough destruction of the republicans in Italy had 
two immediate results : all danger of revolt was at an end, 
and means were found to quiet temporarily the clamors of 
the soldiers. The three could now turn to meet the armies 
which their opponents had gathered in the East. Leaving 
Lepidus in charge of Italy, Antony and Octavian embarked 
their legions for Greece, where Cassius and M. Brutus were 
awaiting them. These two conspirators, fleeing from Rome 
while Antony was dominant there as consul, had taken pos- 
session of nearly all the East without having, or needing, 
the slightest legal right. 17 Brutus had seized Macedonia 
after the bulk of the troops had been withdrawn by Antony, 
while Cassius had gained complete control of Syria. They 
had succeeded in raising large forces but had taken no part 
in the decisive events in Italy. Turning a deaf ear to Cic- 
ero's frantic appeals for help, they had stood passive during 
the last agony of the republic to restore which they had 
murdered Caesar. The cause of their inaction can not be 
fully known. Cassius was probably too far away to act 
in time and it is on M. Junius Brutus that the chief respon- 
sibility must fall. It is just possible that the condition of 
his army was such as to prevent any other course, but the 
impression given by his letters to Cicero is rather that 
narrow-minded obstinacy was the explanation. He had a 
profound distrust of Octavian and was bitterly opposed to 
the alliance with him. He disapproved of extreme meas- 
ures against Antony and Lepidus, and was firmly convinced 
that he in Macedon could judge the situation better than the 



17 See the article by Schwartz in Hermes, xxxiii. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 189 

men in Rome. When the break between Octavian and the 
senate began, he answered Cicero's appeals with a compla- 
cent "I told you so." Quite probably he did not appreciate 
the full extent of the danger, or anticipate the proscription 
till it was too late, but seemingly he held aloof from Cicero's 
policy because it was not his and left his party to be ruined 
because it would not follow his advice. Apparently what 
he desired was that the senate should abandon Rome to take 
refuge in his camp, as had been done in Pompey's day. 18 
Then, in due time, he hoped to bring them back and re- 
establish the republic again. As things turned out it would 
have mattered very little in the end, and Cicero was right in 
feeling that if the republic could not be saved in Italy it 
was lost beyond recall. 

Now that the tragic end had come in Rome, nothing re- 
mained for the two tyrannicides in the East but to unite 
their armies and fight a last battle for their lives. In 
reality the nobility who had murdered Caesar, or approved 
the deed, had perished, and with them the republic they had 
thought to preserve or to restore. The future government 
must be one resting upon the swords of the soldiers and not 
upon the votes of the senate. A victory for Brutus and 
Cassius might change the personnel of that government but 
could not change its character. Whichever party won, in 
the pass to which things had now come, their power would 
have no basis but the sword. If Brutus and Cassius had 
prevailed, they might have undertaken to restore the re- 
public, but the wishes of the senate would have counted for 
little in the decision. Their rule would have been set up 
by the legions and would have depended for its existence 
upon their support. The senate might have been revived 
and reorganized and given nominal supremacy again, but 
this was destined to be the policy of Octavian in the years 
to come after the fall of Antony had left him sole master of 
the Roman world. There is no reason to suppose that the 
senate as reconstituted by Brutus and Cassius would have 
been in any way more capable of governing than was the 



18 Meyer, 548-44. 



190 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

senate of Augustus. Underneath the surface its position 
would have been much the same in the one case as in the 
other. Placed in nominal control by a successful general, it 
could have retained that control only so long as its restorer 
kept possession of the sword for its defense. If once the 
author of its authority should let slip the command of the 
army, the conscript fathers would be at the mercy of some 
new military chief. Eeal power the senate could not have 
unless some means could be devised to give it a serious hold 
upon the loyalty of the legions. The army had paid little 
heed to the conscript fathers since the reforms of Marius, 
and to alter this condition of affairs a reorganization of the 
military system was required. It seems impossible to 
imagine that such sweeping changes could have come from 
the conspirators. The murder itself is conclusive evidence 
of their narrow pedantry. The war which ended at Phil- 
ippi was, therefore, in no real sense a struggle for the old 
republic; in its essence it was only a battle between rival 
pretenders to the throne. Such a struggle, while important 
for individuals, hardly matters for history except as one 
or the other of the rival claimants may be judged the better 
fitted for the task of government. 

The issue was not long in doubt. The battle of Philippi 
crushed forever the hopes of the great party which had 
followed Pompey and after Caesar's death had made a last 
effort to regain control of the state. That this result was 
fortunate for the world there can be little doubt. Nothing 
that we know of Brutus or of Cassius would seem to indicate 
that they possessed better qualifications for the task of re- 
organization than did either of the victors. Octavian must 
be accounted a great statesman and Antony displayed a 
far clearer insight into realities than was shown by the con- 
spirators. The men who killed Caesar without a thought 
of what their next step was to be had shown themselves so 
blind to obvious consequences, so unable to look beneath the 
surface of things, that it cannot be a matter of regret that 
the work of restoring order to the world should have fallen 
into other hands. Even Antony was better qualified to 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 191 

rule than men who combined such violence and such short- 
sightedness. Their fate is hardly likely to provoke much 
sympathy ; their crime was atoned for with their lives, and 
in their ruin they dragged down their whole party. 



CHAPTER VII 
The Triumph of Octavian 

Although the battle of Philippi destroyed the last serious 
foes of the triumvirs, the task which confronted them was, 
nevertheless, one of extreme difficulty. The whole world had 
been thrown into confusion and now urgently demanded 
peace and reorganization at their hands. Their soldiers 
were clamorous for pay and the treasury of the three 
was empty. In the West the silence and submission showed 
that the proscription had succeeded in its purpose, but the 
war with the republicans had produced chaos throughout 
the East. The triumvirs found themselves obliged to deal 
at once with two separate and distinct problems. The 
West must be kept quiet and their soldiers pacified by being 
paid a part, at least, of their demands ; and while this was 
being done, the East must be reorganized and set to rights. 
It was obvious that the soldiers could not safely be ignored, 
and it was equally essential to deal promptly with the East. 
Caesar's experience warned them that to neglect a thorough 
settlement of regions which the republicans had held might 
lead to a renewal of the war. It was Caesar's delay in 
making an end of his opponents after Pharsalia that had 
prolonged the contest. The victorious triumvirs had no 
desire to fight a Thapsus or a Munda, and so they promptly 
determined to divide the difficult task between them. 

In making the arrangements after Philippi, Antony 
showed himself decidedly the predominant partner. The 
credit of the victory belonged to him rather than to Octa- 
vian, and he could safely impose his will in the division of 
responsibility. He took for himself the lion's share of the 
spoils and the more alluring of the tasks before the two. 
The East was the richest part of the Roman world, and 
the settlement of its affairs promised to present few diffi- 
culties and enormous profit. The triumvirs hoped to fill 
their exhausted treasury in this region, and to have this 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 193 

money in his own hands might easily prove of great ad- 
vantage to Antony. In the West the task of settling condi- 
tions abounded in difficulties, owing to the demands of the 
army and the bankruptcy of the three. The confiscations 
which had accompanied the proscription had been but a 
drop in the bucket, and new confiscations would be neces- 
sary to satisfy the troops. Whoever undertook this was 
certain to rouse the bitter resentment of those whom he 
despoiled, and it was not by any means sure that he would 
be able to content the army. It seemed not unlikely that 
he might alienate all parties and every class, while his col- 
league in the East would be engaged in the easy work of 
settling the affairs of the richest provinces of the empire, 
in doing which he might possess himself of an immense 
sum of ready money. If the triumvir in the West should 
fail, as it was probable he might, all parties would turn 
with one accord to his partner in the East, those who were 
being robbed as the only man who could save their property 
or compensate them for its loss, the soldiers as the only 
man who could pay them the rewards so often promised. 
These considerations were so obvious that there can be lit- 
tle wonder that Antony selected the East as his share of 
the world and turned over to the weaker Octavian the dan- 
gerous problems of the West. It is possible that Antony 
already dreamed of carrying out Caesar's plan for the con- 
quest of Parthia, but such an enterprise, if successful, would 
only serve to make his advantages the greater by giving 
him new military glory and the immense plunder of the 
Farther East. Appian represents Octavian as choosing 
the West of his own accord on account of his health, 1 but 
this seems hardly credible. It is quite true that Octavian 
had been seriously ill at the time of the battle of Philippi 
and that he was still far from strong, but it is not easy to 
see why the task awaiting him in Italy was any better 
adapted to the delicate health of an invalid than that in 
the East would have been. Even if the statement of Ap- 
pian be accepted, it would still be certain that the other 

1 Appian, v, 3. 



194 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

arrangements were such as Octavian would never have ac- 
cepted voluntarily. Antony not only assumed full authority 
over all eastern affairs, but he retained control of a large 
part of the West as well. He decided to keep what he had 
held under the first division and to add to it a portion of the 
share of Lepidus. The latter had been from the start the 
weakest of the three and his two partners now determined 
to despoil him. Antony took for himself the province of 
Transalpine Gaul, and Octavian received the two provinces 
of Spain. If Lepidus objected and it should seem danger- 
ous to set him aside entirely, it was agreed that he should 
be given Africa and Numidia in exchange for the prov- 
inces which he was required to surrender. These arrange- 
ments were distinctly favorable to Antony. He held all 
Gaul across the Alps as well as the Cisalpine province, and 
though Octavian was given all of Spain, this was far less 
valuable in every way than Gaul, and was moreover com- 
pletely cut off from Italy by the regions held by Antony. 
Besides all this the army of Antony was to be the larger, 
and while a portion of it would follow him to the East, 
strong forces under his generals would remain behind in 
Gaul and even in Italy itself. Such a dispersal of his le- 
gions might prove dangerous in the future, but at the mo- 
ment he undoubtedly occupied a far stronger position than 
Octavian. 

As soon as the triumvirs had completed these arrange- 
ments each set about the work allotted to him. Octavian 
returned to Rome with empty hands and clamorous vete- 
rans in his train to undertake the formidable task of satis- 
fying them without entire ruin to himself. He was not 
long in realizing the difficulties of his position. The sol- 
diers demanded land and none was available without some 
fresh spoliation. Octavian, in no wise anxious for more 
unpopularity than had already fallen to his lot, sought to 
make his new demands as moderate as possible. In this 
endeavor he very nearly fell between the two horns of the 
dilemma by rousing to fury those who felt their property 
in danger, while leaving the army, on which he must rely 
for power and safety, still unsatisfied. He had scarcely 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 195 

set about his task when the inevitable discontent began to 
show itself in a particularly menacing form because of the 
leaders around whom it gathered. These were none other 
than the brother and the wife of his own colleague. De- 
claring that the new acts of plunder were contrary to the 
absent triumvir's wishes, Lucius Antony and Fulvia put 
themselves at the head of a violent agitation against Octa- 
vian and his policy. 

In the face of this opposition the latter hesitated at first, 
fearing to act with decision lest Antony's generals should 
come to the support of his relatives. However when his 
own men began to desert him, he dared no longer temporize 
but struck boldly as his only chance of saving himself from 
shipwreck. Mustering his troops, he shut his foes up in 
the city of Perusia and there besieged them, while casting 
many anxious glances around him to see if Antony's forces 
would march to their relief. Fortunately for him the offi- 
cers of his colleague hesitated in great perplexity. Both 
sides in Italy claimed Antony's sanction for their course, 
and each could do so with some show of reason. It would 
have seemed quite natural to trust his wife and brother, 
if it had not seemed equally so to trust his partner who 
produced a written agreement with him duly signed and 
sealed. This might have been decisive if men could have 
felt quite sure how Antony would take the defeat of his 
two relatives. Such an event might rouse his resentment, 
agreement or no agreement. Thus Antony's officers found 
themselves uncertain how to act, and fearful of the respon- 
sibility, they hesitated and did nothing. Another factor in 
the situation was that the forces of Antony were divided 
among several generals who were without a common plan. 
Thus it came about that no one of them ventured to make a 
stand against Octavian single-handed, and there was no 
concert whatever between them. Under these circum- 
stances Fulvia and Lucius failed to obtain any assistance 
and were finally compelled to surrender. 

While the crisis was still acute and immediately after the 
fall of Perusia, Octavian made earnest efforts to detach 
some of the Antonian armies from their allegiance. Two 



196 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

legions commanded by Plancus came over to him, but the 
rest rejected his offers. 2 Fate, however, suddenly gave him 
an unexpected but welcome advantage. Fufius Calenus, 
the general whom Antony had left in command of Gaul 3 
with a considerable army, died and Octavian, hastening 
there in person, succeeded in taking over both the provinces 
and the army from the son of Calenus, whom he found in 
charge. 4 Thus circumstances had enabled him to upset 
the unfavorable arrangements made after Philippi and to 
gain the control of practically the entire West. Yet his 
position was by no means free from anxiety, since Antony 
still had considerable forces in Italy. After the fall of 
Perusia these had hastened to the coast to await the coming 
of their leader or the arrival of definite orders from him. 
Octavian had gained the army in Gaul, but seems to have 
been doubtful of its loyalty. 5 A war with Antony was 
something which he could not contemplate without misgiv- 
ings and which he did his best to avert. When Perusia 
surrendered, he was careful to avoid giving his colleague 
any cause for complaint by treating with gentleness and 
courtesy the relatives and particular friends of Antony. 
If vengeance was taken upon any, he took care to let it 
fall on none whose fate would rouse his absent partner's 
resentment. Fulvia and Lucius were allowed to depart un- 
harmed for Greece, there to lay their complaints before 
Antony, while Octavian prepared to stand on the defensive 
if a break should come. For a time war seemed probable 
enough. It appeared unlikely that Antony would permit 
the wrongs of his relatives, and especially the seizure of 
his provinces and legions, to go unavenged and Octavian 
prepared gloomily for the struggle that seemed inevitable. 
Yet the inevitable did not happen, and this for several 
reasons. Antony cared little for the wrongs of his wife 
and brother and seemed disposed to believe those who af- 
firmed that they had brought them on themselves by their 



2 Appian, v, 50. 

3 Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, iv, 58. 

4 Appian, v, 51. Dio, xlviii, 20. 

5 Appian, v, 66. The fact might be inferred in any case. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 197 

own recklessness and folly. The policy of Octavian had 
only been what he had agreed to in advance, and he could 
not with decency protest against it. These reasons for 
moderation might have been overborne by resentment at 
the action of Octavian in Gaul, but they were reinforced 
by other motives which he dared not disregard. In the 
Perusine war the sympathies of the soldiers must have been 
with Octavian rather than with his enemies. His difficul- 
ties must have seemed to the army to be due to his well- 
meant efforts to provide for his troops, and Fulvia and 
Lucius can not have been regarded with much sympathy 
by the veterans whose rewards they were trying to hold 
back. In such a cause his soldiers were not likely to sup- 
port Antony with any enthusiasm against their former com- 
rades. The influence of the army was, therefore, exerted 
strongly in favor of some compromise which would maintain 
the peace. The sentiment of the legions was something that 
neither of the two triumvirs could venture to disregard, 
even if they had been otherwise desirous of war. But both 
had private reasons for avoiding it if possible. Octavian 
was at the head of a large army, but a considerable part of 
it was composed of troops whom he had just taken away 
from his rival and of whose loyalty he was very doubtful. 
So anxious was he to avoid hostilities that he had sought 
earnestly to refrain from any act which would make the 
break irreparable, and he now dispatched friends to his 
colleague to explain and justify his course. On his side, 
Antony was by no means ready for a decisive conflict. The 
East was still so far from settled that ominous clouds were 
gathering in that quarter where the Parthians were threat- 
ening an invasion of Syria, and under these circumstances 
he was reluctant to involve himself in a war in the West. 
The news of the Perusine war had reached him in Alex- 
andria, but he displayed no eagerness to return to Italy. 
Instead of hastening home to settle with Octavian, he lin- 
gered in Egypt until the eastern situation itself compelled 
him to return. The forces he had with him in the East 
were inadequate to deal with the Parthians so that it was 
necessary to bring up reinforcements, and a large part of 



198 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

his army was in Italy itself. Moreover, though he showed 
little sympathy with the complaints of Fulvia, he was not 
disposed to overlook the seizure of his legions and his prov- 
inces. 

When Antony arrived in Italy, his future course of action 
was still so uncertain that Octavian prevented him from 
landing at Brundisium. Yet in spite of this a peaceful set- 
tlement was finally reached. The influence of the soldiers 
who were reluctant to fight each other prevailed, and when 
at length Antony landed, it was to negotiate rather than to 
fight. An agreement was soon brought about and a treaty, 
known as the treaty of Brundisium, was arranged between 
the two triumvirs. The terms of peace could hardly fail 
to be greatly to the advantage of Octavian. He was, in- 
deed, obliged to hand back to Antony the legions he had 
taken from Calenus, but he was able to keep the provinces 
of Gaul which he had seized at the same time. Perhaps 
his colleague agreed to this the more readily since, if he re- 
mained for any length of time in the East, Gaul could be 
of comparatively little use to him. As soon as he had 
sailed for Italy the Parthians had invaded Syria, and a 
serious war with them was unavoidable. For this Antony 
required soldiers and not provinces too remote to be of 
much importance in the conflict. Accordingly he insisted 
that his legions should be restored to him, and in addition 
he reserved the right to recruit soldiers in Italy on an equal 
footing with Octavian. 6 By this new division of the prov- 
inces Antony retained the East while giving up nearly all 
the West to his partner. Lepidus, who can hardly be con- 
sidered as a partner though he bore the name of one, was 
to keep Africa. To make the treaty seem more binding to 
the soldiers, who had largely dictated it, Antony married 
Octavia, the sister of Octavian. This was possible, or at 
any rate easier, since Fulvia had just died, rumor said of 
a broken spirit because of her husband's indifference to her 
wrongs. 

The peace concluded, Antony visited Rome, but made 
only a short stay in the city. The affairs of the East were 



6 Appian, v, 65. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 199 

calling for his attention, and with his new wife he soon set 
out for Greece. Here news arrived that the Parthians had 
been disposed of by his officers, at least for the moment, 
and he remained for a considerable time in Greece, busy with 
preparations for the conquest of Parthia, which he intended 
to attempt. 

In the West Octavian was soon confronted with a new foe 
in the person of a son of the great Pompey, who had turned 
pirate and become dangerously strong. After the battle of 
Pharsalia had overthrown his father's party in the field, 
the young Sextus Pompey had succeeded in making his 
escape to Spain. After Munda he had taken to the sea and 
gathered around him a large number of reckless men. At 
first no one had thought him worthy of serious attention, 
but while the world was occupied with other matters his 
power had grown steadily, recruited from all sides. To 
him had fled runaway slaves, pirates, refugees from the 
proscription and their like, until at length his forces be- 
came so strong that he was able to play a part of greater 
dignity. He seized the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and 
ravaged the western seas at pleasure. At the time of the 
treaty of Brundisium he had been in alliance with Antony, 
but that leader abandoned him without hesitation in order 
to come to terms with Octavian. The latter had at first 
intended to proceed at once to war against him, but the 
pressure of popular feeling at Rome, and doubtless that of 
Antony as well, led him finally to agree to a peace with 
Sextus. This peace, known as the treaty of Misenum, 
proved to be only a brief truce, and hostilities soon flamed 
out again. It matters little which of the two was the more 
to blame. In truth, the position which Sextus held was 
one that Octavian could not tolerate permanently. Master 
at once of Sicily and of the sea, the food supply of Rome 
was at his mercy. Neither party to the treaty could trust 
the other very far, and Sextus had but an imperfect control 
over his own followers. Under such conditions war was 
sure to come before long, and Octavian resolved to crush 
an enemy who was potentially so dangerous. Antony 



200 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

promised help in ships, but they failed to come at the ex- 
pected time, so Octavian resolved to build a fleet of his 
own and put the work in charge of his ablest lieutenant, 
Agrippa. After much difficulty and delay that capable 
officer was finally in a position to take the sea against the 
foe and in a naval battle he broke the maritime power of 
Sextus forever. It now remained only to stamp out the 
last remnants of the young Pompey's forces in Sicily, and 
to assist in this Octavian called on Lepidus to bring his 
legions from Africa. Lepidus did so, but he came filled 
with resentment at the way in which his nominal colleagues 
had set him aside and looking for an opportunity to reassert 
himself. His forces, joined to those of Octavian, were 
speedily successful in reducing Sicily, and Sextus Pompey, 
escaping from the ruin of his power, sought refuge in the 
East with Antony, where he was put to death not long 
afterwards. Meanwhile the conquerors had been left face 
to face in Sicily, and Lepidus, taking advantage of the cir- 
cumstance that he had a large army under his command, 
attempted to regain his old position of an equal partner in 
the triumvirate. But he had not been so long ignored 
without good reason. Instead of meeting him with the 
concessions which he demanded, Octavian appealed to his 
soldiers. On them Lepidus had little influence, and they 
were readily prevailed upon to abandon their general. 
Deserted by his men, the unfortunate Lepidus found him- 
self entirely helpless. Octavian spared his life but sent 
him into exile, and from this time he disappears from his- 
tory. Thus the last independent power in the West was 
eliminated and that part of the Roman world passed wholly 
into the hands of Octavian. From this time on, not before, 
the East and West were face to face and a final struggle 
between them was inevitable. 

While his rival, potential if not actual, was gaining the 
control of the Occident, Antony was pursuing his oriental 
policy. Just what that was has not always been clearly 
seen, and it is worth a brief consideration. This is the 
more true because the real nature of that policy and the 
reasons for its failure were not without a serious lesson 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 201 

for Octavian. From modern eyes the underlying causes of 
the downfall of Antony at Actium have been in part con- 
cealed by the glamor of romance, but the astute statesman 
who had seen and profited by his rival's blunders can 
hardly have been deceived. It was not the beauty of Cleo- 
patra that ruined Antony, except in so far as this was one 
of the factors that lured him into a fatal policy. It was 
the political errors which she persuaded him to commit 
that destroyed him and not the mere fact of his connection 
with her. His personal vices or infatuation were of im- 
portance only as they led him into blunders of statesman- 
ship. 

When Antony first chose the East after the battle of 
Philippi, he probably already dreamed of completing 
Caesar's work by carrying out that war against Parthia 
which the dictator would have undertaken had his life been 
spared. All Caesar's plans for that vast enterprise had 
come into the hands of Antony after the Ides of March, and 
he believed that he could execute the designs formed by his 
master. For such a task he needed first of all to secure his 
hold upon the East by a thorough reorganization of that 
region. He was busily engaged in this when the Perusine 
war interrupted him. In all probability this fact played 
an important part in persuading him to make peace with 
Octavian. If the war which he was planning resulted in 
the conquest of Parthia, the loss of the provinces of Gaul 
would be a comparatively small matter, and Antony was 
very confident of victory. He returned from the compact 
of Brundisium to continue his career of glory in the East. 

As has been seen, the Parthians had not waited till their 
would-be conqueror was ready to attack. During his ab- 
sence in Italy, they invaded Syria and Antony had dis- 
patched against them an officer by the name of Ventidius 
Bassus, who successfully routed them and drove them back. 
This victory procured a breathing space, if nothing more, 
and enabled Antony to proceed at leisure with the prepara- 
tions for his projected war. The treaty of Brundisium was 
concluded in the autumn of 40 B.C., and it was not till the 



202 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

next summer that Antony left Italy. He spent the re- 
mainder of that year and all the next with Octavia in 
Greece. During this time the war between Octavian and 
Sextus Pompey had broken out and Ventidius had been 
winning victories in Syria. In the early part of 37 B.C. 
Antony made a hurried visit to Syria, his critics said be- 
cause he was jealous of the glory which his lieutenant was 
gaining. He accomplished little there, as Octavian's ap- 
peals for help called him back again to the West. Another 
reason for his return was doubtless that the law appointing 
the triumvirate was on the point of expiring and that this 
circumstance necessitated a new understanding with his 
partner. In any case he returned to Italy with a large 
fleet and at Tarentum concluded his last compact with 
Octavian. By the terms of this agreement the two decided 
to renew the triumvirate (Lepidus was not deposed till the 
next year) for a period of five years, and effected an ex- 
change of resources by which Antony was to furnish ships 
for the war against Sextus Pompey and in return was to 
receive a force of 20,000 Italian soldiers for his projected 
war with Parthia. As soon as this bargain was concluded, 
Antony sailed at once for Syria, leaving Octavia in Rome 
with her brother. 7 

Up to this time Cleopatra had played very little part in 
Antony's career. After the battle of Philippi, he had met 
her at Tarsus, where she had been summond to appear be- 
fore him. He had then accompanied her to Alexandria and 
had spent some time there in 40 B.C. The Perusine war 
had forced him to return to Italy, where he had married 
Octavia, and he paid no further attention to the Queen of 
Egypt until, in 36 B.C., he set about the Parthian war in 
earnest. Up to this time she cannot be said to have exerted 
any influence upon his policy. As soon as he assumed the 
command of his army in Syria, almost his first act was to 
summon her to meet him in Antioch. For this step there 
were political as well as personal reasons. For such a war 
as he was planning he needed ample funds which he could 



7 Appian, v, 95. Dio, xlviii, 54. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 203 

not hope to get from his bankrupt partner. Such sums as 
he had so far been able to extort in the East had melted 
away and he still needed money. In all the East the richest 
district was the kingdom of Egypt, which still remained 
nominally independent of Rome. Toward Egypt and its 
wealth the eyes of Antony naturally turned. He wanted 
gold, and as it happened, the government of Egypt was in 
need of military force, though well supplied with money. 
The triumvir might have seized the kingdom, but he did not 
care to take a violent way to reach his ends, since, if he 
did, it was quite possible that the country would revolt as 
soon as he had gone, or would require to be held down with 
a large force of men. If, however, he respected the legit- 
imate government, the peace could be maintained with a 
much smaller force and with a much better chance of success. 
The Egyptian government desired his support to keep itself 
in power and could readily be induced to pay the price he 
might demand. An alliance with the reigning queen of 
Egypt seemed the wisest course and such a policy he now 
adopted. When Cleopatra, responding to his summons, met 
him in Antioch, there seems to have been little difficulty in 
arranging terms. She was to furnish money for the 
Parthian war, and in return was to receive the recognition 
and support of Antony. In addition he ceded to her the 
island of Cyprus and a district in Coele-Syria. 8 Both had in 
former times been dependencies of Egypt and their cession 
does not seem to have aroused any great opposition, al- 
though Cyprus was then a Roman province. If Antony 
had fallen in love with the queen, his passion had not yet 
betrayed him into any very serious political error. 

Having supplied himself with funds, Antony set out on 
his carefully prepared campaign. But in the war that fol- 
lowed the plans of Caesar broke down in the hands of his 
disciple. A single year of fighting served to shatter all 
Antony's dreams of conquest, and his invasion of Parthia 
ended in a masterly retreat. One can not altogether escape 
the question of whether Caesar would have failed in the 

8 Bouche-Leclercq, ii, 254-55. 



204 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

same way. A definite answer is of course impossible, but 
it is easy to see that he would have had advantages which 
his successor lacked. Caesar had allotted five years to the 
task, but Antony could not afford so long a time. He dared 
not turn his back upon his brother-in-law, who had already 
shown himself astute and ready to take prompt advantage 
of any favorable circumstances. If Antony allowed him- 
self to be drawn into a long and difficult campaign in Par- 
thia, he might find the East slipping through his hands as 
completely as the West had done. To succeed at all it was 
necessary that he should succeed at once, and this he failed 
to do. Part of the failure must be attributed to disasters 
which the far greater Caesar might have avoided. In any 
case the result of the expedition was that Antony returned, 
not as a laureled conqueror laden with the spoils of the 
remoter East, but rather as an unsuccessful general who 
had saved his army from entire destruction by a brilliant 
retreat. To this new situation he had now to adjust him- 
self and his policy. 

To understand the policy which Antony now adopted re- 
quires but a brief consideration of the circumstances, yet 
there are one or two preliminary considerations to be borne 
in mind. The first of these is the unquestionable fascina- 
tion which the East possessed for that generation of Ro- 
mans. The countries of the eastern Mediterranean were 
at that time not only richer and more populous than those 
of the West, but they represented a far older, more luxu- 
rious, and subtler civilization. Within their borders, and 
especially in Egypt, the ancient civilizations of the inhabi- 
tants, dating back for milleniums before the foundation of 
Rome, had, after the conquest of Alexander, taken on a 
veneer of Greek culture which made them singularly at- 
tractive to the ruder and more practical Roman. In the 
fields of art and of the intellect the peoples of Italy admit- 
ted themselves inferior to the Greeks, and had long been 
accustomed to accept the superiority of that highly gifted 
race as a matter of course. Though Rome had conquered 
Greece, she in her turn had been vanquished by the weapons 
of the spirit, by the fascination of Greek thought and litera- 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 205 

ture. The greatest minds of Rome were well content to 
imitate and popularize in Latin form the products of the 
East. The average Roman of the upper class was sent to 
finish his education at the famous schools of Greece and 
returned with more or less enthusiasm for the Hellenistic 
culture of the East. While this was happening, the influ- 
ence was deepened by the wars which had flooded Italy 
with eastern slaves, who filled the households of the great. 
With them there came strange gods whose cults began to 
take root in the West. 

In addition to the fascination of the oriental world for 
the Romans, the political structure of the eastern states 
should also be kept constantly in mind. When first the 
Roman legions crossed the Adriatic, the states with which 
they came in contact were for the most part kingdoms that 
had arisen out of Alexander's empire and had taken shape 
in the period of confusion that followed his death. There 
is a striking analogy between the conditions which followed 
the death of the great Macedonian conqueror and those 
which resulted from the Ides of March. In both cases a 
great soldier had been suddenly struck down, leaving be- 
hind him a legacy of war. In both cases the strongest 
power then in existence was to be found in the now leader- 
less army. The vital question in both cases was soon seen 
to be whether these armies could unite in choosing any one 
successor to their dead general. This in both cases proved 
to be impossible and several chiefs arose, each able to secure 
the support of a portion of the veterans and so to claim some 
part of the inheritance. This in both cases led to strug- 
gles between the rival generals before a final solution could 
be reached. In the wars which followed Caesar's death, 
however, the cause of unity was destined finally to prevail 
and his entire empire passed to his adopted son. The bit- 
ter struggle between the successors of Alexander had an 
opposite result. No one of the pretenders was strong 
enough to overcome all rivals, and in the end the empire of 
the Macedonian was divided among his generals. Thus 
arose three important kingdoms in the East which still con- 
trolled the greater part of that region when Rome appeared 



206 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

upon the scene. They were the kingdom of the Antigonids 
in Macedonia, that of the Seleucids in Syria, and that of the 
Lagids or Ptolemies in Egypt. Of these Macedon stood 
somewhat apart, much smaller in size than the others but 
more compact and homogeneous. The other two were em- 
pires, rich and extensive indeed, but without natural unity- 
Their structure was very similar and was the natural result 
of the circumstances which had given them birth. Those 
circumstances and the peculiar conditions which they cre- 
ated will repay a moment's consideration. 

Both Ptolemy and Seleucus were generals of Alexander 
who after his death had gained the support of an important 
section of his now disrupted army. Both depended for 
their power upon their Greek soldiers and were completely 
at their mercy. Neither could venture without the cer- 
tainty of ruin to offend his troops beyond a certain point. 
Both, therefore, although able to seize rich and populous 
provinces, were forced to rule them as Greek sovereigns 
and to depend for the stability of their thrones upon Greek 
mercenaries. Yet in both cases an enormous majority of 
their subjects belonged to other races. Each, therefore, 
was compelled by his position to seek to gain and hold some 
districts which could serve as a recruiting ground for the 
army on which his power rested. Thus the Seleucids strove 
to annex Asia Minor and even to push their conquests into 
Greece itself, while the early Ptolemies, realizing that they 
could not afford to remain cooped up in the valley of the 
Nile, sought to acquire an empire outside. 

In the case of the Ptolemies, who alone concern us here, 
these efforts met with a large measure of success, and they 
were able not only to hold Egypt firmly, but to gain exten- 
sive provinces beyond its borders. To numerous posses- 
sions among the islands of the Mediterranean and on the 
coasts of Asia Minor they added the important district of 
Coele-Syria. Such an empire furnished them a fairly stable 
basis for their power. Egypt supplied the money to fill 
their treasury, while the outlying provinces furnished the 
soldiers for their army and Coele-Syria contributed the ma- 
terials for the fleet on which they must depend to bind the 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 207 

rest together. But their success was destined to be tem- 
porary in its nature. Reverses soon arrived and the seem- 
ingly solid structure fell to pieces. A naval battle served 
to break their maritime supremacy, and before they had re- 
covered from this blow, another fell upon them. In the last 
days of the Second Punic war the two chief rivals of the 
Ptolemies, Antiochus of Syria and Philip of Macedon, tak- 
ing advantage of a regency at Alexandria, united to despoil 
them. Antiochus seized Coele-Syria and Philip threw him- 
self upon their other outlying possessions. The unexpect- 
edly sudden defeat of Carthage enabled Rome to intervene 
in favor of the Ptolemies, who had previously shown them- 
selves her friends. She now protected Egypt from attack, 
and crossing into Greece she easily crushed the power of 
Philip and forced him to give up his plunder. The Ptole- 
mies, however, gained nothing by his defeat, for, whether 
from craft or from a failure to understand their importance 
to her Alexandrian ally, Rome did not restore to Egypt the 
places seized by Philip. Thus the Ptolemaic empire passed 
away and with it the real strength of the Lagid dynasty. 
The later members of that house were suffered to remain 
as kings at Alexandria, but their military power was broken 
and the stability of their throne was undermined. Shut up 
in the valley of the Nile, their army rapidly rotted away. 
They had from the first relied on foreign troops. The 
greater part of these had been provided for by lands as- 
signed to them in Egypt, upon whose soil they were thus 
quartered. The result of this was that they soon became a 
militia and lost more and more their military character and 
effectiveness. 9 For a real standing army the Ptolemies 
maintained a force of royal guards. In time of war they 
trusted to recruiting mercenaries. This was easy enough 
so long as they were in close communication with all the 
ports of the Aegean and while the Greek world had an 
abundant supply of soldiers of fortune ready to take service 
with whosoever could pay them. 10 The native Egyptians 



e Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 2-3. See also Ferguson, Greek Imperialism for an admirable 
discussion of the Ptolemies. 
10 Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 10. 



208 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

were only employed in time of crisis and under pressure of 
necessity. 11 With the destruction of their empire and the 
changed conditions due to the advent of Rome in the east- 
ern Mediterranean, an effective army could no longer be 
created by these means, and they found themselves depend- 
ent on a handful of Greek guards who proved unable to hold 
even the mob of their turbulent capital in awe. If Eome 
had not given them a certain measure of support they must 
have fallen long before they did. As it was, the last rulers 
of the dynasty tumbled off their throne at intervals, but 
upon each occasion found themselves restored by Rome — 
for a consideration. The senate, having no desire to annex 
Egypt, was on the whole content to see it in the hands of a 
line of rulers too weak to stand alone. 

Thus when Cleopatra mounted the unstable throne at 
Alexandria, her house had long enjoyed little but the shadow 
of its former greatness. It was wholly natural that a young 
and ambitious queen should dream of the possibility of re- 
viving the faded glories of her ancestors and of making her 
gilded mockery of rule once more a thing of solid reality. 
Nor did such a dream seem in the least impossible of real- 
ization. The cause of the present weakness of her house 
was so plain that the remedy might well be obvious. The 
Lagid power had declined with the loss of the empire out- 
side of Egypt and it might revive if that could be restored. 
But to make such a revival possible she clearly needed force. 
The troops at her disposal were hardly able to hold in check 
the mob of Alexandria, and she had at hand no means of 
creating an efficient army. She had money, it is true, but 
Rome now controlled the regions from which in the past her 
ancestors had drawn their mercenaries. Even if the troops 
could be obtained, how could she hold off Roman interven- 
tion until the raw recruits had been turned into disciplined 
soldiers? In any plans which she might form she must 
allow for Rome, and she boldly resolved to use Rome as an 
instrument by which to realize her ambition. If she could 



u At the battle of Raphia Ptolemy IV had employed a large number of Egyptians 
successfully, but this had resulted in a series of rebellions on the part of the natives. 
Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 5-7. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 209 

gain the support of the Roman legions the restoration of 
the glories of her house would present few difficulties. The 
queen therefore spared no pains to win the help she stood 
in need of. She had wooed Caesar when he came to Egypt 
in pursuit of Pompey and she now wooed Antony. Nor 
had her wiles been without success in either case. Tradi- 
tion and popular rumor believed that even the great Julius 
had so far yielded to her charms as to meditate giving effect 
to the policy she urged. At Rome before his murder he 
had been credited with the design, after his conquest of 
Parthia was completed, of making Alexandria his capital 
and ruling the world from there. There may have been, 
there probably was, no truth in such reports, but their ex- 
istence is enough to show that the idea was in the air, that 
men had guessed the policy which the Queen of Egypt in- 
carnated. 

But if it seems clear enough why rumor should have at- 
tributed such a policy to her, it may be asked why men 
should deem a Roman likely to adopt it. This too was not 
without some show of reason. If, as men were coming to 
believe, Caesar had dreams of making himself a king in 
name as well as in fact and laying the foundations of a 
dynasty, it might well seem that Alexandria was a better 
stage for such a scheme than Rome. The royal name, so 
odious to Italy with its republican habits and customs, was 
natural in the East, where monarchical traditions had pre- 
vailed for centuries. If Caesar seriously meant to take the 
title, it did not seem incredible that he would assume it in 
Egypt. If any such design was in his mind, his murder 
ended it before he had taken any clear or definite step to- 
ward its realization, and Cleopatra found herself no stronger 
as a result of her influence over the dictator, whatever that 
influence may have been. 

Then came Mark Antony, and the queen perceived in him 
another who might play the part which she, perhaps, had 
once assigned to Caesar in her imperial dream. She set 
herself to win him to her purpose and to obtain from him 
the force she needed to make her policy prevail. She must 
secure his sanction and consent, the support of his military 



210 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

power, if she was to regain the lost possessions of her house 
across the seas. With the wealth of Egypt at her disposal 
and recruiting grounds in her control, she might in time 
create a powerful army and her empire might grow strong 
enough to stand by its own strength. 

To the Roman she could offer not only herself but a 
grandiose dream of oriental empire. That vision might be 
made to seem alluring in itself and could be presented as the 
only possible way out of the difficulties which were crowding 
upon Antony. After the failure of his Parthian expedition 
that general found himself in a position of real peril. The 
disaster had been costly of men, and the means of replenish- 
ing the shattered and depleted ranks of his legions were not 
ready to his hand. Under the treaty of Brundisium he had 
reserved the right to recruit troops in Italy on an equal 
footing with his fellow triumvir, but a short experience 
undeceived him as to the value of this stipulation. It 
proved easy enough for Octavian to prevent recruits from 
reaching him upon a dozen plausible pretexts; so, at Tar- 
entum, he sought to bind his slippery colleague by a defi- 
nite bargain. By the treaty of Tarentum he had agreed 
to furnish Octavian with ships for his war on Sextus Pom- 
pey in return for 20,000 Roman soldiers. But the young 
Caesar promptly found excuses for not delivering the men, 
and without waiting for them Antony marched against the 
Parthians. Returning from that expedition defeated, he 
looked anxiously for the 20,000 men to reinforce his army. 
But when at length, in 35 B.C., Octavian bestirred himself 
to redeem his engagement, instead of the promised soldiers 
he sent back the borrowed ships accompanied by his sister 
and a paltry force of some 2,000 men. The meaning of this 
was clear enough, and it is not to be wondered at that 
Antony in anger ordered Octavia to return to her brother. 
But this left the need for the men no less vital than before, 
and if Antony could not get them from Italy, he must seek 
them somewhere else. His rival plainly hoped to starve 
his army by cutting off recruits, and war had been declared 
between them in everything but name. Under these cir- 
cumstances Antony was compelled to turn to the East for 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 211 

men to fill his ranks, and the imperial dreams of Cleopatra 
might seem to offer the best means of obtaining them. If 
he should adopt her policy it might be possible to arouse 
the East to rally round his standard. Orientals were not 
likely to be enthusiastic for the weaker party in a war, and 
he might believe that the best way to overcome their hesita- 
tion would be to place by his side the one remaining Hel- 
lenistic sovereign. Besides this, if disaster came and he 
were beaten by his rival, Egypt was the easiest of all the 
eastern lands to defend against a foe. Sheltered behind the 
deserts he might hope to hold the valley of the Nile in any 
event, and this would be the easier if the rightful queen to 
whom the people had long been accustomed to look up as a 
goddess reigned by his side. 12 

To all these varied influences Antony at length yielded, 
and his downfall was the consequence. For in the policy 
of Cleopatra there lay one element of weakness that proved 
fatal in the end. To create the eastern empire of which 
she and her lover dreamed the Roman legions were indis- 
pensable ; but Roman soldiers would not consent to play the 
part marked out for them. The vital defect of the whole 
plan was, not that what Cleopatra proposed was obviously 
impossible, but that to realize her design it was necessary 
to employ forces which would not knowingly support it. 
The visions of oriental empire that fascinated the general 
made no appeal to the common soldier. The men in the 
ranks were Italians, and throughout their service they 
looked forward to an allotment of land in Italy as the 
ultimate reward of victory. 13 This, if he lost control of the 
West, their general would be powerless to give. More than 
this, his eastern policy would make necessary the prolonged 
sojourn of his men in the East and postpone indefinitely 
their return to their native country. While thus he de- 
manded the sacrifice of their interests, he offended their 



12 For Antony's final policy and his campaign against Octavian see the brilliant ar- 
ticles by Kromayer in Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv: and Strack's article on Cleopatra 
in the Historiche Zeitschrift, cxv. 

"Antony made it one of his grievances against Octavian that the latter had dis- 
tributed all the available Italian land to his own men and so left none for the army 
of the East. Plutarch, Antony, 55. 



212 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

sentiment as well. There was in them enough of the stern, 
rigid pride of the old Roman character to prevent them 
from viewing with any degree of favor a scheme which 
would separate the eastern lands from Rome. To them 
the very thought of an eastern empire independent of the 
West was repugnant, and any idea of making Alexandria 
supreme over Italy unthinkable. To carry out Cleopatra's 
plan by means of such an army was difficult at best, and 
would be clearly impossible if the purpose in view were 
frankly set before the soldiers. The only chance of suc- 
cess was for Antony to conceal as much as possible his real 
aims from his men. This would involve grave contradic- 
tions and the danger of a sudden collapse if the course of 
events should at any time reveal the secret intentions of 
their leader too clearly to his troops. These difficulties were 
so obvious that Antony did not yield until his rival's 
measures had left him little choice. It may reasonably be 
assumed that Cleopatra had tried to persuade him to adopt 
her policy from the very first, but for a long time she met 
with small success. The only concessions she had been able 
to obtain were made on the eve of the Parthian expedition 
and these were not of great importance. It was only when 
hope of reinforcements from the West was gone that Antony 
came over completely to her side. Already he had been in- 
duced to marry her and so become legitimate king of Egypt. 
This had taken place in Syria just before the war with 
Parthia, but he had carefully avoided taking the royal title 
lest he should alienate his men. Nevertheless Cleopatra 
had issued coins in Alexandria bearing his head side by side 
with hers. 14 After the Parthian disaster he took his place 
more openly as sovereign of Egypt, but still refrained from 
styling himself king in any official way, at least to Romans. 
Neither did he divorce his Roman wife Octavia. His posi- 
tion was thus highly ambiguous. At war with the young 
Caesar in all but name, he seized the occasion when his rival 
was involved in a war in Pannonia to launch a swift and 
successful campaign against Armenia in order to secure 



14 Bouche-Leclercq, ii, 256. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 213 

his rear from danger in the coming struggle. Returning 
victorious to Alexandria, he took the last decisive step, and 
after celebrating a splendid triumph for his victories, he 
solemnly proclaimed a new distribution of the eastern lands. 
To Cleopatra and her eldest son Caesarion he assigned the 
territories of Cyprus, Libya, and Coele-Syria; to his own 
children by her he gave kingdoms formed from his new 
conquest and from the Asiatic provinces of Rome. To one 
he handed over Armenia and Media with the promise of 
Parthia when it should be conquered, and he bestowed upon 
the other Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia. "All this," Mahaffy 
says quite truly, "was evidently suggested to Cleopatra by 
the traditions of her house ; she only claimed in the Greek 
world what had formerly, and had long, belonged to 
Egypt." 15 The Ptolemaic empire was thus boldly revived 
under the sovereignty of Antony, although he did not dare 
to assume the crown himself. 

The new empire created by these measures, known as the 
Donations of Alexandria, could hardly be viewed by 
Romans with any feeling but alarm. Rome was not likely 
to surrender quietly her provinces of Cyprus, Cilicia, and 
Syria to the Ptolemies. Octavian eagerly seized the oppor- 
tunity to turn the sentiment of the West against his rival. 
At first, however, he was far less successful than might 
have been expected. In spite of his recent acts Antony 
retained the loyalty of his soldiers and that of many par- 
tisans in Italy. This may have been due to the unpopularity 
of Octavian, or it may have been that men had not yet come 
to regard Antony as an eastern monarch. That he was the 
tool of Cleopatra was naturally insisted on by his rival, but 
the world seems not to have been entirely convinced. It was 
indeed just possible to construe his policy in a Roman sense, 
and to argue that it had relieved Rome of a heavy burden 
while leaving her such of her eastern possessions as were 
really valuable. Thus the province of Asia, so dear to 
Roman financiers, was still hers, and if Syria was ceded to 
Egypt, that province had never been of much advantage, 



"Mahaffy, History of Egypt, 249-50. See also to the same effect Bouche-Leclercq, 
ii, 278-79. 



214 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

but had merely served to involve Rome in a war with 
Parthia. It might prove cheaper in the end to hold the 
Parthians in check by creating a strong buffer-state between 
them and the Roman provinces. 

Perhaps the Romans excused Antony on some such 
grounds as these, or they may have hoped that once in Italy 
he could be induced to modify his policy. In any case the 
Donations were received in Rome far more quietly than 
might have been expected. 16 Antony had numerous par- 
tisans in the senate, and to that body he addressed a long 
letter professing his desire to restore the republic and re- 
questing the senate's sanction for his new arrangements. 
This Octavian would not, of course, allow, but he was not 
strong enough to prevent the consuls and large numbers of 
the nobles from leaving Italy to join Antony in the East. 
Nevertheless the Donations of Alexandria produced a deep 
impression and one disastrous to Antony; 17 they had not 
been greeted by any outburst of anger, but the tide of public 
sentiment ran more and more in favor of Octavian. Even 
in the ranks of Antony's army a deep distrust was forming 
in the minds of his soldiers. Under these circumstances, 
if Antony was to retain his hold upon his Roman supporters 
for any length of time, it was essential to dispel the 
suspicions that had been aroused. Unfortunately for him- 
self he did the exact opposite, and Octavian found his 
strength daily increased by the blunders of his rival. The 
first great blunder, and the source of all the rest, was that 
Antony permitted Cleopatra to accompany him upon the 
campaign. While she was with him in his camp it was 
difficult for Antony to pose as a Roman general and it 
would have pleased his Roman supporters far better if she 
had been left behind in Egypt. This, however, was not at 
all what she desired. It is clear that she feared the in- 
fluence over Antony of his Roman officers and partisans, 



"Octavian found it necessary to seize and publish Antony's will in order to heighten 
the effect. 

17 Antony's partisans tried to prevent the reading of that part of his letter to the 
senate dealing with the Donations ; evidently they feared the effect on public opinion. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 215 

whom she well knew to have no sympathy with her am- 
bitions. Not only did she insist upon accompanying him, 
but she made every effort to isolate him from his supporters 
and to surround him wholly with counselors on whom she 
could rely. In this she was successful, and her success was 
all to the advantage of Octavian, for it furnished a visible 
justification of all his charges against Antony, which many 
had hitherto been reluctant to believe. 

At the outbreak of the war the position of Octavian was 
most precarious. His legal status was obscure and difficult, 
neither his fleet nor his army was ready for the struggle, 
and Italy was seething with mutinous disaffection. 18 If 
Antony had taken the offensive and invaded Italy at once 
he might have won the war, but this he failed to do. His 
delay has been attributed to Cleopatra, in whose company 
he squandered the precious time in luxurious idleness, but 
a closer study does much to clear his fame. To concentrate 
his army and to transport it to the West was a task of such 
magnitude that it seems very doubtful if Antony could have 
struck more quickly than he did. 19 In any case the op- 
portunity slipped by, and when at last he led his forces 
into Epirus, Octavian was prepared to meet him there. 

Into the details of the campaign it is unnecessary to enter. 
In the end the two armies found themselves face to face on 
the shores of the bay of Actium, directly across the Adriatic 
from Italy. For some time neither side was ready to risk 
a battle, at any rate on such terms that the other side would 
accept the challenge. Antony's land forces outnumbered 
those of Octavian, but his fleet was the weaker of the two. 
As the days passed without a battle the position of Antony 
grew steadily worse ; his fleet was blockaded in the bay and 
his army was so far cut off by land that its supplies began 
to fail. More ominous still, the dissensions among his fol- 
lowers grew constantly more violent. The Roman officers 
in the camp waged a bitter struggle with the partisans of 



18 For the difficulties of Octavian see Ferrero, iv, 69-86. See also the article of 
Caspari in the Classical Quarterly, v, 230-35. 

19 Kromayer in his articles on the campaign of Actium has shown that the things 
that Antony is known to have accomplished were enough to occupy his time fully. 



216 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Cleopatra. Disgusted beyond measure at her influence over 
the general, his supporters began to slip away to join his 
rival. Under these circumstances his position was fast be- 
coming untenable, and his officers advised him to fall back 
from the coast so as to draw his adversary after him, as 
Caesar had done not many years before. This would have 
entailed the sacrifice of the fleet, which must have been 
abandoned, and to this Cleopatra was strongly opposed. 
Influenced by the Queen, Antony decided that his ships 
should make a desperate effort to break through the block- 
ade, and that he and the Queen should sail for Egypt, while 
the army attempted to retreat by land. 

That this was the strategic plan behind the battle of 
Actium Kromayer has shown beyond all reasonable doubt. 20 
But the battle proved a decisive defeat for Antony. In the 
first place his plan miscarried, and instead of breaking 
through his fleet was defeated and almost utterly destroyed. 
Only a small squadron bearing Antony and Cleopatra with 
their treasures succeeded in passing through the hostile 
lines and sailed away to Egypt. This flight has been tra- 
ditionally ascribed to faint-heartedness, or treachery, on the 
part of the Queen and to a love-sick infatuation on the part 
of Antony. The facts, however, furnish an overwhelming 
refutation of this interpretation. That the flight was pre- 
meditated is made clear beyond dispute by the preparations 
for the battle. Dio, indeed, expressly states as much 21 and 
adds that Octavian was fully informed of the design in ad- 
vance by deserters from Antony's camp. 22 But though the 
flight to Egypt was carefully planned beforehand, the cir- 
cumstances under which it happened were quite other than 
Antony intended and its results were wholly unforeseen. 
Instead of finding himself at the head of the greater part of 
his fleet with a large force of men on board sailing for Egypt 
after having triumphantly broken through the blockade of 
his enemies, he found himself a fugitive who had succeeded 



20 See his articles in Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv. 
^Dio, 1, 15. 
^Dio, 1, 23. 



THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 217 

in escaping from a disastrous battle. This in itself irre- 
trievably shattered his prestige in the East. 

While thus his hold upon the orientals was broken, his 
army in Greece promptly abandoned him. In forming his 
design Antony had allowed himself to overlook the senti- 
ments of his Roman soldiers and had failed to take account 
of the psychological effect upon them of his acts. His de- 
parture with the Egyptian squadron and the Queen opened 
the eyes of his men to his real policy. After a brief hesi- 
tation his army surrendered to his rival. So far as can be 
seen it was quite able to obey his orders and retreat to the 
East. It was not merely the disgrace of his flight that de- 
cided his men to abandon him, for they rejected during 
seven days the offers of Octavian, alleging that their gen- 
eral was absent on some military business. This seems to 
show that if he had returned promptly to his army and sep- 
arated himself from Cleopatra, his men would still have 
followed him. Probably one reason for his blunder was his 
failure to realize how deeply his soldiers resented the pres- 
ence of the Queen in his camp and his manifest yielding to 
her influence. For this she was in some part to blame, 
since she had made a consistent effort to surround him with 
her partisans, while keeping all unfriendly counselors at a 
distance, and as a result Antony had in some degree lost 
touch with his men. When his army learned that he had 
fled with her to Egypt, their loyalty to him broke down. 
It was no longer possible to entertain a doubt as to his 
policy ; he was not a Roman general, fighting to restore the 
republic as he had pretended hitherto, but a king of Egypt, 
fighting for an eastern empire against Rome. If his men 
should still follow him, they must renounce their nationality 
and give up all hope of seeing Italy again. They must ac- 
cept their residence in the East, not as a temporary exile, 
but as a permanent fact. Face to face with realities that 
could no longer be misunderstood, they soon reached a de- 
cision. The powerful army of Antony, unbeaten in the 
field, laid down the sword without another blow. Octavian 



218 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

had only to accept its surrender and his rival's power was 
broken forever. 

Antony for a time cherished a hope that it might be pos- 
sible to hold Egypt even yet. He sought to rally round him 
such forces as had been left in the East when he started on 
his fatal campaign. But Roman loyalty to Antony was 
gone, and they no longer felt an interest in his fate. The 
legions in the East followed the example of the army in 
Epirus and deserted at the earliest opportunity. Octavian, 
as he advanced, encountered no resistance. With all their 
hopes in ruins, Antony and Cleopatra had no recourse but 
death. The battle of Actium, which from a military point 
of view was wholly inconclusive, 23 had none the less by its 
political consequences given the world to Octavian. The 
problems of that world the victor had now to face. Above 
all the problem which had baffled even the great Julius must 
be met, that of providing a government for the world which 
men could accept without too keen a sense of degradation. 



23 It has been suggested that Antony's army was forced to capitulate after Actium. 
The account of Dio does not give this impression ; it is expressly stated that no 
battle occurred. It seems incredible that an army which outnumbered its opponents 
should have allowed itself to be cut off and should have surrendered without a blow 
if it had had any real desire to fight. Its retreat may have been blocked, but the 
absence of any effort to break through can only be explained by the supposition 
that it no longer felt any wish to support Antony. The flight of that general from 
Actium to Egypt had made it all too clear what his real purpose was. The account 
in Plutarch is in harmony with this. Like Dio he makes no mention of any fighting 
but implies that the army of Antony surrendered voluntarily. Kromayer, whose views 
have in general been accepted in the text, seems to adopt the view here dissented 
from as to the surrender. See Hartmann and Kromayer, Romische Geschichte, 156. 



CHAPTER VIII 
The Restoration of the Republic 

As a result of the fall of Antony and Cleopatra the whole 
East had been thrown into confusion, and Octavian found 
himself obliged to undertake a general reorganization of 
that part of the Roman world. As soon as this was finished, 
he returned to Italy to face the task of establishing a regular 
and stable government. What actually existed was little 
better than an organized confusion. The triumvirate had ex- 
pired in 32 B.C. and had not been renewed, but Octavian con- 
tinued to exercise the dictatorial powers which he had held 
as triumvir, and to gain some semblance of legal justification 
for this, he had himself elected consul year by year. Yet 
it was obvious to all that the powers which he exercised 
were greatly in excess of those of an ordinary consul, and 
that all constitutional forms were more or less completely 
in abeyance. 

Whatever the obscurity of the legal situation might be, 
no one could doubt that Octavian was in fact the sole com- 
mander of the legions, however little the constitution rec- 
ognized any such position. All considerable forces in the 
Roman world not subject to his authority had been crushed, 
and all the soldiers under arms acknowledged themselves 
subject to his imperium. Now that peace had come the 
proper course would have been to disband the army until 
such time as a new war broke out. In the actual condition 
of things this was no longer possible, nor could Romans, 
even if attached to the customs of their ancestors, desire 
to see it tried. Recent events must have convinced all but 
the most short-sighted that the conquests of the last thirty 
years had created a new situation. 

Since the destruction of Carthage it had been the singular 
good fortune of the republic to have on its frontiers no 
enemy it needed very seriously to dread. In the East the 
weak and declining power of the successors of Alexander, 



220 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

so far from being dangerous, had long served Rome as a 
shield against the restless forces of Asia ; while in the West 
the tribes of Spain and Gaul and Africa were too ill organ- 
ized to cause serious apprehension. The frontiers could 
be protected against any probable enemy by a comparatively 
small force, and Rome no longer needed to fear a formidable 
revolt within her borders. The last uprising of the 
Spaniards had been suppressed and as much of Gaul as 
Rome essayed to hold was reasonably quiet. In such cir- 
cumstances men might persuade themselves that a large 
army was superfluous. A small force of men stationed in 
the provinces could deal with ordinary conditions well 
enough, and if the situation should become serious at any 
point, reinforcements could be raised and hurried to the 
spot under special commanders. 

Now, however, conditions had materially changed. When 
Pompey annexed the province of Syria, he not only extin- 
guished the Seleucid dynasty, which had grown too weak 
to serve any longer as an adequate protection, but he brought 
the Roman frontier into direct contact with a new and 
dangerous foe. The Parthians, now immediate neighbors, 
were a menace that Rome could not afford to ignore, and 
they must be held in check by a strong force stationed in the 
East. It may be doubted if the people of Italy fully realized 
this, for Syria was remote and conditions there may not 
have been clearly understood by men who stayed at home. 
They heard vague rumors from afar, but very probably 
these made little impression on the popular mind. Nearer 
at hand was another peril to which men could not shut their 
eyes. The conquest of Gaul had created a new situation 
on the northern frontier of the empire. The vast terri- 
tories which Caesar had added to the empire were still too 
new to Roman sovereignty for any confidence to be felt in 
their loyalty to their new rulers. If the military forces 
there were too much diminished, a revolt was likely to 
occur. The annexation had, moreover, entailed respons- 
ibilities from which the Romans could not escape. If the 
newly conquered Gauls were allowed to retain their arms, 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 221 

they would in all probability use them against their con- 
querors at the earliest opportunity. If they were disarmed, 
then the duty of protecting them against their enemies was 
plain, and along the Rhine frontier the restless Germans 
could be kept off only by a powerful army. No one could 
reasonably propose to strip the great river of defenders and 
to wait till the invaders had made havoc in the newly ac- 
quired provinces before beginning preparations for defense. 
Under the circumstances it must have been quite clear to all 
that the great force then under Octavian's command could 
not safely be disbanded, but that a considerable part must 
remain under arms for an indefinite period. That at some 
future day Rome could dismiss her soldiers and return to a 
peace footing may have been the dream of many, but they 
could not so far delude themselves with ancient maxims as 
to imagine that that time had yet arrived. The Romans, 
therefore, found themselves compelled to accept a standing 
army as a necessity of the present, at least, and the only 
question open for discussion among reasonable men was that 
of the command. Nor did the situation that confronted 
them admit of much uncertainty on this point. Octavian 
was the actual commander and no one could suggest a sub- 
stitute. 

Public opinion seems to have been unanimous in calling 
on Octavian to remain at the head of the army. His 
problem did not lie in reconciling men to that necessity, but 
rather in finding some means of retaining his position with- 
out offending too deeply such other sentiments as had a 
strong hold on their minds. If the world was eagerly de- 
manding peace and quiet, it was no less insistent on a re- 
vival of the old republic. The force of this demand was 
such that Octavian could not safely ignore it. Even if he 
had been far less astute than he was, the course of events 
within the whole space of his memory would have sufficed 
to convince him that public opinion was still a force to be 
reckoned with, and one that no leader, if he hoped to possess 
stable power, could venture to despise. 

The story of Caesar's life must have been full of mean- 
ing to his adopted son. He must have known how Caesar 



v^ 



222 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

and Pompey at the outbreak of the civil wars had 
maneuvered to put each other in the wrong. He could not 
be blind to the fact that Caesar's victory in the negotiations 
had gone far to make his march on Rome successful. His 
strategy in the first part of the war would have been quite, 
impossible if the sentiment of Italy had been resolutely 
hostile to his cause. Had the towns of the North resisted 
his advance, Pompey might have rallied his forces and have 
defended Italy. If the peninsula had been seething with 
discontent, Caesar would not have dared to take his army 
off to Spain as he had done. If Pompey's diplomatic defeat 
had thus influenced the first part of the war, so in his last 
days when the world was at his feet Caesar had found him- 
self embarrassed and perplexed. It proved impossible for 
him to organize a government that men were willing to ac- 
cept, and this led directly to the Ides of March. That 
tragedy showed clearly that the Roman world would not 
consent to be long governed by the sword alone, and that 
the man who tried to rule it thus would walk in daily peril 
of his life, trembling at the shadow of conspiracy on every 
hand and depending for his safety on nothing but the con- 
stant presence and continued fidelity of his armed guards. 
Although the control of the legions might be the only 
thing that mattered at the moment, Octavian might well 
feel the need of building on some more stable foundation 
for the future. This was only made the clearer since the 
war, from which he had just returned victorious, had shown 
that even the legions could not be depended on to act in- 
definitely against the sentiment of the world around them. 
Subject though they were to an iron discipline, the soldiers 
were yet Romans drawn from the ranks of the common 
people, and it was impossible that in the long run any 
strong drift of sentiment should fail to make itself felt 
even in the army. That this was true the sudden collapse 
of Antony's power after Actium had placed beyond all 
doubt. Octavian could hardly miss the moral of his rival's 
downfall. Antony's ruin had been due to the fact that he 
had adopted a policy for which Roman soldiers would not 
fight. Octavian cannot have imagined that he possessed 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 223 

a stronger hold upon the loyalty of his men than Antony had 
had in earlier years. Plutarch has borne eloquent testimony 
to the passionate devotion of Antony's soldiers, even in the 
midst of the Parthian disaster, declaring that their loyalty 
had never been surpassed and that the approval of their 
general was valued more than life itself by officers and men 
alike. 1 Yet even this loyalty had failed in the end because 
the object of it had blindly ignored the drift of public senti- 
ment. If the victor at Actium should venture to defy the 
strong and deeply rooted feelings of the Roman world, he 
too might see his power suddenly collapse. The very circum- 
stances under which he became the master of the Roman 
world constituted a warning that he must find a way to per- 
suade men to accept his authority if it was to be permanent. 
If the position of Octavian was such as made compromise 
appear more or less necessary, this policy was wholly con- 
genial to his temperament. By nature cautious and averse 
to extremes, he had a real sympathy with the feelings of his 
subjects and a strong love for the old Roman customs and 
traditions. The world was now demanding a return to 
regular government and this, to Roman minds, implied of 
necessity a restoration of the old republic. It was not 
liberty in the modern sense for which men yearned so much 
as law. The great mass of the Roman people had never had 
a voice in public affairs except in abstract theory. The vot- 
ing on all questions had always taken place in Rome and 
the vast majority of the citizens, who lived scattered about 
in Italy, could never hope to cast a ballot in an election or 
to vote upon a law. The decision had been in the hands of 
the rabble of Rome and of the handful of voters from the 
country towns of Italy who might chance to be there on the 
appointed day, or who were rich enough to make a journey 
there for the purpose. As a consequence under the republic 
the greater part of the people had never taken any serious 
or active share in the government. It would hardly seem 



'Plutarch, Antony, 43. Plutarch was not a contemporary, of course, but he 
doubtless drew from contemporary sources. In any case his testimony is borne out 
by all we know of Antony's career up to the last campaign. 



224 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

that they can now have been deeply interested in the restora- 
tion of privileges which they had never used in the past and 
could not hope to use in the future. But to bring back the 
reign of law was a very different matter. By its nature 
the law was essentially a public thing in which the whole 
people must have a certain share. Under the law men knew 
what acts were held permissible and what acts were for- 
bidden. If the statutes were transgressed they knew the 
consequences that would follow. They could demand, as 
an unquestionable right, a public trial in which they had 
an opportunity to plead their cause and where definite ev- 
idence of a definite offense must be presented and weighed 
according to known rules. To this the only alternative was 
the arbitrary action of individual men. In the days of the 
triumvirate, during the proscription, men were put to death 
without any public charge being brought against them, were 
condemned on vague and general grounds, were sentenced 
without trial, on no one knew what evidence, and with no 
chance whatever to reply to the unknown accusation. While 
such things were done no man could feel himself secure in 
either person or property. All men were anxious that 
government by arbitrary force and individual caprice should 
now give place to the known processes of law. 

But the entire body of Roman law had grown up under 
the republic and presupposed that form of government at 
every turn. If the law were to be restored to its supremacy, 
it would entail the restoration of the republic as well. 
This was the more true because the Roman system had 
bound the military, administrative, and judicial functions 
together in one body of institutions. It was impossible to 
return to legality without reviving the old system of which 
the courts were but one part. It was useless to attempt to 
meet the universal demand for law and justice by devising 
some new system, however excellent, since what the world 
passionately craved was precisely a return to beaten tracks 
which had the supreme merit of familiarity. It was, per- 
haps, this feeling which caused the Romans to regard the 
name of king with such intense aversion. The word rex 
seemed the symbol of arbitrary power and hence the 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 225 

negation of all law. The future was to show that they felt 
no such violent hatred for a monarch who could contrive to 
bring his supremacy within the known forms of the Roman 
law. They slew Caesar, whom they suspected of aiming at 
the crown, but they submitted to Augustus quietly enough. 

Nor could Octavian afford to ignore the immense force 
of the sentimental associations which clustered around the 
old republic. Whatever its defects had been, all that was 
glorious in Rome's past was closely bound up with its tra- 
ditional forms; the newer institutions, dictatorships and 
triumvirates, were alike odious and discredited. Although 
the military power had seized the control of the state, 
thrusting aside the old nobility, the circumstances which 
had attended the predominance of the army had produced 
a revulsion of feeling in favor of the vanquished aristocracy. 
Just as in England the execution of Charles I threw a halo 
around the memory of that king and did much to bring 
about the restoration of his son, so in Rome the proscription 
had produced a strong reaction. The Romans were a people 
of an eminently conservative and aristocratic temper, and 
the massacre of the old nobility had filled them with pity 
and with horror. They had found it difficult to submit 
patiently to a government of upstarts stained with the 
blood of the great houses, and they turned with all the more 
deference and honor to such of the old families as still sur- 
vived, desiring earnestly to see them restored to a position 
of dignity and honor in the state. 

If Octavian hoped to build a stable government he must 
take into account these demands of public opinion, and must 
discover some way of meeting the necessities of the present 
without doing too much violence to the traditional usages 
of the past. In particular he must effect a reconciliation 
with the old nobility and persuade them to lend to his 
authority the lustre of their names. In his struggle with 
Antony he had made repeated professions of his desire to 
restore the republic, and the world was now demanding 
that he should make good his promises. Accordingly in 
27 B.C., having carefully set the whole machine in order, he 
proclaimed the restoration. His own description of that 



X 



226 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

event is worthy of quotation. On the monument at Ancyra 
is recorded his view — or at least the view which he wished 
men to take — of his career. To his establishment of the 
principate, as his government has come to be called, he 
alludes in these words: "In my sixth and seventh consul- 
ships, when I had extinguished the flames of civil war, 
being by universal consent the master of all things, I trans- 
ferred the commonwealth from my power to that of the 
senate and the Roman people. For which service of mine 
I was called Augustus by a decree of the senate, laurels were 
placed upon the door-posts of my house, a civic crown wa» 
fixed above the door, and a golden shield was placed in the 
Curia Julia on which was an inscription testifying that it 
was given to me by the senate and the Roman people be- 
cause of my valor, clemency, justice, and piety. After 
that time, while excelling all others in dignity, I possessed 
no greater power than did those who were my colleagues in 
the magistracy." 2 

There is here no suggestion of any new constitution for 
the Roman world, but rather it is implied that the old re- 
public was set up again without serious change. That this 
view of the case does not accurately represent the facts the 
whole history of the early empire bears emphatic witness. 
Even in the reign of Augustus — as Octavian should be called 
after 27 B.C. — the lack of harmony between his theory and 
his practice became sufficiently glaring. From this the con- 
clusion has sometimes been drawn that he was simply a 
hypocrite playing the leading role in an elaborate farce. 
On the face of it this seems too simple an explanation; it 
can hardly have been the truth that a political settlement 
that lasted for several centuries had no better foundation 
than the whim of one man. But even if it be accepted, 
there is still a problem to be solved in explaining why the 
farce should have been so well received and so successful; 



2 The text of the Ancyra monument has often been reprinted. A convenient edi- 
tion is published by Fairley in the University of Pennsylvania Translations and 
Reprints. The passage cited is from chapter 34 of the text; Fairley's translation 
has not been followed though that given above does not differ materially from it. 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 227 

it must seem strange that the world could be so readily de- 
ceived by a few phrases which were obviously devoid of 
truth. In considering the government established by Octa- 
vian in 27 B.C. there is one fallacy against which it is essen- 
tial to guard, and it is one into which the historian is 
especially liable to fall. Knowing what did actually result 
from any given act, it is easy to assume that it was part of 
the conscious purpose of the act, which is not always the 
case. Even though it is true that the restoration of the 
republic was unreal, this is not of itself an adequate proof 
that Augustus meant it to be unreal or was entirely to 
blame for its unreality. Indeed it can be shown that to a 
large degree the unreality was due to causes for which he was 
not in any way responsible. The critics of Augustus have 
sometimes demanded of him the impossible; thus Gardt- 
hausen, his chief modern biographer, asks bitterly why he 
did not restore the republic in a real sense, if he had any 
desire to do so, and concludes that his professions of re- 
publican sentiment were wholly hypocritical. 3 But this 
seems hardly fair to Augustus, since much was involved in 
the matter besides his personal will, The republic had fallen 
long before he was born, and whether he could restore it or 
not would obviously depend upon the underlying causes of 
its fall. To all the Romans of that day the terms republic 
and senate were almost synonymous. The vital weakness 
of the senate since the time of Marius had been the fact 
that it had no real hold upon the loyalty of the army ; such 
a hold no mere imperial edict could give, and without it the 
supremacy of the senate could never be much more than 
nominal. What Augustus had it in his power to restore to 
the conscript fathers he did in fact restore, and more than 
that could hardly be demanded. The Romans were more 
reasonable than some of his modern judges, and accepted 
what he offered them as a satisfactory solution. 

The really vital point in the new settlement was obviously 



3 Meyer has argued in favor of the sincerity of Augustus in his essay on that em- 
peror published originally in the Historische Zeitschrift for 1903, but now included 
in his Kleine Schriften. Gardthausen replied in the Neue Jahrbiicher fiir klassiches 
Altertum, for 1904 and reprinted his answer in his Augustus, vol. i, pt. 3, 1334-49. 



228 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the command of the army. Here there was little room for 
discussion as to the course to be pursued ; it was clear that 
a powerful standing army was necessary for the present 
and Rome had but one method of dealing with such an army. 
Since the republic had first become engaged in distant wars, 
the great command had been an essential part of its ma- 
chinery. This device was not, as has been sometimes 
thought, in any way peculiar to the democrats at Rome; it 
was rather the only means that existed for carrying on war 
on any large scale, and it was therefore used by both parties 
equally. The senate, no less than the people, created great 
commands, but the manner in which it was done differed in 
the two cases. Since the senate ordinarily had control of 
both foreign and provincial affairs, that body was able to 
create a great command by a manipulation of the pro- 
vincial assignments from year to year. This process did 
not entail the necessity of any startling or unusual pro- 
cedure ; for example, when the second war with Mithridates 
broke out and the senate wished to send Lucullus to take 
charge of it, it was comparatively easy to arrange the mat- 
ter. Lucullus was consul at the time and had already been 
assigned a province under the Sempronian law. This he 
straightway resigned and the senate was then free to allot 
him a new province in Asia, which was promptly done. 
Once he had been placed in command of the war it was a 
simple matter for the senate to keep him there as long as 
might be thought desirable. All that was necessary for this 
purpose was for the senate to omit the Asiatic provinces 
each year from the list of those to be assigned by lot and to 
prolong the imperium of their general. When, however, 
the people wished to send Pompey to supersede Lucullus, 
they could only do so by passing the Manilian law. Such a 
law, although perfectly constitutional, was unusual and was 
thus open to criticism; moreover, it attracted much more 
attention, both then and since, than did the annual assign- 
ment of the provinces by the senate. It is this that has 
given rise to the impression that it was the people who 
were responsible for the development of the great command. 
In fact the Manilian law did not create such a command, for 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 229 

it already existed ; all that it did was to transfer the com- 
mand from one general to another. The only question 
between the parties was not how the war should be carried 
on, but simply who should have charge of it. 

That the great command involved a possible peril to the 
commonwealth was obvious enough to Roman eyes ; it had 
been often found that it met one emergency by creating an- 
other. The general who won an important war was almost 
as serious a problem to the state as the enemy whom he had 
defeated. Yet though the Romans were alive to the 
dangers of the great command, no Roman regarded it as 
an institution which was in any way inconsistent with the 
existence of the republic. Such commands had been re- 
peatedly created without any very serious result. In the 
days of Cicero, Pompey had held one of vast extent, and yet, 
if men were to believe the most eloquent of republican ora- 
tors, the republic had continued to flourish. 

If the Romans admitted the need of a strong army, the 
only method of controlling it was by creating a new great 
command. No party had any alternative to propose, since 
it was plainly impossible for the legions to be distributed 
equally among the provinces, as circumstances required 
their concentration along the frontiers. The only point 
that was open for discussion was whether there should be 
several great commands or only one. On this matter it was 
hardly possible for Romans to hesitate a moment; exper- 
ience, dearly bought by two long civil wars, had shown the 
probable result of several simultaneous commands. All 
men were ready to concede at once that, if a large standing 
army must be maintained, the army as a whole should re- 
main subject to the imperium of Octavian. What public 
opinion demanded was not that he should lay down his 
command, but that he should exercise it in accordance with 
the old republican forms. 

To the Roman the republic without the senate was un- 
thinkable, and unless the senate included among its mem- 
bers the great noble families of Rome, it could not claim 
his veneration or respect. But membership in the senate 
had always been closely connected with the magistracies of 



230 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the republic, and so a revival of the republic, if it were to 
have enough reality to be deceptive, must entail a return ro 
power — in some degree at least — of the aristocracy. On 
this point there was little room for hypocrisy; Augustus 
could not persuade the Roman world that the republic ex- 
isted at all unless what survived of the republican nobility 
took a large apparent part in the government. It was nec- 
essary for him to associate the senate with himself, at least 
in name, and to allow the old families to hold many of the 
high positions in the state. In the last analysis his sov- 
ereignty might rest upon the swords of his legions, but only 
if he gave it such a form as this would the world accept it 
willingly. 

If a reconciliation with the aristocracy was thus imposed 
upon Augustus, recent events had gone far to make it pos- 
sible. It was, indeed, much easier for him than it had been 
for Caesar. In the case of the latter the defeat of the nobles 
had been too recent for them to forgive the victor, and it 
was still possible for them to dream that the yoke of the 
army could be shaken off and that the senate could again 
grasp the supreme control. What followed Caesar's death 
had proved this to be impossible, and the greater part of the 
generation that had known the days of freedom had 
perished. The great families which had survived the 
proscription and the civil wars were broken and impover- 
ished, and were ready now to accept with gratitude a system 
which restored them, at least outwardly, to their former 
splendor. 

Circumstances and the weight of public opinion, there- 
fore, clearly imposed upon Augustus the general form his 
settlement must take. He was to be commander of the 
Roman army, but the senate was to be a partner in the 
government and the nobility was to be given a prominent 
place in the state. It only remained to work out the details 
by which this general result could be most readily attained. 
Here Augustus was very careful to follow republican prec- 
edents in all particulars where this was possible, and so to 
make his government seem as familiar as might be to the 
Roman. The principate was intended to appear in all 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 231 

respects a continuation of the old republic and not in any- 
way a new constitution. According to the usage of the 
past, if Augustus was to be the head of the army he should 
be given the governorship of the provinces where that army 
was stationed ; this was the case because the Romans made 
no distinction between the civil and the military functions. 
It seemed, therefore, entirely natural when a law was passed 
by the assembly conferring on Augustus the proconsular 
imperium for ten years over the principal frontier provinces 
of the empire. The position thus created for him was not 
materially different from that held by Pompey under the 
Manilian law. 4 It is true that the army given to Augustus 
was larger, but since the military power intrusted to Pompey 
had been practically irresistible, this could hardly seem im- 
portant. It is also true that so many provinces had never 
before been subject to one man, but the provinces counted 
for little except for the legions stationed there. A Roman 
might, therefore, regard the position of Augustus as sub- 
stantially the same as that of the republican leader in the 
civil war. 

There were many obvious differences in detail in the two 
cases, but they would hardly strike a contemporary as of 
vital significance. This is the more likely since in most 
cases this significance lay chiefly in the future, which the 
contemporaries of Augustus, unlike the historian, did not 
know. They were bound to judge by their own past ex- 
perience and this alone; and judging thus, the changes can- 
not have seemed of much importance. For example, the 
provinces assigned to Augustus were widely separated, and 
instead of residing in them, he found it convenient to remain 
in Rome and from this point to carry on their administration 
by means of deputies. This could hardly be called an innova- 
tion, since Pompey had governed Spain from Italy with the 



4 Meyer is right in saying that Augustus was rather the heir of Pompey than of 
Julius Caesar (Caesars Monarchic 548). It might be questioned, however, whether 
he has not attributed too definite a design and too clear a purpose to Pompey. 
If he had been successful, the position of Pompey in the Roman world would have 
been very similar to that afterwards held by Augustus. This does not mean 
necessarily that Pompey had any notior, of what he was seeking to gain or of the 
inevitable consequences of his acts. 



232 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

sanction of the senate. But if this were to be done it must 
have seemed childish in the extreme to try to prevent Augus- 
tus from coming within the city limits, as Pompey had been 
prevented. It would surely be absurd for the senate to 
meet in the suburbs every time Augustus wished to attend 
the session, and no one could reasonably object to permitting 
him to come within the city while retaining the imperium. 

Serious discussion only became possible when it came to 
determine the precise relations that should exist between the 
princeps, as the holder of the new great command came to 
be called, and the restored republic of which he was to be 
nominally one of the magistrates. If it had been possible 
for the two to work independently of each other, it would 
have simplified the matter very greatly, but this was out of 
the question. If their functions could have been clearly 
separated, the princeps might have administered his prov- 
inces, while the republican magistrates and promagistrates 
under the advice and direction of the senate governed the 
remainder of the Roman world according to the old repub- 
lican tradition. In actual fact the princeps found himself 
so vitally concerned in the working of the republic beside 
him that he was inevitably driven to seek to direct and con- 
trol it. In the first place he derived his own authority from 
the senate and the people, and what they gave they could 
take back again. Then too, like all other Roman generals, 
he was forced to promise rewards to his soldiers, and to 
secure the redemption of his pledges he was compelled to 
interfere in politics. Moreover, many of his acts required 
formal sanction from the senate and assembly, and might, 
in theory, be reversed or modified by them. Perhaps the 
most important point of all, however, was the fact that he 
drew many of his officers from the ranks of the republican 
nobility, which necessarily gave him a keen interest in the 
results of the elections ; if he wished one of his deputies to 
have consular rank, he must see to it that the man in question 
was duly elected consul. In a word, the princeps was so 
closely concerned in the working of the republican machine 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 233 

that he could not permit it to work freely, but was obliged 
to some extent to direct and control it. 

The Romans had already had abundant experience of the 
fact that the holder of a great command could not remain 
a mere spectator in politics. Pompey was certainly no 
politician, yet he had never been able to let politics alone, 
not because of any personal desire to meddle, but because of 
his position. While he was engaged in the war with Mith- 
ridates Pompey had been forced to keep an eye on Rome, 
because measures were constantly brought forward there 
which were certain to affect him. He had been obliged to 
seek for some convenient weapon with which to ward off 
the blows aimed at him by his enemies ; this he found in the 
tribunate. If he could secure the election of one or more 
of his trusted agents to this office, they could protect his in- 
terests by the use of their veto. Such tribunes could also 
be employed to bring forward any new proposals which he 
might desire to have made. This connection between the 
general invested with a great command and the tribunes 
had been carried even further by Caesar during his term as 
proconsul of the Gauls, and it must have been an association 
very familiar by that time to Roman minds. 

That past experience had shown the necessity for some 
connection between the princeps and the machinery of the 
republican government could neither be denied nor over- 
looked. This connection could be established in two ways. 
Indirectly it could be obtained by allowing the princeps to 
select some of the regular magistrates and use them as his 
agents, as had been the method of Pompey. The other way 
of accomplishing the same result was to allow the princeps 
to act in person rather than by deputy, since he intended to 
reside in Rome the greater part of the time. For this pur- 
pose Augustus could be given one of the regular offices of the 
republic, or the special powers which he wished to have 
could be conferred upon him without his holding such an 
office. Both methods were at first resorted to. In view 
of the recent precedents of Pompey and of Caesar it was 
natural that men should think of the tribunate for this pur- 
pose. Since Augustus was a patrician (by adoption though 



234 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

not by birth) he could not hold this office directly, and hence 
he had the tribunician power, detached from the office, con- 
ferred upon him. This can hardly have struck the Romans 
as a very important innovation ; it must have seemed little 
more than a means of allowing Augustus to do in person, 
what preceding holders of a great command had been in 
the habit of doing by deputy. 

The conditions of the case required more than this, how- 
ever. In order to control the republic more easily, es- 
pecially in the first days of its restoration, Augustus had 
himself elected one of the consuls every year. He was thus 
at the same time the holder of a great command (his pro- 
consular imperium), was invested with the tribunician 
power, and was one of the two chief regular magistrates. 
This, in brief, was what may be called the first draft of the 
imperial constitution ; but to all the Romans of that day it 
seemed a first partial and imperfect restoration of the old 
regime. 

Augustus soon found that the arrangement he had made 
was unsatisfactory. The stricter republicans still held 
aloof and insisted that the republic was not yet restored, and 
that they could take no part in public affairs. It is of in- 
terest to note the precise point of their attack. They felt 
that while a single man thus held the consulship year after 
year, the state of affairs was little better than a tyranny, 
and that under these circumstances all talk of a restoration 
of the republic was a mockery. In addition to such opposi- 
tion as this, Augustus had doubtless become conscious of 
several less apparent objections to the practice. If he held 
the consulship, a large amount of routine business would 
necessarily devolve upon him. His health was feeble, and 
he may very well have regarded this as a serious waste of 
the time and energy which were sorely needed elsewhere. 
Another inconvenience lay in the fact that if he held the 
consulship each year, he would be forced to deny to many 
men a distinction which they had come to claim almost as a 
right, and would thus give bitter offense to those old families 
that survived and to the public that had come to look upon 
them with a sentimental affection. Partly to rid himself 



THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 235 

of a troublesome burden, and probably even more to con- 
ciliate the republicans, Augustus in 23 B.C. suddenly laid 
down the consulship and refused to hold it any longer. 
This concession won over to his side the last of the obstinate 
upholders of the past, and their chief leaders accepted office 
under the new regime. With this event the reconciliation 
of the republic and the principate might well have seemed 
to be final and complete. 

But when Augustus laid down the consulship and so di- 
vested himself of any of the regular magistracies, the need 
for some close connection between the princeps and the re- 
public still existed and even acquired an added force. This 
difficulty was promptly solved in a new fashion. Augustus 
began to lay greater stress upon the tribunician power 
than he had hitherto done, but something more than this was 
necessary. Accordingly he had certain of the consular 
powers which he desired to retain conferred upon him by 
special laws. These accorded him the right to summon 
the senate and to bring matters before that body. He could 
do both these things by virtue of the tribunician power, but 
only subject to annoying restrictions. If he convened the 
senate in this way the summons of the consuls had preced- 
ence over his, and when the senate met, it was the consuls 
who presided and controlled the order of business. This 
would offer ample opportunities for vexatious obstruction 
and delay, which the powers now conferred upon Augustus 
would remove. Another special law gave him the right to 
preside over the elections ; this would furnish him a chance 
to influence their results without too great a break with the 
traditional forms. He was furthermore permitted to re- 
tain his imperium even within the city of Rome. When he 
renounced the consulship he could not otherwise have en- 
tered the city without forfeiting the imperium, and must 
have spent his time in the suburbs and country villas round 
about as Pompey had formerly been obliged to do. 5 These 



5 It has usually been held that at this time the imperium of Augustus was declared 
maius and extended to include the senatorial provinces. McFayden in an able article 
in Classical Philology for January, 1921, has shown — conclusively as it seems to the 
present writer — that this is a mistake. If Augustus received any right to interfere 
in the senatorial provinces, he made practically no use of it, and such control as he 
had over them he obtained in other and less direct ways. 



236 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

changes involved no actual change in the position of af- 
fairs, since while he held the consulship he had possessed all 
these powers by reason of his office. All that was done 
was to permit him to lay down that office and yet retain 
some of its rights and privileges which seemed more or less 
necessary to secure the smooth and convenient transaction 
of the public business. No alarm seems to have been felt 
at these extensions of his power, or rather at these reserva- 
tions on his surrender of the consulship. The popular 
clamor was in quite the opposite direction. The fear of 
anarchy was still strong, and men were disposed to quarrel 
with the princeps because he took so little, rather than be- 
cause he asked too much. Confident that what he had 
gained was ample for his purpose, he steadfastly refused 
the still more sweeping powers that were offered him. 

With the changes made in 22 B.C. the principate was 
given its final form in point of legal theory. Throughout 
the early empire this theory was destined to undergo scarcely 
any alteration. It is true that the actual working of the 
government was speedily and radically transformed, but for 
this Augustus was by no means wholly responsible. The 
pressure of circumstances and the necessities of the ad- 
ministration were forces which no one man's will was able 
to control; after a brief vision of a restored republic, the 
drift toward monarchy overwhelmed the constitution. 
Even in his lifetime the principate had been profoundly 
modified in point of fact, and when Augustus died he had 
come to be, not the first citizen of a republic, but an em- 
peror in the modern sense. This transformation was 
brought about by causes far deeper than his personal voli- 
tion. In the main it was not his fault that the republic 
that he had restored failed to maintain itself. Its vital 
weaknesses were not those that any single man could remedy, 
and it was far less the conscious choice of Augustus than the 
irresistible pressure of imperial necessities that led to the 
development of the principate in the direction of a despotism. 



CHAPTER IX 
The Transformation of the Principate 

The settlement toward which Augustus had been feeling 
his way ever since the battle of Actium may be regarded as 
complete in 22 B.C. In that year a sort of partnership, 
sometimes called a dyarchy, had been arranged between the 
republic (officially restored in 27) and the princeps, as 
Augustus now began to be styled. In theory there was no 
suggestion of a monarchy or of a monarch; the emperor 1 
was simply a general of the republic to whom certain ex- 
ceptional powers had been intrusted for a term of years. 
Although no formal change was ever made in this legal 
theory, yet before his death Augustus had come to be an 
emperor in the modern sense and the absolute ruler of the 
entire Roman world. The purpose of the present chapter 
is to call attention to some hitherto neglected causes for 
this striking transformation. 

Although in point of law a general of the republic, the 
powers conferred upon the princeps were so sweeping as to 
make him a partner of the senate rather than a subordinate 
officer in the government. To his sole control had been 
committed a number of provinces, and over these he ruled 
supreme by virtue of a formal law of the Roman people. 
These provinces embraced the greater part of Spain and all 
of Gaul in the West, while in the East they included Syria, 
Cilicia, Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Egypt. Great as were the 
powers thus given, the charge of these regions involved yet 
other responsibilities. The provinces of the princeps had 
been so selected that they carried with them the control of 
the army and of the foreign policy of the empire. The great 
majority of the Roman legions were stationed in his 
provinces and by his proconsular imperium Augustus had 
sole command of them. It is true that the governors of the 



lEverything that could suggest monarchy to the Roman was carefully avoided by 
Augustus. The title imperator, from which our word emperor is derived, was one 
bestowed on any victorious general of the republic. 



238 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

senatorial provinces enjoyed an imperium which was legally- 
independent of the princeps, but they seldom found them- 
selves possessed of a sufficient number of troops for military 
operations except upon a very petty scale. The proconsuls 
of Africa alone were an exception, since they sometimes 
had to undertake campaigns of some importance against the 
tribes of that region, and if victorious they were allowed 
the honor of a triumph. This in itself is evidence that they 
commanded the forces stationed there, not as officers of the 
princeps, but by a commission direct from the state and 
independent of him. Their armies were too small, how- 
ever, to make them a serious factor in the situation; it 
was to the emperor that nearly the entire army looked up 
as its commanding general. It is, therefore, correct to 
characterize Augustus as the war-lord of the Roman stand- 
ing army. 2 It should be borne in mind, however, that he 
held this position indirectly and by virtue of the particular 
provinces subject to his proconsular imperium. With these 
provinces there went also the control of foreign policy. The 
relations of Rome with other states were largely in the 
hands of the governors of the frontier provinces. Whether 
there was war or peace with Parthia would be determined, 
at least in so far as it rested with Rome to decide the matter, 
by the course pursued by the governor of Syria who was 
now the deputy of Augustus, removable at his pleasure, and 
bound to carry out his orders. 

Yet, though a large extent of territory and powers of 
great importance were thus committed to the sole charge 
of the new commander-in-chief, he did not by any means 
control the entire Roman world; the republic stood by his 
side and retained the management of all the older and more 
settled provinces. To govern these the old machinery was 
resorted to without change except that Pompey's law, fix- 
ing a five year interval between the magistracy and pro- 
magistracy, was now enforced, and that Caesar's practice 
of allowing the proconsul to remain for two years in his pro- 
vince was likewise observed. By the division of 27 B.C. 

'Gardthausen, vol. ii, pt. 1, 522. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 239 

ten provinces had been reserved as senatorial, and this was 
almost as large a number as the republic could provide with 
governors. In 22 B.C., when the final settlement was made, 
two other provinces, Narbonensis and Cyprus, were ceded to 
the senate by the princeps and at about the same time the 
number of the praetors was increased by two. 3 Approx- 
imately half the empire was thus subject to the conscript 
fathers, at least in theory, and the responsibility was, per- 
haps, as great as they could undertake. 

The policy which Augustus followed in his portion of the 
Roman world was in the main a peaceful one. At first sight 
it seems almost paradoxical that Rome should have ceased 
to be a conquering power as soon as she was really organized 
for war. Without a genuine standing army she had won the 
world, yet now, with a permanent war-lord, the legions 
halted and stood still. The paradox, though striking, is not 
difficult of explanation. Many of the motives which have 
led modern states to adopt a policy of expansion were of 
little weight in the empire of Augustus. The world he 
governed was not overpopulated and stood in no need of new 
territories for purposes of colonization. It was not indus- 
trial, at least in any modern sense, and had no need to seek 
new sources of raw materials or new markets for its goods. 
Even if these needs made themselves felt, the system of land 
transportation was so clumsy that markets were of little use 
to the manufacturer unless they could be reached by sea, and 
all the markets of this kind Rome already held. Such sur- 
plus capital as was available could find an ample field for 
profitable investment in the newly annexed regions of Gaul 
or in the older provinces. Thus none of the causes which 
have led to the imperialism of our days exerted much in- 
fluence in Rome. In the last years of the republic there had 
been little desire for expansion on the part of the Roman 
government; the chief conquests had been made by the 
over-great proconsuls whom the senate was unable to con- 
trol. Caesar and Pompey had extended the empire, but both 



3 Making ten in all. The two new praetors were the praetores aerarii added in 
23 B.C. With the five year interval there were doubtless some ex-magistrates who 
could not take provinces. 



240 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

had consulted their own will and pleasure rather than the 
wishes of the conscript fathers. The possibility of such 
aggressive wars as they had waged was now abolished. 
The princeps who was now in control of the frontiers had 
no intention of permitting his officers to act in any way 
contrary to his policy. That policy was essentially the 
same as that of the senate, but with the vital difference that 
Augustus could enforce his wishes and the senate could not. 
In addition to lacking most of the modern motives for 
expansion, the emperor had strong reasons of his own for 
desiring to keep the peace as far as possible. By tempera- 
ment and natural ability a statesman and administrator 
rather than a soldier, Augustus felt little inclination for 
military adventure. New conquests would require large 
armies, and he hesitated to intrust too great a power to any 
man whose loyalty was not above suspicion; generals on 
whom he cared to rely were none too common in his service. 
Moreover, war would entail heavy expenses. In the past 
when Roman arms had been directed against civilized or 
semi-civilized peoples the plunder had not infrequently been 
more than sufficient to defray the cost. Now, however, 
there were upon the frontiers only rude and barbarous 
tribes from whom such profits could not be expected. There 
was but one quarter where a successful campaign might be 
remunerative and that was in the East. The conquest of 
Parthia might have yielded a large amount of treasure, but 
experience had shown the Romans that this would prove a 
difficult and perilous venture. If Augustus undertook it, 
he must either lead his armies in person or intrust them to 
a deputy. If he assumed the active command, defeat might 
easily cost him his throne; if he sent one of his generals, 
failure would diminish his prestige and glory, while success 
would inevitably create a most embarrassing situation. The 
conqueror of Parthia would be a dangerous subject and 
might readily become a rival. It was natural that the 
princeps should avoid an enterprise where success or failure 
seemed almost equally damaging to his position and should 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 241 

prefer, if possible, to keep the peace upon the eastern 
frontier. 

Even if Augustus put aside dreams of conquest, he still 
had work enough before him to task his energies. Spain 
had never been completely conquered, and the turbulent and 
restless tribes there gave constant trouble. In Gaul the 
work of organization was still far from finished; Caesar 
had begun the task of setting up a systematic administra- 
tion, but the civil war had interrupted him. To the settle- 
ment of the West Augustus turned his attention as soon 
as he had restored order in the East. In this he found a 
vast and necessary task, and one entirely adapted to his 
temper and abilities. Hardly had he officially restored the 
republic in 27 B.C. than he set out for Gaul and Spain, leav- 
ing his colleagues in the consulship to manage affairs in 
Rome during his absence. He did not return to the city till 
the end of 24, after having completed the provincial organ- 
ization of Gaul and quieted Spain, where serious fighting 
was found necessary. 

Experience may have convinced Augustus that his first 
arrangement of the constitution was unsatisfactory, for he 
employed his sojourn in the city to revise the settlement of 
27 B.C. and make the changes in the principate that have al- 
ready been discussed. After giving to his government what 
was destined to be its final form, he turned his attention 
once more to the East. In 21 he left Rome and remained 
away about two years, during which time his trusted 
general Agrippa represented him in the capital. After the 
princeps returned to Italy in 18 he had his proconsular 
powers renewed for five years and in 16 set out again for 
Gaul, where he remained for the next three years. 

The work of organizing and pacifying the West had been 
fairly well completed by 16 B.C., so that the princeps could 
devote his attention to another phase of the problem com- 
mitted to his care. The northern frontier of the empire 
was in a most unsatisfactory condition; everywhere it 
bordered on turbulent and warlike tribes and for much of 
its length it rested on no natural barriers. If peace and 
security were to be obtained for the Roman world, this 



242 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

boundary must be rounded out and rendered easy of de- 
fense. From Macedonia to Gaul Rome held only a thin strip 
along the shores of the Adriatic, and from the mountain 
fastnesses of the interior the barbarians swept down in 
constant raids upon the settled districts. If any sort of 
durable peace was to be established here the Romans must 
either withdraw from the coast or push their conquest in- 
land to some natural frontier. The first really defensible 
line that they could reach, if they chose the latter course, 
would be the Danube. In Gaul, too, there were frontier 
difficulties. Caesar had carried his conquests to the Rhine, 
but the Germans on the other side of that river gave con- 
tinual trouble, and the best method of dealing with them 
was still an open question. In both these regions Augustus 
decided to consolidate the Roman possessions by an advance. 
The Germans were to be conquered and Gaul protected from 
their raids by pushing the frontier to the Elbe, while farther 
East, by the addition of Pannonia and Moesia, the boundary 
was to be brought forward to the Danube. These lines 
would be much easier to defend than the old ones. The 
wars which this rounding out of the frontiers would entail 
might have a political as well as a military value to the 
princeps. His office was in theory a temporary one, and it 
might be a matter of shrewd policy to silence all objection 
to its continuance. The commander-in-chief could hardly 
be dispensed with in the midst of war, and an aggressive 
policy on the frontiers might make the renewal of his powers 
seem more necessary and less open to dispute by the stern 
republicans. This is suggested, at least, by the fact that in 
18 B.C. Augustus had had his imperium prolonged for only 
half the original term and when this time expired had taken 
it again for but five years. As soon, however, as the new 
policy was inaugurated on the frontiers he reverted to the 
earlier precedent and in 8 B.C. had his powers renewed for 
ten years as at first. 

While he was thus occupied with the organization of his 
provinces and the rectification of the frontier, Augustus ex- 
ercised his proconsular imperium largely through his own 
immediate family circle. At the start he shared his burden 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 243 

with his general Agrippa. In 23 B.C. he dispatched this 
trusted officer to Syria and gave him charge of all — or most 
— of the eastern part of the empire. When he himself un- 
dertook a journey to the East he recalled the general to 
Rome and put him in charge there during his own absence. 
Upon the return of Augustus to the city, Agrippa, after sup- 
pressing a revolt in Spain, went back to Syria in 17 and re- 
mained in charge there until 13 B.C. In the early years of 
the principate Augustus and his ablest lieutenant thus di- 
vided the responsibility for the management of the imperial 
provinces between them. The fidelity of a general so trusted 
was naturally a matter of concern to the emperor. To make 
doubly sure of his loyalty, Augustus sought to bind him as 
closely as possible to the imperial family, and with this end 
in view a marriage was arranged between Agrippa and the 
only child of the emperor, his daughter Julia. Augustus 
then conferred upon his general powers second only to his 
own and recognized him as his heir and probable successor. 

For such other officers as he needed to administer his 
provinces and lead his armies Augustus made but sparing 
use of the old nobility. Among his officers whose names 
are preserved the majority — previous to 16 B.C. — were men 
whose rank had been acquired since the civil wars. During 
this time the higher republican aristocracy played only an 
insignificant role in the imperial provinces. 4 

Augustus made use of his sojourn in Gaul from 16 to 13 
B.C. to inaugurate his new policy on the frontiers. Several 
incidents combined to furnish an excuse for the change. On 



4 A list of the known officers of Augustus from 30 to 16 B.C. may be of interest. For 
further details concerning some of these see the tables in the Appendix. 
T. Statilius Taurus (cos. 37 and 26), Dalmatia 33-28. A new man. 
Sex. Appuleius (cos. 29), Spain before 26. On his father's side of no distinction, 

but on his mother's a nephew of Augustus. 
C. Antistius Vetus (cos. 30), Spain 26. A member of a praetorian family. 
C. Furnius (cos. 17), Spain 22. His father was given consular rank by Augustus. 
M. Vinicius (cos. 19), Germany 25. The son of a knight. 
P. Silius Nerva (cos. 20), Spain after 25. A member of a praetorian family. 
M. Lollius (cos. 21), Germany 16 and in Thrace before. A new man. 
T Carisius — never consul — Spain 25-22. A new man. 
L. Aemilius Paullus Lepidus (cos. 34), Spain 24. Noble. 
M. Licinius Crassus (cos. 30), Macedonia 29. Noble. 
M. Tullius Cicero (cos. 30), Syria 27. Noble. 
M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus (cos. 31), Gaul before 27. Noble. 



244 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

the Rhine the legate of the emperor, M. Lollius, had been 
defeated by the Germans and at about the same time the 
tribes of Noricum and Pannonia had made an attack on 
Istria. The senatorial governor of Illyricum, P. Silius, met 
the incursion of the barbarians successfully and Marquardt 
is probably right in supposing that the conquest of Noricum 
was the direct outcome of the raid and its repulse. 5 The 
situation on the frontier was, perhaps, dangerous, and could 
in any case furnish an excuse for a more vigorous policy in 
dealing with the barbarian neighbors to the north. Under 
these circumstances Augustus set out for Gaul, taking with 
him his two stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus. It was the 
intention of the emperor to give the two young princes a 
trial, and if they displayed capacity, to place the solution 
of the frontier difficulties in their hands. In Gaul he could 
easily keep a close watch upon the course of events. His 
stepsons were first employed in the minor task of subjugat- 
ing the mountainous region known as Rhaetia. In this 
they were successful and demonstrated their fitness for com- 
mand. More serious responsibilities were at once laid upon 
them, and they were placed at the head of the aggressive 
defensive on which Augustus had resolved. When the em- 
peror returned to Rome in 13 B.C. he left Drusus to carry on 
the campaign against the Germans, while Tiberius took 
charge in Illyricum and undertook the definite conquest of 
Pannonia. Thus when Augustus set about the task of se- 
curing natural frontiers for the empire he was able to place 
the active management of his share of the Roman world very 
largely in the hands of his immediate relatives. Agrippa, 
his son-in-law, controlled Syria and the East and his two 
stepsons had charge of almost the whole northern frontier. 
Up to 13 B.C. he had made little use of the higher republican 
nobility. As if by way of compensation the latter had been 
permitted to control the republic and the portion of the 
empire assigned to the senate. 

While the princeps was occupied in the ways that have 
been indicated the restored republic was functioning in 



5 Marquardt, Romische Staatsverwaltung, i, 290. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 245 

Rome. A brief examination of such scanty facts as have 
been preserved will serve to show that during this time the 
restoration had considerable reality and that the republican V 
machine was working with some degree of freedom. It is true 
that by the settlement of 22 B.C. the princeps had acquired 
— or retained — powers which gave him a very important 
opportunity for interference. He had the right to summon 
the senate and to preside at the elections, and his tribunician 
power gave him a sweeping veto which he could employ to 
check at once any policy that might seem dangerous to his 
position in the state. Of these powers the right to preside 
over the elections carried with it a vast indirect influence, 
since by the Roman system the magistrate who presided at 
the polling had the duty of determining the eligibility of the 
candidates. 6 Such a power placed the career of every 
politician more or less at his mercy and so gave him a potent 
means of influencing their conduct. He could in addition to 
this recommend to the people any candidate in whose suc- 
cess he felt an especial interest, and such an indication of 
his will was always followed by the voters. Yet there seems 
no reason to think that Augustus availed himself of these 
powers to interfere with the freedom of the republic more 
than was strictly necessary. Political life certainly revived 
in Rome and ran a sometimes turbulent course. In 21, while 
the princeps was absent, the consular elections were so hotly 
disputed that disorders broke out in the city. 7 It was this ' 
that led Augustus to send Agrippa to Rome to act as his 
representative there during his sojourn in the East. In 
spite of this, when in 19 the emperor returned from Asia, 
he was met by news of further troubles at the consular 
elections, and deputies waited on him in Greece to ask him 
to settle the dispute. 8 These recurrent difficulties led him 



6 That the presiding magistrate had such a power and responsibility has been gen- 
erally held. Willems argues in favor of some restriction of this right, but his view 
would hardly touch the point here involved. That such a right was recognized under 
the empire is shown by the conduct of Sentius Saturninus in 19 B.C. as reported by 
Velleius, ii, 92. See Willems, Le Droit public romain, 221 and Destarac, La Brigua 
electorate a Rome, 25-32. 

7 Dio, liv, 6. 

8 Dio, liv, 10. 



246 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

in the next year to enact a new law against the bribery of 
voters, and another law to the same effect was found neces- 
sary in 8 B.C. 

The impression given by these disorders and the resulting 
legislation is confirmed by an examination of the consular 
fasti for the period. These fasti are simply tables of the 
consuls for each year. As the Romans commonly indicated 
the year by the names of the consuls it was of great im- 
portance to preserve such lists, and it is still possible to 
reconstruct them in a practically complete form. A study 
of them in the reign of Augustus reveals several very sug- 
gestive facts. As has been pointed out, one of the insistent 
demands of the public opinion which the restoration of the 
republic was designed to satisfy had been for a return to 
aristocratic government. The significance of this needs to 
be clearly understood. The aristocracy under the later 
republic was essentially a nobility of office. Every man 
who attained a curule office became by virtue of that fact a 
noble himself and ennobled his descendants after him. The 
precise rank of the family depended upon the dignity of the 
office he had held ; among the nobles there were thus consular 
and praetorian families. Such rank was not hereditary in 
point of law, but popular sentiment and the strong class 
spirit of the aristocracy combined to make it so in fact. 
From this it came about that a member of one of the noble 
houses felt himself entitled to hold in his turn the magis- 
tracies which his ancestors had held and in this claim the 
Roman voter acquiesced entirely. The natural consequence 
was the formation of a ring of noble families who practically 
monopolized the offices in the last century of the republic. 
It was only very rarely and under special circumstances 
that a new man could force his way to the consulship. The 
praetorship was somewhat more open to talent apart from 
birth, but the consulship was almost wholly confined to the 
aristocracy. The civil war and the second triumvirate had 
\7 rudely shattered the monopoly of the noble families, but with 
N;he restoration of the republic, combined with the popular 
reaction in their favor, they were bound to come to office. 
Men were wearied of seeing upstarts receive the highest 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 247 

dignities and longed to bestow the honors of the state on 
such of the old families as had survived the storm. Augus- 
tus, safely intrenched in his own provinces, had little need 
to quarrel with this feeling even if he did not share it. He 
could well afford to let the nobles dominate the republic and 
administer the senatorial provinces while he concerned him- 
self with his own special problems. 

An examination of the fasti for the purpose of estimating 
the position of the nobles is unfortunately attended with 
some difficulty. The Roman system of family names was 
so uncertain and irregular that in some cases a son did not 
bear the same family name as his father; thus Pompeius 
Magnus was the son of Pompeius Strabo and Asinius Gallus 
of Asinius Pollio. Moreover, the gentile name was often 
borne by several unconnected families. In addition to this, 
while the fasti usually indicate the given name of the father 
and often of the grandfather, the storm and stress of the 
civil war and the proscription make such a break that it is 
not always possible to pick up the links. Yet enough can 
be gathered to show the general character of the govern- 
ment sufficiently. 

The administration of the triumvirate had exhibited a 
marked preference for new men in the consulship. Even 
counting as a noble every man who bore a gentile name 
that had appeared in the fasti for two hundred years before 
Actium, the new men formed a majority. 9 It was not until 
after the victory over Antony that Augustus turned de- 
cidedly to the old nobility. The proscription had shattered 
the aristocracy, and the old families were doubtless as a 
whole too deeply injured and too profoundly alienated for 
the triumvirs to trust them. Here and there a noble who 
had adhered to their side or had made his peace with them 
was advanced, but in the main they relied on men of undis- 
tinguished birth. When, however, Augustus sought to 



s 0f the 45 men who held the consulship after Octavian marched on Rome only 12 
were certainly nobles ; of the rest 24 were certainly new men and the remaining 9 
were doubtful. These 9 bore gentile names that had occurred in the fasti in the last 
200 years, but their family names were new to the highest office. Some of them may 
have been members of old families under a new name, but it seems unlikely that they 
vere all so connected. 



X 



248 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

establish a permanent and stable regime he found so marked 
a reaction in favor of the fallen nobility that he at once at- 
tempted to come to an understanding with them. This 
policy was doubtless congenial to his temperament and in 
accord with his convictions, but it was attended with some 
difficulty and he reached his goal only gradually. 

In the years from 30 to 23 B.C. the aristocratic names be- 
come more frequent in the fasti. During these eight years 
Augustus himself held the consulship each year and as- 
sociated with him in the office thirteen other men. Of these, 
seven were members of noble families or had been prominent 
among the republicans, five were officers of Augustus or 
sons of officers of the triumvirs, and one may have been a 
new man, but may also have been a son of a senator men- 
tioned by Sallust and a member of the lower ranks of the 
old nobility. When the emperor laid down the consulship 
in 23 he named two prominent republicans to the office, and 
this event may be taken as indicating that the reconciliation 
was now complete. 

In 22 B.C. the restored republic began to function with com- 
parative freedom and the nobility took prompt possession. 
From 22 to 13 B.C. a period of ten years elapsed, and during 
this time some twenty-one persons held the office. Of these, 
seven were certainly members of consular families, 10 while 
the names of five others suggest a connection with the old 
houses, although their exact relationship remains uncertain. 
Of the rest, two were members of families of praetorian 
rank and three were adherents of the republican party who 
had been proscribed by the triumvirs. The imperial family 
furnished two consuls, of whom one, Tiberius, was also by 
birth a member of an old aristocratic house. Among the 
consuls for this period there were but three who seem to be 
new men, and they were all soldiers who had served under 
Augustus and whose promotion to the highest honor was 
probably a reward for such service. It will thus be seen 



10 One was a son of a supporter of Antony to whom Augustus gave the consular 
rank without the actual consulship. This man was C. Furnius, and he had served 
Augustus as legate in Spain in 22. He was consul in 17 B.C. For details see the 
tables in the Appendix. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 249 

that the old nobility was distinctly predominant. Of the 
twenty-two consuls thirteen belonged to families of consular 
rank, either certainly or probably, while three others had 
been so identified with the aristocratic party and had suf- 
fered so greatly for the cause that it may reasonably be con- 
jectured that the nobles regarded them as members of their 
class. Of the remaining six consuls, half were men pro- 
moted from the lower ranks of the senatorial aristocracy. 
Some such result as this is precisely what might be expected 
if the princeps allowed the republican institutions to work 
freely. The effects of the proscription and the years of 
furious civil strife would amply account for the promotions 
and uncertainties that actually occur. 

While thus the restored republic was functioning with 
comparatively little interference from the princeps, the 
latter was carrying on his own department of the state 
with the help of his immediate family, as has been shown. 
Under these conditions he had no strong motive for meddling 
with affairs in Rome, as long as order was preserved there 
and the regular authorities could carry on the work of the 
government without his help. All that was necessary was 
for him to protect himself against any acts which might 
injuriously affect his own peculiar task and to reward a 
competent officer from time to time, or to give a fitting and 
appropriate rank to some one of whose ability he was 
anxious to make use. These latter needs he probably found 
it easy to provide for in the depleted state of the old aris- 
tocracy ; the known facts give no reason to assume any con- 
tinuous, or even frequent, interference on the part of the a, 
emperor. Moreover, such interference would be clearly to 
his disadvantage. Even if he were simply playing a comedy, 
the part which he had chosen was plainly futile unless it 
were well acted ; there could be little gain in restoring the 
republic if the princeps by his own conduct openly pro- 
claimed it a farce. If Augustus thought it worth while to 
pose as a constitutional magistrate, he must have felt it 
desirable to act the part with care and make the comedy 
succeed. Such facts as are available would seen to show 
that this was actually his course ; he busied himself with the 



250 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

work assigned to him and allowed the nobles to manage 
their republic very much as they pleased. 

Yet the conditions which made it possible for the emperor 
to restore some sort of liberty to Rome were essentially un- 
stable. The Romans were a people of strong aristocratic 
feeling and were little likely to look with favor on men pos- 
sessed of neither birth nor high official standing in im- 
portant posts, even in the imperial service. This mattered 
little while the princeps could conduct his administration 
through his near relatives. If these should fail him, 
Roman sentiment would force him to call in the help of the 
nobility to govern his share of the Roman world, and this 
necessity would give him a far stronger interest in the 
working of the republican government. A time might come 
when the pressing demands of his own administration would 
compel more frequent interference and would oblige him 
to diminish in fact the liberty which he had ostentatiously 
restored. The transformation of the principate into a 
slightly veiled despotism was due to many causes, but among 
^X/ftie most direct, although hitherto almost ignored by his- 
/Horians, was the close dependence of the emperor on the re- 
publican machine. He could not permit it to work freely 
when its working came to affect seriously his own adminis- 
tration. Then he saw himself forced to interfere, and by 
so doing he was bound in the long run to reduce the restored 
republic to a sham. 

The aggressive frontier policy, inaugurated after 16 B.C., 
led directly to such a transformation in the government. 
When the work of consolidating the borders of his empire 
was undertaken by Augustus he could intrust the bulk of it 
to his own family ; in the East his son-in-law was in charge 
of affairs, while in the West his stepsons carried on the wars 
which were the inevitable result of the new policy. At first 
everything went well and the Elbe-Danube frontier was suc- 
cessfully reached, after some hard fighting, indeed, but with- 
out any very formidable obstacles presenting themselves. 
Then fortune seemed to turn against the princeps and the 
situation grew rapidly more difficult. The hand of death 
fell heavily and unexpectedly upon the imperial house, and 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 251 

the management of the republic became steadily less easy 
for the emperor. Both of these factors deserve a brief con- 
sideration. 

In 13 B.C. the family circle of the princeps began to fail 
him. In that year Agrippa left Syria to take command on 
the Danube where revolt was threatening; he was not 
destined to see active service, however, for early in the 
following year he died in Italy. This event compelled the 
emperor to find governors to replace his son-in-law in the 
East, and for them he turned to the senatorial nobility. 
But the death of Agrippa was only the first blow; three 
years later — in 9 B.C. — Drusus, the younger Of his stepsons, 
died in Germany and in 6 B. c. the other, Tiberius, resigned 
his position and retired into voluntary exile at Rhodes. 

This rapid narrowing of his family circle was rendered 
all the more serious by the new responsibilities which 
Augustus had assumed. To furnish a convenient base for 
his aggressive operations on the Danube he had taken over 
the province of Illyricum from the senate, and the very 
success of his campaigns on the frontier had left in his 
hands a vastly increased extent of territory to administer. 
His need of officers was thus greater than ever, while the 
number of his relatives diminished. The consequence of 
this was that he found himself depending on the republican 
aristocracy much more than in the past. At the beginning 
of his reign as princeps, the emperor had but two consular 
provinces (Tarraconensis and Syria) among those assigned 
to him, but by the time of his death three others had been 
added (Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Moesia), and in addition 
to these the command of the army along the German frontier 
usually called for several important generals of consular 
rank. Under these circumstances the retirement of Ti- 
berius, by forcing a sudden increase in the number, brought 
the problem, already becoming serious, to a crisis. Augus- 
tus must now face the situation and devise a method by 
which it could be met. It was this forcing of the issue that 
serves, in part at least, to explain the anger of the emperor 
at the "desertion" of Tiberius. Unable to persuade his 
stepson to renounce his purpose, 'Augustus saw himself 



X 



252 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

obliged to undertake a readjustment of Ms relations with 
the republic and its aristocracy. 

The more extensive employment of the senatorial nobility 
in the imperial service which the changed situation made 
necessary was not without its difficulties. If Augustus 
could have found a way to manage his provinces without 
regard to distinctions of birth or rank he might have per- 
mitted the republic to go on working freely, but this he did 
not do. Probably he shared the general feeling of the 
world in which he lived, or else he thought this sentiment 
too strong to be ignored. At any rate, from whatever mo- 
tive, as his own family failed him the emperor replaced 
them by men taken from the highest rank in the senate. 
To understand the consequences of this policy of the prin- 
ceps, it must be borne in mind constantly that while the 
Roman nobility was essentially one of office, it had acquired 

>,a hereditary character in fact. A man became a noble as 
soon as he held an office of a certain grade of dignity and 
liis descendants after him claimed in their turn, as a matter 
of natural right, to hold the same office; such claims met 
with general support throughout the Roman world. Thus 
every new man elevated to high office might become the 
founder of a new noble house, and his son in due time would 
come forward to demand that he should be advanced to the 
same position that his father had attained. In this way the 
aristocracy, even though badly torn and shattered at the 
beginning of the reign, would soon renew itself and the 
princeps, before many years had passed, would find himself 
surrounded by a group of claimants numerous enough to fill 
all the offices. It would be inevitable that many of these 
nobles should be men who inherited the distinguished rank 
of their ancestors rather than their personal ability, and to 
such men the emperor would be reluctant to intrust his 
armies or his provinces. If he desired to use new men in 
these positions he felt it necessary to give them standing by 
elevating them to the nobility. If the emperor wished the 
chief posts in his service to be held by men of consular rank 
— as in actual fact he did — he found himself compelled to 
take a keener interest in the consular elections. In the first 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 253 

years of the reign he had met with little difficulty since he 
needed but few consulars, and the ranks of the aristocracy 
had been so depleted that he could readily find a place for 
such men as he desired to reward or use. But by the middle 
of his reign the matter became decidedly less simple, and as 
time went on he faced a serious dilemma. The number of 
noble claimants had increased so much that new men could 
be advanced only by the exclusion of a corresponding num- 
ber of nobles. Such an exclusion was certain to be angrily 
resented and Augustus, whether from temperament, or 
policy, or both, was most unwilling to offend the aristocracy. 
Yet, on the other hand, he was equally unwilling to restrict 
his choice of officers solely to the great families of the past. 
It was this problem which the retirement of Tiberius in 6 
B.C. had made acute. 

The increasing dependence of the emperor on the sen- 
atorial nobility is fully attested by such records as have been 
preserved. Unfortunately the lists of the imperial officials 
are incomplete and most of the information that is now 
available has to be gathered from such narrative histories 
of the period as have survived. In these the interest is 
centered on the imperial princes and the court, and the 
provinces are treated only incidentally. Unquestionably 
many of the princeps' officers have failed of record, es- 
pecially when their service was attended by no striking in- 
cidents. But making all due allowance for this, the facts 
which can be gleaned from an examination of the sources 
seem obviously significant. From 22 to 13 B.C. only three 
men of consular rank are mentioned as serving in the im- 
perial provinces ; of the three, two were new men and only 
one was connected with the old nobility. From 12 B.C. to 
3 a.d. the names of nine such consulars are found, 11 who 



u The names of the active consulars in the two periods may be of interest. They 
were as follows : 

From 22 to 13 B.C. 

M. Lollius (cos. 21), Legate in Germany in 16 and in Thrace just before. 
M. Vinicius (cos, 19), in Pannonia 13. 

L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 15), in Pamphylia in 13 and in Thrace 13-11. 
From 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. 

L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, as above. 



254 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

appear upon the scene as the members of the imperial family 
drop out. Thus the death of Agrippa leads — after a short 
gap in the list of governors — to the appointment of six con- 
sulars, one after the other, as legates in Syria ; while on the 
northern frontier Drusus and Tiberius had to be replaced 
a little later. Of the men thus called into the imperial ser- 
vice only three were members of old families of high rank, 
and of these three, but one held a position of the first im- 
portance. 12 It may be worth noting that this one was 
connected with the emperor by marriage. Augustus ev- 
\7 idently preferred to fill the most important posts with men 
/xwhose nobility was recent and who owed their rise to him. 
As the emperor's need for men of high rank thus steadily 
increased, he could no longer look on indifferently at the 
consular elections. He might not care particularly who had 
the honor of presiding over the republic in Rome, but when 
the holding of the consulship became a qualification of his 
officers, that magistracy acquired a new and serious im- 
portance in his eyes. If he were to govern Syria by means 
of consulars, it was essential that the men he wished to send 
out to that province should be successful in the Roman elec- 
tions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the consular 
fasti for this period contain some indications of an increased 



L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16), in Pannonia and Germany, perhaps, 

from 9 on. 
M. Vinicius (cos. 19), in Germany 1 b.C-2 a.d. 
M. Titius (cos. 31), in Syria 9. 
C. Sentius Saturninus (cos. 19), in Syria 8-6. 
P. Quinctilius Varus (cos. 13), in Syria 6-4. 
P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12), in Syria 3-2 and in 2 a.d. 
C. Caesar, in Syria 1 B.c-4 a.d. with 
C. Marcius Censorinus (cos. 8), 
M. Lollius ( cos. 21 ) , and perhaps 
P. Sulpicius Quirinius as counselors. 
It may be noted that C. Caesar seems to have left Syria at the end of 3 A.D. 
12 Domitius seems to have taken over the command on the northern frontier from 
the emperor's stepson. He was married to Antonia Major, the daughter of Augustus' 
sister. The other nobles of old families were L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who con- 
tinued to command in Thrace from the preceding period and Marcius Censorinus in 
Syria. Piso can hardly have had an army at all comparable to that commanded by 
Tiberius in Pannonia at the same time. Censorinus wast only one of the counselors 
of C Caesar. With him were associated M. Lollius and perhaps Sulpicius Quirinius, 
both new men. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 255 

interference by the princeps with the working of the repub- 
lican machinery. 

In the thirteen years preceding Agrippa's death (25-13 
B.C.) there seem to have been but five new men and men 
from praetorian families advanced to the consulship, if three 
men closely identified with the republican party are con- 
sidered nobles. In the thirteen years which followed that 
event there were at least nine such ; 13 not only was the num- 
ber nearly twice as great, but they were advanced in spite of 
the increasing pressure of aristocratic claims upon the office. 
This pressure is clearly attested by the fasti. In the thir- 
teen years in question there were at least six consuls whose 
families had acquired nobility since the outbreak of the civil 
war between Caesar and Pompey. 14 To satisfy the claims 
of this nobility and of the ancient aristocratic houses that 
survived, and at the same time to promote the new men 
whom he needed, Augustus was forced to find some way of 
increasing the number of the consuls. A method of ac- 
complishing this was ready to his hand. In the days of the 
republic it had sometimes happened that a consul died dur- 
ing his term of office ; when this occurred a consul suffectus 
had been elected for the remainder of the year. During the 
government of the triumvirate the resignation of consuls 
had been rather frequent, and extra consuls had been ap- 
pointed to fill the vacancies thus made. After 28 B.C., when 
Augustus began the attempt to establish a stable govern- 
ment, there had been but three occasions when such extra 
consuls were chosen, and one of these was in 23 when the 
emperor laid down the office. As the need of consulars and 
the pressure of aristocratic claims increased, Augustus re- 
verted to the precedents of the triumvirate, though with 
apparent caution. In the year of Agrippa's death the em- 
peror induced the consuls to resign in the middle of the year 
and thus made place for two consules suffecti. Of the 



13 In Liebenam's edition of the Fasti a tenth new man is given, namely C. Fufius 
Geminus, in 2 B.C. For names see the tables in the Appendix. 

14 The number should perhaps be eight rather than six; two consuls, C. Marcius 
Censorinus and M. Herennius Picens, bear gentile names that had occurred in the 
fasti in the last century, but in each case the family name is new. 



256 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

consuls for the year two were afterward active in the im- 
perial service; one of these was a new man and the other 
a member of a praetorian family. 15 In 9 B.C. the death of 
Drusus, who was one of the consuls for the year, enabled 
Augustus to promote another new man destined to hold high 
office in his provinces without any break with the republican 
tradition. The retirement of Tiberius in 6 B.C. rendered 
the situation more acute. Of the four years from 9 to 6, 
inclusive, there were three when — if members of the im- 
perial family are excluded — only one noble of the highest 
rank held the consulship. The claims of the aristocracy 
were, perhaps, becoming pressing, for the emperor himself 
assumed the office for 5 B.C. on the ground of giving greater 
splendor to his grandson's assumption of the toga virilis, 
and made use of the occasion to share the consulship with 
four members of the high nobility. In 2 B.C., when his sec- 
ond grandson became of age, Augustus held the consulship 
for the last time and again with a larger number of col- 
leagues than was normal, though on this occasion two of his 
three associates were new men. 16 In this way the emperor 
was able to increase considerably the number of consuls in 
the period under discussion. So far he had done so only 
tentatively and under circumstances that might seem more 
or less exceptional; the difficulty was a permanent one, 
however, and he needed to find a permanent solution. There 
were four such solutions possible: Augustus might govern 
without the help of consulars ; or he might take his officers 
exclusively from families already of the highest rank; or 
he might advance new men while excluding a corresponding 
number of nobles ; or he might increase the number of the 
consuls in some regular and systematic fashion. Of the four 
the emperor chose the last; beginning with 2 A.D., for the 
remainder of his reign one or both of the consuls regularly 

15 The death of one of the consuls made another vacancy, which was filled by a 
new man. 

w One of them, M. Plautius Silvanus, was of praetorian family. C. Caesar was 
consul in 1 a.d. but as he was absent in Syria his consulship was honorary and it 
may be doubted if the appointment of two consuls in Rome seemed a break with the 
republican tradition. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 257 

resigned in the middle of the year and thus made place for 
one or two consules suffecti. 

The dilemma which had led to the new system can be 
most clearly seen in the last thirteen years of the reign. 
Under the old practice there would have been but twenty-six 
consuls during this time. Excluding one member of the 
imperial house, the office was held by twenty-six men who 
belonged to consular families, either certainly or probably. 
There would thus have been no opportunity to promote a 
single new man without refusing the coveted honor to a 
noble. But during this period Augustus advanced a num- 
ber of new men whom he afterwards used in his provinces 
and army. There are no less than six or seven such men 
whose names have been preserved. 17 These promotions 
alone required either a considerable increase in the number 
of the consuls or a rather extensive exclusion of the aris- 
tocracy. If extra consuls were to be introduced, however, 
it might be well to go beyond the strict necessity of the case. 
It would be desirable to have at hand a few capable men 
of high rank to use if an emergency arose. It was usual 
too to allow a few years to elapse between the consulship 
and active service in the provinces. Thus it happened 
sometimes that the emperor advanced a man to the consul- 
ship intending to employ him in the imperial service with- 
out actually doing so. There can also be little doubt that a 
number did serve in his provinces whose names have failed 
of record. In addition it was necessary to have a consider- 
able number of consulars in Rome to give distinction to the 
deliberations of the conscript fathers, and to assist the prin- 
ceps with their advice and (what he probably wanted far 
more) the support of their names and their exalted rank. 
Thus in 6 A.D., when the finances and the food supply were 
both in difficulties, the emperor was assisted in the task of 



"They were C. Poppaeus Sabinus, L. Aelius Lamia, L. Nonnius Asprenas, C. 
Vibius Postumus, L. Apronius, Q. Junius Blaesus, and Sex. Aelius Catus. The last 
named held an active command in Thrace but whether before or after his consul- 
ship is uncertain. An eighth consular, C. Ateius Capito, held an important admin- 
istrative post in Home, that of curator aquarum, under the emperor in the last year 
of the reign. Of the new men three, including Capito, were from families of prae- 
torian rank. 




> 



258 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

supervising the expenditures by three consulars, and at the 
same time he appointed others — though how many is un- 
known — to take charge of the situation in respect to grain 
and bread. Under these conditions it would seem prudent 
to make the number of the consulars somewhat greater than 
was called for by the immediate needs of the administra- 
tion. 

The increase in the number of the consuls was accom- 
panied by a tightening of the emperor's control over the 
elections, as is made evident in several ways. No more is 
heard of disorderly campaigns, and the last law against 
electoral corruption was enacted in 8 B.C. This would seem 
to mean that as the interference of Augustus increased the 
motive for either riot or bribery disappeared. At first he 
seems to have availed himself of his right to preside over 
the elections to influence their results, but as he grew older 
/ he found this troublesome, and in 8 A.D. he had the power 
conferred on him to act by an official notice and assumed 
the further right to recommend candidates for all the vacant 
places instead of for half of them, as had hitherto been the 
rule. With this change the voting in the comitia became 
an empty form, and Augustus was planning to transfer this 
form to the senate at the time of his death. 

The motives for this increasing control of the elections, 
which ended by depriving the populace of all real share in 
the government, have been already indicated. As the em- 
peror depended more and more upon the consulars for his 
chief officers, he had a keener interest in the results of the 
elections. Not only must he make sure that the men he 
wished to use received the qualifying office from the people, 
but he must see to it that they did so at the time required. 
As evidence of this it is only necessary to note the marked 
increase in the number of men who are found in the imperial 
service very shortly after their consulship. 18 In the case 



18 A brief table may be of interest. The records which have been preserved merely 
show that at a given time a man was in a certain province, not when he went 
there, which must always have been earlier (sometimes perhaps a year or two 
earlier) than the casual mention which reveals him there. Before the Christian era 
we find only two men in the imperial service in less than five years after their 
consulship ; after the Christian era we find three who are in the imperial service 
in the year after their consulship, three who are so active in two years, and four in 
four years. For further details see the tables in the Appendix. 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 259 

of the senatorial provinces an interval of at least five years 
was insisted on between the holding of a magistracy in Rome 
and a provincial command. In the imperial service such 
an interval, though it often occurred, was in no way oblig- 
atory, and in the latter part of his reign Augustus came 
frequently to hurry men from Rome to important posts in 
his administration. This made the strict control of the elec- 
tions all the more necessary. A single illustration of this 
will, perhaps, suffice. In 3 a.d. the consulship was held by 
L. Aelius Lamia, a member of a praetorian family, and in 
the following year he was an officer in the imperial army in 
Illyricum. If he had been defeated in 2 a.d. he must either 
have waited a year before beginning active service, or else 
have held his command without the prestige of consular 
rank. The emperor had, therefore, an obvious motive for 
making sure of his success at that particular election. 

The deaths of Lucius and Gaius Caesar, the two young 
grandsons of Augustus, led to the return of Tiberius to 
public life, but made no essential change in the situation. 
The emperor had again a general of his immediate family 
to place in high command, and in the young Germanicus a 
second prince was soon available for service, but one or 
two members of his house were not enough. The soldiers 
had become accustomed to being led by officers of the highest 
grade of the aristocracy, and the princeps deemed it wise to 
adhere to this tradition. Although he placed his relatives 
at the head of his chief armies, their immediate subordinates 
were mostly consulars. Perhaps the seriousness of the wars 
had something to do with this. The Elbe-Danube frontier 
proved much easier to reach than to hold, and in the last 
years of the reign a furious revolt broke out in the newly 
annexed regions. From 4 to 13 a.d. hard campaigning was 
almost continuous in Pannonia and Germany. It was at this 
time that the imperial arms met their greatest disaster in 
the overwhelming defeat of Varus and the loss of Germany 
which followed it. Faced with military operations of so 
serious a character, Augustus made greater use than ever of 
the senatorial nobility. If from 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. he had 



>< 



260 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

employed nine consulars, from 4 to 14 a.d. there were no 
less than eighteen in his service. The principate was now 
hopelessly entangled in the republican machine, and the re- 
sult was the rapid destruction of the republic's independence, 
accompanied by an inevitable drift of the government in the 
direction of despotism. 

The final form of the imperial government of Augustus 
may be said to have been reached in 2 a.d. The legal and 
constitutional basis remained unchanged, but in the actual 
working of its institutions several important modifications 
were to be found. Thus most of the consuls now held office 
for a term of six months only, and the control of the elec- 
tions had passed wholly into the hands of the princeps. 
Both these changes could not but have far-reaching conse- 
quences. The control of the elections not only diminished 
the part played by the Roman people in the state, but was 
fatal to the independence of the senate as well. Since every 
senator was classed according to the dignity of the office he 
had held, it followed that whoever had the least ambition to 
rise in rank must court the favor of the man upon whom, 
more and more, his promotion would depend. Ambitious 
men were little inclined to oppose the emperor under such 
conditions, and men destitute of ambition were not likely 
to give trouble. 

If the control of the elections was bound to make the 
senate less independent, this effect was emphasized by the 
increased employment of consulars. In the early days of 
the reign a senator's career was likely to lie wholly within 
the republican machine; only in rare instances could he 
look forward to receiving an appointment in the emperor's 
service. The average noble could expect to rise through 
the regular round of the republican magistracies, with an 
occasional term as governor of one of the senatorial prov- 
inces, and when this was finished, to a dignified retirement 
from active service in the highest rank of the nobility. For 
success in such a career it would no doubt be well not to 
offend the emperor too seriously, but some degree of inde- 
pendence might reasonably be ventured. The outlook was 
now profoundly altered ; numerous attractive and important 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 261 

posts in the imperial service were within the reach of the 
senator who could gain the imperial favor. A purely re- 
publican career was not to be compared with that which 
opened out in the imperial provinces. Nor was a senator 
required to make a choice between them ; he could enjoy all 
the honors the republic could bestow, and yet if he pleased 
the princeps he might receive imperial distinctions in addi- 
tion. A remark of Dio shows the situation in a flash; 
speaking of the imperial as contrasted with the senatorial 
provinces, he tells us that in the former the emperor could 
name a man as governor whenever he pleased and that many 
praetors and consuls secured such appointments during 
their term of office. 19 Under these circumstances the con- 
script fathers and the magistrates grew steadily more and 
more subservient to the princeps. Nor was this change dis- 
pleasing to the senators ; if they lost in freedom they gained 
in the splendid careers now opened up to them. That they 
welcomed the changes in the government there can be little 
doubt. Dio expressly says that in his latter years Augustus, 
growing milder with age, became more reluctant to offend 
the senators or to incur their enmity. 20 This change in the 
emperor's character has often been commented upon, and 
has been variously explained, sometimes as burned out 
cruelty : a study of his administration in its practical work- 
ings suggests another motive. In proportion as he drew his 
officers more and more from the nobility, the emperor grew 
more and more reluctant to quarrel with them. 

Another consequence of the new system was an obvious 
decline in the efficiency of the republican government. With 
the chief magistrates in office for so short a term, anything 
like a continuous policy became impossible and the adminis- 
tration of affairs was bound to suffer. Where this could not 
safely be allowed to happen, the only course open was to 
invoke the help of the princeps. Thus in the last years of 
the reign several important departments of the public busi- 
ness in the city of Rome itself were transferred from the 

19 Dio, liii, 14. 
^Dio, lv, 12, 



262 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

republic to the emperor. To him was given charge of the 
police and the maintenance of order as well as the food and 
water supply of the capital. In this way the really vital 
, matters passed into the hands of the monarch and the re- 
)\ public more and more became a thing of pageantry and 
empty honor. Not all the powers thus transferred were 
taken directly from the consuls, but the weakening of that 
office must have made encroachment easier because it took 
away any possible alternative. If affairs were badly man- 
aged the senate and the magistrates could obviously 
provide no remedy, and nothing was left but to have recourse 
to the emperor. This undermining of the republic has been 
pointed out as furnishing the explanation of Augustus' pol- 
icy. But this seems hardly adequate since for nearly thirty 
years he had tolerated the show of freedom, and he had no 
apparent reason for wishing to make a change. In the re- 
quirements of his own administration, however, may be 
found another motive ; the pressing need of consulars was 
something he must meet, no matter at what cost to the re- 
public. That he may have foreseen the consequences is 
quite possible, but he was by temperament an opportunist 
and was inclined to meet a difficulty in the way which gave 
the least amount of trouble at the moment. He was little 
likely to seek to save the republic by quarreling with its 
guardians ; if it declined, the nobility must bear their share 
of the responsibility. 

While thus the power of the princeps grew steadily 
greater, the view men took of the office was also slowly 
changing. Little by little the world came to look upon it 
as a permanent part of the government. In point of law it 
had at first been nothing more than a great command, 
created to meet a special and exceptional condition. In 
strict accord with precedent this command had been con- 
ferred only for a fixed term of years, but as time slipped by 
it grew more and more evident that it must continue. If 
the Romans had ever cherished any dreams of disbanding 
their army, the repeated wars on the frontier would have 
dispelled the illusion. It must have become gradually clear 
beyond dispute that the legions could not be dispensed with 



X 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 283 

save at the price of immediate disaster. But if a great 
standing army must be maintained, the state required a 
war-lord to take charge of it. The principate could only be 
abolished if a substitute could be found, and the only sub- 
stitute was to appoint another princeps. If the senate and 
people shrank from making the selection they merely left 
the choice to the arbitrament of civil war. If death re- 
moved one commander-in-chief, a successor must be found, 
and the emperor might reasonably feel that it was a part of 
his duty to give the Roman people the benefit of his ex- 
perience by helping them to determine in advance a matter 
of such vast importance. Better than any other man he 
knew the situation on the frontiers and could judge the real 
capacity of any general. The question of the imperial suc- 
cession came, therefore, naturally to engross a large part of 
Augustus' time and attention. By the theory of the constitu- 
tion his death should have left the senate and the Roman 
people free to consider whether they had any further need 
of a war-lord in their government. They might abolish the 
office altogether, or if this was impossible, they might in- 
trust such powers as they saw fit to any person they might 
choose. In spite of this, Augustus could find means to de- 
termine their decision. He might content himself with 
pointing out the man he thought most worthy of the place, 
but it was also in his power to make the acceptance of his 
nominee inevitable. He could induce the senate and the 
people to confer such powers on the man of his choice that 
nothing short of revolution could keep him from the throne. 
Such a colleague might obviously be dangerous to the reign- 
ing emperor, and it was natural that Augustus should seek 
to minimize the risk by making his selection from the circle 
of his own family. Family pride and affection had no 
doubt a part in this, but he may well have believed that 
such a choice was more likely to prove successful than any 
other he could make. The republican aristocracy had lost 
none of its haughty exclusiveness, and while the nobles ac- 
quiesced in the supremacy of Augustus and accorded a cer- 
tain deference to his family, they might have been extremely 
reluctant to see one of their own number raised above their 



\ 



264 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

heads. The house of the Caesars had been so long upon 
the throne that its continuance in power would arouse less 
jealous resentment than would the advent of a new dynasty. 
Thus the emperor might feel that the choice of a near 
relative was almost a necessity of the situation in which he 
found himself, and that any other solution of the problem 
of the succession was an invitation to a new civil war. 
From the beginning of his reign Augustus was occupied 
with the question, but the hand of death on several occasions 
thwarted his designs. Marcellus, Agrippa and Gaius 
Caesar all preceded him to the grave, and in the end, he was 
forced to fall back upon his surviving stepson, Tiberius, as 
his heir. All he could do to secure the ultimate succession 
to his own blood was to have Germanicus marry his grand- 
daughter and to cause Tiberius to adopt this prince as his 
son. In this way his descendants would inherit the throne 
and he would thus give a dynasty to Rome. When this 
prospect had become fully apparent, the principate had be- 
come a monarchy in everything but name. 

Whatever the establishment Of the empire may have 
meant in Rome and Italy, it conferred vast benefits upon 
the world at large. That the republic had shamefully op- 
pressed the provinces is a fact beyond all possibility of dis- 
pute. From this misgovernment the empire to a consider- 
able extent relieved them since the princeps could not afford 
to shut his eyes to tyranny and pillage as the senate had too 
often been inclined to do. If the provinces were misgov- 
erned they might be impoverished, or goaded to revolt, and 
either result would create difficulties for the emperor. If 
for no other reason than to avoid trouble, the monarch was 
inevitably a champion of decency and justice. Even the 
senate had feebly striven in the same direction, but the 
princeps had better means of making felt his good inten- 
tions. It had been one weakness of the republic that while 
it might occasionally punish an exceptionally bad governor, 
it had no reward to offer to a good one. His conduct in the 
provinces seems to have counted little, either for or against 
a candidate, in the eyes of the Roman voter. But with 
Augustus in power the situation was at once altered; good 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 265 

government in the provinces was distinctly to the emperor's 
advantage, and by the very fact that he presided at the 
elections, he could exert a powerful influence in its favor. 
The princeps could reject the name of any candidate for 
office, and so had means of stopping the career of any man 
who made a bad record for himself. Moreover, as the use 
of consulars in the imperial service increased, the rewards 
of just and efficient administration became splendid and 
alluring. Thus the establishment of the principate was an 
enormous gain to the provincials quite apart from any 
definite reforms. Such reforms were made and were of 
great value to the empire, but the mere existence of the 
monarch may very possibly have been well worth them all. 

The improvement which the principate brought with it 
in the government of the provinces has long been recognized, 
but it is often said that this gain was purchased at the price 
of Roman liberty. That the part of the people in the gov- 
ernment became a farce has been already shown ; but to the 
bulk of Roman citizens this was no real loss, because they 
never had possessed a voice. All voting was done in Rome, 
and those who lived at any distance from that city had 
always been disfranchised in practice. The populace of 
Rome might lose their bribes and riots, but the citizen at a 
distance merely lost in theory what he had never had in 
fact. The tightening grip of the princeps on the republic 
deprived him of nothing which he can have valued very 
highly. The sort of liberty which he really prized remained 
untouched, the right to control the affairs of his own munic- 
ipality. Italy was a great confederacy of towns with whose 
self-government the emperor had no desire to interfere, and 
in which a vigorous local life went on quite undisturbed 
for many years. When at length this form of liberty died 
out, it was from causes with which the imperial government 
had comparatively little to do, and whose consequences a 
genuine republic, if one could have been preserved, would 
probably have been unable to avert. 

It may be objected that the early empire soon degenerated 
into a gloomy tyranny, and that under such sovereigns as 
came after Augustus the imperial despotism weighed like a )<. 



266 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

nightmare on the world. While partially true, such a 
criticism overlooks some fundamental features in the case. 
Let the reigns of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian be 
painted in the darkest colors, yet their oppression was re- 
stricted within very narrow limits; their tyranny fell al- 
most exclusively upon the senatorial nobility in Rome and 
did not touch the great mass of their subjects. Their 
courtiers may have gone in terror of their lives, but the 
ordinary citizen was not in any way disturbed. Hence the 
personal character of the emperors mattered very little to 
the world at large, and there is no reason to doubt that under 
the worst of the Caesars mankind in general was better off 
than under the republic. 

In conclusion it may be well to mention a reform which 
Augustus considered, but which he finally rejected. This 
was a scheme to extend the franchise in an effective way to 
\/ all the Roman citizens in Italy. To do this the ballot, instead 
/\pf being taken exclusively in Rome, would have been cast 
simultaneously in all the towns of the peninsula ; the votes 
were then to be sent to Rome and counted there. At first it 
might appear as though this was a promising reform and 
one that might have kept alive some elements of genuine 
popular government. There were, however, serious objec- 
tions to the change. Unless the new system of conducting 
the elections proved an empty form, it would have made it 
far less easy for the princeps to control them. This would 
have made the task of governing more difficult if the close 
connection between the republican offices and rank in the 
nobility were permitted to continue. It was probably not 
this consideration, however, which had most weight with 
Augustus. In the restoration of the republic he was seeking 
to conciliate public opinion, and he found a conservative re- 



action in full swing. The reform would very likely have 
been unpopular just because it was a violation of usage and 
tradition; the world could be most readily satisfied by the 
simple restoration of the old forms, and the emperor was 
probably wise to lay the scheme aside. To have preserved 
the republic as a reality would have required far more 



THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 267 

sweeping reforms than a mere modification of the machinery 
of voting. The whole system which made rank depend on 
office must be done away with, and the sentiment of the 
Roman world which called for men of exalted rank in all 
the greatest positions, even in the imperial service, must 
have been modified. Above all the character of the army 
must have been profoundly altered so that the common sol- 
dier would have remained a citizen. For such sweeping 
changes the Romans were quite wholly unprepared, even if 
Augustus had possessed the genius and originality to think 
of them. Had he conceived such designs it is extremely un- 
likely that he could have carried them out in the face of the 
opposition of all classes of his subjects. What was possible 
he did. He conciliated public opinion by setting up again 
the old machinery of government with such slight modifica- 
tions as men in general were willing to accept. This ma- 
chinery, when once it had been set up, he worked with a 
minimum of friction. The fact that he was able to rule the 
world for forty-four years in peace and tranquillity and 
even after death to live on in men's memories as a saintly 
and resplendent figure is a striking testimony to the skill 
and tact with which he had met the world's most pressing 
needs while satisfying its dominant desires. 



APPENDIX 



THE LEX VATINIA 

The view of the Vatinian law taken in the text differs in some 
particulars from that usual among historians, and it seems desirable 
to state briefly the reasons for it. 

It is generally held that the language of Cicero in his oration 
on the consular provinces proves beyond serious question that by the 
Vatinian law Caesar was given the province of Cisalpine Gaul for 
a term of five years beginning March 1, 59. 1 This date is explained 
as that on which the bill was passed by the assembly. But these 
facts, which may be taken as established, raise at once two ques- 
tions: why was the law passed so early in Caesar's consulship, and 
why did it make his governorship in Gaul begin during his year of 
office in Rome? The two problems here stated seem obvious once 
they are raised, but Ferrero was apparently the first to feel their 
full force and to attempt a solution. The explanation which he 
gave has met with considerable favor 2 and is therefore deserving of 
consideration. He accounts for the Vatinian law on the ground that 
the sudden' death of Metellus Celer left the governorship of Cisalpine 
Gaul vacant and that Caesar took prompt advantage of the opening 
thus provided to seize the province and thus to forestall any possible 
intrigues on the part of the conservatives. This explanation en- 
counters serious difficulties, however. 

In the first place, the probable date of the passage of the agrarian 
bill 3 does not fit the theory. Ferrero and the others are forced to 
assume that the bill was passed in February; the evidence of the 
sources is against this, however, and — unless some of the evidence 
is rejected — is decisively against it. We are expressly told by Dio 
that the law imposed an oath on all the senators and that Metellus 
was one of the last to take this oath. He did finally take it, how- 
ever, after much hesitation. 4 Now it is certain from Cicero's letters 
that Metellus was dead by the middle of April. 5 So far the facts 
would agree well enough with the theory of Ferrero. But Dio and 
Suetonius make Bibulus retire to his house immediately after the 

^Guiraud has questioned this, but has met with no apparent support. 

2 Ferrero, i, 290 note. Heitland has adopted the theory of Ferrero in his work 
The Roman Republic, iii, 135 and note 2. Jullian appears to accept it somewhat 
tentatively in his Histoire de la Gaule, iii, 166 note 4. It has finally been adopted 
in the latest text-book on Roman history: Boak, A History of Rome, 166. 

3 There has been some discussion of whether there were two agrarian laws or 
only one. Ferrero, Heitland and Meyer (to name only the latest writers) hold 
that there were two ; Drumann maintains that there was one only. I believe the 
evidence is overwhelming in favor of two. It has not seemed necessary to discuss 
the point, however, since unless there were two laws the theory of Ferrero falls 
at once. 

*Dio, xxxviii, 7. 

^Letters, i, 90. Att., ii, 5. That the passage refers to the death of Metellus is 
made certain by passages elsewhere. See Letters, i, 98. Att., ii, 9 and the Oration 
against Vatinius, 8. The first two passages rather suggest that the death of 
Metellus was very recent. 



272 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

passage of the agrarian law 6 and Plutarch says explicitly that he 
did not appear in public during the remaining eight months of his 
year of office. 7 If this statement is true, his retirement must have 
taken place in April and not in February. If it did take place in 
April, then Metellus must have lived till then and the agrarian law 
must have been passed early in April. If so the death of Metellus . 
can have had nothing to do with the Vatinian law, which was carried 
in March. 

Even if this difficulty should be cleared away, and it can only be 
done by the rejection of Plutarch's statement, there remains another 
difficulty. It is not by any means certain that Metellus had the 
province of Cisalpine Gaul, in fact the probability is that he did not. 
In the preceding year the senate, alarmed by the news of an impend- 
ing war in Transalpine Gaul, directed the two consuls for that year, 
Metellus and Afranius, to draw lotsi for the two Gauls. 8 In all 
probability they first resigned the provinces previously assigned them 
under the Sempronian law, though there is no definite statement to 
that effect. Unfortunately, we do not know how the lots fell, but 
later in the year Cicero speaks of Metellus as greatly disappointed 
at the peaceful news then arriving from Gaul because he was de- 
sirous of a triumph. 9 Since the war that had been threatening was 
in the Transalpine province, this suggests strongly that this was the 
province drawn by Metellus. Of course a very serious war might 
involve the governors of both Gauls, but this is certainly not the 
natural implication of the passage. Hitherto all scholars have held 
that Metellus received the Transalpine province, and this seems 
much the more probable supposition. 

The data furnished by the sources, therefore, fail to support the 
theory of Ferrero either as to the date of Metellus' death or as to the 
province which he held. There is still another objection to it. 
Although intended to explain the Vatinian law, it fails to achieve 
its purpose. Even if it be granted that Metellus died in February 
and that he had the Cisalpine province, his death does not adequately 
explain the haste with which the Vatinian law was carried or the 
reason for making Caesar's proconsulship begin early in his year 
of office as consul. Ferrero thinks that both were due to a desire 
to forestall possible intrigues of the conservatives, but it is difficult 
to see what they could do. After the agrarian law was passed 
and Bibulus was shut up in his house, the opposition was cowed. 
It is not clear that a formal meeting of the senate would have been 
possible without Caesar's consent, but even if it were legally as- 
sembled, what was there that it could do? The conscript fathers 

6 Dio, xxxviii, 6. Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 20. 

7 Plutarch, Pompey, 48. Meyer, Caesars Monarchie, 71 and note 3, accepts thia 
as fixing the date of April for the passage of the agrarian bill. 

8 Cicero, Letters, i, 54. Att., i, 19. 

^Letters, i, 60. Att., i, 20. Metellus never left Rome, but died there after an 
illness of only three days. See Die xxxvii, 50 and Cicero, Oration for M. CoeU 
ius, 24. 



APPENDIX 273 

could only assign the vacant province to one of the consuls or 
praetors of that year. The consuls were out of the question, since 
Bibulus was needed at home to watch the heavens and so invalidate 
Caesar's acts in the future. If they decided to do without his 
services it seems probable that they could have been stopped by the 
veto of Caesar or his tribunes. Even if they were able to put the 
assignment through, the tribunes could prevent his leaving Rome. 
The assignment of the province to one of the praetors was out of 
the question, since here the veto of the tribunes would certainly 
hold good and Caesar had Vatinius ready for that or any other 
purpose. 10 In spite of all this, if the senate did succeed in getting 
through an arrangement contrary to Caesar's interest, he could set 
it aside at any time by an act of the assembly. Why then did he 
show so much anxiety to forestall intrigues which could not, as it 
would appear, do him the slightest harm? 

Groebe suggests that the reason for making the governorship of 
Gaul and Caesar's consular term run concurrently was to enable 
Caesar to assume the command during the year 59 if circumstances 
should require. 11 This might do as an explanation if the province 
assigned to Caesar by the Vatinian law had been Transalpine Gaul. 
So far as we know there was no likelihood of war in the Cisalpine 
province and it is difficult to see any reason why Caesar should 
suppose that he might be obliged to hurry to the valley of the Po 
before his term of office had expired in Rome. 12 It seems certain 
that, even if he did think it possible that he might wish to leave the 
city before the year was up, he can not have intended to do so for 
several months after the Vatinian law was passed. He was then in 
the midst of his legislative program, even if it be granted that the 
agrarian law had been carried, and it seems quite clear that he 
would not dare to leave, nor would his partners dare to let him do 
so, till the elections had been held. Why then did he bring in the 
Vatinian law so early? If the purpose was to take advantage of 
the disorganization and discouragement of the conservatives after 
his first great victory over them in the agrarian law, why did he 
make his term as proconsul begin so early? It was surely possible 
to make the proconsulship of Caesar begin at any date that might be 
specified, and unnecessary to fix a date months before Caesar could 



10 The tribunes could not veto the assignment of the provinces under the Sem- 
pronian law ; but this had been made and Bibulus had received, along with Caesar, 
the care of the roads and forests in Italy. This assignment the senate could only 
alter if the consuls, or one of them, resigned the province so assigned. If this were 
done a new province could be decreed for him by the senate. It seems probable 
that this decree could be vetoed by the other consul, and there is no reason to 
think that the tribunes did not have a veto against such a special assignment. 
The praetorian provinces were always subject to the veto of the tribunes. As to 
leaving Rome, see Dio, xxxvii, 50. 

u Drumann, Geschtchte Roms, edition revised by Groebe, iii, 720. 

12 It should be borne in mind that the governor of the province was probably 
Afranius. He was a competent soldier, at least he was one in whom Pompey felt 
confidence, since he served as Pompey's legate both before and after this time. 
It is not unlikely that his military reputation was quite as good as Caesar's. 
With Pompey it was probably better. 



274 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

take advantage of it. It seems impossible to explain in any such 
way why Caesar should have been authorized to assume command 
of a province where there was no particular danger at a time several 
months earjier than he can have had the slightest intention of acting 
upon the permission. 

It seems to me that the only real explanation of the Vatinian law 
is to be found in the political conditions in Rome. From this point 
of view one of its main purposes was to provide Caesar with a mili- 
tary force with which he could overawe the conservative opposition 
and prevent them from attempting to defend the constitution, which 
he was planning to violate. To this supposition there are two 
obvious objections; the first is the comparative ease with which 
the law was carried, and the second is the absence of any explicit 
statement of such a purpose in the sources. Neither of these will 
be found upon examination to be as serious as it may at first appear. 

As to the first point, there was opposition, but it' seems to have 
contented itself with rendering the law technically invalid by re- 
ligious obstruction; this was the only way in which Bibulus could 
act, since he had no veto as against a tribune. Three of the tribunes 
were conservatives and joined Bibulus in his attempt to stop Caesar 
by raising religious obstacles to the meeting of the assembly. We 
get this information from Cicero's oration against Vatinius, 13 and 
from the silence of the orator as to any actual violence we must 
conclude that none was offered to the hostile tribunes. This seems 
to show quite clearly that on this occasion they did not appear in 
the forum, but contented themselves with announcing unfavorable 
omens. Later, when the agrarian bill was carried, these same three 
did interpose a veto and were nearly killed in consequence. It is 
not unreasonable to conclude that they feared to try direct inter- 
vention at first from fear of the mob, and perhaps also they had 
faith in the effect of the obnuntiatio. When it had been made 
clear that religious scruples would not check Caesar, they tried to 
interpose their veto with the support and backing of the other 
consul. So far as the records show, Cato alone had the courage 
to resist the Vatinian law in person and he warned the people 
that by their own votes they were setting up a tyrant in their 
citadel.! 14 This utterance is entirely in harmony with the con- 
jecture here offered as to the purpose of the law. 

As to the second objection, if the Vatinian law were used as a 
means of establishing in Rome a military tyranny, why was not the 
point brought out explicitly by ancient writers? It does not seem 
impossible to suggest a reason. In the case of Cicero it would be 
natural that he should refrain from writing to his friend what the 
latter already knew; the facts of Caesar's rule were as familiar 
to Atticus as to Cicero. Under these circumstances what we should 

13 Oration against Vatinius, 6-7. 
"Plutarch, Cato Minor, 33. 



APPENDIX 275 

expect to find would be allusion and implication rather than plain 
statement in definite language. This is exactly what we do find; in- 
deed, he makes the case quite reasonably clear if we will only take his 
language at its face value as will be shown presently. In his ora- 
tions he could not speak out because of the risk involved in offending 
Caesar and Pompey. In the case of the later writers, such as Dio, 
Appian, Plutarch, and Suetonius, they all wrote after the empire 
had been established for a considerable time. It would be quite 
natural that they should fail to grasp the full significance of a 
body of troops camped at the gates of Rome, since they were thor- 
oughly familiar with such a situation. They do concur in represent- 
ing Caesar's consulship as a period of violent usurpation, but they 
do not see any occasion to emphasize this particular point in his 
method. If that was not grasped, it would be natural for them to 
treat the Vatinian law as they do and discuss it in connection with 
the end of Caesar's consulship and as looking toward his future 
career in Gaul rather than his present position in Rome. Dio, in- 
deed, places his account of the law in the middle of his narrative of 
Caesar's consulship, but he discusses it from this point of view, and 
his arrangement is clearly logical and not chronological. He deals 
first with the legislation and then takes up the other events of the 
year. Under the head of legislation he places first the laws intro- 
duced by Caesar himself — the Julian laws — and then those that he 
instigated and inspired but which were brought forward by others. 

When these considerations are borne in mind neither of the objec- 
tions will seem decisive, and the positive evidence which the sources 
contain that the Vatinian law was actually used for the purpose 
indicated is fully as strong as could be reasonably expected. Our 
only contemporary source is Cicero; his letters show plainly that 
after the law was passed he regarded the government of Caesar 
as a military despotism. It is not a question merely of mob violence 
overriding technicalities of the constitution, for he twice refers ex- 
plicitly to Caesar's army. Once he represents Pompey as meeting 
all criticism of the triumvirate's measures by saying "I shall coerce 
you by means of Caesar's army." 15 This was written at the begin- 
ning of May. Again, sometime between July and October, he pic- 
tures Clodius as rushing wildly about threatening now this party 
and now that: "When he sees how unpopular the present state of 
things is, he seems to intend an attack upon the authors of it; but 
when he again recalls their power and armies, he transfers his hos- 
tility to the loyalists." 16 

Moreover, Cicero applies to Caesar's government the Greek term 
tyranny and the Latin term regnum,. 17 It is hardly likely that he 



^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 

^Letters, i, '118. Att., ii, 22. 

17 He uses the term tyranny in Att., ii, 14 and 17 and the term regnum in 
Att., ii, 12 and 13. He uses a quotation calling the three kings in. Att., ii, 8 ; 
in a letter to his brother he calls them kings' himself (Q. Fr., i, 2.). 



276 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

would have used these terms on several occasions unless he meant 
them, and if they were seriously intended, they can mean nothing 
but an illegal despotism resting on force. Was the force in this case 
merely that of the mob reinforced by Pompey's veterans? The 
orator's references to Caesar's army show quite clearly that it was 
more than this. If the power of the triumvirate had depended on 
the populace, the conservatives might have rallied if the three lost 
the favor of the mob in any marked degree, but this was not the 
case. Unless Cicero was egregiously deceived the three did lose the 
popularity with which they began and even the rabble turned against 
them. A single quotation in addition to those given already in the 
text will suffice to illustrate the point. In July Cicero wrote to 
Atticus, "They hold no one by affection, and I fear they will be 
forced to use terror . . . The feeling of the people was shewn as clearly 
as possible in the theatre and at the shows. For at the gladiators 
both master (dominus) and supporters were overwhelmed with 
hisses." The younger Curio "received an ovation such as used to be 
given to Pompey when the constitution was still intact (ut salva re 
publico, Pompeio plaudi solebat) . . .They are at war with everybody." 
But Cicero does not imagine that their unpopularity will make any 
difference. "Men are indignant at what nevertheless must, it seems, 
be put up with. The whole people have indeed now one voice, but 
its strength depends rather on exasperation than anything to back 
it up . . . What else is there to say? What else? This, I think: 
I am certain that all is lost. For why mince matters any longer?" 18 
If we are to regard Caesar as a popular leader who simply brushed 
aside senseless technicalities and obstinate obstruction, Cicero's evi- 
dence must, at the start, be thrown out of court. 

If the only contemporary writer is thus clear in testifying to a 
military tyranny, this view is supported by two of the four later 
authorities. Plutarch confirms the evidence of Cicero, though he is 
inaccurate in the details. He states explicitly that Pompey — and it 
should be borne in mind that to contemporaries he was the real head 
of the triumvirate — filled the city with soldiers and carried Caesar's 
laws with a high hand. 19 He also quotes the warning of Cato in 
regard to the Vatinian law, 20 and he narrates the story of Con- 
sidius, an aged senator, who replied to Caesar's question as to why 
the conscript fathers did not meet by saying that they were in 
fear of his soldiers. 21 Appian asserts that at the very beginning 
of their year of office both Caesar and his colleague Bibulus pro- 
ceeded to arm secretly. He interprets the conciliatory bearing of 
Caesar at the first as intended simply to throw Bibulus off his 
guard, and says that Caesar had gathered a large band of soldiers 



^Letters, i, 112-13. Att., ii, 19. 
"Plutarch, Pompey, 48. 
^Plutarch, Cato Minor, 33. 

2 >Plutarch, Caesar, 14. Cicero refers to the incident but does not quote the 
remark of Considius. Letters, i, 124. Att., ii, 24. 



APPENDIX 277 

before he presented his agrarian bill to the senate. When Bibulus 
appealed to the senate against Caesar, Appian says that the con- 
script fathers did nothing to oppose the preparations and force of 
Caesar. 22 It is quite true that Appian does not show how Caesar 
used the force he had gathered, but it can hardly be doubted that 
both Appian and Plutarch drew upon sources wherein the consulship 
of Caesar was represented as a military tyranny. Neither makes the 
mechanism of that tyranny very clear and neither connects it with 
the Vatinian law, but both bear witness to its existence. The other 
two sources are much less definite. Suetonius is very brief and 
merely says that Bibulus was expelled from the forum by Caesar, 
who resorted to arms. 23 This might mean no more than simple riot- 
ing which undoubtedly played a part, and a large part, in the first 
days of Caesar's consulship. Dio does not imply military violence. 
Neither of these writers, however, asserts anything inconsistent with 
the interpretation of the Vatinian law adopted in the text. 

In the discussion of the Vatinian law it has so far been taken 
as established that it was passed in March. This can not be said to 
be entirely certain. The date of March 1 has been treated as that 
on which the law was passed by the assembly. It is possible, how- 
ever, that March 1 may have been named in the bill as the time at 
which it was to take effect. This would leave us free to fix some 
other day as that on which the law was finally voted by the people. 24 
It is hardly possible to place its enactment earlier than March 1; 
and if |it was passed later and yet this date was specified in the 
bill, we should have to suppose that Caesar's proconsulship was de- 
liberately dated back and made to begin at a time then already past. 
The account in Appian would serve to suggest a possible motive for 
this. If Caesar began gathering troops before he had a legal right 
to do so, he might think such a retroactive statute worth while. 
Appian, indeed,, states that the recruiting began at the very begin- 
ning of the year, but he may have thrown it back two months too 
early, or it may have been that up till March the recruiting had not 
involved any definitely illegal act that could be proved in court. 
One question will at once suggest itself, however. Why did Caesar 
suddenly become scrupulous at some time during his stormy consul- 
ship and that apparently upon this single point? It seems not im- 
possible that the somewhat erratic conscience of Pompey was the 
source of the scruple. Pompey had shown himself extremely care- 
ful to disclaim any responsibility for Caesar's acts, but he may have 
felt the accusation that he was supporting and sanctioning a military 



^Appian, ii, 10-11. 

^Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 20. 

^It can not have been carried later than July, when Caesar offered Cicero a 
legateship in his army (Letters, i, 113. Att., ii, 19). It was almost certainly 
passed before the end of April, since in the first days of May Cicero speaks 
of Caesar's army (Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16). See also Letters, i, 91-92. 
Att., ii, 6. 



278 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

tyranny. All ancient moralists regarded resistance to a tyrant 
as a duty of the citizen, and if Caesar was becoming something very 
like one, Pompey may not have been able to quiet his conscience with 
evasions and quibbles. If this were so the Vatinian law, whenever 
passed, may have relieved his troubled mind by dating back the 
beginning of Caesar's proconsulship and so legalizing ex post facto 
Caesar's acts. Such a conjecture would not, as it seems to me, 
matter greatly. The purpose of the Vatinian law is practically the 
same and it is intended to cover the high handed and despotic acts of 
Caesar with a show of legality. Whether those acts were past or 
future makes very little difference, since it would still be true that 
his consulship was a military tyranny. 

It may be worth while to say in conclusion that I am far from 
holding a brief against Caesar. That the republic had become un- 
workable is, I believe, entirely true, and one main purpose of this 
book is to point out some of the reasons why this was so. Neverthe- 
less, it is an obvious duty of the historian to try to understand the 
point of view of those whom he holds to have been in the wrong. 
It was natural that the Roman conservatives should fail to see 
that the republican machine was unequal to the task imposed upon 
it, and this especially since they had ready to hand a plausible ex- 
planation of the obvious breakdown of the constitution. The republic 
had managed to work after a fashion up to the moment when the 
triumvirs threw a wrench into the machinery. The disorders that 
followed, the anarchy of the next few years — for these they had 
a very simple explanation. The three held the military force of the 
state in their hands, and while they did not themselves employ it 
to keep the peace, they would not permit the senate to take any 
vigorous action. In the days of Catiline the propertied classes, 
under the leadership of Cicero and the senate, had had little real 
difficulty in putting down the disturbers of the peace. Under the 
triumvirate they were not allowed to try, and they might very well 
think, and perhaps rightly, that the same thing could be done again. 
Under such circumstances they would naturally feel that the repub- 
lican constitution was not seriously wrong in any part, but that it 
had been stopped by lawless violence, and that this same violence 
was all that stood in the way of its working again. There seems 
to me so much of justice in this view that, while I do not believe 
that the republic could have continued for any length of time, yet 
it seems impossible to prove that it would have broken down in 
59 B.C. had it not been for the action of the triumvirs. Cato was 
literally right when he laid the ruin of the constitution, not to the 
civil war, but to the combination of Caesar and Pompey. 



THE LEX POMPEIA-LICINIA 

As the question of the exact date at which Caesar's proconsulship 
of Gaul came to an end has given rise to much controversy, a brief 
consideration of the matter and an indication of the chief contending 
views may be of interest. It was long supposed that Mommsen's study 
on the subject had definitely settled the date as March 1, 49. Gui- 
raud in 1878 disputed this view and propounded another, but it met 
with little or no favor, and it is only within comparatively recent 
years that the controversy can be said to have been really begun. 
The date supposedly established by Mommsen held the field till 1904, 
when it was attacked by Hirschfeld, who contended that the renewal 
of Caesar's imperium in 55 by the lex Pompeia-Licinia was for no 
definite period, and that the only limits set by that law to his pro- 
consulship were indirect and such as were involved in the clause 
that forbade the discussion of a successor before March 1, 50. This 
new theory gained very considerable acceptance in spite of opposi- 
tion, until in 1913 Judeich advanced another, namely that Caesar's 
term as renewed in 55 ended in December of 50. In general, German 
scholars have accepted the year 50 while English scholars have ad- 
hered to the view of Mommsen, which has recently been very ably 
defended and the arguments of Hirschfeld and Judeich answered by 
Holmes and Hardy. 1 

In this controversy it appears to me that both sides have estab- 
lished some of their contentions. The view of Hirschfeld that no 
date was fixed for the end of Caesar's proconsulship seems to have 
been shown by his opponents to be untenable, and the date fixed by 
Judeich seems to have been equally disproved. So much the adher- 
ents of the view of Mommsen have accomplished and I, at least, 
feel that they have done this convincingly. Does this, however, es- 
tablish their date of March 1, 49, in full possession of the field? 
For myself this does not seem to be the case, and the reasons given 
by the Germans for holding that the command of Caesar terminated 
in 50 appear to have great weight. Some points, at least, have 
emerged from the discussion that seem to be very solidly established, 
either admitted by all sides to the controversy, or proved beyond 
much doubt. These points may be briefly summarized as follows: 

1. The lex Vatinia conferred the governorship of Gaul on Caesar 



1 Mommsen, Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat. 

Guiraud, Le differend entre Cesar et le senat. 

Hirschfeld in Klio, iv and v, with answers by Holzapfel in the same. 

Judeich in Rheinisches Museum, lxviii. 

Holmes, in Classical Quarterly, x. 

Hardy, in Journal of Philology, xxxiv. 

I regret keenly that circumstances have prevented my having access to the 
articles of Hirschfeld and that I have been obliged to depend upon the answers 
of his critics for my knowledge of his views. I sincerely hope that I have done 
him no serious injustice as a result. 



280 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

for five years beginning March 1, 59. Under this law Caesar's term 
would expire March 1, 54. 

2. The lex Pompeia-Licinia extended his imperium for a second 
period of five years. 

3. This law contained a clause forbidding any discussion of a 
successor to Caesar till after March 1, 50. As long as the Sempro- 
nian law remained in force this clause made it impossible to assign 
the Gauls as consular provinces and supersede Caesar there before 
48, when he intended to be consul in Rome. 

4. In pursuance of the design implied in 3, Caesar demanded and 
Pompey helped to pass a special law in 52 by which Caesar was 
allowed the privilege of being elected consul without a personal 
canvass for the office. 

5. But Pompey, who had begun to fear Caesar and to ally himself 
with the senate, also passed a law in 52 which repealed the Sempro- 
nian law and made it possible for the senate to supersede Caesar as 
soon as his legal term expired. 

6. Taking 4 and 5 together, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the right of Caesar to be elected consul in his absence had been 
definitely agreed upon at the conference at Luca, and that in allowing 
the law of the ten tribunes to be passed Pompey was simply keeping 
his word to his partner. Having kept his promise according to the 
strict letter, Pompey tried by repealing the whole Sempronian law to 
render the concession which he found himself obliged to make quite 
worthless for the purpose for which it was intended. 

7. Whatever the precise date when Caesar's legal term in Gaul 
would expire, there was a considerable interval between that date 
and the time when Caesar could be elected consul and a still longer 
interval before he could assume office if elected. If he were super- 
seded during this time he would become a private citizen and as 
such he would be open to a prosecution in the courts for any illegal 
act he had committed. Such a prosecution some of his enemies 
were determined to bring against him and he was equally determined 
to avoid. 

8. The only way in which he could avoid prosecution was to 
remain proconsul of Gaul up to the very time when he would 
assume the consulship. It was, therefore, necessary that he should 
hold his province for a considerable time after his legal term ex- 
pired. The only way in which he could do this was by preventing 
the appointment of a successor to take over the command until the 
beginning of his second consulship on January 1, 48. 

9. Under the Sempronian law Caesar was amply safeguarded 
and could continue in Gaul for the required time. After Pompey 
repealed the Sempronian law this was wholly doubtful; the senate 
now had the power to supersede him before he had been elected 
consul and still more before he had actually taken office. 

10. Caesar, as his one means of safety, strove to prevent the 



APPENDIX 281 

appointment of a successor and found in the veto of the tribunes an 
effective weapon for his purpose. Under the Sempronian law the 
tribunes had been deprived of the veto in connection with the assign- 
ment of the consular provinces. When Pompey repealed the Sem- 
pronian law he inadvertently repealed this restriction on the veto 
along with the rest of the law. Curio made use of this fact to block 
all action in the senate, and Pompey was able to break the resulting 
deadlock only by methods of dubious legality. 

Of these points only the second has been seriously questioned. 
Here it seems to me that the advocates of Mommsen's view have 
proved their case completely, and that the language of Cicero leaves 
practically no doubt that the lex Pompeia-Licinia extended Caesar's 
proconsulship for a definite period of five years. The orator fre- 
quently refers to Caesar's term in Gaul as lasting for ten years 2 
and he states explicitly that it was prolonged for five years. 3 The 
suggestion has been put forward that Caesar meant to stand for the 
consulship in 50 and to hold that office in 49 , 4 or at least that he 
was eligible to do so. 5 This seems to me untenable; the whole course 
of the negotiations appears to show clearly that the older view is 
correct on this point. 

The principal question that is left open is that of the precise date 
at which Caesar's command, as extended by the lex Pompeia-Licinia, 
terminated. I am inclined to think, though tentatively, that the 
weight of the evidence available tends to show that it expired in 50 
and probably early in the year. The issue really narrows down to 
the single question of when the second quinquennium began. Did it 
start, as Mommsen held, with the end of the first, that is with 
March 1, 54; or with the end of 55, as Judeich maintains; or with 
the actual passage of the lex Pompeia-Licinia? In the first case 
Caesar's command would end March 1, 49; in the second, December 
29, 50; in the third, in the early part of 50, though on what precise 
day is uncertain. 6 This last conclusion seems to me upon the whole 
the most probable of the three for the reasons which follow. 

1. At Luca it was determined to give each of the triumvirs a 
province and an army. This would place the three upon an osten- 
sibly equal footing, since each of them would now be invested with 
a great command. Moreover it was agreed that these commands 
should all be held for the same length of time; Crassus and Pompey, 



2 Att., vii, 5, 7, 9, for example. 

*Att. r vii, 6. 

*Hirschfeld maintained this view in his articles. 

6 Mispoulet, La vie parlementaire a Rome, 353-54, offers this suggestion. The 
instances which he cites, however, seem to me wholly inconclusive. They are all 
cases of second consulships that occurred before the time of Sulla, who revived an 
old law requiring a ten year interval. The only ground for thinking that Caesar 
had any intention of becoming a candidate in 50 is an expression in a letter of 
Caelius Rufus to Cicero, for which see the final note at the close of this section. 

6 The lex Trebonia and the lex Pompeia-Licinia were passed with no great in- 
terval between them, and from a letter of Cicero (Att., iv, 9) it is clear that the 
first of these had been passed, or at least published, by April 27, 55. The view 
of Meyer (Caesars Monarchic, 158 note 1) is the same as the one here accepted. 



282 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

therefore, were assigned the provinces of Syria and Spain for five 
years and Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul was prolonged for the 
same period. Now it seems clear that the command of Crassus in 
Syria and that of Pompey in Spain began at once on the passage of 
law (lex Trebonia) conferring these provinces upon them. 7 It would 
seem natural, under these circumstances, that Caesar's command 
should be prolonged in such a way that it would not appear on the 
surface to outlast the others. This would be accomplished if his 
second five years were counted in the same way as those of his 
colleagues, namely from the date of the passage of the law extend- 
ing his term. But while willing to put himself on a footing of 
nominal equality with his partners, Caesar was determined to safe- 
guard his second consulship. To do this without making any obvious 
distinction between the three he inserted the special clause forbidding 
any discussion of a successor before March 1, 50, and very probably 
exacted a pledge that at a later time he should be given permission 
to stand for the consulship in absentia. While the Sempronian law 
stood, this arrangement safeguarded Caesar's interests perfectly, 
though rather indirectly. The only reason for such indirection that 
I can see is the desire to avoid as far as possible the appearance 
of giving Caesar any more than was given to his partners. If his 
imperium would outlast theirs by practically a year the- whole ar- 
rangement seems useless, since the clause forbidding discussion of a 
successor before March 1, 50 was quite unnecessary if Caesar's 
term was prolonged till March 1, 49; the fractional part of a year 
would prevent his being superseded during the remainder of 49 
in any case. The speech of Cicero shows that the Gauls could not 
be assigned to any of the magistrates for 50, because they could 
only be given provinces of which they could take immediate pos- 
session. 8 Thus the Gauls could only be assigned to one of the mag- 
istrates for 49, who could not take over their provinces till January 
1, 48. If Caesar's term expired in 50, however, the clause was neces- 
sary to prevent the Gauls being assigned to the consuls for 50, who 
would be able to take over the provinces at the beginning of 49, 
a full year before Caesar meant to leave. The presence of this 
special clause in the bill seems to me, therefore, a strong argument 
in favor of 50. 

2. The only explicit statements which we have in ancient writers 
as to the time when Caesar's command expired point to 50 as the 
year. Dio gives this date and is so sure of it that he shortens the 



7 Judeich bases his theory on the supposition that the terms of Crassus and 
Pompey began January 1, 54 ; this he says there is no reason to doubt. In 
reply Hardy points out that Crassus left Rome for Syria early in November 
(Att., iv, 13). The answer seems to me conclusive and to prove that the_ lex 
Trebonia, like the lex Vatinia, made the proconsulship begin immediately. Cicero 
makes it clear that the Romans would not have tolerated the idea of a proconsul 
wandering about the empire for nearly two months waiting for a _ province to 
become vacant, possessed of the imperium but unable to exercise it anywhere. 

s On the Consular Provinces, 15. 



APPENDIX 283 

second quinquennium to three years to make it fit. 9 This shortening 
is made necessary by an error of two years in Dio's computation. 
He counts Caesar's first five years as beginning with his actual ar- 
rival in Gaul (March, 58) and not from the true date of a year 
earlier (March, 59). The second five years is then reckoned from 
the end of the first, so that if it expired in 50 it could have had a 
duration of only three years. Dio is plainly aware that the state- 
ment had been made that Caesar's term was renewed for a second 
five years, but he sets this aside because of his certainty that his 
term did in fact end in 50. The language of Appian is in accord 
with that of Dio, though it is not quite so explicit; in his narrative 
of the events of 51 he says that Caesar's term was about to expire, 10 
which is strange if it had more than a year still to run. The other 
writers use language which it seems to me will fit either date. It 
is a fact that ought not to be ignored, however, that the only two 
writers who make definite statements as to the date both affirm that 
it was 50, and that there is no equally clear statement of 49 to be 
found anywhere. 

3. The contemporary evidence of the letters of Cicero and those 
of his friend Caelius Rufus seems to me to imply 50. The expres- 
sions to be found here can be, and have been, interpreted to fit the 
date of 49, but such an interpretation involves a rather forced con- 
struction and compels the conclusion that the writers did not say 
what they meant. It will be sufficient to cite one or two of the most 
important passages and I take those that seem to me the most de- 
cisive. 

In June, 50, while Cicero was in Cilicia, Caelius wrote to him: 
"As for politics, every controversy centers on one point — the prov- 
inces. In this matter Pompey as yet seems to have thrown all his 
weight on the side of the senate's wish that Caesar should leave 
his province on the 13th of November. . .The situation turns entirely 
on this: Pompey, professing not to be attacking Caesar, but to be 
making an arrangement which he considers fair to him, says that 
Curio is deliberately seeking pretexts for strife. However, he is 
strongly against, and evidently alarmed at, the idea of Caesar be- 
coming consul-designate before handing over his army and province." 
Quod ad rem pitblicam attinet, in unam causam omnis contentio con- 
lecta est de provinciis; in quam adhuc incubuisse cum senatu Pompeius 
videtur, ut Caesar Id. Nov. decedat; . . .Scaena rei totius haec; Pom- 
peius, tamquam Caesarem non inpugnet, sed, quod Mi aequum putet, 
constituat, ait Curionem quaerere discordias, valde autem non vult 
et plane timet Caesarem cos. desig. prius, quam exercitum et prov- 
inciam tradiderit. 11 As the date stands it would mean November 13, 
50, and the proposal favored by Pompey was that Caesar should be 

?P} ' . xxxiii > 33 J xl > 59 - Guiraud has shown clearly how Dio gets his three years. 

10 Appian, n, 26, 27. 

^Letters, ii, 176-77. Fam., viii, 11. 



284 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

superseded on that date. If Caesar's term had not then legally ended 
it would seem impossible that such a proposition could be represented 
as fair in any sense of the words. Hardy maintains that the date 
should be November 13, 49, and that Caelius writing in haste did 
not take the trouble to make this clear, knowing that Cicero would 
not be in the slightest doubt as to what year he meant. This 
sounds reasonable in itself, but it makes nonsense of the last sentence 
of the passage quoted. If the November in question was in 49, what 
about the fears attributed to Pompey? In November, 49, Caesar 
would already have been elected consul while still holding his army. 
Hardy meets this difficulty by assuming that the final sentence in- 
dicates Pompey's real feelings and not his professions. That is to 
say, Pompey is pretending to support the proposal of the senate that 
Caesar shall stay in Gaul till November, 49, but in reality he is 
opposed to it because he is afraid of Caesar's becoming consul while 
still retaining his army. But this is not what Caelius says; the 
Latin reads quite clearly and in a different sense. Its obvious mean- 
ing is that Pompey supports the proposal of the senate and pretends 
that he is trying to be fair to Caesar, but in his heart he is afraid 
to let Caesar be elected until he has given up his army. In the 
clause beginning valde autem the autem connects what follows with 
what precedes, not with what comes several lines before. If we take 
the passage as it stands and read it in the natural sense of the Latin 
it is fatal to the date of 49. Pompey could not pretend that it was 
fair to supersede Caesar before his legal term had expired, but if it 
had already expired in the early part of 50, then he could very well 
represent a date which allowed Caesar several months extra as a fair 
and even friendly arrangement. It will be noted that the language of 
Caelius is just as fatal to the theory of Judeich as to that of 
Mommsen. 

In his letters written during 50 Cicero also uses language that 
seems on the face of it to imply that Caesar's term has expired. 
In December of that year he wrote to Atticus concerning Caesar's 
demands, "Could anything be more impudent? 'You have held a 
province for ten years, a time not granted you by the senate, but 
assumed by yourself with the help of violence and sedition: this 
period — not assigned by the law, but by your own caprice — has 
passed. Let us, however, grant that it was by the law: a decree 
is made for naming your successor: you cry halt and say, 'Take 
my candidature into consideration.' Rather do you take us into 
consideration. Are you to have an army (against the will of the 
senate) longer than the vote of the people gave it you?' " Nam quid 
impudentius? Tenuisti provinciam per annos decern,, non tibi a, 
senatu, sed a te ipso per vim et per f actionem datos; praeteriit 
tempus non legis, sed libidinis tuae, fac tamen legis; ut succedatur, 
decernitur; impedis et ais: "Habe meam rationem," Habe tu nostram. 



APPENDIX 285 

Exercitum tu habeas diutius, quam populus iussit, invito senatu? 12 
It has been argued that here Cicero is placing himself in imagi- 
nation in the near future and is picturing what will happen two 
or three months hence. This seems possible, but the context sug- 
gests rather that he is speaking of the past and present; the demands 
are those that Caesar was then making and all that Cicero says 
was true of the past; the senate had tried to pass a decree pro- 
viding a successor for Caesar, and Caesar had objected on the 
ground that in granting him the right to be a candidate in absentia 
the people had extended his term by implication. It is therefore 
possible that in the whole passage Cicero meant exactly what he said, 
and if he did it is clear that Caesar's term had expired at the 
time he wrote. An argument in favor of 49 has been based on the 
expression, both in this passage and elsewhere, of ten years as the 
length of Caesar's term. It seems to me, however, that such lan- 
guage is wholly natural and need not be taken too literally; Gaul 
was granted to Caesar for five years by the Vatinian law and then 
for a second five years by the law of Pompey and Crassus. This 
being so, if Cicero washed to speak of the entire term for which 
Caesar held his province it would be very natural for him to add 
the two grants together and describe the command of Caesar under 
the two laws as ten years. Cicero can not be taken too literally, 
since when he wrote Caesar had not held Gaul for ten years, even 
if we assume that Cicero is speaking from the point of view of 
March 1, 49. Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul began March 1, 59 
under the Vatinian law, but he did not leave Rome till March, 58. 
During this year Afranius had been left undisturbed as proconsul 
of the province and therefore Caesar had actually been in possession 
only from March, 58. Thus on any interpretation of the passage 
Cicero must be held to have in mind the legal term and not the actual 
possession, and from this standpoint he might very naturally speak 
of two grants of five years each as ten years. 

Another passage to which reference should be made is found in 
a letter to Atticus written in January, 49, after Caesar had invaded 
Italy. Cicero is boiling over with indignation against Caesar and 
he writes, after mentioning the news of his advance, "Madman! 
Miserable wretch, that has never seen even a shadow of virtue! 
And he says that he is doing all this 'to support his honour'! How 
can there be any 'honour' where there is no moral right? Can it be 
morally right to have an army without commission from the state? 
To seize cities inhabited by one's fellow citizens, as a means of at- 
tacking one's own country? To be contriving abolition of debts, 
restoration of exiles, hundreds of other crimes . . . ?" The Latin of 
the critical part of this passage reads: Atque haec ait omnia facere 
se dignitatis causa. Ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestas? 



^Letters, ii, 232-33. Att., vii, 9. Shuckburgh omits the invito senatu which 
I have inserted in parenthesis. 



286 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico consilio, occupare 
urbes civium, quo facilior sit aditus ad patriam . . . ? 13 Here Cicero 
seems to say clearly that Caesar has no right to have an army. 
But if his command did not end till March 1, 49, he did at that 
time have a perfect legal right to it. It is true that he had no right 
to bring his army into Italy, and perhaps this was what Cicero 
meant, but if so he failed to say this in his excitement. If Caesar's 
term had expired sometime in 50 and if Caesar had since that date 
been holding on in Gaul by blocking the action of the senate through 
his tribunes, then Cicero wrote exactly what he meant. To him it 
seemed preposterous for Caesar to talk about his honor being in- 
volved when he was trying to retain possession of something to 
which he had no legal right. 

One more passage in Cicero's letters should be cited because it 
has been made to figure in the controversy. In December, 50, Cicero 
wrote : "Well then ! Do I approve of votes being taken for a man who 
is retaining an army beyond the legal day? For my part, I say no; 
nor in his absence either. But when the former was granted him, 
so was the latter." Quid ergo? exercitum retinentis, cum legis dies 
transierit, rationem haberi placet? Mihi vero ne absentis quidem; 
sed, cum id datum est, illud una datum est. 14 For my part I can 
not see that much can be made of this. Cicero is clearly thinking of 
Caesar as a candidate, and the passage may mean: Do I approve of 
giving a special privilege to a man who is now (50) holding an 
army beyond his legal term? or it may equally well mean: Do I 
approve of letting a man receive votes who will be keeping an army 
then (when he becomes a candidate, in 49) ? 

The passages cited above seem to me the decisive ones. If it is 
held that these passages will fit the date of March 1, 49, I can not 
see any difficulty in construing the other expressions to be found in 
the correspondence of Cicero to fit it. If it be assumed that Caesar's 
term ended in 50, it does not seem to me that there is anything in 
the language of Cicero that conflicts with it, at least on the surface, 
except his reference to the ten years of Caesar's proconsulship. 
Whatever theory is adopted, there will remain a few expressions 
whose interpretation will offer some difficulty, but these expressions 
fail to fit any theory and the difficulty is no greater for one than 
for the other. 

4. Finally, it seems to me that the policy of Pompey becomes more 
readily intelligible if the date be taken as 50. There seems no ad- 
equate reason for bringing up the question of appointing a successor 
to Caesar in March, 50, if his term had still a year to run. Hardy 
explains this by assuming that it was still doubtful whether or not 
Pompey's new law in regard to the provincial governors had actually 



13 Letters, ii, 241. Att., vii, 11. 
^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 



APPENDIX 287 

repealed the Sempronian law, 15 and Meyer holds that the provisions 
of the latter which required the assignment of the consular provinces 
to take place eighteen months before the governor appointed took 
possession remained in force. 16 Both writers seem to have over- 
looked the fact that the Sempronian law was ignored at the assign- 
ment of the provinces in 51. Cicero was then given the province of 
Cilicia and he left Rome for the East in May, 51. He could not 
possibly have received this province eighteen months before, since 
this would have been before the law of Pompey was passed, and 
under the Sempronian law he was not eligible for a proconsulship. 
It is evident from this that at the beginning of 51 the whole Sem- 
pronian law was regarded as repealed, and if this was true, there 
seems no very good reason for taking up the matter of the succession 
to the Gauls so long in advance of the possibility of effective action. 
Taken in connection with Pompey's pretence of fairness in support- 
ing the proposal to extend Caesar's term till November 13, the whole 
matter is most readily understandable on the supposition that Cae- 
sar's term expired early in 50. The date of March 1, 49, not only 
leaves us in the dark as to why the question should have been brought 
forward so early, but also forces us to put a rather strained inter- 
pretation upon the language of Caelius. 

To sum up briefly my own impressions of the controversy, the 
explicit statement of Dio that Caesar's term expired in 50, which is 
supported by the testimony of Appian, seems evidence not to be 
lightly set aside. In this case it is reinforced by contemporary testi- 
mony. The letters of Caelius Rufus confirm Dio strongly and can 
only be made to fit any other date by a rather strained interpretation. 
Cicero is somewhat less definite, but he too uses language which, if 
read according to its obvious natural meaning, implies that Caesar's 
term had expired in 50. Unless his words as to the ten years of 
Caesar's government are thought to imply 49, Cicero never uses 
language which on the face of it points to that date. Under these 
circumstances I can see no adequate reason for rejecting the author- 
ity of Dio — though he was certainly far from infallible — and for 
interpreting the language of Caelius and Cicero in any other than the 
obvious and natural way. This conclusion seems all the more rea- 
sonable because the date thus given is the one which might be ex- 
pected a priori from the conditions under which the triumvirate was 
renewed at Luca, and because it is strongly implied by what we know 
of the peculiar clause forbidding the discussion of a successor before 
March 1, 50, and lastly because this date fits the details of the 
diplomatic struggle between Pompey and Caesar at least as well 
as any other, if not better. 

Whatever date is accepted, it does not appear to me to make any 
great difference. Caesar certainly meant to retain his command in 



15 Hardy, Jour, of Phil., xxxiv, 178. 
"Meyer, 256 note 2. 



288 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Gaul after his legal term had expired, and Pompey certainly was 
determined that he should be superseded between that date (when- 
ever it was) and the time when he would take office as consul in 
Rome at the beginning of 48. To make this possible, Pompey cer- 
tainly repealed the Sempronian law, and to ward off the new danger 
which this created, Caesar certainly made use of the veto of his 
tribunes. In this way Caesar was able to hold Pompey in check and 
to prevent any decisive action by the senate. Unable to overcome 
these tactics by any other means, Pompey at length resorted to force 
and precipitated the civil war. Whether Caesar's term had actually 
expired, or whether Pompey was simply trying to take such steps 
that he could be superseded immediately after it should expire, is 
after all a question which can hardly affect materially our judgment 
of the actors. 

FINAL NOTE 

In conclusion it may be well to notice two special points that have 
figured in the controversy but to which I am unable to attach any 
decisive importance. One of these is a passage in the eighth book of 
the Gallic War, written by Caesar's friend Hirtius, and the other is 
a passage in a letter of Caelius Rufus. 

In describing the siege of Uxellodunum, Hirtius says of Caesar 
that on learning the steadfast purpose of the townsfolk — "though he 
disregarded their small numbers, he judged nevertheless that their 
obstinacy must be visited with a severe punishment, for he feared 
that the Gauls as a whole might suppose that what had been lacking 
in them for resisting the Romans was not strength, but resolution; 
and that the rest of the states might follow this example and rely 
on any advantage offered by strong positions to reassert their liberty. 
All the Gauls were aware, as he knew, that there was one more 
summer season in his term of office, and that, if they could hold out 
for that, they had no further danger to fear." Quorum etsi pauci- 
tatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficien- 
dam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad re- 
sistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo 
ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in 
libertatem, cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam 
aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum, ultra 
periculum vererentur. 1 ? Hirschfeld makes the unam aestatem refer 
to that summer, namely the summer of 51. Holmes denies the pos- 
sibility of this since only a part of the summer was then left and in 
another connection Caesar speaks of a part of a summer as exigua 
parte aestatis (Gallic War, iv, 20). This does not seem to me very 
conclusive. In the first place, Hirtius is not Caesar, and his use of 

"Caesar, Gallic War, viii, 39. I have taken the translation from that of Edwards 
in the Loeb Library edition, since he interprets the passage in the same fashion 
as Holmes and thinks that the unam aestatem refers to the summer of 50. 



APPENDIX 289 

words might differ from that of his friend. 18 In the second place, 
the context is quite different in the two cases and would in itself 
explain a different form of expression. Lastly, the sense of the 
passage seems much better if Hirschfeld's interpretation is followed. 
Caesar made an example in this case for fear that otherwise the 
other Gauls would prolong their resistance, since they knew that 
that summer was the last of his term. If they thought that they 
had only to hold out a few months, one can readily understand the 
matter, but if the summer referred to is that of 50, as Holmes holds, 
it does not seem so clear; they would in this case have to hold out 
not only for the rest of that summer but for the whole summer of 
50 as well. Under these circumstances it would hardly seem that 
their knowledge of the date when Caesar's proconsulship ended can 
have had any very great influence on their conduct. However, if 
the point be conceded and it be admitted that the summer in question 
was that of 50, does that prove that Caesar's term ended in 49? 
For my part I can not see that it does. The Gauls may not have 
been well informed as to the technicalities of Roman law, but they 
must surely have known something of the plans of Caesar, if only 
because his whole army must have known them. Now Caesar's plan 
was to stay in Gaul till the end of 49 so that he expected to spend 
two more summers there. However, since in the summer of 49 he 
would be a candidate for the consulship, he would of necessity have 
to pass the summer in the Cisalpine province and could not under- 
take military operations on the other side of the Alps. They might 
therefore reason that 50 was the last summer which they had to 
fear, because it was the last in which their conqueror would be able 
to take the field against them. In short, I do not see that this 
passage can be regarded as decisive either way, and it seems to me 
quite possible to reconcile it with either date. 

In a letter of Caelius Rufus, written in October, 51, he tells Cicero 
among other things that Caesar has made up his mind not to be a 
candidate this next year, neque hoc anno sua ratio habeatur. 19 If 
this passage stood alone we should have no hesitation in deciding 
that hoc anno meant 50. An attempt has been made on the basis 
of it to maintain that Caesar meant to be a candidate in that year 
and hence meant to hold the consulship in 49. I can not think that 
this attempt has met with any success, and it must, I believe, be 
taken as established that Caesar did not mean to be a candidate in 
50. But what then are we to do with the remark of Caelius? Two 
explanations of it have been suggested, one by Hardy and the other 



18 To me the force of Holmes' argument from the usage of Caesar is very greatly 
weakened, if not entirely destroyed, by his admission that Caesar never uses the 
word provincia in the sense here given to it. If Hirtius did not use single words 
in the same sense as Caesar, I really can not see why he was bound to use phrases 
in the same way. See Holmes, Caesar de Belio Gallico, 389 note. 

^Letters, ii, 78. Fam., viii, 8. 



290 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

by Meyer. Hardy thinks that the words hoc anno should be under- 
stood to mean this year, that is, the year that we both have in mind. 
Meyer thinks that the passage probably refers to some compromise 
proposal that had been put forward of which one provision was that 
Caesar should be given a special dispensation to permit of his election 
as consul in 50. So far as I can see the words of Caelius are equally 
difficult for all theories, and therefore nothing can be made of them 
in favor of any one. 



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF CONSULS CLASSIFIED ACCORD- 
ING TO THEIR RANK 

In the following list the names of the consuls who held an active 
command in the imperial army or provinces, either before or after 
their consulship have been printed in italics. A list of consulars 
who were so employed, with indications as to time and place, is given 
separately. Those consuls whose names are inclosed in parentheses 
died in office. Republicans (in the column headed Republicans and 
Nobles from praetorian families) are marked by an asterisk. A 
more complete knowledge of the praetors would undoubtedly transfer 
some names from the third column to the second. 



Date 


Nobles from consular 
families 


Republicans and nobles from 
praetorian families 


New men 


30 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar IV 
M. Licinius Crassus 
M. Tullius Cicero 


C. Antistius Vetus 
L. Saenius Balbinus 




29 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar V 

M. Valerius Messalla 
Potitus 




Sex. Appuleius 1 


28 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar VI 




M. Vipsanius Agrippa 1 


27 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar VII 




M. Vipsanius Agrippa 1 
III 


26 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar VIII 




T. Statilius Taurus 
II 


25 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar IX 
M. Junius Silanus 






24 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar X 

C. Norbanus Flaccus 






23 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar XI 

(A. Terentims Varro 

Murena) 
Cn. Calpurnius Piso Frugi 


*L. Sestius Quirinus 




22 B.C. 


M. Claudius Marcellus 
Aeserninus 


*L. Arruntius 




21 B.C. 


Q. Aemilius Lepidus 




M. Lollius 


20 B.C. 




P. Silius Nerva 


M. Appuleius 1 


19 B.C. 




*Q. Lucretius Vespillo 
*C. Sentius Saturninus 


M. Vinicius 



l A relative of Augustus. 



292 



THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 



Date 


Nobles from consular 
families 


Republicans and nobles from 
praetorian families 


New men 


18 B.C. 


P. Cornelius Lentulus 

Marcellinus 
Cn. Cornelius Lentulus 






17 B.C. 


C. Furnius 

C. Junius Silanus 






16 B.C. 


L. Domitius Ahenobarbus 2 
P. Cornelius Scipio 




L. Tarius Rufus 


15 B.C. 


M. Livius Drusus Libo 
L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi 






14 B.C. 


M. Licinius Crassus 
Cn. Cornelius Lentulus 
Augur 






13 B.C. 


Ti. Claudius Nero 2 


P. Quinctilius Varus 2 




12 B.C. 


( M. Valerius Messalla 

Barbatus Appianus ) 2 
(C. Caninius Rebilus) 


L. Volusius Saturninus 


P. Sulpicius Quirinius 
C. Valgius Rufus 


11 B.C. 


Paullus Fabius Maximus 


Q. Aelius Tubero 




10 B.C. 


C. Julius Antonius 
Q. Fabius Maximus 
Africanus 






9 B.C. 


( Nero Claudius Drusus ) 2 
T. Quinctius Crispinus 
Sulpicianus 




A. Caecina Severus 


8 B.C. 


C. Marcius Censorinus 
C. Asinius Gallus 






7 B.C. 


Ti. Claudius Nero IP 
Cn. Calpurnius Piso 






6 B.C. 


C. Antistius Vetus 




D. Laelius Balbus 


5 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar XII 
L. Cornelius Sulla 
L. Vinicius 
Sex. Pompeius 
Ser. Sulpicius Galba 






4 B.C. 


C. Calvisius Sabinus 




L. Passienus Rufus 


3 B.C. 


L. Cornelius Lentulus 
M. Valerius Messalla 
Corvinus 






2 B.C. 


Imp. Caesar XIII 
L. Caninius Gallus 


M. Plautius Silvanus 


Q. Fabricius 

C. Fufius Geminus 


1 B.C. 


Cossus Cornelius 

Lentulus 
L. Calpurnius Piso 

Augur 









a A relative of Augustus. 



APPENDIX 



293 



Date 


Nobles from consular 
families 


Republicans and nobles from 
praetorian families 


New men 


1 A.D. 


C. Caesar 3 

M. Herennius Picens 

L. Aemilius Paullus 






2 A.D. 


T. Quinctius Crispinus 

Valerianus 
P. Alfenus Varus 
P. Vinicius 
P. Cornelius Lentulus 

Scipio 






3 A.D. 


L. Volusius Saturninus 
P. SUius 


L. Aelius Lamia 


M. Servilius Nonianus 


4 A.D. 


C. Sentius Saturninus 
Cn. Sentius Saturninus 




C. Clodius Licinus 
Sex. Aelius Catus 


5 A.D. 


L. Valerius Messalla 

Volesus 
Cn. Cornelius Cinna 

Magnus 


C. Ateius Capito 


C. Vibius Postumus 


6 A.D. 


M. Aemilius Lepidus 
L. Arruntius 


L. Nonius Asprenas 




7 A.D. 


A. Licinius Nerva 

Silianus 
Q. Caecilius Metellus 

Creticus Silanus 




. . . Lucilius Longus 


8 A.D. 


M. Furius Camillus 


Sex. Nonius Quinctili- 
anus 


L. Apronius 

A. Vibius Habitus 


9 A.D. 






C. Poppaeus Sabinus 
Q. Sulpicius Camerinus 
M. Papius Mutilus 
Q. Poppaeus Secundus 


10 A.D. 


P. Cornelius Dolabella 
C. Junius Silanus 
Ser. Cornelius Lentulus 
Maluginensis 




Q. Junius Blaesus 


11 A.D. 


M\ Aemilius Lepidus 
L. Cassius Longinus 
T. Statilius Taurus 






12 A.D. 


Germanicus Caesar 3 
C. Fonteius Capito 




C. Visellius Varro 


13 A.D. 4 


L. Munatius Plancus 
C. SUius Caecina Largus 






14 A.D. 


Sex. Pompeius 
Sex. Appuleius 







3 A relative of Augustus. . . . . 

*In 13 a.d. there was another consul whose name is lost except for the iasx 
three letters namely, cits. 



A LIST OF CONSULARS ACTIVE IN THE IMPERIAL SERVICE 

From 30 B.C. to 23 B.C. 

T. Statilius Taurus. Cos. 37 and 26 B.C. In Spain 29 B.C. 

A new man. 
M. Licinius Crassus. Cos. 30 B.C. Macedonia 29 B.C. 1 A 

grandson of the triumvir. Of an old and distinguished 

family. 
M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Cos. 31 B.C. In Gaul 28-27 B.C. 

Of an old and distinguished family. 
Sex. Appuleius. Cos. 29 B.C. In Spain 27 B.C. A nephew 

of Augustus through his mother. His father is unknown. 
M. Tullius Cicero. Cos. 30 B.C. In Syria 27 B.C. A son of 

the orator. A noble. 
C. Antistius Vetus. Cos. 30 B.C. In Spain 25 B.C. Of a 

praetorian family. 
L. Aemilius Paullus Lepidus. Cos. 34 B.C. In Spain 24 B.C. 

Of an old and distinguished family. 

From 22 B.C. to 13 B.C. 

M. Lollius. Cos. 21 B.C. In Germany 16 B.C. and in Thrace 

shortly before this. A new man. 
M. Vinicius. Cos. 19 B.C. In Pannonia 13 B.C. A new man. 
L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. In Pamphylia 13 B.C. 

A noble. 

From 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. 

L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. In Thrace from 13 to 

11 B.C. A noble. 
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Cos. 16 B.C. In Germany 9 and 2 

B.C. A noble. 
M. Titius. Cos. 31 B.C. In Syria 9 B.C. A new man. 
C. Sentius Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. In Syria 8 to 6 B.C. A 

member of the old republican party but not apparently of 

high birth. 
P. Quinctilius Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. In Syria 6 to 4 B.C. Of 

a praetorian family. 
P. Sulpicius Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 3 to 2 B.C. He 

probably remained as a counselor of C. Caesar perhaps till 

4 a.d. A new man. 
C. Marcius Censorinus. Cos. 8 B.C. In Syria as a counselor of 

C. Caesar 1 B.C. to 2 a.d. A noble. 



Macedonia was not an imperial province but the division was not made till 
27 B.C. and as Crassus commanded a considerable force he should probably be 
reckoned a lieutenant of Augustus. 



APPENDIX 295 

M. Lollius. Cos. 21 B.C. In Syria as a counselor of C. Caesar 

I B.C. to 2 A.D. A new man. 

M. Vinicius. Cos. 19 B.C. In Pannonia and afterwards in Ger- 
many 1 B.C. to 2 A.D. A new man. 

From 4 a.d. to 14 a.d. 

C. Sentius Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. In Germany 4 to 6 A.D. 

A member of the republican party but not apparently of 

high birth. 
L. Aelius Lamia. Cos. 3 A.D. In Illyricum 4 to 6 A.D. Of a 

praetorian family. 
L. Volusius Saturninus. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 4 to 5 A.D. Of 

a praetorian family. 
P. Sulpicius Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 6 A.D. A new 

man. 
A. Caecina Severus. Cos. 9 B.C. In Moesia 6 a.d. A new man. 
M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Cos. 3 B.C. In Pannonia 6 A.D. 

Of an old noble family. 
M. Plautius Silvanus. Cos. 2 B.C. In Pannonia 6 to 9 A.D. Of 

a praetorian family. 
L. Nonius Asprenas. Cos. 6 A.D. In Germany 7 to 9 A.D. 

Perhaps of a praetorian family. 
P. Quinctilius Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. In Germany 6 to 9 A.D. 

Of a praetorian family. 
C. Vibius Postumus. Cos. 5 A.D. In Dalmatia 9 a.d. A new 

man. 
A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. Cos. 7 A.D. In Germany probably 

before 9 a.d. Of a family raised to consular rank by 

Augustus. 
M. Aemilius Lepidus. Cos. 6 A.D. In Pannonia 8 A.D. and in 

Spain 14 A.D. Of an old noble family. 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Cos. 7 A.D. In Syria 

II to 17 a.d. Of an old noble family. 

C. Poppaeus Sabinus. Cos. 9 a.d. In Moesia 11 to 35 A.D. A 

new man. 
P. Cornelius Dolabella. Cos. 10 A.D. In Dalmatia 14 a.d. Of 

an old noble family. 
L. Apronius. Cos. 9 a.d. In Germany 14 a.d. A new man. 
Q. Junius Blaesus. Cos. 10 a.d. In Pannonia 14 A.D. A new 

man. 
C. Silius Caecina Largus. Cos. 13 a.d. In Germany 14 A.D. 

Of a family raised to consular rank by Augustus. 

There are three cases which remain doubtful. They are as follows: 

Cn. Cornelius Lentulus. Cos. 18 B.C. We know from Florus 

that he inflicted a defeat upon the Dacians and checked the 

barbarians who were making attacks across the Danube. 



296 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

The date, however, is uncertain but it may well have been 
after his consulship and in connection with a legateship in 
Illyricum. It is possible that his service was before he 
attained consular rank, or it may have been while he was 
serving in the senate's province of Macedonia. He was 
probably of an old noble family. 

Gn. Calpurnius Piso. Cos. 7 B.C. It is clear from Tacitus that 
Piso had governed Spain but the time is uncertain. It 
seems not unlikely that it was shortly after his consulship, 
or at least within the limits of the period from 12 B.C. to 
3 a.d. He was probably of an old noble family. 

Sex. Aelius Catus. Cos. 4 a.d. We know from Strabo that he 
was in command in Thrace but the time is uncertain. It 
may well have been that it was after his consulship and 
that he should be counted among the consulars of the period 
from 4 to 14 a.d. He was probably a new man. 



ANALYSIS OF THE CONSULAR FASTI 

A somewhat more detailed analysis of the consular fasti from 
22 B.C. to the end of the reign than that given in the text, where 
only the general results have been cited, may be desirable. In the 
ten years from 22 B.C. to 13 B.C., inclusive, there were in all twenty- 
two consuls. Of these one was Tiberius, the stepson of the emperor, 
destined to succeed him on the throne, but not at that time re- 
garded as his heir. Another was a certain M. Appuleius, who was 
probably a nephew of Augustus through the emperor's sister Octavia 
Major. The remaining twenty include some seven who were cer- 
tainly members of families of consular rank. These seven were as 
follows, the date of their consulship preceding their names: 

21 B.C. Q. Aemilius Lepidus. Son of the triumvir. 

18 B.C. P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus. Grandson of cos. 

56 B.C. 

17 B.C. C. Furnius. Son of a man given consular rank by 

Augustus. 
16 B.C. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Son of cos. 32 B.C. 
16 B.C. P. Cornelius Scipio. Son of cos. 38 B.C. 
15 B.C. L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Son of cos. 58 B.C. 
14 B.C. M. Licinius Crassus. Son of cos. 30 B.C. or perhaps 
grandson of triumvir. 
In addition to the seven named above, two men were given the 
consulship who belonged to families of praetorian rank; they were 
20 B.C. P. Silius Nerva. 
13 B.C. P. Quinctilius Varus. 
Three men were advanced to the consulship who, without belong- 
ing to families of high rank in the nobility, had adhered to the re- 
publican cause and had been proscribed by the triumvirs; they were 

22 B.C. L. Arruntius. 

19 B.C. Q. Lucretius Vespillo. 
19 B.C. C. Sentius Saturninus. 

There remain to be considered a certain number of doubtful names. 
In a period of such confusion as that which had just closed it would 
not be strange if many men of high rank had perished leaving no 
trace behind; this would be especially likely in the case of the younger 
men of rank. After such a period we might expect to find a number 
of men whose names suggest relationship to some of the great houses 
of the aristocracy, but whose descent can not be determined with 
certainty. This is actually the case; no less than five such names 
occur in the consular fasti for these ten years. These five were as 
follows : 

22 B.C. M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus. 

18 B.C. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus. 



298 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

17 B.C. C. Junius Silanus. 

15 B.C. M. Livius Drusus Libo. 

14 B.C. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Augur. 
Of these, M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus was certainly related 
to the Cornelii Lentuli Marcellini and was very probably connected 
with the Claudii Marcelli, who were of consular rank. His exact 
connection with the Claudii is uncertain, so that it can not be said 
positively that any of his direct ancestors had held the consulship. 
The next case, that of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, is typical of several 
others. The Cornelii Lentuli were an old and distinguished family, 
and it seems likely that the Lentulus in question was a member of 
this house. Positive proof is unfortunately lacking, as the indica- 
tion of his father's name which is furnished by Dio is not sufficient 
to connect him definitely with any known member of the family; the 
Lucius whose son he was might have been the son of any one of 
several of the Lentuli who figure at an earlier period. It is of 
course possible that there was no connection between the consul for 
18 B.C. and the noble family bearing the same name. Among the 
Romans family names were sometimes duplicated, and the name of 
Cornelius was a common one. However, since the policy of Augustus 
was distinctly favorable to a revival of the old nobility, it seems more 
probable that the man in question was a member of the noble house 
and owed his promotion, at least in part, to that fact, despite our 
inability to trace his descent with certainty. The same considerations 
apply to the cases of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Augur and C. Junius 
Silanus. There remains for consideration only the name of M. Livius 
Drusus Libo, concerning whom there has been some controversy. 
Borghesi thinks he was an adopted son of the father of the empress 
Livia; if so he would have been the descendant (by adoption) of the 
consular family of the Livii Drusi. Mommsen has questioned this 
conjecture, 1 but it seems probable that he was connected with the 
consular family in question, though precisely in what way remains 
somewhat uncertain. It would seem a not unreasonable conclusion 
that all five of the men here set down as doubtful were nobles belong- 
ing to families of consular rank. 

In the period under consideration there occur but three names that 
suggest no connection whatever with the aristocracy. These new men 
were 

21 B.C. M. Lollius. 

19 B.C. M. Vinicius. 

16 B.C. L. Tarius Rufus. 

Of these it may be said briefly that the fasti show no such name 
as Lollius for the previous two hundred years, while we are expressly 
informed that neither Vinicius nor Rufus was of noble birth. It 
may also be of interest to note that all three of the new men were 
soldiers. 



1 B'oth opinions are quoted in the Prosopographia. 



APPENDIX 299 

To summarize the results of this analysis for the period, it may 
be said that of the consuls for this decade two were connected with 
the imperial house, seven were taken from families o? consular rank, 
five were probably from such families, two were nobles descended 
from families of praetorian rank, three were men of marked re- 
publican affiliations, and only three were new men representing mili- 
tary distinction rather than birth. 

In the period from 12 B.C. to 1 a.d., inclusive, it is possible to 
identify a larger number of the consuls as taken from the highest 
rank of the nobility. The waste of the civil wars had now been to 
some degree repaired and a new aristocracy was forming, composed 
of those old families that had survived the period of storm and the 
descendants of those who had come to the front in the confusion. 
It will be noted that the number of consuls belonging to these more 
recently ennobled families was much greater in this period than in 
the one preceding. In the decade just passed there was but one 
consul representing this recent nobility, namely C. Furnius. In this 
period of thirteen years there were at least six and probably seven; 
namely, C. Caninius Rebilus, A. Asinius Gallus, C. Antistius Vetus, 
C. Calvisius Sabinus, L. Caninius Gallus, L. Vinicius and probably 
M. Herennius Picens. In the last case the doubt arises from the 
fact that, while the family name is new, the gentile name had oc- 
curred before in the fasti, a certain M. Herennius having been consul 
in 93 B.C. 

In the thirteen years in question there were thirty-five consuls — 

besides the emperor himself, who held the office on two occasions. 

Of the thirty-five, three were members of the imperial family; 

namely, Nero Claudius Drusus, Tiberius, who held the office a second 

time, and C. Caesar. 

Of the remaining thirty-two, there were at least seventeen who 
were nobles belonging to families of consular rank; they were as 
follows: 

12 B.C. C. Caninius Rebilus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
11 B.C. Paullus Fabius Maximus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
10 B.C. C. Julius Antonius. Son of the triumvir. 
10 B.C. Q. Fabius Maximus Africanus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
8 B.C. C. Marcius Censorinus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
8 B.C. C. Asinius Gallus. Son of cos. 40 B.C. 
7 B.C. Cn. Calpurnius Piso. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 
6 B.C. C. Antistius Vetus. Son of cos. 30 B.C. 
5 B.C. L. Vinicius. Son of cos. 33 B.C. 
5 B.C. Ser. Sulpicius Galba. Descended from cos. 108 B.C. 
4 B.C. C. Calvisius Sabinus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
3 B.C. M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Son of cos. 31 B.C. 
2 B.C. L. Caninius Gallus. Son of cos. 37 B.C. 
1 B.C. Cossus Cornelius Lentulus. Son of cos. 18 B.C. 



300 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

1 B.C. L. Calpurnius Piso Augur. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 

1 A.D. M. Herennius Picens. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 

1 A.D. L. Aemilius Paullus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
In addition to these seventeen, there were five others who were 
probably nobles of consular descent, though their fathers can not 
be identified so certainly; these five were 

12 B.C. M. Valerius Messalla Barbatus Appianus. 

9 B.C. T. Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus. 

5 B.C. L. Cornelius Sulla. 

5 B.C. Sex. Pompeius. 

3 B.C. L. Cornelius Lentulus. 
Of these, Valerius Messalla has been thought to be a son of the 
consul for 38 B.C. adopted by the consul for 53 B.C. In any case 
he was connected by marriage with the imperial family, his wife 
being Claudia Marcella, the daughter of Augustus' sister Octavia. 
L. Cornelius Sulla was probably descended from a brother of the 
dictator and from the Sulla who was elected consul in 66 B.C. but 
whose election was set aside by the senate. L. Cornelius Lentulus 
may have been a brother of the consul for 18 B.C.; in any case it 
seems reasonable to suppose that he was a member of the noble house 
of the Cornelii Lentuli. T. Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus is some- 
what more doubtful. There was an old patrician family at Rome 
bearing the name of Quinctius Crispinus; the last of this name to 
gain the consulship held the office in 208 B.C. However, in 55 B.C. 
there was a quaestorian senator of this name who may have been the 
father of the consul for 9 B.C. by adoption. Willems conjectures 
that the senator in question may have held the praetorship at a later 
date, 2 and while this seems very probable it can not be called certain. 
On the whole it seems likely that the consul for 9 B.C. was a member 
of an old consular family which had not risen above the praetor- 
ship for many years. Sex. Pompeius also presents some difficulty. 
It has been suggested that he was a son of the consul for 31 B.C.; 
if this is correct he was probably a descendant of the consul for 
88 B.C. and his ancestors had borne the name of Pompeius Rufus. 
His grandfather's name as given by Klein is inconsistent with this, 
but the name is very doubtful. If the name be taken as established 
as Sex. Pompeius Cn.f.Sex.n., then it would seem very possible that 
he was the son of a younger brother of the consul for 35 B.C. Such 
a relationship would make him a member of the same family as the 
great Pompey, he being a descendant of a brother of the triumvir's 
father. Whatever the exact descent of the consul for 35 B.C., it seems 
likely that he belonged to a family of consular rank. 

Among the consuls for this period there were three who came from 
praetorian families; they were 



2 Willems, i, 508. 



APPENDIX 301 

12 B.C. L. Volusius Saturninus. 

11 B.C. Q. Aelius Tubero. 

2 B.C. M. Plautius Silvanus. 
Of these three the case of Aelius Tubero is the most doubtful. A 
certain L. Aelius Tubero held the praetorship between 66 B.C. and 
60 B.C. 3 and this consul may have been his descendant. The grand- 
father of Plautius Silvanus was praetor in 51 B.C., but it is just 
possible that the family had consular rank, since there was a 
M. Plautius Hypsaeus who was consul in 125 B.C. However, it 
would seem rash to assume that there was any relationship between 
this consul and the M. Plautius Silvanus who held the office in 

2 B.C. 

Among the consuls for the period there occur names of seven men 
who seem to have been new to the highest office; they were 

12 B.C. P. Sulpicius Quirinius. 
12 B.C. C. Valgius Rufus. 

9 B.C. A. Caecina Severus. 

6 B.C. D. Laelius Balbus. 

4 B.C. L. Passienus Rufus. 

2 B.C. C. Fufius Geminus. 

2 B.C. Q. Fabricius. 
Of these seven, five bear gentile names which do not occur in the 
consular fasti for the preceding two centuries. There had been a 
consul of the name of Laelius in 190 B.C., but there seems no reason 
to connect him in any way with the consul for 6 B.C. The Sulpicii 
were an old and aristocratic family in Rome, but Tacitus expressly 
informs us that the consul for 12 B.C. was not connected with it. 4 
To sum up the results of the analysis for this period, it may be said 
that three of the consuls were members of the imperial family, 
seventeen were members of noble families of consular rank, five 
others were probably members of such families, three were probably 
nobles belonging to families of praetorian rank, and seven were 
new men. 

In the period from 2 a.d. to 14 a.d. there is a decided increase 
in the number of new men, but, as the number of the consuls was 
increased at the same time, it is not accompanied by any decrease 
in the number of consuls who were taken from the highest rank of 
the aristocracy. Of the consuls for the period (ignoring one whose 
name has perished except for the last three letters) we find no less 
than twenty-two who certainly belonged to consular families, includ- 
ing one member of the imperial house. These twenty-two were as 
follows : 

2 a.d. P. Alfenus Varus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 

2 a.d. P. Vinicius. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 

2 a.d. P. Cornelius Lentulus Scipio. Son of cos. 14 B.C. 



3 Willems, i, 468-69. 
*Tacitus, iii, 48. 



302 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

3 A.D. L. Volusius Saturninus. — Son of cos. 12 B.C. 

3 a.d. P. Silius. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 

4 A.D. C. Sentius Saturninus. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 

4 a.d. Cn. Sentius Saturninus. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 

5 A.D. L. Valerius Messalla Volesus. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 

5 A.D. Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus. Grandson of cos. 87 B.C. 

and of the great Pompey. 

6 a.d. M. Aemilius Lepidus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 

6 a.d. L. Arruntius. Son of cos. 22 B.C. 

7 A.D. A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. Son of cos. 20 B.C. adopted 

by a Licinius Nerva. 

7 A.D. Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Adopted son of 

a grandson of cos. 69 B.C. 
10 a.d. P. Cornelius Dolabella. Grandson of cos. 44 B.C. 
M\ Aemilius Lepidus. Son of cos. 21 B.C. 
T. Statilius Taurus. Grandson of cos. 26 B.C. 
Germanicus Caesar. Member of imperial family. 
C. Fonteius Capito. Son or grandson of cos. 33 B.C. 
L. Munatius Plancus. Son of cos. 42 B.C. 
C. Silius A. Caecina Largus. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 
Sex. Pompeius. Son of cos. 5 B.C. or grandson of cos. 

B.C. 

Sex. Appuleius. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 
In addition to these, there were five consuls whose relationships 
are somewhat doubtful, but who were probably of noble and even of 
consular descent. These five were the following: 
2 A.D. T. Quinctius Crispinus Valerianus. 

8 A.D. M. Furius Camillus. 
10 A.D. C. Junius Silanus. 

10 a.d. Ser. Cornelius Lentulus Maluginensis. 

11 a.d. L. Cassius Longinus. 

Of these five, Quinctius Crispinus has been thought to be an adopted 
son of the consul for 9 B.C., 5 which from the names seems very 
likely. Furius Camillus is expressly said by Tacitus to be a de- 
scendant of the ancient dictator. 6 No member of the family had 
held the consulship for more than 300 years, however. Just how the 
Romans would view the revival of claims to nobility so long dormant 
can not be regarded as quite certain, though from the general temper 
of the times one might surmise that a man representing so old a 
house would be welcomed rather than otherwise. Junius Silanus was 
probably a member of the noble family of that name, but his descent 
can not be traced with certainty. Cornelius Lentulus Maluginensis 
was certainly of patrician descent, as is made quite clear by Tacitus, 7 
and he was probably descended from the old patrician house of that 



11 


A.D. 


11 


A.D. 


12 


A.D. 


12 


A.D. 


13 


A.D. 


13 


A.D. 


14 


A.D. 




35 


14 


A.D. 



B Prosopographia. 
e Tac, ii, 52. 
7 Tac, iv, 16. 



APPENDIX 303 

name. Perhaps he stood in somewhat the same case as Furius 
Camillus. Cassius Longinus bears a name which seems to connect 
him with a noble house of plebeian origin. Tacitus says of him :hat 
he was of a plebeian, but old and respected family. The son of the 
present consul was banished by Nero because he had among the 
images of his ancestors one of Cassius the conspirator. 8 This does 
not make his descent entirely clear, however, since the father of the 
murderer of Caesar is unknown. At any rate there was a family 
of the name which had furnished a number of consuls to Rome and 
the conspirator may very well have been descended from one cf 
them. Even if this were not the case, a relationship to the "last of 
the Romans" might seem sufficient claim to noble rank in the eyes of 
the republican aristocracy, if not in those of Augustus. 

In addition to the nobles mentioned above, there were four consuls 
who came from families of praetorian rank, namely, 
3 a.d. L. Aelius Lamia. 

5 a.d. C. Ateius Capito. 

6 a.d. L. Nonius Asprenas. 

8 a.d. Sex. Nonius Quinctilianus. 

Of the remaining consuls, all thirteen should probably be regarded 
as new men. There is some possible doubt in the case of four of 
them, however. These four were as follows: 

3 A.D. M. Servilius Nonianus. 

4 a.d. Sex. Aelius Catus. 

9 A.D. Q. Sulpicius Camerinus. 
10 A.D. Q. Junius Blaesus. 

In the case of the first of these, there was an old gens bearing 
the name Servilius to which the consul may have belonged, but his 
relationship is doubtful. The other three all bear gentile names of 
distinction, but their family names are new to the consular fasti. 

The remaining nine, who were almost certainly new men, were as 
follows : 

4 a.d. C. Clodius Licinus. 

5 a.d. C. Vibius Postumus. 

7 a.d. Lucilius Longinus. 

8 a.d. L. Apronius. 

8 a.d. A. Vibius Habitus. 

9 a.d. C. Poppaeus Sabinus. 

9 A.D. Q. Poppaeus Secundus. 
9 a.d. M. Papius Mutilus. 
12 a.d. C. Visellius Varro. 
Not only is the family name of these men strange to the consular 
fasti, but the gentile name as well. The only exceptions to this state- 
ment would be in case Clodius Licinus were a member of the great 
Claudian house, with which there seems to be no reason to connect 

8 Tac, vi, 15 and xvi, 7. 



304 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

him, or in case the two Vibii were descendants of C. Vibius Pansa, 
cos. 43 B.C., which it would be rash to assume, but which is just 
possible. Even if the Vibii in question were so related, it still seems 
doubtful whether they should be considered nobles. Pansa was not 
a member of the higher aristocracy and only obtained the consul- 
ship by virtue of Caesar's appointment. Since then about fifty years 
had passed and during this time his family had made no particular 
mark. Under these circumstances it may be doubted whether his 
descendants would be regarded by the nobles as really belonging 
to the aristocracy. 

To sum up the results of the analysis for this period, it may be 
said that twenty-two of the consuls were almost certainly nobles 
belonging to families of consular rank, including one member of the 
imperial house, five others were probably nobles of the same rank, 
or what was regarded as its equivalent, four were members of fami- 
lies of prateorian rank, and thirteen were new men. 



A LIST OF THE CONSULS FROM 30 B.C. TO 14 a.d. ARRANGED 
ALPHABETICALLY UNDER THEIR GENTILE NAMES 

In the following list the attempt has been made to give such facts 
as are pertinent to the purposes of the present work concerning each 
consul. In general the list is based upon the Prosopographia Imperii 
Romani, but in some few cases facts have been added which are not 
there given. In these instances a reference has been appended giving 
the authority for the statement. Where no such indication occurs 
the facts stated will be found in the Prosopographia with full in- 
formation as to the original sources. 

For a discussion of the reasons for considering a consul as a noble 
or a new man, where they are not obvious from the information in 
this list, the reader is referred to the Analysis of the Consular Fasti 
in this Appendix. 

Aelius. 

Sex. Aelius Q.f.L.n. Catus. Cos. 4 a.d. Transported 50,000 
Getae across the Danube into Thrace but at what time is 
uncertain. 

L. Aelius L.f.L.n. Lamia. Cos. 3 a.d. Fought in Illyricum under 
Tiberius 4-6 a.d. His father was of praetorian rank. 

Q. Aelius Q.f. Tubero. Cos. 11 B.C. The son of a distinguished 
jurist. A certain L. Aelius Tubero held the praetorship be- 
tween 66 and 60 B.C. (Willems, i, 468). 
Aemilius. 

Q. A6milius M.f.M.n Lepidus. Cos. 21 B.C. Son of the triumvir. 

M'. Aemilius Q.f.M.n. Lepidus. Cos. 11 A.D. Son of the preced- 
ing. 

M. Aemilius Paulli f.L.n. Lepidus. Cos. 6 a.d. Serving under 
Tiberius in Pannonia in 8 A.D. Maintained order in Spain 
14 a.d. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 

L. Aemilius L.f.L.n. Paullus. Cos. 1 a.d. Married the grand- 
daughter of Augustus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
Alfenus. 

P. Alfenus P.f.P.n. Varus. Cos. 2 A.D. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
Antistius. 

C. Antistius Vetus. Cos. 30 B.C. An officer of both Caesar and 
Augustus. Served as legate in Spain 25 B.C. His father 
had been propraetor of Spain. 

C. Antistius C.f. Vetus. Cos. 6 B.C. Son of the preceding. 
Antonius. 

C. Julius Antonius M.f.M.n. Cos. 10 B.C. Son of the triumvir 
by Fulvia. 



306 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Appuleius. 

Sex. Appuleius Sex.f.Sex.n. Cos. 29 B.C. Proconsul in Spain 
and celebrated a triumph for his victories there in 26 B.C. 
Son of Octavia, sister of Augustus. Of his father nothing 
is known beyond the name. 
M. Appuleius Sex.f. Cos. 20 B.C. Before his consulship, in 
23 B.C., an officer in the army. His father's name suggests 
that he was probably a brother of the preceding. 
Sex. Appuleius Sex.f. Cos. 14 a.d. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 1 
Apronius. 

L. Apronius C.f.C.n. Cos. 8 A.D. Served under Drusus in Pan- 
nonia 6-9 a.d. Lieutenant of Germanicus in Germany 14- 
15 A.D. 
Arruntius. 

L. Arruntius L.f.L.n. Cos. 22 B.C. Proscribed by the triumvirs 
he fled to Sextus Pompey but was pardoned by the treaty of 
Misenum. Commanded part of Octavian's fleet at Actium. 
L. Arruntius L.f.L.n. Cos. 6 a.d. Tiberius regarded him with 
suspicion as worthy of the throne. He married a grand- 
daughter of Pompey (Drumann). Son of cos. 22 B.C. 
Asinius. 

C. Asinius C.f. Gallus. Cos. 8 B.C. He married Vipsania, the 
divorced wife of Tiberius. Augustus called him ambitious 
of the throne but unworthy. Son of C. Asinius Pollio, cos. 
40 B.C. 
Ateius. 

C. Ateius L.f.L.n. Capito. Cos. 5 A.D. An eminent jurist he 
was curator aquarum 13-22 a.d. His father was of prae- 
torian rank. 
Caecilius. 

Q. Caecilius Q.f.M.n. Metellus Creticus Silanus. Cos. 7 a.d. 
Governor of Syria 11-17 a.d. He was probably a descendent 
by adoption of Q. Metellus Creticus, cos 69 B.C., who was a 
member of an old consular family. 
Caecina. 

A. Caecina Severus. Cos. 9 B.C. Governor of Moesia 6 A.D. 
Legate in Germany 14 A.D. 
Calpurnius. 

Cn. Calpurnius Cn.f.Cn.n. Piso. Cos. 7 B.C. Governor of Spain 

but at what time is unknown. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 
L. Calpurnius Cn.f. Piso Augur. Cos. 1 B.C. Another son of 

cos. 23 B.C. 
Cn. Calpurnius Cn.f.Cn.n. Piso Frugi. Cos. 23 B.C. A bitter 
republican. He fought against Caesar and later joined 
Brutus and Cassius. 



1 The Prosopographia and Drumann agree on this relationship. In Klein's edition 
of the Fasti the name is given Sex. Appuleius Sex. f. Cn. n. which is inconsistent 
with it. 



APPENDIX 307 

L. Calpurnius L.f. Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. Legate in Pam- 
phylia 13 B.C. and in Thrace 13-11 B.C. Son of cos. 58 B.C. 
According to Drumann a brother of Caesar's last wife. 
Calvisius. 

C. Calvisius C.f. Sabinus. Cos. 4 B.C. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
Caninius. 

L. Caninius L.f.L.n. Gallus. Cos. 2 B.C. Son of cos. 37 B.C. 

C. Caninius C.f.C.n. Rebilus. Cos. 12 B.C. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
Died in office. 
Cassius. 

L. Cassius L.f. Longinus. Cos. 11 A.D. His son was banished 
by Nero because he had an effigy of Cassius, the conspirator, 
among the imagines of his ancestors. Tacitus says of this 
consul that he came of a plebeian, but ancient and respected 
family. 
Claudius. 

M. Claudius M.f. Marcellus Aeserninus. Cos. 22 B.C. The 
Claudii Marcelli were an old and distinguished family. 

Ti Claudius Nero. Cos. 13 and 7 B.C. The future emperor 
Tiberius. Stepson of Augustus. 

Nero Claudius Drusus. Cos. 9 B.C. Younger stepson of Au- 
gustus. Died in office. 
Clodius. 

C. Clodius C.f.C.n. Licinus. Cos. 4 A.D. A Roman writer. 
Cornelius. 

Cn. Cornelius L.f. Magni Pompei n. Cinna Magnus. Cos. 5 
A.D. Fought against Octavian in the civil war, but was 
pardoned. In 4 A.D. he conspired against Augustus, but 
was not only pardoned but given the consulship. A grand- 
son of Pompey and a descendant of the consul 87-84 B.C. 

P. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Dolabella. Cos. 10 a.d. Governor of Dal- 
matia 14-18 A.D. Grandson of cos. 44 B.C. 

Cn. Cornelius L.f. Lentulus. Cos. 18 B.C. Legate against the 
Dacians. With the army in Illyricum in 14 A.D. 

L. Cornelius L.f. Lentulus. Cos. 3 B.C. 

Cossus Cornelius Cn.f. Lentulus. Cos. 1 B.C. Son of cos. 18 B.C. 

Cn. Cornelius Cn.f. Lentulus Augur. Cos. 14 B.C. The word 
Augur seems to have been a family name and not a title. 

Ser. Cornelius Cn.f. Cn.n. Lentulus Maluginensis. Cos. 10 A.D. 
A member of a patrician family. (Tacitus, iv, 16). 

P. Cornelius P.f. Lentulus Marcellinus. Cos. 18 B.C. Accord- 
ing to Drumann a grandson of cos. 56 B.C. 

P. Cornelius Cn.f.Cn.n. Lentulus Scipio. Cos. 2 A.D. Possibly 
a son of cos. 14 B.C. 

P. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Scipio. Cos. 16 B.C. Son of cos. 38 B.C. 
His mother was Scribonia, the first wife of Augustus. 



308 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

L. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Sulla. Cos. 5 B.C. He was probably de- 
scended from a brother of Sulla the dictator. 
Domitius. 

L. Domitius Cn.f.Cn.n. Ahenobarbus. Cos. 16 B.C. Governor 
of Dalmatia in 9 B.C. He probably succeeded Tiberius in 
Germany in 6 B.C. and in any case he was in charge there 
in 2 B.C. He married Antonia Major. Dio (liv) gives his 
grandfather's name as Gnasus, but this is certainly a mis- 
take. He was undoubtedly the son of cos. 32 B.C. and grand- 
son of cos. 54 B.C. 
Fabius. 

Paullus Fabius Q.f. Maximus. Cos. 11 B.C. Served as legate in 
Spain before his consulship. A member of a distinguished 
family. His name would suggest that he was a son of cos. 
45 B.C. 
Q. Fabius Q.f. Maximus Africanus. Cos. 10 B.C. A brother of 
the preceding. 
Fabricius. 

Q. Fabricius Q.f. Cos. 2 B.C. Perhaps a grandson of Q. Fab- 
ricius, tribune of the people in 57 B.C. (Willems, i, 493). 
Fonteius. 

C. Fonteius C.f.C.n. Capito. Cos. 12 a.d. Perhaps a son, or 
a grandson, of cos. 33 B.C. 
Fufius. 

C. Fufius Geminus. Cos. 2 B.C. His name is inserted in the 
fasti for this year by Liebenam, Fasti Consulares. A cer- 
tain Fufius Geminus was an officer in Pannonia in 35 B.C. 
Furius. 

M. Furius P.f.P.n. Camillus. Cos. 8 A.D. Tacitus makes him a 
descendant of the ancient dictator. No member of the family 
had held the consulship in 300 years. 
Furnius. 

C. Furnius C.f. Cos. 17 B.C. Before his consulship, in 22 B.C., 
he served as legate in Spain. His father had been a sup- 
porter of Antony who was given consular rank by Augustus. 
Herennius. 

M. Herennius M.f.M'.n. Picens. Cos. 1 A.D. Probably a son of 
cos. 34 B.C. 
Junius. 

Q. Junius Blaesus. Cos. 10 a.d. Legate in Pannonia 14 A.D. 

An uncle of Sejanus. 
M. Junius M.f.D.n. Silanus. Cos. 25 B.C. Proscribed by the 
triumvirs he fled to Sextus Pompey, but was pardoned by 
the treaty of Misenum. Later he abandoned Antony for 
Octavian. Perhaps a grandson of cos. 62 B.C. 



APPENDIX 309 

C. Junius C.f. Silanus. Cos. 17 B.C. Perhaps a relative of cos. 
25 B.C. Smith's Dictionary of Clas. Biog. makes him a 
cousin. 

C. Junius C.f.M.n. Silanus. Cos. 10 a.d. Perhaps related to 

the preceding. 
Laelius. 

D. Laelius D.f.D.n. Balbus. Cos. 6 B.C. 
Licinius. 

M. Licinius M.f.M.n. Crassus. Cos. 30 B.C. Sided at first with 
Sextus Pompey, then with Antony. Deserting to Octavian 
he was raised to the consulship without having held the 
praetorship. Governor of Macedonia in 29 B.C. he con- 
quered Moesia. A grandson of the triumvir. Groebe makes 
him a descendant of another branch of the family. 
M. Licinius M.f. Crassus. Cos. 14 B.C. Son of cos. 30 B.C. 
The Prosopographia considers this doubtful. Drumann ac- 
cepted it, but Groebe expressed doubts on the ground of the 
dates and thought it more likely that he was a grandson of 
the triumvir. 
A. Licinius A.f.A.n. Nerva Silianus. Cos. 7 a.d. An officer in 
the army he died young. Son of P. Silius Nerva (cos. 20 
B.C.) adopted into another family. 
Livius. "] 

M. Livius L.f. Drusus Libo. Cos. 15 B.C. Perhaps a descend- 
ant by adoption of cos. 112 B.C. If so he was the adopted 
son of the father of the Empress Livia. 
Lollius. 

M. Lollius M.f. Cos. 21 B.C. Propraetor in Galatia 25 B.C. 
Legate in Germany in 16 B.C. He had conquered the Bessi 
in Thrace shortly before (Dio, liv, 20). Accompanied C. 
Caesar to the East 1 B.C. to 2 a.d. 
Lucilius. 

Lucilius Longus. Cos. 7 a.d. An intimate friend of Tiberius, 
he was the only senator who accompanied him to Rhodes. 
Tacitus (iv, 15) calls him a new man. 
Lucretius. 

Q. Lucretius Q.f. Vespillo. Cos. 19 B.C. He followed Pompey 
in the first civil war and was later proscribed by the trium- 
virs. He was descended from the aedile for 133 B.C. His 
father was an orator and jurist proscribed by Sulla. (Ap- 
pian, iv, 44.) 
Marcius. 

C. Marcius L.f.L.n. Censorinus. Cos. 8 B.C. One of those who 
accompanied C. Caesar to the East, he died in Asia in 2 
a.d. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 



310 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Munatius. 

L. Muntius L.f.L.n. Plancus. Cos. 13 a.d. Son of cos. 42 B.C. 
Nonius. 

L. Nonius L.f.L.n. Asprenas. Cos. 6 A.D. A nephew of Varus, 
he served under him in Germany 7-9 A.D. According to 
Willems (i, 471) there was a praetor named Nonius Aspre- 
nas in 62 B.C. 
Sex. Nonius L.f.L.n. Quinctilianus. Cos. 8 a.d. Perhaps a 
brother of the preceding. 
Norbanus 

C. Norbanus C.f.C.n. Flaccus. Cos. 24 B.C. Probably a son of 
cos. 38 B.C. who had been an officer of the triumvirs. 
Papius. 

M. Papius M.f.N.n. Mutilus. Cos. 9 a.d. 
Passienus. 

L. Passienus Rufus. Cos. 4 B.C. 
Plautius. 

M. Plautius M.f.A.n. Silvanus. Cos. 2 B.C. Served with dis- 
tinction in Pannonia 6-9 a.d. His grandfather was praetor 
in 51 B.C. 
Pompeius. 

Sex. Pompeius Cn.f.Sex.n.? Cos. 5 B.C. Probably son of cos. 
31 B.C. His grandfather's name is inconsistent with this 
but it is given only by Klein who regards it as doubtful. 
If it is correct he might be descended from the father of 
cos. 35 B.C. 
Sex. Pompeius Sex.f.Sex.n. Cos. 14 a.d. Drumann made him 
a son of cos. 35 B.C. Groebe thought him a son of cos. 5 B.C. 
He was related to Augustus. The length of time would 
suggest a grandson of cos. 35 B.C. 
Poppaeus. 

C. Poppaeus Q.f.Q.n. Sabinus. Cos. 9 a.d. Governor of Moesia 
for twenty-four years, 11-35 a.d. A man of humble birth 
(Tacitus, vi, 39). 
Q. Poppaeus Q.f.Q.n. Secundus. Cos. 9 a.d. A brother of the 
preceding. 
Quinctilius. 

P. Quinctilius Sex.f. Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. Legate of Syria 6-4 
B.C. Legate of Germany 6-9 a.d. Grandson of praetor for 
57 B.C. He was related to Augustus by marriage. 
Quinctius. 

T. Quinctius T.f. Crispinus Sulpicianus. Cos. 9 B.C. There was 
an old family named Quinctius Crispinus a member of which 
had held the consulship in 208 B.C. but they had not been 
prominent since that time. A certain T. Quinctius Crispinus 
was a patrician member of the senate in 55 B.C. (Willems, 
i, 508). 



APPENDIX 311 

T. Quinctius T.f.T.n. Crispinus Valerianus. Cos. 2 a.d. Per- 
haps an adopted son of the preceding. 
Saenius. 

L. Saenius L.f. Balbinus. Cos. 30 B.C. Perhaps a son of the 
senator mentioned by Sallust. No one of this gentile name 
had held the consulship for over two hundred years. 
Sentius. 

C. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. Proscribed by the 
triumvirs he fled to Sextus Pompey, but was restored by the 
treaty of Misenum. Legate of Syria 8-6 B.C. Legate of 
Germany 4-6 A.D. 

C. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus Cos. 4 a.d. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 

Cn. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus. Cos. 4 a.d. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
Servilius. 

M. Servilius M.f. Nonianus. Cos. 3 a.d. Perhaps connected with 
the senator named Nonnius proscribed by Antony. 
Sestius. 

L. Sestius P.f.L.n. Quirinus. Cos. 23 B.C. A republican noted 
for his devotion to Brutus. The son of a senator of prae- 
torian rank (Willems, i, 481). 
Silius. 

P. Silius P.f. Nerva. Cos. 20 B.C. Legate in Spain before his 
consulship. In 16 B.C. he was governor of Illyricum, then 
a senatorial province, and conquered the Pannonians. His 
father was of praetorian rank (Willems, i, 473-74). 

P. Silius P.f.P.n. Cos. 3 a.d. Commanded an army in Thrace 
shortly before his consulship. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 

C. Silius P.f.P.n. A. Caecina Largus. Cos. 13 a.d. Legate in 
Germany in 14 A.D. and for seven years at the head of 
the army there. Son of cos. 20 B.C. Why he assumed the 
additional names is uncertain. 

A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. See Licinius. 
Statilius. 

T. Statilius T.f. Taurus. Cos. 37 and 26 B.C. A distinguished 
general of Augustus. Velleius (ii, 127) calls him a new 
man. 

T. Statilius T.f.T.n. Taurus. Cos. 11 a.d. Grandson of the 
preceding. 
Sulpicius. 

Q. Sulpicius Q.f.Q.n. Camerinus. Cos. 9 A.D. 

Ser. Sulpicius C.f. Galba. Cos. 5 B.C. Father of the emperor 
Galba. The family had been of consular rank since 144 B.C. 

P. Sulpicius P.f. Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. He was not related to 
the old patrician Sulpicii. Born in a municipal town, he 
rose by military and business talent. Governor of Syria 3-2 
B.C. He was one of the advisers of C. Caesar in 2 a.d. 
Governor of Syria again in 6 a.d. (Liebenam, Forschungen) . 



312 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Tarius. 

L. Tarius Rufus. Cos. 16 B.C. Of an insignificant family he 
rose by military merit. Served as an officer at Actium. 
Terentius. 

A. Terentius A.f. Varro Murena. Cos. 23 B.C. He commanded 
in the army before his consulship. During his term as 
consul he was charged with conspiracy against Augustus 
and was put to death. Perhaps a son of L. Licinius Murena, 
cos. 62 B.C. adopted by a Terentius Varro. 
Tullius. 

M. Tullius M.f.M.n.M.pron. Cicero. Cos. 30 B.C. Governor of 
Syria 27 B.C. Son of the orator. 
Valerius. 

M. Valerius M.f. Messalla Barbatus Appianus. Cos. 12 B.C. 
Perhaps a son of Appius Claudius Pulcher, cos. 38 B.C., 
adopted by M. Valerius Messalla, cos. 53 B.C. He married 
Claudia Marcella, daughter of Augustus' sister Octavia. 
He died in office. 

M. Valerius M.f. Messalla Cbrvinu's. Cos. 3 B.C. Governor 
of Pannonia 6 a.d. Son of cos. 31 B.C. A member of a very 
distinguished family. His father had held several import- 
ant posts. 

M. Valerius Messalla Potitus. Cos. 29 B.C. Perhaps a brother 
of Messalla Corvinus, cos. 31 B.C. If so he was a member 
of a very distinguished family. 

L. Valerius Potiti f.M.n. Messalla Volesus. Cos. 5 A.D. Son of 
cos. 29 B.C. 
Valgius. 

C. Valgius C.f. Rufus. Cos. 12 B.C. A poet and friend of 
Horace. 
Vibius. 

C. Vibius C.f.C.n. Postumus. Cos. 5 a.d. Conquered the Dal- 
matians and received the triumphal ornaments 9 A.D. 

A. Vibius C.f.C.n. Habitus. Cos. 8 a.d. Perhaps a brother of 
the preceding. 
Vinicius. 

M. Vinicius P.f. Cos. 19 B.C. Before his consulship he com- 
manded in Germany in 25 B.C. Afterwards he commanded 
in Pannonia in 13 B.C. and in Germany in 1 B.C. and 2 A.D. 
His father was a knight. 

L. Vinicius L.f.M.n. Cos. 5 B.C. Son of cos. 33 B.C. The 
father of the cos. 33 was a knight (Willems, i, 527). 

P. Vinicius M.f.P.n. Cos. 2 a.d. Served in Thrace shortly be- 
fore his consulship. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 



APPENDIX 313 

Vipsanius. 

M. Vipsanius L.f. Agrippa. Cos. 37 and 28 and 27 B.C. The 
ablest of the generals of Augustus and later his son-in-law 
and intended successor. He was a new man. 
Visellius. 

C. Visellius C.f.C.n. Varro. Cos. 12 A.D. 
Volusius. 

L. Volusius Q.f. Saturninus. Cos. 12 B.C. Governor of Syria 

4-5 a.d. His family was of praetorian rank. 
L. Volusius L.f.Q.n. Saturninus. Cos. 3 a.d. Served as a legate 
of Augustus but where is unknown. Son of the preceding. 



LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THE NOTES 

In the following list no attempt has been made to enu- 
merate all the works which have been used in the prepara- 
tion of this book, still less to make a complete bibliography 
of the subject. All that has been intended is to give ade- 
quate information concerning the works referred to in the 
notes and by this means to avoid frequent repetition of 
titles without inconveniencing the reader who may wish to 
verify a statement. 

THE SOURCES 

As the sources referred to have all been published in 
numerous editions an enumeration of them is unnecessary 
and it will be sufficient to say that all reference to Appian 
are to the books on the Civil Wars and all those to Tacitus 
are to the Annals. Where references have been made to 
any particular edition this has been included in the list be- 
low under the name of the editor or translator. 

MODERN WORKS 

Boak, A. E. R. — The Extraordinary Commands from 80 to 

A8 B.C. in the American Historical Review, xxiv. New 
\ York, 1918. 
«oak, A. E. R. — A History of Rome to 565 A.D. New York, 

1921. 
Bouche-Leclercq, A. — Histoire des Lagids. 4 vols. Paris, 

1903-1907. 
Caspari, M. 0. B. — On the Juratio Italiae of 32 B.C. in the 

Classical Quarterly, v. London and Boston, 1911. 
Destarac, J. — La Brigue electorate a Rome a la fin de la 

republique. Toulouse, 1908. 
Dodge, T. A.— Caesar. New York, 1894. 
Drumann, W. — Geschichte Roms. 2nd. edition edited by 

P. Groebe. Of this edition only 4 vols, have appeared. 

Berlin, 1899. 



APPENDIX 315 



V 



V 



Edwards, H. J. — Caesar, The Gallic War. Text and Eng- 
lish translation in the Loeb Library. New York, 1917. 

Fairley, W. — Monumentum Ancyranum. The Deeds of Au- 
gustus. Edited by Wm. Fairley in the University of 
Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints. Philadelphia, 
1898. 

Ferguson, W. S. — Greek Imperialism. New York, 1913. 

Ferrero, G. — The Greatness and Decline of Rome. 5 vols. 
London, 1907-1909. 
V Ferrero, G. — La Ruine de la civilisation antique. Paris, 
1921. 

Frank, T. — Roman Imperialism. New York, 1914. 

Hartmann, L. M. and Kromayer, J. — Romische Geschichte 
(Hartmann, L. M. — Welt geschichte in gemeinverstdnd- 
licher Darstellung) . Gotha, 1919. 

Gardthausen, V. — Augustus und seine Zeit. 3 vols. Leip- 
zig, 1891-1904. 

Goyau, G. — Chronologie de Vempire romain. Paris, 1891. 

Greenidge, A. H. J. — A History of Rome during the Later 
Republic and Early Principate. New York, 1905. 

Groebe. — See Drumann. 

Guiraud, P. — Le Differend entre Cesar et le senat. Paris, 
1878. 

Hardy, E. G. — The Evidence as to Caesar's Legal Position 
in Gaul, in Journal of Philology, xxxiv. London, 1918. 
S/Hardy, E. G. — Studies in Roman History. 2 vols. Vol. i, 
2nd edition. London, 1910-1909. 

Heitland, W. E. — The Roman Republic. 3 vols. Cambridge, 
1909. 

Hirschfeld, O. — Articles in Klio, iv and v. Leipzig, 1904- 
1905. 

Holmes, T. R. — Caesar de Bello Gallico. Oxford, 1914. ' 

Holmes, T. R. — Caesar's Conquest of Gaul. 2nd. edition. 
Oxford, 1911. 

Holmes, T. R. — Hirschfeld and Judeich on the Lex Pompeia- 
Licinia in the Classical Quarterly, x. London ^and 
Boston, 1916. 

Holzapfel, L. — Article in Klio, v. Leipzig, 1905. 



316 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Sjudeich, W. — Das Ende von Caesars Gallischer Statthalter- 

schaft und der Ausbruch des Biirgerkrieges in the 

Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie, lxviii. Frankfurt, 

1913. 
Jullian, C. — Histoire de la Gaule. 6 vols, the first three in 

the 3rd. edition. Paris, 1914-1920. 
Klebs, Dessau, and de Rohden. — Prosopographia. See that 

title. 
Klein, J. — Fasti Consulares inde a Caesaris Nece usque ad 

Imperium Diocletiani. Leipzig, 1881. 
Kromayer, J. — Die Vorgeschichte des Kriegs von Actium in 

Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv. Berlin, 1898-1899. 
Lange, L. — Romische Altertumer. 3 vols. 2nd. edition. 

Berlin, 1863-1876. 
Liebenam, W. — Fasti Consulares Imperii Romani. Bonn, 

1909. 
Liebenam, W. — Forschungen zur Verwaltungsgeschichte 

des romischen Kaiserreichs. I. Die Legaten in den 

romischen Provinzen von Augustus bis Diocletian. 

Leipzig, 1888. 
McFayden, D. — The Princeps and the Senatorial Provinces 

in Classical Philology^, xvi. Chicago, 1921. 
Mahaffy, J. P. — A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic 

Dynasty. New York, 1899. 
Marquardt, J. — Romische Staatsverwaltung. 4 vols, in 

Marquardt and Mommsen, Handbuch der romischen 

Altertumer. 2nd. edition. Leipzig, 1881-1886. 
Meyer, E. — Caesars Monarchic und das Principat des Pom- 

peius. 2nd. edition. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919. 
Meyer, E. — Kleine Schriften. Halle, 1910. 
Mispoulet, J. B. — La Vie parlementaire a Rome sous la 

republique. Paris, 1899. 
Mommsen, T. — The History of Rome. New edition. New 

York, 1903. 
Mommsen, T. — Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem 

Senat. Breslau, 1857. 
\j ^elham, H. F. — Essays on Roman History. Oxford, 1911. 



APPENDIX 317 

Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Vol. i, edited by E. 
Klebs. Vol. ii, edited by H. Dessau. Vol. iii, edited 
by P. de Rohden and H. Dessau. Berlin, 1897-1898. 

Reinach, T. — Mithridate Eupator, roi de Ponte. Paris, 
1890. 

Schwartz, E. — Die Vertheilung der romischen Provinzen 
nach Cdsars Tod in Hermes, xxxiii. Berlin, 1898. 
y Shuckburgh, E. S.—The Letters of Cicero. Translated 
into English by E. S. Shuckburgh. 4 vols, in the 
Bohn Library. 

Smith, W. (editor). Dictionary of Greek and Roman 
Biography and Mythology. 3 vols. London, 1880. 

Strachan-Davidson, J. L. — Cicero and the Fall of the Roman 
Republic. In the Heroes of the Nations series. New- 
York, 1894. 

Strack, M. L. — Kleopatra in the Historische Zeitschrift, 
cxv. Munich and Berlin, 1916. 

White, H. — Appian's Roman History. Text and English 
translation in the Loeb Library. 4 vols. New York, 
1912-1913. 

Willems, P. — Le Droit public romain. 7th. edition. Lou- 
vain, 1910. 

Willems, P. — Le Senat de la republique romaine. Sa com- 
position et ses attributions. 2 vols. Louvain, 1885- 
1883. 

Winstedt, E. 0.— Cicero, Letters to Atticus. Text and Eng- 
lish translation in the Loeb Library. 3 vols. New 
York, 1912-1918. 



INDEX 

Actium, campaign of, 215f. 

L. Aelius Lamia, cos. 3 A.D., 259. 

Aemilius, see Lepidus. 

L. Afranius, cos. 60 B.C., in Cisalpine Gaul, 272, 285. 

Africa, annexation of, 15 : province of, 52 ; campaign of Pompey in, 61 ; civil war 
in, 153, 154 ; governor sends troops to Rome, 184 ; assigned to Lepidus, 194 ; 
governors hold independent imperium, 238. 

Agrarian commission, of Ti. Gracchus, work of, 40. 

.Agrarian bills — 
of Flavius, 90f. 
of RuUus, 80f. 

Agrarian laws — 

of Caesar, 94ff., 271f. ; oath of senators, 271f. ; second agrarian law, 101. 
of Gracchus, 38f. 
^Agriculture, crisis in Italian, 32ff. ; Roman views of, 36f. 

Agrippa, M. Vipsanius, crushes Sex. Pompey, 200 ; represents Augustus in Rome, 
241, 245 ; sent to Syria, 243 ; in Spain, 243 ; marries Julia, 243 ; recognized as 
successor of Augustus, 243, 264 ; in Syria, 244 ; death of, 251, 254, 255. 

Ahenobarbus, L. Domitius, see Domitius. 
/•Alexander the Great, Caesar's wish to rival, 159 ; conquest of East, 204 ; conditions 
after his death, 205f. ; kingdoms arising from the division of his empire, 205f. 

Alexandria, Caesar in, 153 ; Antony in, 197, 202 ; regency in, 207 ; mob of, 208 ; 
Donations of, 213f. 

Amnesty, voted by senate after Caesar's death, 169. 

Anarchy in Rome, in 57 B.C., HOff. ; in 54-52 B.C., 122f. 

Ancyra, monument at, quotation from, 226. 

Antigonids, kingdom of, 206. 

Antioch, Antony and Cleopatra at, 202f. 

Antiochus of Syria, 5, 30, 32, 207. 

C. Antonius Hybrida, cos. 63 B.C., 79. 

L. Antonius, brother of the triumvir, in the Perusine war, 195f. 

M. Antonius, triumvir, elected tribune, 140 ; vetoes decrees of senate, 143 ; flees to 
Caesar's camp, 144 ; spared by conspirators, 164 ; convenes senate, 165 ; speech 
in senate, 168 note 2 ; funeral oration, 170 ; position of, 171f. ; rallies Caesarians, 
172f. ; use of Caesar's papers, 173f. ; forgeries of, 174 ; provincial arrangements 
of, 175f. ; quarrel with Octavian, 177f. ; Macedonian legions desert, 179 ; war 
around Mutina, 181 ; escapes to Gaul, 183 ; Lepidus and Plancus join, 184 ; 
coalition with Octavian, 185f. ; second triumvirate, 186 ; share in the proscrip- 
tion, 187 ; division of empire after Philippi, 192f. ; Perusine war 1 , 196f. ; returns 
to Italy, 197f., 202 ; treaty of Brundisium, 198 ; marriage with Octavia, 198, 202 ; 
in Greece, 199, 202 ; war with Parthia, 193, 199, 201, 203f. ; oriental policy, 
200ff. ; results of Parthian failure, 210 ; adopts policy of Cleopatra, 211 ; marriage 
with Cleopatra, 212 ; Donations of Alexandria, 213f. ; Roman partisans of, 214 ; 
letter to senate and will, 214 ; campaign of Actium, 214ff. ; ruin of, 218, 222f. ; 
devotion of soldiers to, 223. 

Antony, see Antonius. 

Apollonia, Octavian at, 177. 

Appian, his translation of the proscription, 186 ; on health of Octavian, 193. 

L. Appuleius Saturninus, see Saturninus. 

Armenia, conquest of, by Antony, 212 ; ceded to Ptolemies, 213. 
^Army 1 , standing, Romans lack, 219f. ; necessity for, 220f., 262f. ; command of, 221, 
229, 237f. See Military System. 

Aristocracy, see Nobility. 

Arretium, lands of the men of, 90. 



320 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Asia, annexation of, 6 note 1, 19 ; province of, 52 ; policy of Lucullus in, 73 note 5 ; 
assigned to Pompey, 74 ; taxes of, 92, 102 ; retained by Rome under Donations 
of Alexandria, 213. 

Asia Minor, desire of Seleucids for, 206. 

C. Asinius Gallus, son of C. Asinius Pollio, 247. 

C. Asinius Pollio, see Pollio. 

Assembly, Roman, dominated by urban citizens, 37f. ; 223 ; effect of agricultural crisis 
on, 41f. ; effect of corn dole on, 42 ; deprived of electoral functions, 258. 

Attalus of Pergamum, will of, 19. 

Atticus, T. Pomponius, warns Cicero of danger of public funeral for Caesar, 169. 

Augustus, restoration of republic, 221ff. ; name of Augustus given to Octavian, 226 ; 
question of his sincerity, 226f. ; reconciliation with nobility, 229ff., 248 ; com- 
mander-in-chief of army, 229, 237f. ; proconsular imperium, 231 ; did not extend 
to senatorial provinces, 235 note 5 ; first form of principate, 234 ; final form of 
principate, 235f. ; special powers given to, 235 ; avoidance of monarchical forms, 
237 ; frontier policy, 239ff., 242ff. ; work of organization, 241, 243f ; government 
of imperial provinces, 242f., 250 ; use of his family in the government, 242f., 
250 ; use of new men, 244, 255, 257 ; control of elections, 245, 252ff., 260 ; con- 
sequences, 258, 260 ; policy toward republic, 249ff . ; deaths in imperial family, 

251, 259 ; retirement of Tiberius, 251 ; use of consulars in government, 251, 

252, 253, 254, 259f., 265 ; changes in imperial provinces, 251 ; increase in number 
of consuls, 255ff. ; last consulships of, 256 ; plan to transfer elections to senate, 
258 ; final form of government, 260 ; unwillingness to offend senators, 260 ; en- 
croachments on republic, 260f. ; question of succession, 243, 263f. ; rejects plan of 
electoral reform, 266 ; achievements, 267. See also Octavian. 

Bassust, P. Ventidius, see Ventidius. 

Bibulus, M. Calpurnius, cos. 59 B.C., elected consul, 94 ; opposes Caesar, 95 ; driven 

from forum, 100 ; convenes senate, 100 ; retires to his house, 101 ; edicts of, 101, 

105 ; date of his retirement, 271f. 
Bithynia, annexation of, 62 ; assigned to Pompey, 74. 
Bithynia-Pontus, province of, organized by Pompey, 88. 
Brundisium, treaty of, 198, 199, 201. 
Brutus, Decimus Junius, named as heir in Caesar's will, 170 ; province of Cisalpine 

Gaul assigned to, 175 ; establishes himself there, 179f. ; besieged in Mutina, 181 ; 

explanation of Antony's escape, 182 ; soldiers refuse to serve under, 183. 
Brutus, M. Junius, forced to live at Lanuvium, 174; in the East, 180, 185, 188; 

fails to aid Cicero, 188f. ; defeat and death, 190f. 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, cos. 60 B.C., death of, 180 ; date of death, 271f. ; province 
assigned to, 272. 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, cos. 109 B.C., commands against Jugurtha, 43. 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, cos. 80 B.C., sent against Sertorius, 59, 62 ; unable to 
assist senate, 63. 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, cos. 52 B.C., father-in-law and colleague of Pompey, 
125. 

M. Caelius Rufus, letters to Cicero, 127, 130, 136, 139, 151, 283f., 287, 289f. ; char- 
acterization of Pompey, 131 note 13 ; joins Caesar, 151. 

C. Caesar, grandson of Augustus, assumes toga virilis, 256 ; death of, 259, 264. 

L. Caesar, grandson of Augustus, assumes toga virilis, 256 ; death of, 259. 

Caesar, C. Julius, propraetor in Spairi, 55 note 1, 93 ; supports Manilian law, 74 ; 
manager for Crassus, 76 ; early career of, 76 ; supports Catiline, 79 ; agrarian 
bill of Rullus, 80 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; unable to pass Pompey's bills 
legally, 86 ; first triumvirate, 93 ; elected consul, 94 ; tries to secure alliance of 
Cicero, 94 ; his consulship, 94ff., 275ff. ; sanctions banishment of Cicero, 108 ; 
conquest of Gaul, 109f. ; attacks on, 115 ; renewal of triumvirate at Luca, 116ff. ; 
death of Crassus, 121 ; fear of nobles of, 94, 96, 121 ; given right to be a candidate 
in absentia, 125 ; date when his proconsulship ended, 125, 279ff. ; plans for future, 



INDEX 321 

125ff., 280f. ; fears of prosecution, 130 ; obligations to army, 131 ; question at 
issue between him and Pompey, 131 ; demands extension of his proconsulship, 
135 ; Pompey's threat against, 136 ; elections for 50 B.C., 137 ; buys Curio, 
138 ; policy of Curio, 139f. ; last offers of compromise, 143 ; war declared 
on, 143f. ; unprepared for war, 145 ; invasion of Italy, 146 ; Cicero's view 
of him and his party, 149ff., 156f. ; clemency of, 149ff., 156ff. ; threats 
against opponents, 150f. ; government of, provisional, 151, 153 ; interview 
with Cicero, 151 ; expedition to Spain, 152 ; battle of Pharsalia, 152 ; Alex- 
andrian war, 153 ; campaigns in Africa and Spain, 153, 154 ; problem confront- 
ing, 154ff. ; character of his party, 155f. ; policy toward senate, 157f. ; increase 
in number of magistrates, 158 ; plans for conquest of Parthia, 159, 193, 199, 
201, 203f. ; position and powers, 159f. ; intentions for future, 160 ; resentment 
of nobles, 161, 230 ; reasons for conspiracy against, 161ff. ; murder of, 163 ; 
senate dares not declare him a tyrant, 167ff. ; funeral of, 169f. ; will of, 170; 
conditions after his death, 205 ; relations with Cleopatra, 209 ; suspected of 
intending to take title of king, 209 ; his use of tribunes, 233. 

Caesarion, son of Cleopatra, 213. 

Calenus, Q. Fufius, general of Antony, 196 ; legions of, 198. 

Caligula, reign of, 266. 

M. Calpurnius Bibulus, see Bibulus. 

L. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 133 B.C., 90. 

Campanian lands, 89f., 101, 115, 118. 

Carthage, destruction of, 15, 30. 

Q. Cassius Longinus, elected tribune, 140 ; vetoes decree of senate, 143 ; flees to 
Caesar's camp, 144 ; misgovernment in Spain, 156. 

Q. Cassius Longinus, the conspirator, in the East, 180, 185, 188 ; fails to help 
Cicero, 188 ; defeat and death, 190f. 

Catilina, L. Sergius, candidate for consulship, 79 ; conspiracy of, 81ff. 

Catiline, see Catilina. 
.jSato-, M. Porcius, the Censor, views on agriculture and ranching, 35f. 
JZraXo, M. Porcius, character, 89 ; opposes Pompey, 89 ; quarrel with the knights, 92 ; 
obstructs Caesar's agrarian bill, 95 ; sent to Cyprus, 107 ; influence over con- 
suls, 115 ; supports sole consulship of Pompey, 124 ; cult of, and Anticato, 157 
note 58 ; opposition to Vatinian law, 274 ; quoted, 278. 

Censor, power over senate, 7f. ; Crassus as, 76f. ; censorial powers conferred on 
Caesar, 159. 

Cicero, M. Tullius, supports Manilian law, 74 ; elected consul, 79 ; defeats agrarian 
bill of Rullus, 81 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; speech on Pompey's agrarian 
bill, 90 ; refuses to join first triumvirate, 94 ; attitude toward first triumvirate, 
102ff., 275f. ; banishment of, 107f. ; recall of, lllf. ; attacks Julian laws> 115 ; 
abandons opposition, 118 ; fear of Caesar's second consulship, 127 ; governor of 
Cilicia, 127, 130, 136, 287 ; desire for peace, 133f. ; interviews with Pompey, 
136, 143 ; disapproves of the conduct of the optimates, 142 ; disillusionment with 
Pompey, 147f. ; fears of a proscription, 149f. ; interview with Caesar, 150, 151 ; 
opinion of Caesar's party, 150, 155f. ; advantages to Caesar of clemency, 150 ; 
remark of Caesar concerning, 161 ; attitude toward Caesar, 165 ; conception of 
the republic, 165ff. ; supports conspirators, 167 ; proposes compromise, 169 ; dis- 
illusionment of, 174 ; alliance with Octavian, 179ff. ; failure of Brutus and 
Cassius to support, 1 188f. ; proscribed by triumvirs, 187. 

Cilicia, annexation of, 20, 21 ; province of, 52 ; Pompey in, 72, 74 ; Cicero in, 127, 
130, 136, 287 ; ceded to Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial province, 237. 

Cimbri and Teutons, conquered by Marius, 45. 

Cinna, L. Cornelius, cos. 87-84 B.C., master of Rome, 48 ; Lepidus tries to imitate, 
60 ; cruelty of, 149. 

Cisalpine Gaul, annexation of, ,20 ; unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36 ; Crassus at- 
tempts to extend citizenship to, 77 ; assigned to Caesar, 97, 271 ; importance of, 
176 ; assigned to D. Brutus, 175 ; transferred to Antony, 176 ; war in, 179ff. ; 
held by Antony, 184, 194 ; seized by Octavian, 196, 198 ; Afranius governor of, 
272, 285. 



322 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Civil and military functions, union of, 224. 

Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, 201 ; meets Antony, 202 ; makes terms with Antony, 

203 ; policy of, 208ff. ; relations with Caesar, 209 ; marriage with Antony, 212 ; 
revival of Ptolemaic empire, 213 ; campaign of Actium, 214ff. ; death of, 218. 
Claudius, see Marcellus. 
P. Clodius Pulcher, elected tribune, 107 ; banishment of Cicero, 107 ; attacks Pompey, 

111, 114; rivalry with Milo, 123; death of, 123; fears armies of triumvirs, 276. 
Coele-Syria, ceded to Cleopatra, 203 ; acquired by Ptolemies, 206 ; seized by Antiochus, 

207 ; ceded to Caesarion, 213. 
Confiscations, necessary to satisfy army, 187, 193, 194. 
Conscription, for Roman army, 37 ; abandoned by Marius, 44. 
Conservatives, see Optimates and Nobility. 
Conspirators against Caesar, retire to Capitol, 164; flee from Rome, 170; senate 

powerless to protect, 174 ; helpless against Antony, 175 ; revival of their hopes, 

176 ; proscribed by Octavian, 185. 
Consulars, use of, in imperial service, 253ff., 260, 265. 
Consular tribunes, appointment of, 25. 
Consules suffecti, 255ff. 
Consuls, character of, under second triumvirate, 247 ; from 30 to 23 B.C., 248 ; from 

22 to 13 B.C., 248f. ; from 12 B.C. to 1 A.D., 255f. ; from 2 to 14 A.D., 256f. ; term 

shortened, 256ff. 
-Corn dole, effect of its establishment on the Roman assembly, 42. 
L. Cornelius,! Cinna, see Cinna. 

Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, see Marcellinus. 
L. Cornelius Sulla, see Sulla. 
Corruption at elections, law of Pompey against, 124 ; laws of Augustus against, 

246 ; no legislation after 8 B.C., 258. 
Corsica, annexation of, 26. 
Courts, de repetundis, 15 ; composition of, under Sulla, 55 ; knights regain control 

of, 67. 
Crassus, M. Licinius, general, 59 ; named praetor with command against Spartacus, 

63 ; combines with Pompey and the democrats, 64f. ; character of, 67 ; elected 

consul with Pompey, 67 ; declines proconsulship, 69 ; opposition to Pompey, 75 ; 

political connections, 75 ; censorship of, 76 ; Egyptian project of, 77ff ., 80 ; 

supports Catiline, 79 ; agrarian bill of Rullus, 80 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; 

enmity to Pompey, 86, 87, 106 ; relations with the democrats and knights, 91f. ; 

joins first triumvirate, 92f. ; supports Caesar publicly, 99 ; attitude toward the 

conquest of Gaul, 110; quarrels with Pompey, HOff. ; renewal of triumvirate at 

Luca, 116 ; Syria assigned to, 117, 120 ; second consulship with Pompey, 119 ; 

Parthian war, 120 ; defeat and death, 120. 
Curia Julia, 226. 
Curio, C. Scribonius, elected tribune, 138 ; bought by Caesar, 138 ; policy of, 138f. f 

283 ; warning to Cicero, 150 ; death of, 156 ; ovation given to, 276. 
Cyprus, annexation of, 107 ; ceded to Cleopatra, 203 ; given to Caesarion, 213 ; im- 
perial province, 237. 
Cyrene, annexation of, 6 note 1. 

Dalmatia, consular province, 251. 

Danube, natural frontier, 242 ; threatened revolt on, 251. 

Democrats, failure under Gracchi, 42 ; election of Marius, 43 ; Saturninus and 
Glaucia, 45f . ; Sulpicius Rufus, 47 ; overthrown by Sulla, 47 ; regain power, 47f. ; 
defeated by Sulla, 48 ; combination with Pompey and Crassus, 65f. ; Crassus 
seeks leadership of, 75f. ; divided between Pompey and Crassus, 91 ; condemn 
execution of Catilinarian conspirators, 107 ; incapable of governing, 166f. 

Despotism, tendency toward, under Augustus, 239, 250, 260. 

Dictator, Sulla appointed, 49 ; Caesar appointed, 159. 

Dio Cassius, on imperial provinces, 261 ; on reluctance of Augustus to offend the 
senators, 261. 



INDEX 323 

Domitian, reign of, 266. 

L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, candidate for consulship, 115. 

Donations of Alexandria, 213, 214. 

Drusus, stepson of Augustus, in Rhaetia and Illyricum, 244 ; death of, 251, 254, 256. 

Dyarchy, 237. 

East, fascination for Romans, 204f. ; political structure of its states, 205ff. 

Egypt, bequeathed to Rome, 19, 77, 80 ; senate rejects bequestt 7 note 2, 19 ; designs 
of Crassus on, 77ff., 80 ; Pompey desires a commission to restore king, 113, 114, 
116 ; Ptolemies in, 206ff. ; easy of defense, 211 ; imperial province, 237. 

Elbe river, natural frontier, 242 ; reached by Romans, 250f. 

Elbe-Danube frontier, reached by Romans, 250 ; troubles on, 259. 

Elections, for 53 B.C., 123; for 52 B.C. impossible, 123; for 50 B.C., 137; difference 
between those for consul and for tribune, 137f. ; for 49 B.C., 140 ; right of 
princeps to preside at, 235 ; power of princeps over, 245, 252ff., 258, 260 ; plan 
to transfer them to senate, 258; plan for electoral reform, 266f. 

Electoral corruption, see Corruption. 

Electoral reform, plan of, rejected by Augustus, 266f. 

Emperor, derivation of title, 237 note 1 ; see Augustus and Princeps. 

Empire, improvement in provincial government under, 264f . ; liberty under, 265 ; 
tyranny under, 265f. 

Epirus, Antony and Octavian meet in, 215. 

Etruria, economic changes in, 36 ; rebellion of Lepidus in, 60. 

Expansion, intermittent character of Roman, 4f. ; opposed by senate, 5f.> 13ff. ; 
opposed by Augustus, 239ff. 

Fasti, consular, 246f. ; see also tables in Appendix. 

Ferrero, opinion on civil war, 145 note 34; explanation of Vatinian law, 271ff. 

First Punic War, see Punic wars. 

First Triumvirate, see Triumvirate. 

L. Flavius, tribune, agrarian bill of, 90. 

Foreign affairs, control of, by princeps, 238. 

Frontier policy of Augustus* 241ff., 250ff. 

Q. Fufius Calenus, see Calenus. 

Fulvia, wife of Antony, part in Perusine war, 195f. ; death of, 198. 

Gabinian law, 7 Off., 74, 98. 

A. Gabinius, tribune, 70, 71f. 

Gardthausen, criticism; of Augustus, 227. 

Gaul, provinces of, 52 ; conquest of, 109f. ; Caesar's proconsulship in, prolonged, 126, 

279ff. ; assigned to Antony, 186, 194 ; seized by Octavian, 196, 198 ; consequences 

of conquest of, 220f. ; organization of, 241. See also Cisalpine and Transalpine 

Gaul. 
Germanicus, 264. 
Germans, threaten Gaul, 221, 242 ; campaign of Drusus against, 244 ; defeat of 

Varus by, 259. 
Glaucia,, C. Servilius, 45, 96 note 14. 
Governors* see Provincial governors. 
Gracchus, C. Sempronius, career of 42 ; law concerning juries, 55 ; aims of, 68, 166 ; 

law concerning the consular provinces, see Sempronian law. 
Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius, horrified at conditions in Etruria, 36 ; agrarian law of, 

38f. ; opposition to, 40ff., 71 ; death of, 40 ; results of his career, 41. 
Great commands, 21f., 32, 56 ; only method of carrying on important wars, 228 ; 

danger to state, 229. 
Greece, Rome involved in, 31 ; Antony in, 199. 

Hannibal, war with, 26fJ, 30. 

Helvetians, migration of, 109. 

A. Hirtius, cos. 43 B.C., 180 ; death of, 182 ; quotation from, 288f. 



324 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Illyricum, assigned to Caesar, 108 ; Silius governor of, 244 ; Tiberius in, 244 ; trans- 
ferred to emperor, 251. 
Imperator, titles 237 note 1. 

Imperium, meaning of term, 8 note 4 ; see Proconsular imperiwm. 
Italian allies, obtain citizenship, 46. 

Jugurtha, war against, 43. 

Julia, daughter of Augustus, 243. 

Julia, daughter of Caesar, 104, 120. 

C. Julius Caesar, see Caesar. 

C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, see Octavian and Augustus. 

Junius, see Brutus. 

King, Caesar suspected of desiring title, 209 ; Roman hatred of name, 224. 

Knights, ranged against senate by C. Gracchus, 42 ; deprived of courts by Sulla, BO ; 
regain control of courts, 67 ; quarrel with Lucullus, 73 note 5 ; breach with sen- 
ate, 92 ; turn against triumvirs, 105 ; victims of proscription, 187. 

Kromayer, view of campaign of Actium, 216f., 218 note 23. 

T. Labienus, deserts Caesar, 145. 

Lagids, see Ptolemies. 

Lamia, L. Aeliusi, see Aelius. 

Lanuvium, town in Latium, 174. 

Law, martial, senate dares not declare, 100 ; declared by consuls, 141 ; reign of law 
demanded by public opinion, 224f. 

Laws, of Antony concerning the provinces, 176 ; of Augustus concerning elections, 246 ; 
Gabinian, 70ff., 74, 98 ; Manilian, 74, 84, 228, 281 ; Ovinian, 7 ; of Pompey concern- 
ing elections, 124 ; of Pompey concerning the magistrates, 129 ; of Pompey con- 
cerning the provinces, 129 ; effect of Pompey's laws on Caesar, 130 ; of Pompey 
and Crassus prolonging Caesar's proconsulship, 226, 279ff. ; of Octavian against 
murderers of Caesar (Lex Pedia) , 185; Sempronian, concerning the consular 
provinces, see Sempronian ; of ten tribunes, 125, 280 ; Trebonian, 282 ; see also 
Agrarian laws and Vatinian law. 

Lepidus, M. Aemilius, cos. 78 B.C., 60 ; revolt of, 60, 96 note 14, 99. 

Lepidus, M. Aemilius, triumvir, commands army in Gaul, 183 ; joins Antony, 184 ; 
second triumvirate, 186 ; left in charge of Italy, 188 ; forced to exchange prov- 
inces, 194 ; in Africa, 198 ; called to Sicily and deposed, 200, 202. 

Lex Manilla, see Manilian law. 

Lex Pompeia-Licinia, 226, 279ff. 

Lex Trebonia, 282. 

Lex Vatinia, 271ff. ; see also Vatinian law. 

Liberty, Romans not desirous of, in modern sense, 223f. ; under empire, 265. 

Libya, ceded to Caesarion, 213. 

M. Licinius Crassus, see Crassus. 

L. Licinius Lucullus, see Lucullus. 

Liguria, troubles in, 20. 

M. Lollius, legate of Augustus, 244. 

Luca, renewal of triumvirate at, 117ff., 120, 280, 281f. 

Lucullus, L. Licinius, cos. 74 B.C., early career, 59 ; given command against Mith- 
ridates, 62, 228 ; war with Mithridates, 72f. ; quarrel with knights, 73 note 5 ; 
enmity to Pompey, 86, 87. 

Macedonia, annexation of, 5, 15 ; province of, 52 ; Cicero cedes province to Antonius, 
79 ; assigned to Antony by Caesar, 175 ; seized by M. Brutus, 188 ; kingdom of 
Antigonids in, 206. 

Macedonian legions, transferred to Gaul, 176 ; desert Antony, 179. 

Mahaffy, on Donations of Alexandria^ 213. 

Manilian law, 74, 84, 228, 231. 



INDEX 325 

Marcellinus, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, cos. 56 B.C., 115. 

Marcellus, C. Claudius, cos. 50 B.C., 140; action in senate, 140; declaration of martial 

law, 141. 
Marcellus, M. Claudius, cos. 51 B.C., 130 note 11, 135f. 
Marcellus, M. Claudius, destined successor of Augustus, 264. 
C. Marius, elected consul, 43; military reforms of, 44, 85; conquers Cimbri and 

Teutons, 45; political career, 45; in social war, 46; attempt to supersede Sulla, 

47 ; regains power in Rome, 47. 
Martial law, see Law. 
Media; given to Ptolemies, 213. 
Mercenaries, Greek, used by Ptolemies, 207f. 
C. Messius, tribune, bill of, 113. 
Metellus, see Caecilius. 
Military system, early, 23 ; changes in, 24f., 32 ; reforms of Marius in, 44, 85 ; after 

Sulla, 53f. ; union of civil and military functions, 224. 
Mile, T. Annius, tribune, leads riots against Clodius, 112ff. ; rivalry with Clodius, 123 ; 

murder of Clodius, 123; trial and banishment, 124. 
Misenum, treaty of, 199. 

Mithridates, king of Pontus, wars with, 46, 62, 72, 228. 
Moesia, conquest of, 242 ; consular province, 251. 
P. Mucius Scaevola, cos. 133 B.C., 90. 
L. Munatius Plancus, see Plancus. 
Munda, battle of, 153, 192, 199. 
Mutina, war around, 181f. 

Names, Roman family, 247. 

Narbonensis, see Transalpine Gaul. 

Nero, reign of, 266. 

New men, Marius one, 43; Cicero one, 79; rarely reach consulship under republic, 

246 ; common in consulship under triumvirs, 247 ; use in government under 

Augustus, 244, 255, 257. 
Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, 62. 
Nobility, development of, 9ff. ; control of assembly, 41 ; weakened by Gracchi, 41ff. ; 

seek to regain power after Caesar's death, 166ff. ; reaction in favor of, 225, 246ff. '; 

character of, 246, 252 ; reconciliation with Augustus, 229ff ., 248f. ; little used by 

Augustus, 243, 253f. ; compensations for decline of republic, 260f. 
Noricum, conquest of, 244. 
Numidia, assigned to Lepidus, 194. 

Octavia, sister of Augustus, marriage with Antony, 198, 199, 202 ; remains in Italy, 
202 ; sent back to Italy, 210 ; failure of Antony to divorce, 212. 

Octavian, relationship to Caesar, 176; adopted in Caesar's will, 177; quarrel with 
Antony, 177f. ; assumes name of Caesar, 178 ; raises army, 178 ; Macedonian 
legions join, 179 ; alliance with Cicero, 179 ; war around Mutina, 181f. ; brealc 
with senate, 182ff. ; elected consul, 185 ; combines with Antony, 185 ; second tri- 
umvirate, 186 ; share in the proscription, 187f. ; division of empire after Philippi, 
192ff. ; returns to Italy, 194 ; Perusine war, 195f. ; seizes Gaul, 196 ; tries to avoid 
war with Antony, 197; treaty of Brundisium, 198; relations with Sex. Pompey, 
199f. ; deposition of Lepidus, 200 ; treaty of Tarentum, 202 ; evades terms of 
treaty, 210 ; Pannonian campaign, 212 ; Donations of Alexandria, 214 ; position 
of, 215 ; campaign of Actium, 215ff. ; problems confronting, after Actium, 219ff. ; 
sole commander of army, 219, 221 ; character, 223 ; restoration of republic, 225 ; 
name of Augustus given to, 226. See also Augustus. 

C. Octavius, see Octavian and Augustus. 

M. Octavius, tribune 133 B.C., 40. 

Optimates, fear of Caesar, 94, 96, 121 ; anger against Pompey, 99, 122 ; alliance 
with Clodius, 111, 112 ; Pompey's attempt to conciliate, 113f. ; overconfidence of, 
115 ; alliance with Pompey, 121ff. ; opposition to war, 133f. ; favor compromise 
with Caesar, 141 ; flee from Rome, 147 ; majority in senate under Caesar, 157. 

Ovinian law, 7. 



326 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Pannonia, campaign of Octavian in, 212 ; conquest of, 242, 243, 244 ; consular prov- 
ince, 251 ; revolt in, 259. 

Pansa, C. Vibius, cos. 43 B.C., 180 ; death of, 182. 

Parthia, war of Crassus with, 120 ; threatened war with, 140 ; Caesar's plans for 
conquest of, 159, 193, 199, 201 ; Antony's campaign against, 202ff. ; promised 
to Ptolemies, 213 ; danger from, 220 ; policy of Augustus toward, 240. 

Parthian legions, withdrawn from Caesar's army, 140 ; Pompey takes command of, 
141 ; untrustworthy, 147. 

Parthians, invade Syria, 197, 198, 201 ; checked by Antony's officers, 199. 

Patricians, struggle with plebeians, 25. 

Perseus, king 1 of Macedon, 5. 

Perusia, city in Italy, 195, 196. 

Perusine war, 195f., 201, 202. 

Phalaris, Greek tyrant, 149. 

Pharsalia, battle of, 152, 153, 154, 199 ; Cicero regards it as decisive, 165. 

Philip V of Macedon, 30 ; war witbi 31 ; seizes possessions of Ptolemies, 207. 

Philippi, battle of, 190, 192, 202. 

Phoenicia, ceded to Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial province, 237. 

Pirates, growth of, 69 ; stop grain ships, 70 ; war of Pompey with, 72. 

Pisistratus, Greek tyrant, 149. 

Plancus, L. Munatius, commands army in Gaul, 183 ; joins Antony, 184 ; two legions 
desert, 196. 

Plebeians, struggle with patricians, 25. 

Plutarch, testimony of, as to devotion of Antony's soldiers, 222f. 

Po, valley of, see Cisalpine Gaul. 

Pollio, C. Asinius, quoted, 130 ; father of Asinius Gallus, 247. 

Pompeia-Licinia, Lex, 226, 279ff. 

Pompeian party, see Optimates. 

Cn. Pompeius Magnus, general, 59 ; crushes revolt of Lepidus, 60f ., 99 ; early career 
of, 60f . ; sent against Sertorius, 62 ; recalled to Italy, 63 ; coalition with Crassus 
and the democrats, 64f. ; character of, 65f. ; joint consulship with Crassus, 67 ; 
Gabinian law, 70 ; war with pirates, 72 ; Manilian law, 74 ; disbands his army, 
83, 84 ; policy of, 84ff. ; ratification of his eastern acta, 85ff., 101 ; opposition of 
senate, 86ff. ; agrarian bill, 90 ; joins first triumvirate, 92f. ; threatens force in 
support of Caesar's measures, 99 ; attitude of, during Caesar's consulship, 103ff. ; 
marriage with Julia, 104 ; affair of Vettius, 106 ; supports assignment of Trans- 
alpine Gaul to Caesar, 108f. ; attitude toward Caesar's conquest of Gaul, 110 ; 
quarrel with Crassus, 110 ; recall of Cicero, 111 ; quarrel with Clodius lllff. ; 
employs Milo, 112 ; charge of grain supply, 113 ; designs on Egypt, 113 ; position 
in Rome, 115 ; renewal of triumvirate at Luca, 117 ; Spain assigned to, 117 ; 
elected consul for second time with Crassus, 119 ; death of Julia, 120 ; effect of 
Crassus' death on his position, 121 ; alliance with optimates, 121f. ; governs Spain 
from Italy, 122, 231 ; sole consul, 123f. ; measures of, 124 ; marries again, 124f. ; 
chooses father-in-law as colleague, 125 ; law of ten tribunes, 125 ; fear of Caesar, 
127f., 283 ; laws of, 129f. ; intention of prosecuting Caesar, 130 note 13 ; question 
at issue between Caesar and, 131 ; renews command in Spain, 132 ; difficulties 
with optimates, 133f. ; attitude uncertain, 136 ; declares attitude, 136f. ; attitude 
in 50 B.C., 139f. : illness of, 139, 146 ; desires war, 143 ; plan of campaign, 145f. ; 
abandons Rome, 147 ; retreats to East, 148 ; threatens a proscription, 150 ; battle 
of Pharsalia, 152 ; death of, 153 ; position under Manilian law 1 , 229 ; Augustus his 
heir, 231 note 4 ; use of tribunes, 233 ; conquests of, 239f. ; son of Pompeius 
Strabo, 247. 

Sex. Pompeius Magnus, son of Pompey, 199 ; early career, 199 ; seizes Sardinia and 
Sicily, 199; overthrow and death, 200, 202, 210. 

Cn. Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey, 247. 

Pompey, see Pompeius. 

T. Pomponius Atticus, see Atticus- 

Pontifex Maximus, office held by Caesar, 159. 



INDEX 327 

Porcius, see Cato. 

Praefectus morum, censorial powers given Caesar under 1 title of, 159. 

Praetors, increase in number, 8ff. ; objections to further increase, 12; increase under 

Sulla, 21 ; establishment of, 25f . ; increase in number under Caesar, 168 ; under 

Augustus, 239. 
Princeps, meaning of term, 232 ; relations to republic, 232ff. 

Principate, meaning of term, 226 ; first form of, 234 ; changes in, 234f. ; trans- 
formation of, 236f. 
Proconsul, meaning of term, 15, 26 ; term of office lengthened to two years by 

Caesar, 238. 
Proconsular imperium of Augustus, conferred on him, 231, 235; powers implied 

in, 237f. ; renewals of, 241, 242. 
Promagistracy, origin of, 15 ; used to govern provinces, 16f. ; defects of system, 17 ; 

advantages, 17f., 29. 
Propraetor, meaning of term, 15. 
Proscription, fears of, from Caesar, 149f. ; threatened by Pompey, 150; of second 

triumvirate, 186f., 224, 247. 
Protection, impossible in Rome, 37f. 
Provinces, under early republic, 4-22; arrangements of Sulla for their government, 

52; problem presented by new provinces, 88f. ; increase in number under later 

republic, 158 ; division between senate and emperor, 237 ; changes in division, 

239 ; improvement in government of, under empire, 264f. 
Provinces, consular, increase in number under Augustus!, 251; see also Sempronian 

law. 
Provinces, imperial, names of, 237. 
Frovinces, senatorial, 239. 
Provincial governors, objections to direct election of, 13; objections to prolonging 

term of, 18f., 88f. 
Ptolemies, character of their empire, 206ff. ; military weakness of, 207f ; revival of 

their empire, 213. 
Ptolemy I, general of Alexander, 206. 
Ptolemy XII Alexander II, will of, 19,, 77, 80. 
Public opinion, against civil war, 132f. ; turns in favor of Caesar, 144, 146; effect 

of Pompey's flight on, 148f. ; leads to peace of Misenum, 199 ; turns in favor of 

Octavian, 214; influence of, 221f. ; demands of, after Actium, 221f. ; reaction in 

favor of nobility, 225. 
Punic warsi First, 26; Second, 26f., 207. 
Pydna, battle of, 5. 

Quaestors, increase in number, 8f. ; place of office in Roman public life, 9; mem- 
bership in senate, llf. ; objections to increase in number, 12 ; increase in number 
under Caesar, 158. 

P. Quinctilius Varus, see Varus. 

Republic, Roman, aristocratic in fact, 10 ; Cicero's conception of, 165f. ; popular de- 
mand for restoration of, aften Actium, 221ff . ; Roman law bound up with, 224 ; 
restoration of, by Augustus, 225f. ; great commands not inconsistent with, 229; 
relation of, to princeps, 232f., 245, 250 ; reality of restoration, 245 ; decline of, 
under Augustus, 260ff. 

Republicans, promoted by Augustus, 249. 

Rex, Roman hatred of word; 224. 

Rhaetia, conquest of, 244. 

Rhine frontier, insecurity of, 221, 242. 

Rubicon, crossing of, 146. 

Rullus, P Servilius, tribune, agrarian bill of, 80. 

Samnium, unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36. 

Sardinia, annexation of, 8, 26 ; province of, 52 ; assigned to Octavian, 186 ; seized 
by Sex. Pompey, 199. 



328 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 

Saturninus, L. Appuleius, 45, 96 note 14. 
C. Scribonius Curio, see Curio. 
Second Macedonian War, 5. 
Second Punic War, see Punic. 
Second triumvirate, see Triumvirate. 
Seleucids, dynasty of, 206. 
Seleucus, general of Alexander, 206. 

Sempronian law concerning the consular provinces, 62 note 3, 96, 228, 273 ; protects 
Caesar in Gaul, 126, 280; repealed by Pompey, 129, 138, 280f., 286f. ; veto of 
tribunes under, 273 note 10. 
Sempronius, see Gracchus. 

Senate, opposed to expansion, 5f., 13f . ; composition of, in early times, 7f. ; right to 
prolong imperium, 15f. ; assignment of provinces by, 16, 52f., 56 note 2 ; size 
increased by Sulla, 21 ; position of, in government, 39 ; control of courts by, 
55, 67 ; quarrel with Pompey, 86ff. ; breach with knights, 92 ; opposition to 
Caesar's agrarian law, 95 ; favors, compromise between Caesar and Pompey, 141 
declares war on Caesar, 143f. ; flees from Rome, 147 ; hostile to Caesar, 157 
identified with republic by Cicero, 166 ; session of, after Caesar's murder, 167ff. 
powerlessness of, 174 ; alliance with Octavian, 181 ; breach with Octavian, 182f. 
vital weakness of, 227 ; creation of great commands' by, 228 ; see also Optimates 
and Nobility. 
Senators, average duration of life of, 11 note 6 ; reluctance of Augustus to offend, 261. 
L. Sergius Catilina, see Catilina. 
Q. Sertorius, war with, 59, 62, 63^ 70. 
C. Servilius Glaucia, see Glaucia. 
P. Servilius Rullus, see Rullus. 
'Sicily, annexation of, 8, 26; revenue system in, 33; province of, 52; Pompey in, 61; 
assigned to Octavian, 186 ; seized by Sex. Pompey, 199 ; war in, 200. 
P. Silius, governor of Illyricum, 244. 
Soldiers, payment of, 28 ; extension of term of service, 28 ; attitude toward Antony's 

eastern policy, 21 Iff. ; influenced by public opinion, 222 ; see also Veterans. 
Spain, annexation of, 9 ; wars in, 28f., 153 ; provinces of, 52 ; military force stationed 
in,* 55 note 1 ; revolt of Sertorius in, 59, 62, 63, 70 ; Caesar propraetor in, 93 ; 
assigned to Pompey, 117 ; retained by Lepidus, 186 ; transferred to Octavian, 
194 ; Sex. Pompey in, 199 ; pacified by Augustus, 241 ; Agrippa suppresses revolt 
in, 243. 
Spartacusi, revolt of, 62f. 

Special powers conferred on Augustus, 235, 245, 262. 
Succession, imperial, question of, 243, 263f. 

Sulla, L. Cornelius, reforms of, 21 ; early career of, 46 ; marches on Rome, 47 ; war 
with Mithridates, 48 ; civil war, 48 ; dictator, 49 ; constitutional reforms; 50f., 52f., 
58f. ; death of, 51, 59, 60 ; weakness of his constitution, 58f. ; its overthrow, 63ff. ; 
lands confiscated by, 90 ; rapacity of, mentioned by Cicero, 149. 
P. Sulpicius Rufus, 47. 

Syria, annexation of, 88 ; assigned to Crassus, 117 ; seized by Cassius, 188 ; Parthians 
invade, 197f., 201 ; Antony in, 202 ; Seleucid dynasty in, 206 ; consequences to 
Rome of its annexation, 213f., 220 ; ceded to the Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial prov- 
ince, 237f. ; Agrippa in, 243, 244 ; consular province, 251. 

Tarentum, treaty of, 202, 210. 

Tarraconensis, consular province, 251 ; see Spain. 
Tarsus, Cleopatra summoned to, 202. 
Tellus, Temple of, meeting of senate in, 165, 167ff. 
Teutons, see Cimbri. 
Thapsus, battle of, 154, 192. 

Tiberius, stepson of Augustus, in Rhaetia and Illyricum, 244 ; consul, 248 ; retire- 
ment to Rhodes, 251, 254, 256 ; return to public life, 259 ; reign of, 266. 



INDEX 329 

Transalpine Gaul, annexation of, 5f. ; assigned to Caesar by senate, 108 ; Caesar's 

position in, 116f. ; held by Lepidus, 186 ; transferred to Antony, 194 ; Metellus 

Celer governor of, 272. 
Trebonian law, 282. 

C. Treboniua, one of the conspirators, travels to his province by by-roads, 174. 
Tribunes, deposition of, 40, 71 ; powers restricted by Sulla, 50 ; restored by Pompey 

and Crassus, 67 ; used by Pompey and Caesar to protect their interests, 233. 
Tribunician power, conferred on Caesar, 169 ; conferred on Augustus, 234 ; limitations 

on, 235 ; receives increased stress, 235. 
Triumvirate, first, formation of, 93ff. ; character of^ 110 ; temporary break up of, 

HOff. ; renewal of, at Luca, 117ff., 120 ; break up of, 120f. 
Triumvirate, second, formation of, 186 ; proscription, 186f. ; problems confronting, 

after Philippi, 192f. ; division of empire, 193f. ; Lepidus deposed, 200 ; renewal of, 

202; end of, 219. 
M. Tullius Cicero, see Cicero. 

Umbria, unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36. 
Uxellodunum, siege of, 288. 

Varus, P. Quinctilius, defeat of, 259. 
Vatinian law, 97f., 108, 109, 126, 271ff. 
P. Vatinius, tribune, 97, 98. 
Veii, siege of, 28. 

P. Ventidius Bassus, officer of Antony, repels Parthians, 201, 202. 
Vercingetorix, revolt of, 129, 133, 135. 

Veterans of Pompey, agrarian bill for the benefit of, 89ff. ; Caesar proposes bill 
y" for, 94 ; support Caesar, 98 ; do not respond to Pompey's appeal at outbreak of 

civil war, 147. 
Veterans of Caesar, lands assigned to, 168 ; intimidate senate, 169 ; distrust of 

senate, 171f. ; power of, 172 ; rally around Octavian, 178 ; only material available 

for army, 180 ; reluctant to fight each other, 182, 185f. ; interests of, ignored 

by senate, 183. 
L. Vettius, informer, 106. 
Volaterrae, lands of the men of, 90. 

"War-lord, Augustus as Roman; 238, 239, 263. 



H 73 79 



1/ 



\3$r 



1$ 



















o 






<lK o 




Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 

ft TreatmentDa,e: NOV ?001 

^f»* ^ S? * ry^' </> "V wf^\\^ PreservationTechnologies 

,V ... _,^ _\ A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 





1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-2111 















v4 










^ ^ /JSP**- 













+o 







V . i • o . * - > 



X "TV 





JessL 




